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Preface
This book tries to merge two streams of analysis: diffusion research, a
relatively recent interdisciplinary field, and the long established dis-
ciplines of transportation planning and the economic history of trans-
port systems. After World War II, diffusion research emerged simul-
taneously from a number of disciplines, including sociology, geogra-
phy, and the economics of technological change. For over a hundred
years economic historians have provided many detailed, but often
fragmented studies of the development and socio-economic impacts of
individual transport systems.
At a conference held at the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in 1989 on Diffusion of Technologies and
Social BehaV1:our it became clear that while many valuable theories
and models have been developed, a unifying theoretical framework has
not yet emerged in diffusion research. This is related to the fact that
research has almost exclusively concentrated on a micro-level analysis
of technological or social/cultural change. This book makes a contri-
bution toward bridging the different fields of diffusion research. First,
by providing an overview of the different theoretical streams within
the discipline, and secondly by studying diffusion phenomena for tech-
nological change at the sectorial level up to the macro-level diffusion
of pervasive transport systems. The economic history of transporta-
tion has provided many prominent examples of the fruitfulness of
blending macro theory with a strong empirical basis at the sectorial
level.
It was not the objective of this work to develop a new comprehen-
sive theory of infrastructure development. Instead, the study aimed
at combining the methodological apparatus developed within diffusion
research with the empirical research tradition of the economic history
of transportation. Its objective was to provide a synthetic description,
covering all successive transport modes both individually in their
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historical evolution, and in their integration into a holistic view of the
whole transport sector. The analysis is international and spans about
200 years, i.e., the developments in a number of countries are studied
to highlight similarities and differences in development patterns.
With such objectives, this work is both a risky and a necessarily lim-
ited effort, but it has been undertaken in the hope of providing some
new perspectives for people working in, or interested in both fields.
The work has benefited from many institutions and individuals.
First of all, I wish to acknowledge the intellectual and physical infra-
structure of IIASA, which made this study possible. Cesare Marchetti
and Neboj§a Nakicenovic provided many ideas, examples, and stimu-
lating discussions. Eddie Loser and the staff of the IIASA library gave
invaluable help in the never ending quest for historical data sources.
Jesse Ausubel and Maximilian Posch read various drafts and provided
detailed and useful comments. Special thanks are due to Eryl Madel
and Susan Riley for all their efforts at casting sheer endless sentences
into English, and to Eva Delpos and Linda Foith for all their help in
the preparation of this manuscript. None of them can be blamed for
my errors and misinterpretations; lowe the completion of this work to
their spontaneous support and continued friendship.
The study evolved out of a doctoral dissertation at the Technical
University of Vienna. I thank the Institut fUr Finanzwissenschaft und
Infrastrukturpolitik and in particular Wolfgang Blaas for hosting this
endeavor. It is impossible to thank individually all the numerous insti-
tutions and individuals, who helped and contributed to this work,
however, I would like to extend particular thanks to Didier Borderon
and Group Planning, Shell International for positive feedback and
support.
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CHAPTER 1
Prologue and Introduction
Durch die Eisenbahnen wird der Raum getodtet, und es bleibt uns nur noch
die Zeit ubrig. Hatten wir nur Geld genug, um auch letztere anstandig zu
todten! Mir ist als kamen die Berge und Walder aller Lander auf Paris
angeruckt. Ich rieche schon den Duft der deutschen Linden; vor meiner
Thure brandet die Nordsee.
Heinrich Heine, Lutetia, 1843
Human activities take place simultaneously in space and time. A
sequence of activities at different coordinates of the spatio-temporal
framework of human action (comprehensively described in the work of
Hagerstrand, 1970) is made possible by transportation. Space and
time thus define the human activity range, with transportation provid-
ing the basic means to cover and extend our "action radius". This is
applicable whether we consider hunting and agricultural societies
(Carlstein, 1982), or the presently emerging post-industrial societies.
The extent, range, and variety of activities and social contacts we
experience, as well as the related costs needed (time and money) to
realize them, are to a great extent, dependent on the availability and
quality of our transport infrastructures and the technologies using
them. The movement of people, goods, and information has conse-
quently been a vital aspect of the functioning of all societies.
The space that can be covered by walking, and the time spent
walking to, working on, and returning home from the fields defined
the "economic" (Le., the cultivated) zone around an agricultural set-
tlement for existing industrial countries well into the 20th century and
continues to do so for the rural population of most developing coun-
tries. Ancient Athens or Rome were essentially pedestrian cities, and
it has been noted that their spatial size never exceeded the distance a
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person could cover within a maximum of 1.5 hours walking time: the
diameter intra muros, of imperial Rome was approximately 20 stadia,
i.e., four kilometers (km) (Putzger, 1965). The vast dimensions of still
larger cities in antiquity (over two million inhabitants), like the
Chinese imperial capital Ch'ang-an of the western Han and T'ang
periods (206 Be to AD 8 and AD 618 to AD 907) were only possible
because of the existence of an elaborate man-made transport infra-
structure, i.e., canals (Schafer, 1971). Similarly, Peking provided a
public wagon transportation system from a remarkably early date on
(Herman and Ausubel, 1988). Herodot (Historiae V 52, 53) gives an
impressive account of the size, elaborate engineering, and high quality
of the transport infrastructure of the Persian Empire (including a
2,500 km imperial road between Susa and Sardes) and its vital stra-
tegic importance. The same can be said about the (military) roads of
the Roman Empire, estimated to have extended over 75,000 km by the
first century AD (Sax, 1920).
Empirical evidence suggests that the time devoted by an indivi-
dual (on average) to transportation appears to be close to an anthro-
pological constant: it ranges from around 1 to 1.5 hours per day, both
in rural-agricultural and in urban-industrial societies. This evidence
was most convincingly put forward by Zahavi, 1979 and 1981. In his
Unified Mechanism of Travel (UMOT) transport model the range
covered or distance travelled by an individual is defined by two con-
straints: the available individual time budget (1 to 1.5 hours per day)
and the available money budget (around 15 percent of disposable fam-
ily income).
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 and Table 1.1 document this travelling time
constant. Figure 1.1 details the space-time diagram for the region of
Niirnberg, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). As family car owner-
ship increases, the distance travelled increases also. This is the result
of the transport system configuration in a particular place and point
in time where cars appear to be the fastest mode of transportation.
Increased accessibility of other family members to this mode of trans-
port allows larger distances to be covered within the given time
budget constraint. Table 1.1 shows that Niirnberg is not a special
situation. An international survey of time allocation budgets (Szalai,
1972) shows how, on average, a 24 hour day is spent by the
urban/suburban population in a number of cities/regions throughout
the world. With one exception, the total travel time (commuting to
and from work and other reasons for travelling, e.g., shopping or lei-
sure) shown in Table 1.1 ranges between 1 and 1.5 hours per day.
This result is all the more noteworthy, in view of the differences in the
degree of economic development, access to and use of various
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Figure 1.1. Space-time diagram of travelling in the Niirnberg region. (Source:
Zahavi, 1981.)
transport means, and the different spatial settlement patterns prevail-
ing in the countries, regions, and cities covered by the survey.
A similar invariant feature of the spatial organization of society is
formulated by Lees and Hohenberg, 1988, who have observed that the
distance (measured in travel time) between cities of a given size or
rank tends to be more or less uniform. This occurs in addition to the
regularity of the rank-size distribution of a hierarchical system of cen-
tral places (see e.g., Zipf, 1949, and Carroll, 1982).
The conclusion about the static nature of the average length of
total travel time that has evolved out of the cross-national and cross-
sectional data discussed so far, is further corroborated by a longitudi-
nal analysis for the USSR spanning a period of over 50 years. Figure
1.2 shows the average commuting time to and from work for men and
women that has emerged from a number of time budget surveys car-
ried out in the Soviet Union since the 1920s (summarized in Zuzanek,
1980, and updated by data from Robinson et al., 1989). The static
nature of commuting time ranging from 4.5 to 5.5 hours per week, per-
sistent gender differences, as well as surprising elasticity effects (e.g.,
increased commuting time but a decrease in daily working
4hrs/week
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Figure 1.2. Average weekly commuting time for males and females in the
USSR, hours per week.
Table 1.1. The use of time in 12 countries, hours per day. (Source: Szalai,
1972.)
Average Time per Person Spent on Activity
Travel
Household
Country/ city Work Children, .. Sleep Leisure Work Non-work Total
Belgium 4.38 5.65 8.35 4.73 0.40 0.53 0.93
Bulgaria, Kazanlik 6.05 6.04 6.97 3.55 0.68 0.80 1.48
Czechoslovakia, Olomouc 5.07 6.34 7.80 3.77 0.55 0.45 1.03
France, 6 cities 4.25 6.73 8.30 3.85 0.37 0.60 0.97
FRG, 10 districts 3.87 6.87 8.50 4.18 0.30 0.35 0.65
FRG, OsnabrOck 3.63 6.60 8.34 4.68 0.27 0.70 0.97
GDR, Hoyerswerda 4.63 6.81 7.90 3.70 0.53 0.47 1.00
Hungary, Gyllr 5.55 6.30 7.88 3.10 0.68 0.55 1.23
Peru, Lima-Callao 3.57 5.97 8.28 4.68 0.62 0.88 1.50
Poland, Torun 4.97 5.92 7.78 4.10 0.62 0.68 1.30
USA, 44 cities 4.03 6.15 7.83 4.75 0.42 0.88 1.30
USSR, Pskow 5.65 5.43 7.70 3.77 0.55 0.92 1.47
Yugoslavia, Kragujevac 4.00 6.08 7.87 4.87 0.45 0.83 1.28
Note: Figures may not add up to 24 hours due to rounding errors.
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time in the 1930s) are interesting features to note in Figure 1.2. This
points to the fact that time allocation patterns and travel time budget
constraints are important determinants of modal split choices, and as
such, are possibly still insufficiently recognized variables in most
transport analyses and models.
If we accept the notion of a time budget constraint taking the
form of an invariant over time and between different cultures, then
what determines the possible range that can be covered by an indivi-
dual? The answer is availability, costs, performance, quality of trans-
port infrastructures, and the technologies available to make use of
these infrastructures. The most decisive performance or quality cri-
terion for the transport system with respect to defining the realizable
(spatial) range of human action is probably speed.* Speed that exceeds
the limits of human capabilities is provided by access to infrastructure
and technology, with increasing degrees of sophistication ranging from
riding horses to flying in a jet aircraft.
Marchetti, 1987, sees man as a territorial animal that under cer-
tain time and budget constraints will try to maximize the territory
covered or "controlled" (i.e., his/her range). Transport technologies
and infrastructures thus allow for the "control" of territory and the
expansion of the range beyond that defined by our inherent human
"performance levels". The extension of the space-time framework of
human activities is made possible by the widespread application (dif-
fusion) of innovations that take the physical form of transport and
information infrastructures and the technological devices that allow us
to make use of them. It is these innovations that are the subject of
this study.
Particularly since the onset of the industrial revolution, many
innovations have appeared that have consequently enjoyed widespread
application (or failure, as illustrated for example, by the history of
Zeppelins). Although generally technical in nature, innovations are all
intrinsically interrelated to organizational and social adaptation
processes. Once innovations appear and demonstrate potential techni-
cal and economic viability, they are put forward for societal "testing".
They are either refused or accepted, and in the case of acceptance,
start to diffuse into the economic and social environment, interacting
with existing techniques which satisfy the same basic human need
(covering range). If innovations prove to be better adapted to the
technical, economic, and social requirements (boundary conditions)
imposed by a society and its economy, they will start to replace exist-
ing techniques and practices.
• For an unconventional and critical philosophical discussion of "dromological progress- see Virilio, 1977
and 1978.
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Throughout history, the availability of new transport modes,
which could significantly alter the spatial and temporal activity range
of people, had disruptive effects both on individuals and on the spatial
organization of society. This fact is probably best illustrated by the
quote from Heinrich Heine given above, which reflects the revolution-
ary transformation brought about by the first railway connection
between Germany and France. Despite the fact that such revolutions
were in the early stages often alarming to the individual, sometimes
even leading to opposition or violent rejection, they nevertheless
proved vital for the long-term development of industrialized economies
and the resulting transformations in the spatial division of labor.
Study Outline
The dynamic picture that emerges in analyzing when and how innova-
tions in the transport sector appear and become accepted by society,
as manifest in their growth and rate of interaction (replacement or
substitution) with existing techniques, is the main subject we want to
describe within a historical and especially within a quantitative frame-
work.
The objective of this study is to integrate a large body of litera-
ture in the areas of technological change and diffusion, evolutionary
economics, and long-wave research, and to embed these concepts into
a holistic view of the long-term developments in transportation. The
analysis aims at integrating a large body of quantitative material on
the development of individual infrastructures for a number of coun-
tries. The wealth of available material led us to concentrate on one
specific area of technological change and infrastructures: the trans-
port system; a few examples from other areas are also given mainly for
didactical purposes. Because of data availability and international
comparability, the study deals primarily with long-distance transport
systems and infrastructures. However, the formal analysis framework
and the conclusions derived from our analysis of long-distance tran-
sportation are, to a large extent, also applicable for the analysis of
short-distance (local) transport.
It is not the aim of this study to develop a new integrative theory
on long-term infrastructure development, but to reconcile existing
works, analyses, and data within a consistent descriptive framework,
and in particular to take into account the self-referential qualities of
different systems. Thus, the study concentrates on a comparison of
the dynamics of change and generally refrains from (normative) com-
parisons of transport systems in individual countries on absolute lev-
els. As such, the study aims at assembling comprehensive evidence for
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regular and recurring patterns of technological change in the area of
transportation, without, however, being exhaustive. A particular
effort is devoted to demonstrating that in the area of technological
change in transportation, we are dealing with technologically interre-
lated and international phenomena: the development of particular
systems is characterized by interdependence and cross-enhancing at
the level of technologies and by coupled dynamics and synchronization
at the international level.
The material is structured into six Chapters. Mter the introduc-
tory Chapter, we present the methodological framework for our
analysis (Chapter 2). This is provided by a number of relatively sim-
ple models originating from biology. All these models deal with the
processes of growth or decline of an innovation and its interaction
with the technological, economic, and social environment in which it is
embedded. We discuss in some detail how these interaction models
can be rationalized in terms of sociology, behavioral sciences, and
economics. We conclude that ordered, structured evolutionary paths
at the macro level are driven rather than dissipated by diversity in
technological design, individual behavior, and uncertainty about the
economic and social consequences of technological innovations at the
micro level. In particular, the development and structural change in
the transport sector will be analyzed and interpreted through the
paradigm of self-organizing systems.
Chapter 3 describes quantitatively the historical development
pattern of different transport infrastructures in a number of countries
in chronological order, starting with canals and railways, continuing
with roads, and concluding with air transport. Regularities, discon-
tinuities, and synchronization in the development patterns of trans-
port infrastructures in different countries will be outlined and exam-
ples of technological change in the devices using these infrastructures
will be presented.
Chapter 4 integrates the various development trends of individual
infrastructures into a holistic view of the whole transport sector. This
integrative view will attempt to show some general regularities in the
structural change of the transport system, by considering structure in
terms of the length and value of the capital stock of the (physical)
transport infrastructure as well as by its performance (output or
modal split). These regularities consist of a recurring pattern in the
replacement of old forms of transport by new ones in order to satisfy
human needs. They appear invariant for the particular economic sys-
tem for which such evolutionary processes are analyzed. This leads to
a discussion of some simplified generalized propositions as regards the
driving forces of the long-term developments in the transport sector.
These are seen in the quality (speed and geographical coverage) of
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service and performance with respect to changing economic and social
boundary conditions. An analysis of the long-term transport intensity
of an economy suggests that future changes in the transport system
will most likely be driven by the evolving structure of the output mix
of our economies, dematerialization (a decrease in the material input
per unit of output), and a shift to higher value goods and services.
Finally, a brief discussion on the relationship between transport and
communication is presented, and concludes that these requirements
appear - at least from a long-term perspective - to be of a complemen-
tary rather than a substitutable nature. Therefore, in the presently
emerging "information age" , is seems unlikely that we are in a phase
of discontinuity in the long-term (growth) trend in passenger trans-
port.
After having established empirical regularities and synchroniza-
tion in the historical development pattern of transport infrastructures
and of technological change in their use, we suggest a model for
integrating the phenomena outlined in the transport sector with the
evolution of the form and direction of economic growth in general
(Chapter 5). This will be done by embedding changes in infrastruc-
tures and transport technologies within the framework of discontinui-
ties in long-term economic development (Kondratieff or long waves).
The integration of infrastructure growth and technological change in
the transport sector into a long-wave framework attempts to show
how each major infrastructural development cycle is closely related to
the difussion of a number of important technological and organiza-
tional innovations. These form a "socio-technological cluster" or
"paradigm" (Perez, 1983), which dominates and drives major
economic expansion periods, reaches saturation, and initiates a struc-
tural discontinuity in the long-term economic development pattern.
Because of their vital importance to society, infrastructures and
transport technologies are in fact, "metaphor" (indicator) systems
representative of historical economic "expansion paradigms" , e.g., the
railway/steam/coal or the automobile/internal combustion/oil "ages".
In Chapter 6 we then draw several main conclusions from this study.
First, one has to acknowledge explicitly discontinuities in the histori-
cal evolutionary pattern of infrastructure development. Second, we
have to appreciate the substantial time constants involved in building
up and decommissioning such pervasive, large-scale systems as trans-
port infrastructures and technologies. Finally, quality of service in
response to continually evolving technical, economic, and societal
boundary conditions is seen as a major driving force shaping the
future of the transport system. This includes, in particular, high
speed, flexibility, and environmental quality, as well as institutional
and organizational adjustment processes.
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The study points out that of the existing long-distance transport
systems, air transport corresponds best to future requirements with
regards to speed, flexibility, and quality of service. Consequently, air
traffic, including freight transport, is expected to grow at a rate possi-
bly not yet fully realized by transport planners in terms of foreseeable
bottlenecks in the related infrastructure. Similar performance and
quality criteria will have to be satisfied by all new long-distance trans-
port systems (e.g., high speed regional or local "metro type" links) that
are introduced, complementing existing infrastructures, including,
possibly as the most decisive factor, new institutional and organiza-
tional arrangements for the construction and operation of such sys-
tems.
Our transport infrastructure records the past and shapes our
present and future. The current spatial configuration and the techno-
logical choices, with all their positive and negative impacts, that
represent our present transport system, are the result of a long evolu-
tionary process. Still other choices are before us, as we are apparently
in a period of structural discontinuity, in which a forthcoming new
socio-technical paradigm is shaped. This could lead us into a new
(qualitative rather than quantitative) growth phase, possibly starting
around the turn of the millennium. From a historical perspective, we
have tried to develop a quantitative frame of reference to improve our
understanding of the evolution of today's transport system. It is a
modest and necessarily crude effort (justified only by our aim to pro-
vide a long-term and holistic picture) but we hope it will contribute to
the better understanding of the complex system we call transport
infrastructures, which are an expression of our history and the techni-
cal and social evolution of our society.

CHAPTER 2
Methodology
La sociite, c 'est I'imitation, et I'imitation c 'est une espece de somnambu/isme.
Gabriel Tarde,
Les lois de I'imitation, 1895
This Chapter presents a number of mathematical models that describe
growth and substitution processes and help to organize the empirical
data base that illustrates the long-term patterns of infrastructure
development and structural change in the transport sector (described
in Chapters 3 and 4). All these models have a common theme: the
interaction of a population (e.g., species) with its limiting environ-
ment, and the interspecies interactions (competition) among popula-
tions. By using this biological metaphor we point to the origin of
these models, that is, they are all either directly taken from biology or
originate from it. By analogy, these models have been applied in
order to describe the dynamics of technological systems and their com-
petition for market shares.
As a first step, these models serve as descriptive tools, and as
such they do not provide insight into the driving forces and causality
of the evolutionary processes they describe. They are used merely as
an instrument for the systematization and quantification of long his-
torical development patterns and to provide consistency in interna-
tional comparisons. The application of such growth models to diffu-
sion and technological substitution phenomena shows the "growth to
limits" (Nakicenovic, 1984) of technological systems along regular,
structured evolutionary paths. This is accompanied by a characteristic
recurring pattern in their structural change, consisting of a series of
replacements of old forms to satisfy human needs by new ones.
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Having established the regularity of many of the processes which
have shaped the present transport system, the next obvious step is to
look deeper and uncover the driving forces behind this historical pro-
cess. To this end, Sections 2.2 to 2.4 discuss In some detail how the
temporal and spatial patterns identified are consistent, and can be
rationalized based on models developed within the framework of
behavioral sciences, economics, and geography. These Sections are
geared to respond right from the beginning to possible objections
about the "deterministic" character of the models and the processes
they describe. The historical evolution described thereafter should, in
fact, be understood through the paradigm of self-organizing systems.
System diversity (i.e., in terms of human behavior, technological
options available, and their economic and social impacts) is turbulent
(basically stochastic) at the lower (for example, individual or firm)
levels of aggregation, while still evolving along structured trajectories
at higher levels of aggregation. Chaos thus gives birth to stability and
order.
2.1. Descriptive Growth, Diffusion and
Substitution Models
The main objective of this Section is to present the formal characteris-
tics and properties of various growth, diffusion, and substitution
models, whereas the underlying rationale for their use is treated in
Sections 2.2 to 2.4.
2.1.1. Introduction into biological growth models
As mentioned in the introduction to Chapter 2, growth models are of
interest for the present study as they consider growth as a process of
interaction with an environment. Environment in a biological and
economic sense provides resources: food and energy supply for biologi-
cal species and the required resource inputs, and final demand for
technologies. The environment, however, also imposes ultimate con-
straints to growth. In the absence of an interaction with the environ-
ment, we may simply consider evolution as an exponential growth pro-
cess. However, it is precisely this interaction with the environment
that shapes the characteristic development patterns along S-shaped
trajectories, which ultimately result in a "growth to limits". It should,
however, be noted that for economic and technological systems this
interaction with the environment requires a more complex interpreta-
tion than traditional concepts of resource scarcity, such as that
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(2.1.1)
(3)
(1)
(2)
underlying for instance the Club of Rome study (Meadows et al.,
1972). In fact, resource scarcity proper does not appear to have
directly shaped or constrained any of the growth processes in the area
of transport infrastructure and technology development described in
the subsequent empirical part of this study.
A quite general model of interaction in biological systems is pro-
vided by the Lotka-Volterra equation (Lotka, 1924, Volterra, 1931):
dNi 1 n .
-d = OtiNi - -. ~ AijNiNj , t=1, ... ,nt I, )=1
This system of differential equations describes the growth (or
decline) of a species i as a function of the number (density) of the
species Ni and its interaction rate with other species. The interaction
in the general Lotka-Volterra equation depends on the number of
species Ni and N j as well as on the "collision rate" Aij between the
species. Oti and Ii in equation (2.1.1) are constants. In our applica-
tion of this general model to the description of growth and structural
change processes in the transport sector we consider three aspects of
interaction:
The interaction of a species Ni with its (limiting) environment in
the form of a growth process.
The interaction (competition) between two species Ni and Nj
inside a particular ecological (or market) niche in the form of sub-
stitution models.
The interaction (competition) between more than just two species
in the form of a multiple (logistic) substitution model.
In cases (2) and (3) we are mainly interested in studying the interac-
tion between "species" characterized by different levels of adaptation
to the requirements imposed by the environment (the market). When
a species (a technology) proves to be better fit, described by a complex
vector of (technological, economic, and social) performance charac-
teristics, to environmental (market) conditions, competition will result
in a substitution pattern, with new species (technologies) replacing old
ones.
Of course, the general Lotka-Volterra equation also describes
other (than competitive) types of interaction between species, that in
biology can also take the form of symbiotic and interdependent
(predator-prey) type of relationships. In these cases the general
Lotka-Volterra equation results in (mathematically) complex, oscilla-
tory types of systems behavior, which will not be discussed here. A
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good discussion of the complex solutions of the Lotka-Volterra equa-
tion can be found in d'Ancona, 1939, Goell et al., 1971, and Gatto,
1985. For a more philosophical discussion of the mathematics of the
Lotka-Volterra equation see Peschel and Mende, 1983.
2.1.2. Simple growth models
There is a multitude of different models describing growth in interac-
tion with a (limiting) environment. Our discussion concentrates only
on those models which have also found application in the description
of technological change and in economic modeling. All the functions
discussed below contain (at least) three parameters, which have the
following interpretation:
(i) As t tends to infinity, y=f( t) approaches an upper bound that
represents the level at which the growth process saturates, i.e.,
lim f(t) = K
t--+oo
(2.1.2)
where K is positive and finite. Furthermore we consider only*
curves with lim f( t) = O.
t--+-oo
(ii) There exists a time to, at which the curve has a point of inflec-
tion, Le.,
(2.1.3)
where the growth rate reaches its maximum. A growth curve is
called symmetric if it is symmetric around to, I.e.,
f(to-t) = f(to+t). A necessary condition for symmetry is
KYo := f(t o) = T (2.1.4)
(iii) A third parameter, denoted by f:1t, gives the length of the time
interval needed to grow from 10% of K to 90% of K. More pre-
cisely, let tp be defined by
(2.1.5)
• Of courlle a growth process may "take off" also at initial levels >0. In such a case the original level is
subtracted from the data and reintroduced thereafter in the model in the form of a constant intercept.
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then A t is given by
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(2.1.6)
As a first example of a S-shaped growth curve we consider the logistic
function.
(1) Three parameter logistic:
This curve is given by
y f(t) - K (2.1.7)
The curve is symmetric* around to and a simple calculation shows
that the parameter At is related to the growth rate b by
1 1At = b log81 = b 4.39444915 ... (2.1.8)
It was first proposed by Verhulst, 1838, as a model for human
population growth and then rediscovered by Pearl, 1925, for the
description of biological growth processes. The logistic function can
be derived from the general Lotka-Volterra equation for the two
species competition assuming a limited environment
(N1 + N 2 = const). The interactive mode of the growth of a species
with its environment becomes also apparent by re-writing the logistic
function with a linear right-hand side:
log K Y = b(t - to)
-Y
(2.1.9)
Here the interaction between the growth achieved (available resource
used, growth potential realized) y, to the growth remaining to be
achieved (resources remaining to be used, remaining growth potential)
K - y, when plotted on a logarithmic scale yields a linear function
which, when plotted, highlights in particular the early and late phases
of the growth process.
In addition, we may consider a three parameter logistic with data
dependent weights wk given by
• Other .ymmetric growth curve. like the cumulative normal derived from probability theory (.ee e.g.,
Davie., 1979) are not di.cu88ed here becau8e they are only gradually different from the logi.tic function.
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1
W/c = (2.1.10)0"1
with
(2.1.11)
Considering y/c as an observation of the random variable Y( tic), the
expectation of Y(t) is given by f(t) and its variance by equation
(2.1.11).
This choice of weights stems from a statistical interpretation of
the data (see Debecker and Modis, 1986) and is dealt with in more
detail in Section 2.1.5 when discussing parameter estimation algo-
rithms and parameter uncertainties.
(2) Positively skewed S-curves:
A growth curve displaying asymmetry was proposed by Floyd, 1968,
within the context of technological forecasting for the description of
the evolution of technical performance or "figures of merit", with very
rapid initial take-off, Le., an asymmetrical growth pattern:
F(K,y) = log y + y = bt+cK-y K-y
Here the inflection point, Yo, is given by
KYo = f(to) = 3
instead of K/2 for the logistic. The parameter At is given by:
(2.1.12)
(2.1.13)
At = ~ [lOg81 + 890 1=
(3) Gompertz function:
1b 12.28333803... (2.1.14)
This non-symmetric growth function was first proposed by Gompertz,
1825, for the description of human population growth. It is given by:
y = f(t) = Kexp(_e-b(t-to)) (2.1.15)
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The value at the point of inflection is given by
K 1Yo = f( to) = - where - = 0.36787944...
e e
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(2.1.16)
(e ... denotes the basis of the natural logarithm), and the parameter b
is related to !::i.t via
1 log10 1
!::i.t = b log log(10/9) = b 3.08439977... (2.1.17)
The Gompertz function can be rewritten with a linear right hand side:
KF(K,y) := -loglog- = b(t - to)
Y
(2.1.18)
for instance if a linear* regression algorithm is used to estimate to
and b.
(4) Modified exponential:
This function, which is not a genuine S-shaped curve but has been
proposed several times in the diffusion literature (e.g., Coleman et al.,
1966), is defined by
(2.1.19)
For this function the parameter to does not indicate the point of
inflection. The curve exhibits constantly decreasing gradients; it has
no inflection point, and f( t) < 0 for t < to. The parameter b is related
to !::i.t by
1 1!::i.t = blog9 = b2.197224577...
and the "linear form" of the function is given by
KF(K,y) = log K = b(t - to)
-y
(2.1.20)
(2.1.21)
• Because of the twofold exponentiation, non-linear lea.st square fit algorithms do not ea.sily converge,
therefore usually linear regression of the transformed data ba.sed on equation (2.1.18) is preferred.
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2.1.3. Simple substitution models
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In the previous Section we used the concept of interaction as described
by the general Lotka-Volterra equation in a wider sense, in that the
realized growth potential is related (dependent) to the growth poten-
tial (resources) remaining to be realized (utilized). Now we turn to a
more conventional interaction between biological and technological
species: the case of interspecies competition.
In biology a competitive substitution pattern was first described
by Lotka, 1924, to study the evolution of two types inside a popula-
tion in which selection operates upon a species subject to Mendelian
inheritance. Volterra, 1927, and 1931, as discussed in d'Ancona, 1939,
analyzed the evolution of two species competing for a limited food
supply, showing that if the relationship between the size of the two
species differs (Le., one species outnumbers the other - even by very
small amounts) at the initial stage of the process, the system con-
verges to a state where one species completely replaces the other.
Thus, initial random fluctuations in the number of a competing
species may result in a "lock-in" of the competitive pattern with one
of the species replacing the other one completely. Such a concept has
been proposed also for the initial selection mechanism of competing
technological designs by Arthur, 1983.
As the total population in both competitive situations (the two
types of species, and the two species inside the population competing
for the food supply) remains constant, the evolution of competing
species is renormalized in considering only the relative share of the
competing species in the total population. This relative share evolves
according to a logistic trajectory with the obvious constraint K=1,
i.e., no species can have a higher share in the total population than
100%.
Fisher-Pry Model
Fisher and Pry, 1971, proposed a similar model to study the replace-
ment of old by new technologies. The basic assumptions of the
Fisher-Pry model are: (1) The substitution process is competitive. (2)
Once substitution by the new technology has progressed as far as a
few percent (i.e., "lock-in"), it will proceed until a complete takeover
occurs. (3) the rate of fractional substitution F1 is proportional to the
remaining substitution 1 - F1 possible. Thus the model suggests a
logistic substitution trajectory:
F 1
1 F = exp ( a + bt )
- 1
(2.1.22)
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Figure 2.1.1. Life cycle in the introduction of 17 different technological innova-
tions measuring fractional market shares. (Source: adapted from Fisher and
Pry, 1971.)
where the share of the two technologies F1 (for technology 1) and
1 - F 1 (for technology 2) in the total market is calculated via:
F 1 = N 1 / ( N 1 + N 2 ). Of course, the fractional shares may be cal-
culated not only by measuring the number of economic or technologi-
cal "species" (e.g., number of firms, number of technological objects)
but also measuring their production capacity, output and so on. In
equation (2.1.22) a and b are constants and t is the independent vari-
able, usually representing time. Equation (2.1.22) is equivalent to
equation (2.1.9) discussed above the only difference being that the ori-
ginal three parameter logistic growth curve is reduced to a two param-
eter (as K=1) logistic substitution curve in the Fisher-Pry model, with
to at F=O.5. Figure 2.1.1 shows the fractional logistic substitution
curve for the introduction of 17 technological innovations (basic oxy-
gen steel production, synthetic fibers, etc.) studied by Fisher and Pry.
The curve on the left shows the linear transform log(F/(1-F)), i.e.,
market share of the new innovation divided by the market share held
by the old technology on a logarithmic scale, highlighting in particular
the early and late phases of the substitution process. The same model
was applied by Blackman, 1971, 1972, and 1974, and numerous
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studies have since confirmed the descriptive power of this simple sub-
stitution model. Of course, any of the other growth functions dis-
cussed in Section 2.1.1 above can also be applied to a simple (binary)
substitution case by setting K=l; therefore they are not discussed
here again.
Sharif-Kabir Model
The only additional binary substitution model which we discuss here
is the substitution model proposed by Sharif and Kabir, 1976a, which
is a so-called "flexible" substitution model, in that an additional
parameter is introduced to accommodate a whole range of substitution
patterns from the symmetric logistic to various degrees of positively
skewed (asymmetric) ones. This model, originally proposed as a sub-
stitution model (with K=l), becomes a growth model when the
parameter K is allowed to take positive values other than one.
Using the above notation (K=l), this model is given by:
bt+ c , 0 ~ T~ 1 (2.1.23)
This model contains two special cases: For 1 = 0 it reduces to the
Fisher-Pry model while for 1= 1 it corresponds to the Floyd model
presented in equation (2.1.12) above (with K=l). For If 0 it is a
non-symmetric function; the value at the inflection point, Yo' is given
by
(2.1.24)
showing that Yo drops from 1/2 to 1/3 when 1 increases from 0 to 1.
Introducing the parameter to, equation (2.1.23) can be rewritten in the
following way:
F 1 F 1
log "1 - F1 + 1 1 - F1
b(t t)+l 2 + 21
- 0 og 1+v'1+81 1+v'1+81 (2.1.25)
The parameter !:1t (see Section 2.1.2) now depends on 1 and is given
by
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Figure 2.1.2. Sharif-Kabir substitution functions for "Y=O (logistic curve),
"Y=O.lO, "Y=O.25, "Y=O.50, and "Y=1 (Floyd curve). (Source: Griibler et al., 1988.)
1 [ 80] 16.t = 7) log81+ g1 = 7)(4.39444915"'+/8.88888888 ... ) (2.1.26)
Figure 2.1.2 shows some substitution curves resulting from the Sharif-
Kabir model for different values of the parameter I' This particular
model offers considerable flexibility to describe a whole range of
binary substitution processes, when the empirical data can not sup-
port the symmetry assumption underlying the logistic Fisher-Pry
model. We have to note, however, (discussed in more detail in Section
2.2.2) that before a conclusion with respect to a deviation of a particu-
lar data set from the functional form of a substitution model can be
reached, a careful analysis has to be carried out on whether the pro-
cess under investigation is indeed a binary substitution process. In a
majority of cases asymmetric substitution patterns are an indication
that additional technologies compete on the market. In such cases the
substitution process can only adequately be described by a multiple
substitution model such as the Marchetti-Nakicenovic model discussed
below.
2.1.4. Multiple substitution models
The main drawback of the Fisher-Pry model presented above is that it
deals just with two competitors, whereas in reality more than two
technologies may compete on the market. An extension of the Fisher-
Pry model to a multiple substitution model was first proposed by
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Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979*. In this model each technology
undergoes three distinct phases as measured in the market share Fi -
logistic growth, non-logistic saturation, and finally logistic decline.
The growth and decline phases of technologies are described in the
model in the same way as the Fisher-Pry model, however, two addi-
tional assumptions are made: (1) When more than two technologies
compete in a market, one technology is in its (non-logistic) saturation
phase defined as residual after the logistic growth/decline trajectories
of the other technologies are calculated. (2) The technology that
enters the saturation phase (due to the growth of newer competitors)
is the oldest of the growing technologies. Thus the market share of
growing/declining technologies are:
(2.1.27)
and the market share of the saturating technology is then given by:
F·=l-EY
J '-J.' '
'rJ
(2.1.28)
The saturation phase is represented by a parabolic transition
function between the linear growth and decline phases in the
log(F/ (1- F)) transformation of the logistic substitution curves (see
Figure 2.1.3 below). The model is thus nearly complete; growth and
decline as well as entry into the saturation phase (defined by the
growth of the i+1 technology) are determined. It remains to define
the point where the non-logistic transition trajectory ends and the
logistic decline phase for technology Fj begins. This is done by using
the properties of the non-logistic transition function. This function
has negative curvature, passes through a maximum (peak of market
share of the technology Fj ), and then starts to diminish again. The
end of the saturation phase and entrance to the logistic decline phase
is then defined as the point where the curvature of Yi (t) relative to its
slope reaches its minimum value:
Y/,(t)/y/(t) = minimum (2.1.29)
• See also Marchetti, 1975, Peterka., 1977, Marchetti d aI., 1978, and Peterka. and Fleck, 1978. For the a.l-
gorithmic and computer implementation of the model see Nakicenovic, 1979. In this context we note also
a simple 3-way substitution model, proposed by Sharif and Kabir, 1976b.
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Figure 2.1.3. World primary energy substitution. (Source: Nakicenovic, 1984,
after Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979.)
Note that yO and y' are both negative in the region of the
minimum. When this minimum condition is satisfied at time point
t j +1, then technology j+1 may in turn enter the saturation phase.
The logistic decline trajectory of technology j is determined by:
(2.1.30)
(2.1.31)
This mechanism is continued for the successive technologies until
the penultimate technology n-1 enters its saturation phase, leaving
the market ultimately to the final winner, which in the model is
assumed to be the most recently introduced technology.
Figure 2.1.3 presents such a multiple substitution case by analyz-
ing the share of different primary energy forms in the world energy
balance (Nakicenovic, 1984). The parameters of the model defining
the slopes and the positioning of the various estimated substitution
curves in Figure 2.1.3 are determined using an ordinary least squares
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regression algorithm. Because the share of nuclear energy has hardly
penetrated beyond the level of a few percent of market share, its slope
is assumed to be similar to the introduction of the traditional fossil
energy carriers coal, oil, and natural gas. It thus represents a
scenario. The technology referred to as solfus (to indicate that it
could both be solar or fusion technology) is introduced in scenario
form to analyze how the dynamics of the system would respond to the
introduction of a new technology.
Before turning to the discussion on models supporting these
descriptive models, we briefly treat the question of estimating the vari-
ous parameters of the models from empirical data, as well as the sta-
tistical uncertainty related to the estimated model parameters.
2.1.5. Parameter estimation and statistical uncertainty
The main objective for using the models presented above is to map the
historical evolution of transport infrastructures and technologies, both
in terms of their growth and in terms of their changing structure. In
this context it is important to discuss to what extent the various
models, the parameters of which are estimated from empirical data,
adequately describe the historical pattern and in particular what the
statistical uncertainty of the estimated parameters (like the saturation
level K) is.
The algorithms for parameter estimation are not discussed here.
For the purposes of this study we have used both linear least square
algorithms for parameter estimation of linear transforms of the vari-
ous growth and substitution functions, as well as non-linear least
squares algorithms for untransformed values. These algorithms are
documented in Griibler et al., 1988, and for the multiple substitution
case in Nakicenovic, 1979.
With respect to parameter uncertainty it turns out that it is the
parameter K, i.e., the saturation level of a particular growth process
that is the most sensitive to changes in the data. For the models
where this parameter is known (like in the case of market substitution
models, where no technology can exceed 100% market share) parame-
ter uncertainty is not considered a major problem. Here it suffices to
rely on standard statistical measures of the goodness of fit, like R2 or
t-statistics, or leave the judgment to the human eye to assess how
good a model performs in mapping the empirical data. Consequently,
we are not presenting statistical measures of goodness of fit for the
results obtained with these models. Sensitivity analyses with different
models and estimation algorithms have been performed throughout
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the study and only the results with the best statistical fit are given.*
From the empirical results presented in the figures in Chapters 3 and
4 one can conclude that the fit of the models is quite satisfactory, with
practically all R2 values being well above 0.9 and in a majority of
cases even above 0.99.
However, when dealing with growth processes, where the asymp-
tote is not known a priori, statistical uncertainty in the estimated
parameters (primarily in the asymptote K) may be substantial. In
principle, the minimization algorithms used provide the matrix of the
second derivatives, and therefore allow the determination of the stan-
dard deviations of the values of the parameters and the corresponding
confidence levels. However, this method of determining the confidence
levels is not suitable, since it assumes that the errors in the parame-
ters are normally distributed and, in addition, that they are uncorre-
lated. There is no compelling reason why such a restrictive assump-
tion is warranted and as demonstrated by Debecker and Modis, 1986,
there is in fact evidence that these standard statistical assumptions do
not hold for estimating parameters of S-shaped growth curves. There-
fore only a numerical approach, Le., a study based on several
thousands of S-curve fits on simulated data covering the different con-
ditions for the parameters, can circumvent this problem.
Such a study, using a Monte Carlo simulation approach, was car-
ried out by Debecker and Modis, 1986, for the three-parameter logistic
function with data dependent weights W/c [see equation (2.1.10) and
(2.1.11)]. This study provides tables for determining the uncertainties
associated with the three parameters K, to, and b of a logistic growth
curve based on over 35,000 simulations of randomly modified parame-
ter values. The uncertainties, and the associated confidence levels, are
given as a function of the uncertainty of the observations and the
length of the historical period for which data are available. These
results have been used in determining statistical uncertainties in the
estimated parameters of logistic growth and diffusion processes with
unknown K, and corresponding ranges for the model parameters are
presented when discussing empirical results. Debecker and Modis,
1986, conclude in their study that as a rule-of-thumb the uncertainty
of the parameter K (saturation level) is less than 20 percent within a
95 percent confidence level, provided at least half of the data are
available** with a precision of more than 10 percent.
• We would like to point out that in the case of substitution, when properly analyzed (e.g., in considering
the whole set of competing technologies via a multiple substitution model) the results of different substitu-
tion models and estimation algorithms varied only slightly and can be neglected within the context of the
present study.
.. That is, data are available at least up to the inflection point.
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Since for other growth curves no similar information is available,
uncertainty estimates for the estimated parameters cannot be
presented. Consequently these models were used only in the ex post
modeling of completed growth and diffusion processes (such as that of
the railway network), where the uncertainty with respect to the
asymptote of the growth process does not pose a problem and the
choice of a particular growth model can be made on the basis of tradi-
tional measures of goodness of fit.
2.2. Causal Models for Temporal Diffusion
and Substitution
The previous Section introduced the mathematical models used here
to describe historical growth and structural change patterns in the
area of transport infrastructures and transportation technologies.
From a formal perspective, it may suffice to justify the use of these
models if they provide satisfactory fit for the empirical data. How-
ever, it is equally desirable to identify appropriate theories that pro-
vide a rationale for the use of such models, as well as some insight into
the determinants and causal factors influencing and shaping the evolu-
tionary processes manifest in empirical data. Justification for the use
of technological diffusion (growth) and substitution models is drawn
from a variety of research disciplines, including sociology, social learn-
ing theory, economics, and geography, as discussed in the following
Sections.
2.2.1. Innovation diffusion and adoption models
Diffusion research evolved as a discipline after WorId War II and stu-
dies the spread, adoption, and effects of innovations within a social
system. The research tradition originates from a variety of disciplines
including anthropology, (rural and medical) sociology, education
research, communication theory, marketing, (agricultural) economics,
and geography. The status of diffusion research has been reviewed
recently at two conferences in Venice (1986) and IIASA, Laxenburg,
Austria (1989).* Because of the heterogeneity of the original research
disciplines it is not surprising that diffusion research has still not yet
evolved into a coherent, interdisciplinary research discipline. Instead,
it has been noted (Rogers, 1962) that one of the most prominent
• Arcangeli et al., 1990 (forthcoming). Proceedings of the IIASA diffusion conference are to appear in a
special issue of the journal Technological Forecalting and Social Change.
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characteristics of diffusion research is the lack of diffusion of the
research findings from one discipline to others. Consequently, there
does not exist a single, universally accepted model dealing with the
diffusion of innovations. However, Everett Rogers (Rogers, 1962,
Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971, and Rogers, 1983) provides a number of
synthesizing generalizations drawing on the findings from various
research disciplines.
Following the definition given by Rogers, 1983, diffusion is the
process by which an innovation is communicated through certain com-
munication channels over time among the members of a social system.
An innovation may be an idea, object or practice which is per-
ceived as new by an individual or another unit of adoption (e.g., an
organization) .
Communication via communication channels refers to how
knowledge about an innovation is transferred between the members of
a social system. Communication takes time, and is therefore an
important aspect of innovation diffusion. In fact, all theoretical and
empirical diffusion studies agree that an innovation does not instantly
diffuse into a social system. Instead a typical time pattern of diffusion
along a S-shaped trajectory seems to be the rule. The S-shaped pat-
tern of diffusion appears to be a basic anthropologic phenomenon, as
it is also confirmed by a large number of studies· of primitive pre-
industrial societies.
The typical diffusion pattern stems from the last element of the
diffusion process, i.e., from the heterogeneity of the members of a
social system with respect to their attitudes toward an innovation.
Members of a social system have a diversity of expectations about the
potential benefits of an adoption decision, but are at the same time
not isolated, exchanging experience (learning) and imitating the
behavior of others.
It was the French sociologist Tarde, 1895, who first described the
process of social change by an imitative "somnambulistic" mechanism
and a S-shaped pattern in this process. It is, however, only the aggre-
gation of individual behavior that portrays such a characteristic pat-
tern. A diversity of individuals, with different expectations, value sys-
tems, communication networks, etc., interact with each other (sharing
information and experience), and the diffusion pattern is merely an
expression of this interaction between a diversity of economic agents
or members of a social system.
•. For an extensive bibliography of anthropological diffusion studies see Rogers, 1962, and Rogers and
Shoemaker, 1971.
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A necessary step for diffusion is therefore the transfer of
knowledge and experience about an innovation from its early adopters
to the rest of the population. Hagerstrand, 1952, was one of the first
to recognize the importance of information flows (either via mass
media or interpersonal communication) in the diffusion of innovations.
Whereas mass media are more effective in communicating the
knowledge about an innovation, interpersonal contact appears to be
more effective in influencing the adoption decision of an individual.
Thus, information transmission is the first step in innovation dif-
fusion. The next step concerns how that information is used in arriv-
ing at a decision. Rogers, 1983, developed a four stage model of the
innovation decision process consisting of: (1) knowledge, (2) persua-
sion, (3) decision and implementation, and (4) (re-)confirmation.
In the knowledge stage, individual characteristics of the decision
maker (social, economic, communication behavior, innovativeness) as
well as his/her previous practices, perceived needs, and the general
norms of the social system, act as "filter" mechanisms for incoming
information. In this context Gatignon and Robertson, 1986, propose
(from a marketing perspective) the following influencing parameters
on information "filtering" and in consequence on the persuasion stage:
• Availability of positive information (negative information will
have a greater impact than positive information).
• Credibility of information ("objective" information or informa-
tion from persons with high personal or societal influence will
have higher credibility).
• Consistency of information (the more consistent the higher the
impact of the information).
• The type of information source (media or personal influence, with
the latter being of greater influence).
• Personal characteristics (information processing style, life stage,
and social integration).
Mter information "filtering" the persuasion stage follows and it is
in this stage that the actual adoption/rejection decision is made. The
obtained knowledge is evaluated in terms of the perceived characteris-
tics of the innovation (relative advantage, compatibility, complexity,
triability, and observability). These innovation characteristics are
treated below in more detail when discussing the determinants of the
diffusion speed. In the next stage the decision to reject or to adopt
and implement an innovation is made. Finally, the decision is
reassessed in that confirmation from other members of the social sys-
tem is sought, which in turn may lead to the (dis)continuation of the
adoption decision.
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Figure 2.2.1. Distribution of adopters as a function of adoption date. (Source:
Rogers, 1983.)
The above is a general model (the stages and influencing vari-
ables of which are confirmed by a large number of empirical studies)
of the individual decision making process. However, the whole popula-
tion of potential adopters is not homogeneous in terms of its innova-
tion decision process. Consequently, Rogers, 1962, and 1983, divides
the population of potential adopters according to their adoption date
and categorizes them in terms of their standard deviation from the
mean adoption date (Figure 2.2.1). He presents extensive empirical
evidence to suggest a symmetric bell shaped curve for the distribution
of adopters over time. This curve reminds us of the first derivative of
the logistic growth and substitution curve presented in the previous
Section and consequently the cumulative number of adopters will yield
a symmetric S-shaped pattern as described by a logistic curve.
The symmetric diffusion pattern as postulated by Rogers shows
how the members of a social system learn from the experience and imi-
tate the behavior of the innovators (i.e., the first ones to introduce an
innovation). The learning aspect is described in more detail by
Casetti, 1969, and in terms of social learning by Bandura, 1977. The
main trait of the argument is that the potential adopters show dif-
ferent degrees of resistance against an innovation as a function of their
diversity in expectations, experience, etc. Resistance may be gradu-
ally overcome by appropriate stimulus, like the frequent repetition of
the message (Casetti, 1969). The learning behavior of individuals is
the deeper underlying cause of the symmetry of the diffusion process
according to Rogers, 1983.
Decision processes for adopting an innovation can be understood
as learning processes. At the beginning, when an individual is con-
fronted with a new (learning) situation he/she makes many mistakes.
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These mistakes are gradually reduced (by learning) over time because
more and more information is received and acts as a stimulus. The
gain in learning per trial is proportional to the product of (1) the
amount already learned and (2) the amount remaining to be learned
before the limit of learning is reached. Recall here that this is exactly
equivalent to the Fj(l-F) transformation of the logistic curve dis-
cussed in the previous Section. It should be emphasized that these
properties of the learning process were found in real learning situa-
tions and are confirmed by a large number of laboratory and field
experiments (for a bibliography see e.g., Rogers and Shoemaker,
1971). Thus each adoption of an innovation in a social system is
equivalent to a learning trial by an individual (Rogers, 1983). Thus,
the symmetric diffusion pattern results from the way messages about
an innovation are emitted and processed by social learning.
This completes the overview of diffusion models, primarily based
on sociology and behavioral sciences. The only element to be dis-
cussed in more detail is the rate of adoption of an innovation, i.e., the
diffusion rate (denoted by tl t in this study).
Determinants of the Diffusion Rate
Rogers, 1983, identifies five classes of variables that determine the
rate of adoption of innovations.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Type of innovation decisions (optional, collective or authorita-
tive);
Communication channels (external via mass media or internal
through interpersonal contact, a categorization based on the work
of Hamblin et al., 1973);
Nature of the social system (norms, degree of interconnectness).
Extent of change agents promotional effort.
The perceived attributes of an innovation.
However, to date there has been very little research devoted to deter-
mining the relative contribution of each of the five types of variables.
For the diffusion of an innovation inside a larger social and economic
system (like a country) it is (with the possible exception of the role of
change agents) primarily the attributes of an innovation that should
determine the diffusion rate.
The attributes of an innovation that influence the rate and extent
to which it becomes accepted inside a social system are: relative advan-
tage, compatibility, complexity, triability, and observability.
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Relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation is per-
ceived as being beneficial and, in particular, better than the
idea/product/organizational form it supercedes. Perceived relative
advantage may in reality be a complex vector of costs, performance,
personal utility, social prestige and so on. Compatibility is the degree
to which an innovation is considered as being consistent with existing
values, past experience and individual needs and expectations. Com-
plexity relates to the extent to which an innovation is perceived as
being difficult to understand and to use (the learning requirement
needed for its adoption). Triability and observability is the degree an
innovation may be experimented with before making a final commit-
ment on its adoption, and the degree to which the results of adoption
and/or the innovation are visible to other members of the social sys-
tem (in terms of learning from the experience of others and social
prestige stemming from adoption). All variables, except complexity,
are positively correlated to the adoption rate.
We thus conclude that the formal models introduced in Section
2.1 find an underlying causal rationale in sociological and behavioral
diffusion models. In particular we recall the fact that from the diffu-
sion perspective, the spread of a new idea, practice or product is inter-
preted as a social learning process, with consequences for the diffusion
of an innovation, in particular its symmetric S-shaped pattern.
In the next Section we discuss diffusion models in economics in
more detail. These models try to explain the pattern and rate of diffu-
sion of new technologies or consumer products primarily based on the
(perceived) relative advantage of an innovation, as reflected in con-
ventional economic variables.
2.2.2. Diffusion models in economics
This Section starts with a presentation of the oldest and most influen-
tial diffusion model in economics. In a seminal contribution, Edwin
Mansfield, 1961,* proposed a model explaining the adoption rates of
industrial innovations, and provided empirical tests of his model for a
number of innovations in various sectors.
• The first of this type of model was actually proposed by Griliches, 1951, who analyzed the diffusion of
the use of hybrid corn seeds in various states in the USA. The approach followed is very similar to that of
Mansfield both in terms of using a logistic curve to describe the diffusion patterns as well as in linking the
(empirically) estimated diffusion rate to the profitability of adopting the innovation. Because this particu-
lar study dealt only with the diffusion of a single innovation and lacks a strong technological component,
we prefer to discuss the Mansfield model in more detail within the present context.
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We continue with an overview of the literature on first generation
diffusion models and their empirical findings, and subsequent exten-
sions of the basic model to include additional explanatory variables.
As a result, a host of second generation models have been proposed,
which one might group together as "equilibrium" type diffusion
models. Here, diffusion is seen as a sequence of equilibria determined
by changes in the economic attributes of an innovation as well as in
the environment. These models are mainly discussed in terms of their
relevance to the most recent, and most promising, research direction:
the evolutionary type of diffusion models.
Evolutionary models, which describe diffusion as an evolutionary
process under conditions of uncertainty, diversity of economic agents,
and disequilibrium dynamics, try to model the complex feedback
mechanisms at work at the micro level between economic agents,
while still being consistent with the overall macro level ordered diffu-
sion pattern confirmed by numerous empirical studies. Thus, these
models integrate the concept of self-organizing systems as, for
instance, formulated by Prigogine, 1976, into economic theory. This is
illustrated by one such model in Section 2.2.3.
The Mansfield Model
Letting mij be the number of firms in the ith industry having intro-
duced the jth innovation at time t, and nij the total number of firms,
the model proposes that the number of firms at time t that will intro-
duce the innovation at time t+ 1, Aij, is a function of: (1) the propor-
tion of firms that have already introduced the innovation, (2) the pro-
fitability of the innovation relative to other possible investments, '1rij'
(3) the size of the investment Sij, and (4) other unspecified variables:
(2.2.1)
The postulated relationship between the number of adopters and
the number of firms having already adopted an innovation is a typical
learning model where the rate of learning depends on the already
accumulated knowledge. The asymptote of this learning process is
reached when all potential adopters have adopted the innovation.
Note the structural similarity to the linear transform of the Fisher-Pry
model discussed above, where the ratio of adopters to nonadopters
F / (1-F), is a function of time. Consequently, Mansfield derives from
equation (2.2.1) a logistic function to describe the diffusion process.
Assuming that \j (t) can be approximated by a Taylor's expansion,
which drops third and higher order terms, and assuming that the
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coefficient of (mij(t)/nij)2 in this expansion is zero and that for
t --+ -00, the number of adopting firms tends to zero, i.e.,
it follows
lim mdt)
t-+-oo J
o (2.2.2)
(2.2.3)
which is the logistic diffusion function discussed above. Note that we
have retained Mansfield's original notation in this discussion. ,
The rate ~ ij which is equivalent to the growth/substitution rate
b or bi (i.e., ~t) in Section 2.1, describes the "steepness" of the diffu-
sion curve or is a measure of the rate of adoption (or rate of imitation
in Mansfields terminology). Recall that lij is equivalent to variable a
and ai (to) in Section 2.1 and represents a shift parameter determining
the positioning of the diffusion curve in time.
The diffusion (imitation) rate in turn depends on the profitability
and the size of investments 1rij and Sij in particular*
~ .. = a·+b1r··+cS"+z,,IJ I IJ IJ IJ (2.2.4)
where Zij is an error term. The model assumes that only the intercept
ai but not the coefficients band c vary among industries. Thus, the
diffusion rate is determined by two categories of driving factors: those
related to the industry (i.e., ai represents an innovation index measur-
ing the propensity towards innovation in various industries) and those
related to the innovation (i.e., 1rij and Sij). Empirical measures for
the first category are, for instance, provided by Blackman et al., 1973,
for 15 industrial sectors of the USA.
In an empirical test of 12 important innovations in four industries
(brewing, coal, steel, and railroad) Mansfield concludes that the logis-
tic curve describes the diffusion pattern of innovations among firms
quite well and that the (relative) profitability, in relation to other pos-
sible investments, is positively correlated (i.e., the higher the relative
profitability of an investment, the faster the rate of adoption), and the
required investment is negatively (i.e., the higher the investment for a
particular innovation, the slower the rate of adoption) correlated with
• 'lfij is defined a.e the average pay-out period required by the firms divided by the average pay-out period
for the innovation. For relatively long lived investments, the reciprocal of the pay-out period is an ap-
proximation of the rate of return, Le., 'Ifij is approximately equal to the average rate of return derived (ez
pod) from the innovation divided by the average rate of return firms required (u ante) to justify invest-
ments. 8ij is defined a.e the percentage of the average initial investment in the innovation a.e a percentage
of the average total a.esets of firms.
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the diffusion rate ~ ij' Mansfield found that the influence of both vari-
ables on the diffusion rate was statistically highly significant, the sig-
nificance of Sij, however, depends on a single observation (the tin con-
tainer) in the data sample. Also significant interindustry differences
(for given 7rij and Sij) were found.
For the data sample of 12 innovations in four industries, Mans-
field tested four further hypotheses regarding additional influencing
variables on the rate of diffusion: The diffusion speed is negatively
correlated with the average lifetime of the equipment to be replaced;
the diffusion rate is positively correlated with the industry growth
rate; the diffusion rate tends to increase over time (due to better com-
munication channels, etc.); and finally, the diffusion rate depends on
the time period in the (10-year) business cycle (expansion or contrac-
tion phase) when the innovation is introduced. Statistical analysis
showed, however, that none of these variables had a significant influ-
ence on the diffusion rate of an innovation.
Thus, the model supports the conclusion that the rate of diffusion
of a new innovation is, to a large extent, determined by the proportion
of firms already using the new technique, the profitability of introduc-
ing it (compared to alternative investments), and the size of the
investment required. Finally, significant interindustry differences in
the rate of diffusion were observed.
In a number of subsequent studies (Mansfield 1968a, 1968b, 1977,
and 1984, and Mansfield et al., 1971, and 1977) the basic model was
extended to include:
• Additional industrial sectors, including the chemical industry and
the introduction of numerically controlled machines.
• Consideration of product innovations.
• Different measures of the diffusion process (in addition to the
number of adopting firms, growth of output produced by a new
industrial process, share of numerically controlled machines in
new installations).
• Analysis of intrafirm diffusion rates in addition to industry diffu-
sion rates.
• Testing a host of hypotheses associated with additional variables
influencing the rate of adoption of industrial innovations.
In his analysis of the intrafirm rate of diffusion, Mansfield, 1968a
and 1968b, analyzed two aspects of how particular firms respond to a
new technique. First, what are the variables explaining the time delay,
i.e., the length of time a firm waits before introducing an innovation,
and second, testing a model and explaining economic variables on the
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intrafirm rate of diffusion, Le., the pattern and driving variables of
innovation diffusion inside different firms. It is important to consider
these two aspects separately, because in the subsequent reception of
the Mansfield model they have often been put together and misinter-
preted, in particular with regard to the wide acceptance of the positive
correlation of firm size to diffusion speed.
The main conclusions from these extensions to the original Mans-
field model are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
The same kind of model, Le., logistic type, can be applied to
represent diffusion among, as well as within firms, pointing at the
unity and similarity between the two processes.
The influence of the profitability and size of investment variables
found in the original study are confirmed.
The results of the effect the firm size may have on diffusion are
more differentiated: whereas the size of a firm appears to signifi-
cantly influence the time a firm waits before introducing an inno-
vation, it "appears that small firms, once they begin, are at least
as quick to substitute new techniques for old ones as their larger
rivals." Company liquidity and possibilities for learning through
the experience of other firms already using the innovation appear
also to significantly influence the intrafirm rate of diffusion.
Before turning to a discussion of the reception and critique of the
original model and the subsequent second generation of diffusion
models, it may be useful to summarize the basic conclusions from the
model applications. These conclusions, as put forward by Mansfield
1968a, 1968b, and 1984, and Mansfield et al., 1977, also integrate the
empirical findings of other studies supporting the basic model at the
phenomenological and economic interpretative level; in particular
those of Blackman, 1971; Hsia, 1973; Nasbeth and Ray, 1974; Simon,
1975; and Romeo, 1977. Mansfield concludes that the innovation pro-
cess is essentially a learning process, characterized by a "bandwagon"
or "contagion" effect. There appears to be an economic analogue to
classical learning models and psychological laws, in that the extent of
learning (diffusion) is a function of accumulated knowledge. Firms
learn from the experience of others, who have already adopted an
innovation. Furthermore the "reaction time" (time lag for adoption)
and the rate of learning (adoption) are dependent on the intensity of
the "stimulus", which in economic terms is represented by the profita-
bility of the innovation.
The determinants of the rate of diffusion may therefore be sum-
marized as follows (Mansfield, 1968b):
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Four principal factors seem to govern how rapidly an innovation's level
approaches its ultimate, or equilibrium level: (1) the extent of the
economic advantage of the innovation over older methods or products,
(2) the extent of the uncertainty associated with using the innovation
when it first appears, (3) the extent of commitment required to tryout
the innovation, and (4) the rate of reduction of the initial uncertainty
regarding the innovation '5 performance.
In Mansfield, 1984, the following additional determinants were
proposed:
(1) Scientific capabilities and skill level of industry (science based
industries with high levels of R&D and consequently higher capa-
bilities to evaluate proposed innovations would have higher rates
of adoption).
(2) Industry and market structure, as reflected in the concentration
of an industry and the dispersion of the profitability of an innova-
tion among firms.
(3) Experience with the innovation gained outside the industry, thus
reducing uncertainty via external learning.
All these determinants still constitute the backbone of any satis-
factory economic modeling of innovation diffusion. They are taken up
again in the rationale underlying the self-organizing model of technol-
ogy diffusion and structural change discussed in Section 2.2.3.
Second Generation Diffusion Models
Since the publication of Mansfield's study, the literature dealing with
diffusion in the areas of technology, economics and in marketing, has
grown to such volumes that it would be outside the framework of this
study to provide a detailed overview. A good compendium of earlier
papers can be found in Linstone and Sahal, 1976, and concise over-
views of proposed models are presented in Hurter and Rubinstein,
1978, and Mahajan and Peterson, 1985. Here we provide an overview
of second generation diffusion models. We start with those that can
be considered in the stream of the original models and later on struc-
ture the discussion of subsequent models around four areas of critique
of the diffusion modeling approach in economics.
A number of subsequent studies have confirmed the findings
about the regularity of the diffusion process, as well as the role of pro-
fitability and size of investment on the diffusion rate; in particular:
Blackman, 1971, and 1974; Hsia, 1973; Simon, 1975; and Romeo,
1977, to name a few. Others, using a different analytical framework
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to describe the diffusion process (alternative models to the logistic or
no formal model at all) have confirmed the empirical findings on the
determinants of the diffusion speed postulated by first generation dif-
fusion models, including Metcalfe, 1970; Nasbeth and Ray, 1974; and
Davies, 1979, and 1980. In the international comparative study
reported in Nasbeth and Ray, 1974, technological and institutional
differences, and industry characteristics are also said to influence the
differences in the adoption rates between countries. An exception is
the study by Martino et al., 1978, which could not identify any influ-
ence of an innovation's profitability on the diffusion speed, however
this study is affected by a number of methodological shortcomings*
and the negative conclusions should therefore be read with caution.
Finally, a number of conflicting propositions have been discussed
with respect to the relationship of firm size to innovativeness and
adoption rates of new technologies. The above mentioned studies con-
firmed Mansfield's findings, especially if we keep in mind that size
appears to primarily influence the time a firm waits before starting to
adopt an innovation, but that subsequently it may not necessarily be
slower than earlier innovators. However, there have also been con-
flicting arguments that large firms concentrating on domestic markets
tend to be technological laggards, as argued by Oster, 1982, in the
case of the US steel industry, or that high cost firms (i.e., small com-
panies with lower economies of scale) are more likely to adopt a new
technology as argued by Reinganum, 1983. This issue is therefore still
open for debate and the most likely outcome of such a discussion is
that the influence of the firm size variable can go either in a positive
or negative direction depending on the structure of the industry and
the market, the existence of different economies of scale and so on.
This problem appears to be more adequately tackled when market and
industry diversity in diffusion models is explicitly considered, as done
in Section 2.2.3.
We have structured the following discussion on second generation
diffusion models along the four areas of critique that have been
advanced about most of the diffusion models elaborated within
economics (see e.g., Davies, 1979, Rogers, 1983, or Sahal, 1981):
(1) The mathematical properties (especiallY the symmetry aspect)
and the adequacy of the application of the logistic model to
describe the diffusion process, and the fact that the diffusion
• The shortcomings relate to (1) The procedure in determining the independent variables considered in the
model; (2) A large number of apparent mistakes in the data gathering process from original references; (3)
A restrictive definition of the appropriate market in which the innovations compete; and finally, (4) The
inappropriate use of a simple (binary) diffusion model of the Fisher-Pry type for innovations which com-
pete simultaneously on the market (Le., in multiple substitution cases).
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model is not derived functionally from an underlying economic
rationale or the driving force model explaining the rate of diffu-
sion.
(2) The nature of the adoption process, in particular the binary
nature of diffusion models (both in terms of the population of
potential adopters as well as in the pool of innovations available)
and the static assumption on the size of the potential adopters,
Le., the competitive "niche" for an innovation (be it individuals,
firms and, by exteI1sion of the model, market volume).
(3) The process innovation bias of model applications, which has led
to the foundation of a second stream of innovation diffusion
models (marketing models) for consumer products.
(4) The narrow definition of the group of influencing variables, the
ignorance of other factors affecting diffusion as well as the fact
that the models (implicitly) assume that both the economic
(social) and the technological environment in which the innova-
tion is embedded remain unchanged over time. This aspect is
particularly highlighted and incorporated into a diffusion model
in an important contribution by Metcalfe, 1983.
(1) Mathematical properties of diffusion models
A criticism deals with the use of a logistic model to describe diffusion
patterns when it is not derived functionally from an underlying
economic theory of diffusion. It is criticized that the model has been
taken from a different field of reasoning, Le., the spread of contagious
diseases as applied to the dissemination of information, as well as from
(social) learning theory. Secondly, the assumptions underlying the
behavioral (learning) rationale of the logistic model (resulting in its
symmetry around K/2) are considered to be too constraining. In par-
ticular the model assumes that the probability of persuasion to adopt
an innovation (or the "infectiousness" of the innovation decision), as
reflected in the growth rate parameter of the logistic ~t, stays con-
stant over time.* Put in a different way, the logistic model assumes
that the interaction between adopters and non adopters does not
change over time. A second corollary of the logistic is that it assumes
a homogeneous population, in the sense that potential adopters
• Note here a certain semantical difficulty in the argument. Of coul'lle the grotlJth ratt, (i.e., the fil'llt
derivative of the logistic function) vary over time in the form of a symmetric bell shaped curve with a
maximum at K/2, resulting in the particular shape of the diffusion proce811 over time: slow growth at the
beginning, followed by very fut growth (the bandwagon effect) and finally levelling off towards the satura-
tion level. The argument about the constant value of the diffusion rate (i.e. fl.t, 6, or ~) merely refel'll to
a perceived -lack of flexibility· (Mabajan and Petel'llon, 1985) of the logistic to represent data exhibiting a
certain skewness (see also Davies, 1979, and Sabal, 1981, on this point).
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broadly speaking share the same value system (e.g., profit maximiza-
tion), and that each potential adopter is susceptible to a new innova-
tion.
In response to this perceived "lack of flexibility" a host ..)f alterna-
tive models have been proposed (the mathematical properties of most
of them were already discussed in Section 2.1 above). These include
the use of a modified exponential curve following Bass' (1969) distinc-
tion between external and internal influence driven diffusion (see
Hamblin et al., 1973, on the sociological rationale for these models,
first proposed by Coleman et al., 1966); the Floyd curve (Floyd, 1968);
the Gompertz curve (e.g., Dixon, 1980); or a cumulative normal or
cumulative lognormal pattern (e.g., Davies, 1979).* Other models
tried to develop more comprehensive formulations with additional
parameters that can accommodate a whole set of different S-shaped
diffusion patterns. Examples of these type of models include the
Sharif-Kabir, 1976a, model, the NSRL (Nonsymmetric Responding
Logistic) model (Easingwood et al., 1981), or the model proposed by
Skiadas, 1986, among others.
In view of the amount of effort devoted to the development of
various asymmetric diffusion models, it is surprising that the flexibil-
ity of these models (in terms that they can describe a wide range of
diffusion patterns) is achieved by paying a high theoretical price. No
reasoning is given by any of the model developers as to why a particu-
lar diffusion pattern should follow their models or what the (economic
or behavioral) explanation of the additional model parameters might
be. To some extent this line of research has thrown out the baby
(behavioral/economic rationale of diffusion models) with the bathwa-
ter (the supposedly too constraining conditions underlying the
behavioral rationale of the logistic diffusion model).
The only remaining justification for these models appears to be
that they can describe ex post** the diffusion patterns more accu-
rately. Whereas we do not argue that there are diffusion/substitution
processes that do not conform to logistic trends (and in the empirical
part of the study we use the best fit model wherever appropriate to
describe historical patterns), it is somehow ironic that in the majority
of cases the logistic performed better than the "more flexible" models.
For instance the fit of the logistic turns out to be superior in 9 out of
• Davies rea.sons that a cumulative normal (a symmetric S-shaped curve) describes adequately the diffu-
sion of innovations characterized by relatively large capital outlays and complex technology I wherea.s the
(positively) skewed cumulative lognormal curve is a.ssumed for relatively inexpensive, uncomplicated
proce88es (often of a supplementary nature) .
•• Ez ante use of these models does not appear rea.sonable in view of the absence of a theoretical rationale
underlying the model application.
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10 cases analyzed by Sahal, 1981, and in 6 out of 8 cases analyzed by
Sharif and Kabir, 1976a.
We conclude this discussion on the use of symmetric versus asym-
metric diffusion models by considering one final point. Hardly any
innovation is introduced into a vacuum. In fact, in the majority of
innovation diffusion/substitution cases more than two technologies
(innovations) compete on the market. Therefore it is entirely inade-
quate to arrive at conclusions with respect to a particular innovation
diffusion pattern by looking at it in isolation. An extremely illustra-
tive case is provided by Skiadas, 1986, in his comparison of various
asymmetric diffusion models to the adoption of the oxygen steel pro-
cess in different countries. It can be easily shown that the levelling off
of the diffusion of oxygen steel (i.e., the "retarding" of diffusion,
resulting in asymmetry) is simply the result of the oxygen process
being replaced in turn by a newer process, namely the electric arc pro-
cess (growing itself logistically). Therefore, it is completely pointless
to argue in favor of a particular model in the absence of a theoretical
basis for the functional form of the diffusion process and without a
complete analysis of the technological and market environment (Le.,
the competitive "niche") the innovation is embedded in.
The last area of criticism in relation to logistic
diffusion/substitution models is the fact that the model is not derived
functionally from an underlying economic rationale. This critique was
certainly valid for the first generation of models. However, in the
mean time there have been a number of formulations proposed to
show how a particular diffusion curve can be deduced functionally
from an underlying economic rationale. Davies, 1979, deduces a
cumulative normal curve i.e., a symmetric diffusion curve, which he
(Davies, 1980) considers equivalent to the logistic, based on the plau-
sible assumption of a lognormal distribution of firm size. Russell,
1980, considering marketing diffusion models, argues that income dis-
tribution is lognormally distributed and if the price of a new consumer
item will fall linearly, the resulting diffusion process will yield a log-
normal curve. A similar line of argument is followed by Gottinger,
1985, who takes a probabilistic perspective of adoption and derives a
logistic diffusion curve from a logistic probability distribution of the
utility function vector of the possible entrants. Finally Tani, 1988,
derives a Gompertz curve for the diffusion of industrial robots in
Japan based on a rank size distribution of firm size and a size-
dependent distribution of the potential benefits of adoption. The
underlying rational is that the labor reduction effect of robots is
higher in large firms than in small ones, due to different economies of
scale. Thus both symmetric (like logistic or lognormal) and
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asymmetric diffusion curves (like the Gompertz) have been analyti-
cally derived from underlying economic rationales. This justifies
therefore the use of these models even in those cases where data limi-
tations (distribution of firm size, income, etc.) do not allow the inclu-
sion of these additional variables into the diffusion model proper.
(2) The nature of the adoption process
The binary nature of most diffusion models with respect to the adopt-
ing population (by considering just adopters and non adopters) is cer-
tainly an oversimplification of the various stages of the adoption pro-
cess (awareness, knowledge, etc.) formulated for instance by Rogers,
1962, and 1983. However, in an economic context such a model sim-
plification appears justified, as we are mainly interested in the impact
of the adoption decision with its resulting economic consequences.
Within this context another critical point has been raised, namely that
diffusion models tend to be pro-innovation biased and do not offer
detailed insights into the mechanisms why an innovation is not
adopted at all (see Rogers, 1983, on this point). Clearly this is both
an empirical and philosophical problem, as unsuccessful innovations
are usually very badly documented, if at all, and to date practically no
diffusion researcher has pursued a Popperian falsification approach in
analyzing technological change. However, we do not consider it a
major deficiency in the approach as long as one is primarily interested
in studying the economic effects of innovations.
Finally, it has been noted that diffusion models generally assume
implicitly only one adoption per adopter (i.e., excluding repeat pur-
chases), and that the models do not consider the possibility that an
adopter might give up the innovation ("curing") and readopt it again
at a later stage ("reinfection"). The exclusion of repeat purchases is
certainly a drawback for the marketing analysis of the diffusion of
consumer durables, where most models (e.g., Bass, 1969) are con-
cerned only with initial purchases. There appear to be only two prag-
matic ways out of this situation, the first is not to consider flow vari-
ables (like sales), but stock variables (like items in use or per capita
values) instead. Thus, only the increase in stock would be used to
measure the diffusion of a new product into the market. The second
more difficult, but at the same time more realistic, possibility would
be to model initial purchase and replacement demand separately.
This is more plausible, as the time constant involved in diffusion and
the resulting annual sales might be very different from the annual
replacement demand, which depends on the size of the age cohorts of
the product and its average life time as for instance represented
dynamically by a "death curve" (see e.g., Marchetti, 1983, for such a
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model for the Japanese car market). A diffusion model incorporating
replacement, in addition to expansion investments, is discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.3 below.
The critique on the binary nature of the population of innova-
tions treated by most diffusion models is to be taken seriously. In
fact, most models cannot even be considered to be of a binary nature
in dealing strictu sensu with the case of diffusion, e.g., in analyzing the
number of firms adopting a particular technique. Such models ignore
the fact that potential adopters do not introduce the innovation into a
vacuum, but instead replace existing techniques, equipment, etc.
Therefore the process of technological change should in most cases be
considered as a substitution rather than a diffusion phenomenon.
This argument was particularly convincingly put forward by Sahal,
1981, and Mahajan and Peterson, 1985, among others.
The pioneering work in overcoming this deficiency in diffusion
models is certainly due to Fisher and Pry, 1971 (and also Blackman,
1971), who analyzed diffusion/substitution on the basis of measuring
the relative market share F of old versus new innovations competing
in a market. This model was discussed in more detail in Section 2.1
above. Note, that with this model no restriction on the ultimate
market volume of the innovation is imposed, which can continuously
change over time, as only the relative evolution of market shares is
considered. The same holds true for the multiple competition model
of Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979* (discussed in Section 2.1 above).
The development of (relative) market share models as discussed
above resolves most of the problems in dealing with changing market
sizes, however, it leaves one open question, namely what is the impact
of the diffusion of an innovation on market growth? The answer is
discussed below in considering Metcalfe's, 1983, model where diffusion
is considered as an adjustment process between two equilibria (both in
terms of technology as well as in market volume) and where the
increase in market volume is determined by the shift in the
demand/supply curves as a result of changing prices due to the intro-
duction of an innovation. With respect to the critique on the constant
geographical size of the market niche for diffusion assumed in most
models, we mention that temporal diffusion models may also be
applied to the spatial spread of innovations (see the integrated
time/space diffusion model discussed in Section 2.4 below).
• Peterka, 1977, provides an economic model explaining the dynamics of multivariate competition, based
on production costs and specific investment differentials as well as a total growth rate factor.
Causal Models/or Temporal Diffusion and Substitution
(3) Process innovation bias
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The critique on the process innovation bias* of diffusion models has
led to a second stream of innovation diffusion models (marketing
models) for consumer products. The formal descriptive characteristics
of these models is very similar to the S-shaped models of technological
innovation diffusion and substitution, including a large variety of
models developed to represent asymmetric S-shaped diffusion pat-
terns.** However, marketing diffusion models differ somewhat in their
underlying behavioral rationale and the driving forces of the diffusion
process. In addition to the relative advantage and costs of a new con-
sumer product, marketing models also emphasize other factors relat-
ing to the potential adopters perception of an innovation and its attri-
butes such as product complexity, its compatibility with existing con-
sumer experience, its triability, etc.
Of particular importance for marketing is the two dimensional
approach underlying the behavioral assumptions of marketing models.
This approach was first proposed by Bass, 1969, who developed a dif-
fusion model of the initial purchase (excluding replacement purchases)
of "new" generic classes of consumer products. Bass proposes that the
diffusion of a new consumer product is dependent on two factors, the
coefficient of innovation and the coefficient of imitation, respectively.
The innovation coefficient relates to the number of initial innovators
buying a product, whereas the coefficient of imitation refers to the rest
of the population assumed to imitate the behavior of the innovators
and learn from their experience. Usually the group of innovators is
characterized by high income, education and influence on decision
making processes. Related to this two-dimensional behavioral founda-
tion of the model is the distinction between external and internal
influence diffusion models in marketing. This distinction relates to the
communication channels through which information about a product
is communicated (based on the work of Hamblin et al., 1973).
External influence refers to information spreading vertically to
potential adopters through mass media, advertising, etc., whereas
internal influence refers to horizontal communication channels, i.e.,
interpersonal communication. It is generally argued (e.g., Gatignon
and Robertson, 1986), that products that involve low consumer learn-
ing, are of low social relevance and are characterized by high
• Thia biaa ia repreaented by the fact that mode18 generally deal with important (contrary to amall incre-
mental), inveatment intenaive proce88 innovationa, the diffuaion of which ia not impeded by patent!. The
dominant role profitability playa aa a cauaal driving force of the diffuaion proceu relatea only to proceu in-
novationa, for which it repreaenta the paramount adoption criteria uaed by firma.
•• For an overview aee Mahajan and PeterBon, 1985, Mahajan and Wind, 1986, and Mahajan, Muller and
Baaa, 1990.
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marketing/advertising efforts, diffuse via external influence communi-
cation, yielding a modified exponential diffusion pattern as first pro-
posed by Coleman et al., 1966. More complex and socially visible pro-
ducts requiring experimentation and observation of the experience by
early adopters, and where non adoption tends to create some economic
or social disadvantage (the type of products of most interest in this
study), diffuse primarily through interpersonal communication chan-
nels with a resulting S-shaped diffusion pattern, usually represented
by a logistic curve. The model proposed by Bass, 1969 (see also Bass,
1980), which can be considered as a "classic" in marketing models,
combines both of these external and internal communication mechan-
isms. Bass, claims that the internal influence (i.e., interpersonal com-
munication, as reflected in the coefficient of imitation) exerts a much
larger influence on the successful diffusion of a new product, resulting
in a logistic diffusion pattern.
Thus the rationale underlying technological diffusion and substi-
tution models has also provided the basis for marketing models
analyzing the diffusion of new consumer products. Whereas the rela-
tive role of influencing factors may be different from process innova-
tion models, the formal analytical descriptions are very similar in both
fields and allow similar conclusions about the regularity and driving
forces of the innovation diffusion process. Still, it is somehow surpris-
ing that these two streams of diffusion research have never really con-
verged or even interacted with each other. In particular, the relation-
ship of marketing to technological substitution models has hardly been
explored; this fact has been admitted by the representatives of the
marketing models discipline (see e.g., Bass, 1986).
(,0 The narrowness in the definition of influencing variables and
their static nature
A final group of critical comments on diffusion models in economics
deals with the narrow set of influencing variables included in the
models, as well as their static nature, e.g., the profitability of an inno-
vation is assumed to stay constant over the diffusion process. Finally,
it has been argued that changes in the environment in which an inno-
vation is embedded, for example, a changing competitive structure, is
ignored by the models.
Probably the most extreme line of argument in this direction was
followed by Gold et al., 1970, who claim that innovation diffusion is
affected by such a diversity of (changing) variables, that it is almost
pointless to build general models of innovation diffusion. However,
this appears to be an unnecessarily pessimistic view, as our main
interest is in the general factors influencing diffusion against which
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special or random influences can be assessed further. The criticism of
a narrow definition of influencing variables was certainly valid for the
first generation of diffusion models, for instance, the models would not
hold if the (relative) profitability of an innovation would be close to
one. However, a large number of additional influencing variables have
since been studied both in the technological literature (e.g., Sharif and
Haq, 1979, who in addition to profitability and investment size,
analyze factors like product quality, advertizing effort and price
ratios), and the marketing literature (e.g., Gatignon and Robertson,
1986). Ayres, 1969, proposed an industry classification scheme, in
which the driving variables of diffusion might be regrouped into (a)
performance maximization, (b) sales maximization, and (c) cost
minimization. Thus, the models have been considerably extended in
the direction of a multidimensionality of influencing factors. Mono-
causality appears thus to be no longer a valid objection to the formu-
lation and application of diffusion models both in the area of techno-
logical change and marketing.
Related to the missing multidimensionality of influencing factors
is another critique on diffusion models: the static nature of the
influencing variables considered. In reality these variables change
continuously over time and interact with each other: e.g., technologi-
cal performance will increase, prices go down, uncertainty in applica-
tions will be reduced, etc. This possible interaction has been neglected
by a number of researches arguing that the profitability of adoption
(and thus the the diffusion rate ~t) should decrease over time, result-
ing in an asymmetrical diffusion trajectory. However, it is rather the
expected profitability, i.e., the vector of profitability and uncertainty
about the future, that determines the diffusion rate. As profitability
is reduced in due course in the diffusion process, uncertainty is
reduced as well, so the resulting vector may also stay constant over
time. In addition, there have been objections to the ex post nature of
the measurement of the driving variables, like profitability or com-
parative advantage. Thus, the explicative power of these variables for
the behavior of individuals (consumers or firms) would appear limited,
as the decisions to adopt are rather the result of an ex ante (subjec-
tive) assessment of the comparative advantage of an innovation under
conditions of uncertainty. This is contrary to the "objective" nature
of the ex post assessed variables, assuming no radical uncertainty and
quasi perfect information, usually taken for granted in traditional
economic theory (see the papers contained in Dosi et al., 1988, on a
critique of assumptions in classical, equilibrium economics).
The dynamic nature of the driving forces influencing innovation
diffusion applies not only to the innovation itself (e.g., through chang-
ing performance-price relationships, Le., the well established learning
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curve effect) but has to be extended to the whole environment in
which an innovation is embedded. Even an old technology, when chal-
lenged by competition may improve its technical/economic perfor-
mance. This phenomenon has been termed the "sailing ship effect"
(Ward, 1967, discussed further by Rosenberg, 1976), referring to the
considerable improvements in the technology of sail ships (clippers)
when challenged by the introduction of steamships. Whereas this
effect can certainly not be denied, there exist some doubts about its
impact on the diffusion of new technologies. Montroll, 1978, deter-
mined a time shift (of to) in the diffusion curve of steamships of 11
years, due to this effect which, in view of the time constants of steam-
ship diffusion (75 years to diffuse from 10 to 90 percent market share
in the USA), is certainly not dramatic. Similarly, by inspecting the
empirical substitution curves presented in Section 3.1, one can observe
a certain distortive influence of this effect. However, it does not seem
to significantly affect the diffusion rate proper.
Although both old and new technologies are affected by changing
performance, prices, and profitability over time, it appears to us that
the most important element influencing diffusion is the perceived rela-
tive performance-price relationship between the old and the new tech-
nology. To go one step further, one might argue that it is not so much
the perceived relative relationship at the time of adoption, but rather
the subjectively assessed difference between the ultimate
performance-price relationships of competing technologies, i.e., includ-
ing the subjective assessment of likely future improvements along the
learning curve.
The final criticism deals with the fact that diffusion models tend
to ignore the interaction between the various influencing variables. In
particular, the interaction between the supply and demand aspects of
innovation diffusion has been noticed. This aspect is highlighted and
incorporated into a diffusion model by Metcalfe, 1983 (see also Cam-
eron and Metcalfe, 1987). Metcalfe is a prominent representative of
the "equilibrium" diffusion modeling approach*. Here, diffusion is
seen as a transition between equilibria levels, defined by changing
economic 'attributes, e.g., costs, prices, etc., and a changing environ-
ment, e.g., differences in the market structure. Diffusion is not so
much interpreted as a learning phenomenon, but as a result of the
interaction of changes in the innovation and adoption environment,
i.e., the interaction between suppliers and customers of an
(product/process) innovation e.g., via licensing, price strategies and so
on.
• For similar arguments and models see e.g., Peterka, 1977, and Silvennoinen and Vaananen, 1987.
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Figure 2.2.2. Innovation diffusion within an equilibrium framework. Innova-
tion seen as impulse on the economy creating growth potential (from z to e),
filled by the innovation. (Source: Metcalfe, 1983.)
Figure 2.2.2 presents a graphical representation of the most
important relationships in the model proposed by Metcalfe. The term
equilibrium is used in this model in two ways: first, supply and
demand diffusion (Le., the dynamics of demand growth and capacity
expansion) are treated separately in that each has a different equili-
brium asymptote, but are kept in balance (equilibrium) via price
adjustment. Second, innovation diffusion is seen as the transition
between two equilibria levels. All along this transition, relative prices,
production costs, and the relative profitability of using and producing
both the old and the new technology vary endogenously, with their
variations being in turn driven by the substitution process. Without
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going into detail about the structure and mathematics of the model we
summarize its main conclusions.
The substitution trajectory is determined by the long-run market
share, the pre- and post-innovation market ratio and the (supply-
demand) balanced output growth of the innovation, as well as the ini-
tial conditions that exist between the old and the new
product/process. Yet, despite this complexity the substitution curve
is reduced to a simple logistic [Figure 2.2.2(a)].
The innovation acts as an impulse in the economy creating a
potential for growth, that is filled by the innovation. Adjustment to
the new equilibrium level is achieved via the continuously retarding
combined growth rate g(t) [Figure 2.2.2(b)]. However, the price and
costs of the new innovation change continuously over time producing
a profitability squeeze, as shown in Figure 2.2.2(c). Finally, Figure
2.2.2(d) shows the equilibrium demand and supply curves. Note in
particular that the price-output trajectory of the new innovation, i.e.,
arrowed line in Figure 2.2.2(d), does not lie either on the equilibrium
demand or supply curves until the final equilibrium (end of diffusion)
is reached. This points to the transient (non-equilibrium type) nature
of the diffusion process, which we discuss more in Section 2.2.3 where
we present the most recent diffusion models that are based on the
principles of self-organization.
Models such as the one presented in Section 2.2.3 represent to
some extent the end point of a long line of increasing complexity in
the economic modeling of causal relationships underlying the diffusion
process, a line of research initiated by the model of Mansfield. In the
following Section we see that, despite the increasing complexity of
innovation diffusion models, they are still consistent with the empiri-
cal regularities of diffusion identified and described by behavioral dif-
fusion models. Thus, empirical regularities as identified in the subse-
quent chapters on infrastructure development and technological
change in the transport sector, are consistent with the causalities of
diffusion models formulated in behavioral sciences and economics.
Structured evolutionary paths at the aggregate level emerge from
(rather than contradict) diversity in behavior, technological charac-
teristics, and economics at the micro-economic level or the level of the
individual.
Causal Models for Temporal Diffusion and Substitution
2.2.3. A self-organizing model of technology diffusion
and structural change
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This section* presents the underlying rationale and structure of a
model in which the evolution of a particular system (i.e., the struc-
tural change induced by the diffusion of an innovation), is regulated
by changing technological and behavioral diversity, learning, and
selection mechanisms. These, together with their interrelated feed-
backs, generate continuous adjustment processes to a changing
techno-economic environment and result in ordered evolutionary
paths at the macro (industry) level. The model proposed by Dosi et
al., 1986 (see also Silverberg et al., 1988), appears particularly appeal-
ing as it reconciles both a complex set of economic driving variables
and their interactions (and thus most of the host of hypotheses gen-
erated by first and second generation diffusion models discussed in the
previous Section) at the micro level, Le., the level of the firm, while
still being consistent with the ordered evolutionary paths at the macro
industry level, suggested by behavioral diffusion theory and empirical
observations.
Characteristics of Technology and Industry Environments
Technology in a broad sense, Le., including both process and product
innovations is not a free good. Instead, it is characterized by varying
degrees of appropriability, e.g., existence of patents, access to informa-
tion, etc., a priori uncertainty about its future technical and economic
characteristics and prospects, cumulativeness, in the patterns of inno-
vation and capabilities to innovate (Le., an analog to "learning by
doing" as formulated by Arrow, 1962) and of tacitness of knowledge
and expertise on which development and successful adoption of an
innovation is contingent. Adoption decisions are characterized by
particular search and learning processes, drawing on specific
knowledge bases, containing both freely available information, like
published scientific results, as well as internal and external skills.
As a result of the above, a fundamental characteristic of any
industrial environment undergoing (technological) change is in fact
the diversity of the economic, technological, and behavioral environ-
ment in which a particular innovation is embedded. Diversity in the
economic environment implies that at any given point in time the
economic population (be it firms or consumers) is in fact heterogene-
ous. Firms have different technological capabilities to innovate
• Based on Dosi el aI., 1986, and Silverberg eI aI., 1988.
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(consider for instance the different R&D expenditures and capabilities
among companies), show different degrees of success in the develop-
ment and adoption of innovations, and finally have different cost
structures. Economic structure is the result of the differences in
economic performance, the relative differences in innovation and
adoption of innovations between individual firms, in search pro-
cedures, production techniques, combination of factor inputs, and
finally the products of firms. The diversity between firms influences
the rate and nature of the diffusion process in the following way: if
the average level of technological capabilities in an industry is high,
diffusion will proceed fast, if the variance of the distribution of capa-
bilities between firms is high, one might expect ceteris paribus diffu-
sion to proceed through competition rather than through
learning/imitation.
Diversity between economic agents implies that any economic
system undergoing change through innovation and diffusion, is in a
disequilibrium situation in the neoclassical sense. "Better" and
"worse" firms, with a different technological base (even to the extent
of a redundancy of the technologies present in the market), etc., coex-
ist. Decisions are affected by uncertainty about the technical and
economic outcomes of the introduction of an innovation, because of
interactions and interdependencies between firms with respect to
prices, and technological and market competition, and so on. In fact,
the outcome of a decision of any particular firm depends on the
actions of other firms. Thus, it is difficult to reduce the behavioral
diversity to a simple maximizing behavior underlying the traditional
equilibrium type diffusion models.
The basic task of a self-organizing model consists thus in the
representation of the feedback loops between the structure of an
industry, the behavior of firms and the evolution of the industry in
general. The coupled dynamics in the areas of technology, economic
structure, and diverse behavior interact to produce relatively ordered
evolutionary paths at the industry level, and in total at the level of the
whole economy. The changing nature of the system in turn feeds back
on the (technological) capabilities, incentives, constraints, and the
behavior of economic agents.
Model Description
In the following we present an overview of a model proposed by Dosi,
Orsenigo and Silverberg, 1986, with further discussion of the underly-
ing economic rationale of some of the model assumptions and equa-
tions contained in Silverberg, 1984, and 1987. Dosi et aI., 1986 (p. 9)
state:
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Innovation/imitation/diffusion [are] * represented as the process
through which endogenously generated fluctuations of a system become
'autocatalytic' and, under certain conditions, progressively change the
morphology [the structure] of the system itself. Diffusion of new pro-
ducts and production technologies is the outcome of evolutionary
processes whereby the interactions between agents (the carriers of
capabilities, technologies and behavior) induce changing incentives,
selection mechanisms and learning processes. Innovation and diffusion
processes are thus governed by (different combinations of) selection
and learning mechanisms. Selection tends to increase the economic
dominance of the firms which carry the innovation and penalize others,
while learning spreads innovative/imitative capabilities throughout the
(changing) set of potential adopters.
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The balance/composition of these two different modes of diffusion
contains technological, structural and behavioral components. More
specifically, diffusion depends on (Dosi et at., 1986, pp. 8-9):
(a) the characteristics of each technology (sources of basic knowledge,
degrees of appropriability and tacitness of innovation, complexity of
research, production and products, existence and role of various forms
of economies of scale, cumulativeness of technological learning, etc.),
(b) the degrees and forms of diversity between economic agents (including
their levels of technological capabilities and variety of search pro-
cedures and behavioral rules), and
(c) the endogenous evolution of incentives, constraints and selection
mechanisms (including the evolution of relative profitabilities of dif-
ferent technologies, firm sizes, cash flows and market shares).
The assumed industry situation for which the model has been
developed, is characterized by a supplier dominated industry, which in
turn purchases its investment goods from outside suppliers where no
availability constraints are assumed. The market is characterized by
strong price competition, although for the sake of simplicity no dif-
ferentiation in the product according to different product qualities is
assumed. Only one existing and one new technology are considered.
The diffusion of a new technology is represented by its incorpora-
tion into the capital stock of a firm, constrained by cash flow, i.e., no
negative cash flow and self-financing are assumed in order to make the
feedback between profitability and investment (diffusion) more
straightforward, but at the same time also less realistic. In addition,
scrapping of old capital stock is included in the model. Demand and
supply are represented and linked by the variables orders, delivery
• Square brackets refer to alterations and emphasis added by the author.
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delay (in case orders exceed productive capacity in the time interval),
capacity utilization, and shipments. Obviously production is con-
strained by maximum capacity, and average and marginal costs are a
decreasing function of the production level up to full capacity utiliza-
tion. Total demand is assumed to be exogenous* (growing at an
exponential rate), and demand (orders) for a particular firm are a
function of competitiveness (price). Market shares of individual com-
panies may therefore change over time due to disparities in their rela-
tive competitiveness. The competitiveness of a firm is defined in rela-
tive terms, Le., the difference between its competitiveness and the
average competitiveness for the industry.
Initially, the model consists of a system of equations in which a
single best practice technology is available to all agents. It is assumed
that the investment process (implicit in the payback method of the
model) ensures that productivity gains due to technological advances
(incremental innovations) are continually incorporated into the capi-
tal stock, even under different payback criteria used by different firms.
Thus, the investment policy as represented in the model assures the
diffusion of technical progress within the capital stock installed.
However, one has to go one step further: first by considering
more than just one (old) best practice technology, although it too
evolves in the direction of productivity improvements, and take into
account the introduction of a** new technology that may, however,
not be freely available to everybody. Second, although an innovation
may initially have a lower productivity level than the best existing
technology, it has a larger ultimate improvement potential. In this
context, a new innovation might consist of improvements in the exist-
ing technology in terms of its economic and technical performance and
capabilities. It could also constitute a "quantum leap" opening up
entirely new performance dimensions, new markets, etc. which might
not be apparent at the initial stage of introduction.
Firms making investment decisions have to subjectively weigh the
improvement potential of existing versus new technology, Le., the
remaining improvement potential of their respective learning curves.
In both cases, of course, the exact rate and ultimate potential for
improvements are unknown. In addition, improvements in the tech-
nology are not only of a technical and/or economic nature, but involve
also changing levels of expertise (scientific/engineering, qualification
• This model simplification appeartl problematic in view of the linkage between diffusion and market ex-
pansion, argued by Metcalfe, 1983, and discussed in the previous Section.
.. The model deals just with the rather special case of a one to one competition between two process inno-
vations producing the same type and quality of output, Le., a fully standardized commodity. Quality dif-
ferentiation, multiple competition and/or the possibility that a (radical) innovation opens completely new
product lines/market! are not considered.
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of workforce, etc.) available both internally and externally to the firm.
Different strategies are therefore pursued by individual firms with
respect to developing their knowledge base: either by in-house
development or by waiting for the competitor to act and thus avoid
(initially high) development and learning costs. These different stra-
tegies imply that an innovation might never be introduced if no one
takes the initiative to develop it. On the other hand there is also the
possibility that a firm might acquire a new technology free or at very
moderate costs, after it has been developed, improved, and demon-
strated as technically and economically feasible by some competitor.
In fact, it can be shown by simulation runs that if the subjective
assessment criteria (represented by an anticipation bonus about the
future improvement of the technology) for a firm adopting an innova-
tion and being the net "winner" are fixed uniformly for all firms in a
subsequent simulation run, the innovation is not adopted at all,
because no firm is ready to incur the costs of developing the technol-
ogy and bring it to the commercialization stage.
Therefore the notion of a single "optimum time" for adoption has
to be questioned due to the uncertainty and diversity of expectations
about the future "trajectories" of existing and new technologies, and
the actions and outcomes between the different agents thereof. Dosi
et al., 1986, go so far as to consider this diversity of expectations as
not only unavoidable in any assessment for investment purposes, but
almost as a prerequisite for the adoption of an innovation. They claim
that this diversity is socially superior, despite the fact that it forces
firms to profit or incur losses unevenly in the process of innovation
adoption.
In order to model the dynamics of different technological trajec-
tories the following assumptions are made. Two changing technologi-
cal trajectories represented by maximum productivities are available.
It is assumed that the second technology is ultimately always superior
to the old one. The actual productivity realized by a firm is the result
of the changing inherent productivity value of the technology and the
changing specific skill levels of the firm. In the model firms are
assumed to know only the product of the inherent technology effi-
ciency and their respective efficiency in adoption and exploitation.
They may (in fact must) make subjective assessments about the rate
at which the new technology will achieve further productivity
improvements as well as their internal rate of application efficiency
(learning by doing). This can be improved both by internal learning,
or by obtaining skills from outside, e.g., by hiring engineers, workers,
etc., from competing firms. For reasons of simplicity the model
assumes that the old technology is mature, i.e., its efficiency of appli-
cation cannot be improved further. Modeling the evolution of the
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efficiency parameter of the new technology is quite simple as it is
nothing more than the well established learning curve effect, where
the rate of improvement (in use) is a function (power law) of the
cumulative output (experience) associated with the technology.
The choice of a new technology will thus depend on a firm's
assessment of its future learning curve potential. Investment decisions
are awarded on the basis of an anticipative "bonus" with respect to its
future prospects. The current realizable productivity of a technology
is multiplied with this bonus and then compared to the best practice
productivity of the old technology. The new technology will be
adopted when its adjusted productivity is higher than for the old one
and the new technology is either (1) cheaper per unit of capacity at
the time of comparison, or (2) more expensive, but the investment
difference can be compensated for by a reduction in production costs
within the desired payback period.
Despite some simplifying assumptions, the model contains a clear
economic rationale for the interaction and feedback mechanisms
between economic agents. The complex structure of this model illus-
trates that there are many more mechanisms at work affecting the dif-
fusion of innovations at the micro level than have been captured even
in the most detailed diffusion models proposed in economics to date.
It would be difficult indeed to infer the relative strategies, fate and
performance of economic agents at the micro level, from a relatively
small number of postulated driving variables, notwithstanding the
explicative and predictive power of these simpler models at the macro
level.
The following figures document some model simulation runs and
illustrate how structured, evolutionary paths at the macro level evolve
out of uncertainty, interdependence, and (antagonistic) competition at
the micro level. The feedback mechanisms link the "whole" and the
"parts" in order to demonstrate their mutual coevolution through a
self-organizing mechanism. The characteristic diffusion pattern, for-
mulated by traditional macro level diffusion models and observed
empirically, emerges here as the outcome of the joint dynamics of
technological behavior and economic activities and interactions at the
micro level.
Figures 2.2.3 to 2.2.5 show the results of a simulation run in
which* the pre-innovation equilibrium is disturbed through the
• The main assumptions for the simulation run are: The (new) technology 2 is potentially 100% more pro-
ductive. Both technology 1 and 2 evolve at a rate of 4% per year as do nominal wages (production costs).
The initially higher price of technology 2 decreases at a rate of 1%per year. All firms start with identical
conditions (model parameters) except for their (subjective) "anticipation8 bonus used to estimate the im-
provement potential of technology 2. This bonus ranges from 3.3 (i.e., the firm that introduces technology
2 first, evaluates its potential productivity a factor 3.3 higher than its present productivity) to 1 (Le., the
firm does not consider technology 2 to have any future productivity gain potential).
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Figure 2.2.3. Diffusion curves of incorporating an innovation in the capital
stock of an industry, (a) share of adopting firms in total number of firms, (b)
market share of adopters, (c) percent capacity installed with new technology.
(Source: Dosi et al., 1986, and Silverberg et al., 1988.)
availability and consequent diffusion of a new technology. The dif-
ferent strategies followed by different firms produce a complex set of
phenomena and outcomes at the micro level, while resulting in a
ordered path at the macro level. This is consistent with the empirical
observations in the diffusion literature, as well as with the empirical
regularities on transport technologies and infrastructure development
identified in Chapters 3 and 4.
Figure 2.2.3 shows the aggregate macro level behavior of the sys-
tem represented by three classical measures of diffusion: percentage of
adopting firms (curve a), percentage of the market share held by those
firms who adopted the new technology (curve b),* and finally (curve
c) percentage of installed capacity, Le., the result of inter- and
intrafirm diffusion as well as of the changes in the relative sizes of
firms. Dashed lines indicate the adoption dates of particular firms.
All three measures display the classic S-shaped diffusion pattern.
• In this particular example the adopters (aggregated together) have not gained significant market shares
over the non adopters. See, however, Figure 2.2.4 for the drastic differences in the market shares of the in-
dividual adopting firms.
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Figure 2.2.4. Market share of individual firms as a result of changes in com-
petitiveness through adoption (or lagged or non-adoption) of an innovation by
individual firms. (Source: Dosi et al., 1986, and Silverberg et al., 1988.)
Figures 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 illustrate the micro-economic "drama"
going on underneath the smooth macro level surface. The relative
success of the different firms in terms of market share (Figure 2.2.4)
and in average productivity of the capital stock (Figure 2.2.5) is very
different.
In terms of market share, early adopters of technology 2 do not
perform as well as later adopters. This particular simulation outcome
is (among other factors) the result of the assumed appropriability of
technology 2, as reflected in the rate of internal learning. If the respec-
tive coefficient is set higher, the appropriability of technology 2 is
accelerated, and the adopters become net benefiters. Particularly
noteworthy is the market share of the "laggard" in adopting the tech-
nology 2: it is completely driven out of the market. This demon-
strates the pitfalls of missing the boat by not providing for an anticipa-
tion bonus in the productivity assessment of a new technology (Dosi et
al., 1986, p. 33). The results show, that the relative payoffs of dif-
ferent adoption strategies depend partly on factors beyond the control
of an individual firm, such as the adoption decisions of other firms,
appropriability of a technology, etc. This illustrates the disequili-
brium nature of the diffusion process, i.e., there is no individual
optimal strategy independent of the strategies of one's competitors.
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Figure 2.2.5. Realized average productivity of capital stock of different firms
as well as industry average (dashed line) as a result of innovation adoptions.
(Source: Dosi et al., 1986, and Silverberg et aI., 1988.)
Figure 2.2.5 shows the productivity of the capital stock realized
for each firm, as well as the industry average (dashed line in Figure
2.2.5). It shows in particular how successful adopters realize above
average productivity levels, which contribute to their market share
gains, whereas late adopters stay consistently below this average.
This is a result of the differentials in the internal efficiency (skill) lev-
els of firms. Whereas the innovation pioneers indeed build up their
skill levels, later adopters benefit from this experience via external
learning and eventually overtake the earliest adopters in terms of skill
level and realized productivity. It should, however, be remembered
that productivity is only one variable influencing competitiveness and
thus market shares. The dynamics of the delivery delay incorporated
into the model contribute equally to the changes in the market shares
and the price margins realized.
Of course the outcome of the simulation run presented is the
result of the particular technological, market, and behavior variables
assumed. The main purpose here, is not to discuss the simulation
result in terms of how well it represents reality, or in terms of "robust-
ness" of innovation policies responding to the diversity in, and uncer-
tainty about, the behavior of economic agents and the interdependen-
cies of their strategies. Instead, the model demonstrates only the
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dynamic behavior of such an evolutionary self-organizing system. The
main lesson to be learned is (the realization that) the dynamic interac-
tion between the macro and micro level in such a system leads to the
emergence of spatial and temporal patterns, which are driven rather
than dissipated by micro level diversity. This becomes especially
important when interpreting the empirical long-term regularities of
diffusion and technological substitution. From this perspective, regu-
larity in the evolutionary paths at the macro level is not a contradic-
tion but rather a consequence of the diversity of technological expecta-
tions, designs, dynamic appropriability, and behavior of economic
agents.
2.3. Spatial Diffusion Models
How do innovations diffuse spatially, and how do they affect spatial
(geographical) structures? Innovations in the transport and commun-
ication sector, which are the subject of the present study, especially
have important influences on spatial structures, as they alter the
human space-time activity patterns. The geographical discipline of
spatial innovation diffusion cannot be comprehensively treated within
the present context (for an overview see, for instance, Morrill et al.,
1988). We briefly discuss, however, the conceptual and empirical con-
tribution of Torsten Hagerstrand to the field of spatial innovation dif-
fusion. This is not only because of his pioneering role both at the con-
ceptual and formal level (computer based Monte-Carlo simulation
techniques as early as the beginning of the 1950s), but his approach
continues to be the most comprehensive formal conceptualization of
spatial innovation diffusion to date.
The scale of spatial innovation diffusion is similar* to that of
temporal diffusion models: hierarchically decomposed. As such, diffu-
sion may be represented by the fractal decomposition of various
space-time hierarchies. Different spatial scales, in a hierarchy
of"cones of resolution" (Abler et al., 1971) may be considered, rang-
ing, e.g., from the international, to national, regional, and finally local
level. This hierarchical decomposition of spatial scales is important
for two reasons. First, social communication networks, which are - as
in temporal diffusion models - at the core of spatial diffusion analysis,
are different at the various levels of the spatial hierarchy. At the
• Complex systems are generally hierarchica.!, which in turn allows their abstraction in the form of
mathematical models, as discussed by Simon, 1988. Consider for instance the diffusion of road infrastruc-
ture, automobiles, car components, etc. See also Chapter 5 on a proposed temporal hierarchy of diffusion
processes in the transport area.
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micro scale (local level), communication networks are primarily based
on interpersonal communication linking individuals to each another.
This communication network changes when considering higher level
spatial aggregates from the regional to national, or even international
level. Second, spatial innovation diffusion is characterized by a strong
heterogeneity of diffusion patterns, as innovations do not spread uni-
formly in space, but proceed through a hierarchy of "innovation
centers", in order to spread out from these centers to the hinterland.
In the following discussion of Hagerstrand's spatial diffusion
model* (Hagerstrand, 1953, and 1967) we are primarily concerned
with the lowest level of the spatial hierarchy, i.e., the local or subre-
gional level. As a result, interpersonal communication plays a central
role in the conceptualization of the diffusion process. This does not
imply that interpersonal communication would be of lesser importance
at higher spatial hierarchy levels (because the latter are in fact aggre-
gates of lower level entities), but suggests that other forms of com-
munication and information flows may also be at work at these higher
levels.
Hagerstrand's conceptualization of the spatial innovation process
is based on two principles. First, it consists of a model of the diffusion
process itself and its empirical regularities. Diffusion is seen to
proceed in a "wavelike fashion" (Hagerstrand, 1952) through interper-
sonal communication networks. Second, a probabilistic concept of
communication behavior (hence the use of Monte-Carlo simulation
techniques) is central in Hagerstrand's model, as represented in his
"mean information field" (Hagerstrand, 1953, and 1967).
Spatial innovation diffusion in Hagerstrand's model consists of
three stages.
Stage 1: Local concentrations of initial acceptances (initial
agglomeration) .
Stage 2: Radial dissemination outward from the initial agglomeration,
accompanied by the rise of secondary agglomerations.
Stage 3: The condensing and saturation stage, in which filling-in
occurs and diffusion eventually ceases.
Thus, three main characteristics define the spatial diffusion process:
(1) As in temporal diffusion models, an S-shaped pattern in the
cumulative level of adoption.
• Higeratrand formulated in fact three models, including further subvariants of Model III. These are not,
however, treated here.
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(2) A "hierarchy effect" by which diffusion proceeds from initial
centers to secondary ones. Within the context of urban systems
(central places) this implies a hierarchical spread of an innovation
from larger to smaller centers, and from the centers to the sur-
rounding hinterland.
(3) A "neighborhood effect" Le., diffusion proceeds outwards from
innovation centers, first "hitting" (Brown, 1981) nearby rather
than far-away locations.
Diffusion in a spatial context is seen as changing the relative pro-
portions of a population in a region between non adopters and
adopters. The mechanism of this change remains to be discussed. In
Hagerstrand's model, adoption is a function of the cumulative number
of messages received about an innovation (e.g., its advantages, experi-
ence with it and so on). The exact amount of information required
before adoption takes place, depends on (different) individual "resis-
tance" levels, as a function of both individual and group characteris-
tics. This resistance can both be in the form of "social resistance",
should an innovation be inconsistent with given societal values, or
"economic resistance", stemming from the relative attributes of an
innovation, such as (high) costs, triability, etc., as discussed in Section
2.2 above.
The information flows between early adopters and the remaining
population (i.e., how, and the number of messages an individual
receives, before his resistance is overcome) define the time lag between
initial adopters and followers. The flow of information is assumed to
be a function of the distance between message emitters (adopters) and
receivers (rest of the population). Later Hagerstrand conceptualized
physical "barrier" effects like lakes or uninhabited areas, which, in
addition to distance, act as further retarding effects on diffusion.
These are formalized in the form of "zero" or "half" contact multipli-
cators on the (distance decaying) message flows.
The above concept of diffusion via cumulative message flows
may, to some degree, be considered problematic. In approaching inno-
vation diffusion through information diffusion, many other variables
influencing information circulation are left aside, including an
individual's different perception and interpretation of information,
possible transformation of message contents, etc. In addition, social
rather than geographical distance may ultimately determine the "effi-
ciency" of communication channels (see in particular Pred, 1967, in
his postscript of the English translation of Hagerstrand's "Innovation
Diffusion as a Spatial Process" on these points). The concept of indi-
vidual "resistance" has also to be considered as simplifying, as it does
not differentiate between the attributes of individuals (social values,
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risk attitude, etc.) and the ones of the innovation proper (e.g., costs,
relative advantages, complexity, etc.).
The last two elements of Hagerstrand's model deal with how the
message flow between individuals can be described, and secondly, how
the initial distribution of adopters is modeled. Communication is
modeled in a probabilistic manner, where the probability that an
adopter communicates with a non adopter is a negative exponential
function of the intervening distance corrected for the existence of
natural barriers. The initial distribution of early adopters or receivers
of adoption messages is not deterministically fixed, but instead gen-
erated by drawing random numbers, hence the use of Monte-Carlo
simulation techniques·.
At a conceptual level the use of Monte-Carlo simulation suggests
that individual human behavior is usually so complex, e.g., in the deci-
sion to be (become) the first adopter(s) of an innovation, that their
aggregate spatial expression is randomly determined within certain
constraints, even though decisions behind individual behavior are not
randomly motivated. Spatial diffusion in Hagerstrand's conceptuali-
zation (i.e., exactly to whom information is spread leading to adoption
decisions) is defined by the neighborhood effect (operationalized by
communication probabilities as a function of intervening distance) and
random selection.
With respect to the formalization of the communication flows
Hagerstrand defines a "mean information field" (MIF), in which the
probability of communication is a negative function of distance
between individuals. Space-wise, the MIF assigns different communi-
cation probabilities to the area surrounding an adopter, represented
by grid cells, with the sum of all cell probabilities being one. Thus,
the MIF is the area into which a message, whenever passed, will fall
with a probability of one, with the fractional probabilities (of "hit-
ting" a particular grid cell) decreasing away from the origin as a func-
tion of distance. The communication probabilities of the MIF are cali-
brated based on telephone communication data, but Hagerstrand also
considered migration data as an indicator for particular spatial com-
munication networks. The frequency of messages sent out is opera-
tionalized by considering discrete time steps in the simulation runs,
with one message being passed per time step.
• This implies of course that there exist various outcomes of the spatial distribution pattern of adopters
between the model runs. However, from an interpretative as well as conceptual viewpoint this is a signifi-
cant advantage rather than a drawback of the model. Recall here the discussion of the evolutionary
economic diffusion model in Section 2.2.3 above, where diversity in individual behavior results in ordered
structured evolution paths at the macro level.
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Figure 2.3.1. Spatial diffusion of tuberculosis control by farmers in two dis-
tricts of southern Sweden. (Source: Hagerstrand, 1967.)
The model has been applied to study the diffusion of a number of
innovations, including agricultural ones like tuberculosis (TB) control
for cattle, financial (such as the diffusion of checking accounts), and
transport and communication innovations (automobile and tele-
phones) in two small districts (Kinda and Ydre) in the Swedish pro-
vince of Ostergotland.
Figure 2.3.1 illustrates the "wavelike" fashion of the spatial diffu-
sion of innovations on the basis of the adoption of TB-controls by
farmers in the region. Compared to temporal diffusion, more complex
patterns may be observed in space, as innovations spread out from a
number of innovation centers and may overlap in between. Note that
the model maps spatial diffusion patterns at the lowest level of the
spatial hierarchy discussed above. If the "hierarchy effect" between
central places is examined, e.g., in considering spatial innovation at a
national level, the resulting pattern may become even more complex.
This should be borne in mind when judging simplifying restrictions of
higher aggregate spatial diffusion models, such as the one described in
the following Section.
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Figure 2.3.2. Spatial diffusion of automobile ownership in a region of southern
Sweden 1920, 1923, and 1933, in isolines of areas having more than 4, 8, 16 and
32 car owners. (Source: adapted from Hagerstrand, 1967.)
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As a conclusion to this Section, we present Hagerstrand's simula-
tion results with respect to automobile ownership diffusion as
presented in Figure 2.3.2. Particularly noticeable is the spread of the
innovation out from a number of innovation centers. In terms of the
diffusion speed and absolute diffusion levels reached, the spread of
automobile ownership proceeds differently from the various centers as
a result of spatial differences in communication networks and the
"resistance" of the resident population to adoption.
Adoption levels are highest in innovation centers, i.e., in those
areas where the automobile was first introduced. We show below
(Section 3.3) that a similar observation can also be made for the diffu-
sion of the automobile at the international level. This points to the
self-similarity of the process of spatial diffusion along all spatial
hierarchy levels. Also visible is the "wavelike" fashion of the diffusion:
initially slow, followed by rapid growth, and finally very slow again as
it reaches the farthest hinterlands of the innovation centers where
adoption levels are lowest. This confirms the formal and functional
equivalences of both the temporal and spatial dimension of innovation
diffusion, pointing to their common conceptual basis: diffusion as a
social learning phenomenon.
2.4. Diffusion Models Integrating Time and Space
Any social, economic or technological diffusion or substitution
phenomenon occurs simultaneously in space and time. From the pre-
vious Sections, where we discussed temporal and spatial innovation
diffusion models, the following regularities of the process emerged.
(1) Interpretation of technological change as a learning process,
driven by a complex vector of communicational, social, and
economic stimuli.
(2) Diversity in the behavior of economic agents, in available innova-
tion designs, and uncertainty about the ultimate (economic and
social) consequences of adoption decisions imply that an innova-
tion is not accepted instantly by a social system, but spreads as a
function of the experience gained.
(3) S-shaped patterns of diffusion/substitution result.
(4) There is a hierarchy effect in spatial diffusion.
(5) There is a neighborhood effect, i.e., diffusion spreads out from
innovation (usually urban) centers, first reaching nearby rather
than distant areas.
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Figure 2.4.1. Substitution patterns as a function of time and space. (Source:
Mahajan and Peterson, 1979, after Morrill, 1968.)
In the following we discuss an intergrated space/time diffusion
model proposed by Mahajan and Peterson, 1979. The purpose of this
model presentation is primarily illustrative. It is not considered to be
an ultimate formulation of an integrated space/time diffusion model
as it is affected by a number of limiting simplifying assumptions.
However, its simplicity, and especially the fact that the model was
tested successfully with empirical data, merits its presentation as an
example of the class of integrated models dealing with spatial and
temporal aspects of innovation diffusion.
Figure 2.4.1 presents a graphical representation of the integrated
time-space model following the work of Morrill, 1968, and 1970, (see
also Steinbach, 1980, for a discussion of the Morrill model). Diffusion
(substitution) is considered to evolve over time following a standard
diffusion model of the logistic type, with the time lag of introduction
being a function of the distance from the innovation center. The
upper limit of diffusion is assumed to decrease also as a function of
distance from the innovation center, whereas the diffusion speed is
assumed to be constant for all regions. Thus only K (the saturation
level of diffusion) and a (the time shift parameter denoted in this
study as to), but not the diffusion rate parameter b (~t in our
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notation) of the standard logistic diffusion model are considered as
functions of distance and time. Thus, denoting* the asymptote of the
diffusion in the innovation center as K 1 and the distance from the
innovation center to the peripheral regions 2, ... ,n with x, the asymp-
tote in region x F (x) is defined by
- x2F(x) = K 1 - d-2 (2.4.1)
where d is a constant, similar to the distance sensitivity parameter of
standard gravity spatial interaction models. Assuming a constant dif-
fusion rate b for all values of x (i.e., all regions), then
aF~~,t) = bF(x,t)(F(x)-F(x,t)) (2.4.2)
and allowing the time shift parameter a to be a function of the dis-
tance x and using the Fisher-Pry variable to (inflection point) to
represent a with
as the initial value and
aF (O,t) = °
ax
(2.4.3)
(2.4.4)
as the boundary value, to ensure that the solution of equation (2.4.2)
for the innovative region is independent of x. Without going into
detail about the formal derivation of this model (described in Mahajan
and Peterson, 1979), the final formulation of the space-time model is
given by:
F(xt)= (K-dx2 /2)
, 1 + (((K - d x2 / 2) - F0 (x) ) / F0 (x) ) exp (- b ( K - d x2 / 2 ) ( t - to) )
(2.4.5)
For x=O, eq':!.ation (2.4.5) reduces to the standard logistic diffusion
model with F = K and equation (2.4.4) also being satisfied. In their
application of the model to the diffusion of farm tractor adoption in 25
states of the central farm producing region of the USA, Mahajan and
• We have retained the original notation of Mahajan and Peterson, 1979.
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Peterson, 1979, conclude that the estimated regression coefficients of
the model are statistically highly significant, and report a good fit
between the adoption rates estimated via the model and the empirical
data for the entire period.
Despite the fact that the model shows a certain elegance in its
simplicity and that the empirical test did indeed generate impressive
results, a number of serious model simplifications should be borne in
mind. First, the measure of distance from the innovation center is
only a crude approximation of the spatial aspects of diffusion. In par-
ticular, the "hierarchy" effect, where the innovation spreads through
main, secondary, and tertiary innovation centers and then on to the
hinterland (i.e., an innovation may spread out from more than just
one center), is ignored in the model. Secondly, distance is in fact a
surrogate measure: first incorporating one spatial aspect of diffusion
proper, i.e., the spread of information and experience with an innova-
tion from centers to hinterland areas, and second, reflecting the dif-
ferent characteristics of an innovation, e.g., its profitability of intro-
duction, in different areas as reflected in the decreasing value of F
with increasing distance from the innovation center.
Last and most important, the model assumes a constant value of
b (~t in our notation), i.e., diffusion in other areas proceeds at the
same rate as in the region of origin. However, bearing in mind the
learning process, we should expect a "catch-up" effect in peripheral
areas, so that although the diffusion process started at a later date, it
proceeds faster, shortening the overall diffusion time of late starters.
We show empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis in Chapter 3.
Therefore, the above model should be interpreted mainly as an
illustrative example, showing how an integrated formulation between
the spatial and temporal aspects of diffusion can be achieved. A more
comprehensive integrated model was formulated by Sonis, 1984, and
1986. This model integrates innovation diffusion and substitution
models with multinomial Logit and Dogit individual choice and
regional growth/decline models based on multiregional competition.
This (the complexity of which does not allow a concise discussion
here) is a particularly interesting model for its duality formulation
between the choice behavior of individuals and the spread of competi-
tive alternative innovations, seen as the driving force for
urban/regional dynamics. As such, it supports the formulation of
innovation diffusion as a structured, self-organizing dynamic process
under behavioral and technological diversity.
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In this methodological chapter we have presented a number of
mathematical models to describe the growth and structural change
processes from the perspective of the interaction between a (technolog-
ical) system and its (social and economic) environment. Innovations
in the transport sector, physically manifested in infrastructures and
the technologies using them, are subject to competition and adapta-
tion to changing social and economic boundary conditions. Adjust-
ment processes take the form of structured evolutionary transition
paths, which can be summarized by simple mathematical models.
We then explored at the macro level how such structured evolu-
tionary paths can be rationalized from the perspective of sociology,
behavioral sciences, economics, and geography. In a long line of
increasing model complexity we reached the conclusion that the
dynamics of technological and economic systems are best viewed as
portraying the features of self-organizing systems. Structured evolu-
tionary paths at the aggregate level emerge rather than dissipate due
to diversity in behavior, technological characteristics, and economics
at the micro-economic level or that of the individual.
Diffusion models serve as a useful tool for the systematization
and organization of empirical data, in order to describe the dynamics
of long-term development patterns. The models are also a prerequisite
for comparative analysis between different countries where the abso-
lute size of a particular market (the "niche" infrastructures grow into,
or within which various technologies compete for market shares) is
very different in terms of population, size, GNP, etc. Thus, the formal
analysis framework used here allows us to take the self-referential
qualities between different systems (countries) into account. The use
of a formal descriptive framework also enables us to identify regulari-
ties and stable long-term trends in the transport sector. We show
that the development of transport systems evolves along structured
development paths both in terms of growth and decline. In addition,
we document a regular pattern in the changing morphology of the
transport system, consisting of a sequence of replacements of old by
new forms to satisfy human (transport) needs.
The models presented in this chapter provide not only consistency
for our comparative analysis, but equally an underlying rationale
based on the findings from a number of research disciplines, ranging
from social learning theory to evolutionary economics. The dynamics
of change and the stable evolutionary patterns identified give an
insight into the lead times for social acceptance, proof of economic via-
bility, and possible rates of change in the competition between alter-
natives. The results suggest that these lead times are very long
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indeed, especially for large, pervasive technological systems. We also
have to recognize explicit d£scont£nu£ties in development, identified by
the use of formal descriptive models. In Chapter 5 we show how these
discontinuities in development can be interpreted from the perspective
of Wechsellagen in long-term economic development (Kontradieff or
Long Waves).
Having established a consistent descriptive picture, the next obvi-
ous question is what drives the system and why is there regularity in
its evolution. At this point a final caveat is in order. Models aimed at
describing driving forces and causality have become increasingly com-
plex, in terms of the number of variables they consider and the multi-
tude of interactions and feedback mechanisms, as shown in particular
in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. This provides us with an even better
understanding of the driving forces of technological change. Unfor-
tunately, a similar complex and differentiated strategy to explain why
we have come to the point we have with respect to our transport infra-
structure cannot be followed.
Many of the key variables and system configurations responsible
for the long-term development are, in fact, hidden from us in the his-
torical past. Thus our modest efforts (in comparison with the com-
plexity of an ultimate comprehensive causal model) to formulate some
generalized propositions and aggregate driving forces responsible for
the historical development patterns (as done in Chapters 4 and 5)
should be seen as £nd£cat£ve rather than comprehensive.
We consider, however, that a descr£pt£on of the evolutionary pat-
tern that shaped the transport system with its regularities and discon-
tinuities provides useful insights. Contrary to the detailed descriptive
portrait, we use a much wider brush to illustrate some of the underly-
ing driving forces and causalities. As such the discussion is mainly
h£nt£ng at some of the key variables that may be responsible for driv-
ing the system. The intention is to invite further exploration rather
than provide an ultimate answer.

CHAPTER 3
Evolution of Il1.frastructures:
Growth, Decline, and
Technological Change
... the evolution of man's artificial aids to his effectors, by a process of
"survival of the fittest" was recognized as early as 1757 by David Hume. We
can now add, from the modern quantitative viewpoint, that this resemblance
between the development of our inorganic accessories and that of organic
populations extends also, in a number of instances, to the growth curves.
Alfred Lotka, Elements of Physical Biology, 1924
(describing the growth of railways in the United States)
In this Chapter we try to give a quantitative overview of the rise and
fall of different transport infrastructures in chronological order. The
evolution of canals and ships, railways, roads, horses and cars, and
finally, air transport is discussed. Illustrative examples of technologi-
cal change and substitution for those technologies using particular
infrastructure networks is also given.
The absence of detailed quantitative data led us to focus our
attention on long-distance transport networks, thus, urban mass trans-
port is not discussed in detail here.* Our analysis concentrates on a
quantitative overview of the historical development patterns of indus-
trial transport infrastructures and on a comparison of the dynamics of
their growth and decline in different countries.
• For an excellent narrative and pictorial history of the London transport system the reader is referred to
the two volumes of Barker and Robbins (1975).
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Due to space limitations we refrain from supporting our quantita-
tive analysis with the rich body of information assembled by transport
historians on the numerous facets of infrastructure development and
the multitude of - in retrospect even bizarre - technological options
advocated at various periods in time. Here we refer only to some of
the classical works that provide an excellent overview of the history of
transportation: Sax, 1920; Voigt, 1965; various articles contained in
the Oxford History of Technology (Singer et al., 1972, 1975, and
1979); and the Murray History of Technology (Daumas, 1980).
Finally, much useful information on the role of the transport system in
the industrialization process is contained in the monumental work of
Sombart, 1916. Detailed works on transport development in indivi-
dual countries are Dyos and Aldcroft, 1969, for England; Taylor, 1962,
for the United States of America (USA); and Toutain, 1967, for
France. Where appropriate, further references on the history of indi-
vidual transport systems will be made.
As the quote from Alfred Lotka at the beginning of this Chapter
illustrates, a large number of scientists deserve credit for their pioneer-
ing contributions to the quantitative description of infrastructure
development. Even at the risk of doing injustice to those who are not
mentioned here, names like Alfred Lotka, Walter Isard, and the
invaluable statistics compiled by Wladimir Woytinsky, Brian Mitchell,
and Jean-Claude Toutain have to be mentioned. We feel the present
study represents a new contribution in so far as it provides a sys-
tematic and common methodology based description of the develop-
ment of all successive infrastructure systems for a number of coun-
tries, including also centrally planned economies. The methodological
aspect becomes all the more important in view of the fact that infras-
tructural endowment levels cannot be compared internationally in
absolute terms, because of differences in country size, population den-
sities, spatial structures, etc. Our analysis shows however, that fruit-
ful comparisons can be made of the dynamics of the processes of diffu-
sion and technological change, once the self-referential qualities of dif-
ferent systems (countries) are adequately taken into account.
Thus, the rates of change and the timing of periods of growth,
saturation, and senescence appear indeed to be comparable; however,
we have to recognize explicitly heterogeneity in both absolute and rela-
tive diffusion (penetration) levels, in infrastructural endowment levels,
and in the organizational embedding of similar infrastructure systems
among different countries.
Canals and Ships
3.1. Canals and Ships
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At the onset of the take-off of the industrial revolution in the mid-
18th century, the transport system relied essentially on natural water-
ways and roads which had been developed to varying degrees in dif-
ferent countries. Both the natural and man-made infrastructures
allowed for only modest amounts to be transported at high costs with
low speed and quality of service. Arthur Young in 1770 (quoted in
Daumas and Gille, 1980) spoke of "infernal roads ... where you ran the
risk of breaking your neck and legs"'. On average transport speeds for
passengers did not exceed about 3 kilometers/hour (km/hr), i.e., walk-
ing speed (Voigt, 1965). This was even true for France, where the
highest quality transport infrastructure existed* as a result Colbert's
efforts in early canal and road construction within the framework of a
centralized mercantile policy. The transportation of goods by river or
by roads was even slower (typically around 1.5 km/hr)' and the costs
were exceedingly high. In England it is reported that the cost of
transporting grain by road from Carlisle to Newcastle was higher than
the transport costs from Cape Hope to Newcastle (see Sax, 1920, and
Voigt, 1965). Similarly, importing coal from England (over more than
1000 miles) was cheaper than transporting fuelwood over a distance of
just 10 miles by road to the Atlantic cities of the early United States
(Braudel, 1979).
Transport systems, in the contemporary sense of an intercon-
nected grid, existed only in the most rudimentary forms. Conse-
quently, longer distances were covered only by the most valuable
"objects"': human beings, information (mail), and high-value products
(salt, spices, precious metals, textiles, luxury goods, etc.). The inade-
quacy of the transport infrastructure to carry large amounts of goods
at modest costs to areas not endowed with natural infrastructures, like
rivers or seaports (one of the most decisive locational factors for the
foundation and growth of medieval cities), resulted in the repeated
scarcity of local resources. Frequently the supply of food to areas
where harvests had failed from other regions with abundant supplies
was not possible, resulting in famines. Similarly, the so-called "fuel-
wood crisis" (see e.g., Sieferle, 1982) in 16th and 17th century England
was not so much an "energy crisis'" in that there was a lack of wood,
but rather it was impossible to transport fuelwood and charcoal from
areas with large supplies to the main centers of consumption (espe-
cially to the iron industries and cities). Braudel, 1979, and Sombart,
• Passenger transport speeds increased in France gradually, finally achieving, for the best connections, up
to 12 km/hr by 1850 (Voigt, 1965).
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1919, provide a comprehensive account of the inadequacy of the
medieval transport system for economic development.
The first infrastructure system to overcome some of the deficien-
cies in the transport system of the pre-industrial age was the natural
system of inland waterways; the waterways were greatly improved,
and integrated into a high capacity transport network by the construc-
tion of canals.* Canal construction (especially after the invention of
locks in 15th century Italy) did occur at a modest scale already before
the onset of the industrial revolution. The first plans to link the
Rhine-Main river system to the Danube, for example, date back to the
period of Charlemagne, although a canal was finally built (with mod-
est commercial success) only in the 19th century, and is at present an
issue of lively public debate regarding its reconstruction.
However, the only countries where canal construction and river
improvement occurred to any significant extent prior to the beginning
of the 18th century were France and the Netherlands. The Dutch
treckvaarten were used primarily for passenger transport and took con-
siderable advantage of the topography of the Low Lands. Early
French canals like the Canal de Briare (completed in 1642, linking the
Loire to the Seine river to improve the connection to Paris) were, from
the onset, conceived to integrate the inland navigation system into a
national network for transporting goods and passengers. This was in
contrast to early canal construction in England, which was primarily
aimed at providing local access (e.g., from coal mines) to rivers and
seaports.
Nevertheless, even in the case of France, the amount of construc-
tion going on was - whilst being impressive in view of the primitive
contemporary construction technologies available - on a modest scale.
The length of the French canal and improved inland waterway system
increased from 156 km at the end to the 16th century to some 1,000
km at the end of the 18th century (Toutain, 1967). However, in Eng-
land, the rapid early industrialization resulted for the first time in a
"quantum leap" in the size and transport quality of the infrastructure
network: the age of canals began.
England
The first attempts at improving inland navigation on rivers in Eng-
land, by building locks and making cuts, resulted in 1,000 km of
engineered rivers, in addition to more than 1,000 km of navigable
• The moet compreheneive and detailed hietory of canal development ie provided in the numeroue booke of
Charlee Hadfield, e.g., 1968 and 1986.
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rivers by the mid-18th century. However, the poor spatial coverage of
this transport system represented a major impediment in England's
early industrial development. In fact, coal deposits located only a few
kilometers away from rivers or seaports were practically unexploitable,
due to the lack of transport possibilities. Early iron works had consid-
erable logistics problems regarding the supply of basic materials (iron
ore, charcoal, and later coal and coke) and for the delivery of final
products (wrought iron).
It is not mere chance, that the first canal, which initialized the
canal age in England, was built by the Duke of Bridgewater to trans-
port coal from his Worsley mine to Manchester. The Bridgewater
canal (1759-1761) became a symbol, visited and copied by many
(especially continental) canal planners and developers. Generally
canal construction in England was financed by private capital after
being authorized by a parliamentary Canal Act. Widespread imita-
tion of the successful Bridgewater canal resulted in a rapid increase in
the length of canals as presented in Figure 3.1.1.* The total length of
man-made waterways increased along a quite regular logistic growth
pulse starting around 1760 and saturating around 1850 at a length of
5,630 km, or 96 percent of the (ex post) estimated saturation level.
Hadfield's (1968) estimates of total canal length suggest a higher fig-
ure of around 6,570 km for England (including, however, Wales), but
agrees with the saturation of the expansion in the length of the canal
network by the 1850s.
Particularly noticeable in Figure 3.1.1 is the deviation from the
long-term logistic growth trend around 1795. These years are charac-
terized by feverish** canal construction and named by contemporary
sources and canal historians as the period of "canal mania" with over
80 canal acts passed within a few years. This short-term deviation
was, however, elastically absorbed in due course. The slowdown in
canal construction after 1830 (when already over 90 percent of the
ultimate maximum canal length had been constructed) is generally
• In the following Figures the appropriate parameters of a (logistic) diffusion model (saturation level K,
inflection point to, and time constant tot, i.e., time required to grow from 10 to 90 percent of the ultimate
saturation level (or of market share) will be reported. Note In particular the linear transforms
F/(I-F) on the logarithmic scale of the logistic diffusion curves, with F=V/ K. As the statistical
uncertainty involved with parameter estimation is not significant when describing growth/substitution
processes which are completed, no estimates of goodness of fit or parameter uncertainty for K will be
presented. For diffusion/substitution processes, which are still ongoing, parameter uncertainty and R~
values will be reported .
•• One should bear in mind however, that even in peak years investment in canals and inland navigation
represented not more than one third of total infrastructure investment (including turnpikes, parish roads,
and bridges), and even all transport infrastructure investment combined together, never significantly ex-
ceeded one percent of the national product of the time, based on estimates of Ginarlis and Pollard, 1988.
Still, even when we do not neglect the role of early road transport, we have to acknowledge the "quantum
leap' in transport volume and quality resulting from canal development.
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years]. (Data source: Ginarlis and Pollard, 1988.)
attributed to increasing competition from the railways (e.g., Hadfield,
1986). However, the situation appears to be more complex, as sug-
gested by Figure 3.1.1. The expansion dynamics of the canal network
in England do not appear to be directly affected by the appearance of
the railways in the 1820s. Based on our simple model, one could have
predicted saturation in the expansion of the network as early as 1800,
i.e., significantly before the advent of railways. In addition, with the
introduction of the railways no significant deviation from the long-
term logistic growth trend in canal network expansion can be observed
(apart from the fact, that the growth process stops at 96 percent of its
estimated ultimate potential). The main effect of railways on canals
thus appears to be after the completion of the canal expansion pulse.
This is reflected in the fact that no second growth pulse of canal net-
work expansion was initiated, and also that railways started to com-
pete with canals, resulting either in the closure of canals or their take-
over by railway companies.
Before turning to a discussion of what happened to canals after
their expansion saturated around the 1850s, let us acknowledge both
the engineering achievements and economic impacts of canals. The
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construction of over 4,000 km of canals in the period 1760 to 1850 is in
itself a formidable engineering achievement of early industrialization.
Moreover, there existed an elaborate support infrastructure, e.g.,
locks, water reservoirs, etc., for water control and for overcoming
height differences. The most spectacular engineering achievements
were possibly the tunnels and aqueducts constructed for canals. Had-
field, 1986, estimates that by 1850 some 60 km of canal tunnels (the
Standedge tunnel being nearly 5 km long) and a large number of canal
aqueducts had been erected, e.g., like the impressive iron trough at
Pontcysyllte - constructed in 1805 with a maximum height of 38
meters above the valley floor and over 300 meters long. The economic
impacts of canals were also impressive in lowering transport costs and
facilitating the growth of new industrial centers. For example, after
the completion of the Bridgewater canal, the number of workers in the
pottery industry in the area increased from 7,000 to nearly 20,000
(Voigt, 1965). The relatively reliable* and large-scale transportation
of coal, industrial raw materials, food, and manufactured goods made
possible by canals, reduced inland transport costs significantly. Canal
construction and operation was also good business at that time: divi-
dends of 70 percent annually or even over 150 percent in peak years
are reported (Sax, 1920, and Duckham, 1983). However, with the
expansion of canals approaching saturation, and with increasing
(price) competition from the rapidly growing railways, profitability
declined sharply, as discussed in more detail in the following Section
on railways.
Other countries
The successful English model of canal development, especially the
canal mania of the end of the 18th century was also adopted in con-
tinental Europe and in the USA, albeit with a considerable time lag.
A similar growth pulse in Europe, comparable to the English canal
development, started only after the Napoleonic wars. Still, despite
this time lag, growth proceeded much faster and as a result, the
expansion of the canal networks reached saturation in all industrializ-
ing countries, where quantitative data allows such an assessment, over
a relatively short time period around 1860. This synchronization of
saturation is worth noting, since all countries started with different
initial conditions and expanded their networks with different growth
rates to different ultimate maximum levels. We will see in due course,
• The main limiting factors were water shortages and the cold winter climate (ice). For estimates of the
impact of climatic variations on canal operation see Freeman, 1980.
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that an identical pattern can also be observed for other infrastructures
and technology expansion pulses in later time periods.
It should be noted that canal construction did not come to a
standstill even after the network had reached its maximum size and
subsequently entered a period of decline. Examples are the Manches-
ter Ship Canal completed in 1894 in England (built to cut high tariffs
charged by railways and the Bridgewater canal which was controlled
by railway companies after 1872), or the Canal de l'Est in France
completed 1880-1882 (in order to compensate for the Lorraine water-
ways lost to Germany after the 1871 war). However, these canal addi-
tions could not compensate for the length of canal infrastructure being
closed down after the 1860s as a result of the success of the railways.
Thus, canal construction after the 1860s does not contradict our
conclusion about the synchronous saturation of the expansion of canal
network size in a number of countries. With the exception of Ger-
many and Russia (discussed below) canals everywhere reached their
maximum network size around the 1860s, and entered a phase of
decline or at best of stagnation thereafter.
France and USA
We have discussed above, that France took a pioneering role in very
early canal construction, especially in the 17th century. By 1760 (the
beginning of the English canal expansion) France had already
developed over 1,000 km of engineered rivers and canals. However, as
a result of the French Revolution, canal construction and maintenance
came to a standstill. Despite the efforts of Napoleon, the network
grew only modestly, i.e., by some 200 km between pre-1800 and 1813.
Only after the Napoleonic era can observe the take-off of a similar
(logistic) canal network expansion pulse, as in the case of England,
with an ultimate saturation level of around 4,825 km being reached by
1867 (99 percent of the estimated K) as shown in Figure 3.1.2 (data
from Toutain, 1967, quoting contemporary sources). The French
canal expansion of approximately 3,570 km in the period 1820 to 1867
was based on a planning effort on a national scale, with resulting laws
being passed in 1821 and 1822: canales undique versum effosi (Had-
field, 1986). Although the English canal system served as a general
model, the dimensions of the canal locks were more modest than in the
original plans, in order to speed up construction and lower costs.
Financing was, in contrast to England, a combination of private capi-
tal and government financing. For the period after 1870, we have only
scarce quantitative data on the length of the canal system proper.
This evidence suggests, that the length of the canal network in France
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Figure 3.1.2. Growth pulses in canal expansion for France [K 4,825 km, to
1832, Li.t 41 years] and USA [K 7,010 km, to 1835, Li.t 31 years]. (Data sources:
Toutain, 1967, and Isard, 1942.)
did not decrease significantly after the saturation of the expansion
phase by 1870, but remained rather constant until the 1920s (Voigt,
1965, and Woytinsky, 1927). According to the most recent estimates,
the French navigable waterway system (canals plus rivers) extends
over 8,500 km, out of which 6,400 km are actually used for inland
navigation (Ann. Stat., 1987). Thus, the extent of canals in use
appears to have considerably decreased since the 1920s, with some of
them finding new uses for recreational purposes.
The expansion of the canal network in the USA is* similar to that
of France, except that it started practically from zero. According to
Isard, 1942, only around 50 km of canals had been constructed by
1794. In due course, however, the length of the canal network
increased along the growth pulse shown in Figure 3.1.2 to an
estimated saturation level of some 7,010 km, with the maximum
length being reached by 1861 at 6,860 km or 98 percent of our
estimated K. The diffusion process in the USA, the country to start
• More details on canal development in the USA can be found in Goodrich, 1960; Goodrich ot aJ., 1975;
Poor, 1860; and Taylor, 1962.
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last in our sample, has a ti.t of about 30 years and thus proceeds faster
than both England and France. Particularly noteworthy is the syn-
chronous saturation of canal expansion in France and the USA as
reported in Figure 3.1.2. As a result of a "catch-up" effect, canal
expansion in the USA reached saturation at a date very close to that
of England and France, where canal construction began earlier, but
where growth proceeded slower.
The financing (see Myers, 1970) of canal expansion in the USA
was achieved partly by private capital but often with a speculative ele-
ment. For instance, shares for a newly founded canal company could
be easily obtained; collecting the funds from investors was a more dif-
ficult matter. Very often public funds (primarily from federal states,
or cities) were also required. Until 1830, federal funds were available
for transport infrastructure development in the USA, primarily for
canals. Thereafter, local governments found more and more ingenious
ways to raise funds for canal development (including a lottery by the
state of Georgia), especially after the commercial success of the New
York Erie canal (1825) became apparent. These financial engage-
ments (together* with the funding of railway construction after 1830)
brought a number of US federal states close to bankruptcy.
After the saturation of canal expansion in 1870, the total length
of US canals decreased very rapidly under competition from railways.
Perhaps the best indicator of the decrease in importance of canals is
that no detailed statistics on the length of the canal network after
1870 are readily available. Voigt, 1965, reports that by the end of the
19th century over 4,000 km of the canal network in the USA (max-
imum length: 6,860 km) had been closed down. Canals in the USA
(and to a lesser extent England), thus provide a first example of an
infrastructure decay process after the zenith of its maximum expan-
sion, a situation we will return to when discussing the railway network
in these countries.
At this point we would like to stress another important aspect of
the synchronization of the saturation of canal expansion. As the
quantitative results presented above indicate, maximum canal net-
work size occurred at different absolute and relative (in terms of per
km 2 country area or per capita) levels. It seems therefore, that only
the growth dynam£cs are comparable between different countries, and
comparisons of diffusion levels between countries (in a kind of norma-
tive approach) is not possible. We suggest thus, that the diffusion of
• Out of the total US state debt of 175 million US dollars in 1838, canal shares a.ccounted for 60 million,
railroads for 42 million, and turnpikes and miscellaneous purposes for 20 million US dollars. Thus canals
a.ccounted for one third of state debt and transport infrastructure for 70 percent of US state debt (Myers,
1970).
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canal networks (and we will see later, that the same applies also for
the diffusion of railways and cars) is comparable in terms of the
dynamics over time, whereas the resulting different saturation levels
are caused by the diverse boundary conditions in which an innovation
(canals in this case) is embedded in various countries. Such boundary
conditions reflect differences in geography, endowment of natural
infrastructures (like rivers), economic and spatial structure, and so on.
Canal network expansion after 1870
Although detailed quantitative statistics on canal expansion in other
countries are lacking, there exists evidence that at least two countries
are exceptions to the rule for the zenith of canal network length prior
to 1870. These are Germany and Russia (USSR).
Sombart, 1916, reports that by 1836 some 650 km of canals had
been built in Germany. Borchard, 1968, reports an estimate of 870
km for 1870. The canal network in Germany therefore appears signifi-
cantly smaller than in England, France or the USA. However, espe-
cially after the creation of the German Reich in 1871, significant canal
construction occurred. For 1913, Woytinsky, 1927, reports the canal
length to range from 1,711 to 2,114 km. Still, the available quantita-
tive data is too sparse to allow a formal analysis as for England,
France, and the USA. It is not surprising that the expansion of canals
continued after 1870 in Germany, as a consequence of the integration
of Germany into a national state similar to France and England. As
examples of such canal construction we can cite the Kiel (Kaiser
Wilhelm or Nord-Ostsee) canal completed in 1895 (enlarged between
1909-1914) or the Dortmund-Ems canal with its 269 km completed in
1899.
The data situation with respect to Tzarist Russia and later, the
USSR, is to some extent better, due to the research of French, 1983,
and available official USSR statistics. The vastness of the country
and the extensive length of its natural waterways, currently around
140,000 km, (Narod. Khoz., 1986) made investments into canals to
link the various extensive river systems a necessary condition for the
development of an early transport infrastructure. As in many other
areas, the early pioneer in canal construction was Peter the Great,
whose "canal mania" became even anecdotal. The most outstanding
project was his attempt to link the Volga river system with the Baltic;
this was of special importance after the foundation of Petersburg.
The Tvertsa and Tsna canals (completed in 1708 and 1722, respec-
tively) are early examples of successfully completed canals in Russia.
The first "quantum leap" in the canal network came with the
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completion of the 110 km long Emperor Peter the Great canal in 1731
(Figure 3.1.3). However, this initial burst in canal construction was
not followed by further expansion, so that the long-term expansion
trajectory (as represented by the logistic model in Figure 3.1.3) was
resumed only at the beginning of the 19th century when a canal age
similar to that in Europe started (Figure 3.1.3, based on the account
of canal construction in French, 1983).
It becomes apparent from Figure 3.1.3, that the canal expansion
growth pulse of Tzarist Russia proceeds substantially slower than in
other countries (~t of over 100 years) and extends beyond 1870, with
important canals like the Emperor Alexander III or the Ob-Yenissey
canal system being completed just before the end of the 19th century,
at which point the length of the canal system had reached around 90
percent of the estimated saturation level of 900 km. This canal net-
work extension does not appear large in comparison with other coun-
tries. However, one has to keep in mind the complementary and
integrative nature of the canal network, linking the vast natural water-
way system of Russia.
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Contrary to what occurred in other countries, where the canal
network decreased in length or at best stagnated after the completion
of the 19th century expansion phase (being improved then only in
terms of quality and capacity), we observe that the USSR followed an
ambitious canal expansion program in the 20th century, extending the
canal network from some 900 km* in the Tzarist period to close to
21,000 km at present. This second expansion appears to be perfectly
described by the logistic growth pulse depicted in Figure 3.1.3, which
is especially noteworthy for infrastructure development in a planned
economy. Canal expansion in the USSR at present is almost
saturated, and no noteworthy further expansion would be expected on
the basis of Figure 3.1.3, a situation which becomes the more plausi-
ble, when considering the increasing (environmental) opposition to
large-scale river improvement and canal construction inside the USSR.
Despite the ambitious program of canal development, canals represent
currently less than 2 percent of the length of physical transport infra-
structures of the USSR (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4).
Technological change in the ship fleet
The decisive speed advantage of railways as a result of steam power,
resulting in subsequent stagnation and decline of inland waterway
infrastructures, led quickly to the adoption of the steam engine as a
ship propulsion system. Whereas steamships on inland waterways**
could not significantly improve the competitive position of inland
navigation against railways (notwithstanding many successful local
applications), they started successfully to compete with sail ships for
long-distance (sea) transport.
In fact, the diffusion of steam propulsion in sea vessels, or rather
the substitution of sail ships, was a relatively slow process. Chal-
lenged by the appearance of steamships, sail ship technology was
• This starting level is subtracted as an intercept in the calculation of the second growth pulse of USSR ca-
nal expansion for Figure 3.1.3. As the second growth pulse in Figure 3.1.3 is not an U P08t description but
represents a forecast, statistical measures of goodness of fit are presented: Assuming a 5 percent data er-
ror the estimated saturation level K (21,710 km including the intercept) is with 90 percent probability
within 21.0-22.4 thousand km. R~ of the estimated growth pulse is 0.998. The fact that we describe canal
expansion in Russia and later the USSR by a discontinuous two phase diffusion model might seem at first
sight arbitrary. However, we rationalize this discontinuous model by the inherent (and different) dynam-
ics of the first expansion pulse as early as 1850, which allows us to conclude u pod, that its saturation will
be by the beginning of the 20th century.
•• Early examples of steamships for inland navigation are according to Hadfield, 1986, the Margerv servic-
ing the Thames, starting 1815 (renamed Eliu and servicing the Seine after 1816). In Germany steam
boats appeared on the Weser by 1817 and as an example of technological pioneering in Austria we would
like to mention the 60 hp steamship Franz I introduced on the Danube by 1830 by the Erd. K.K. prill.
Donau Dampf8chiffahrt Gudl8cha/t (DDSG), a company still operating (though heavily subsidized) on the
Danube.
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Figure 3.1.4. Share of steam- (and later also motor) ships in the gross tonnage
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sky, 1927.)
improved to such an extent that even a new clipper age began.* Sail
ship construction continued and the gross tonnage of sail ships
increased even after the appearance of steamships. In analyzing, how-
ever, the relative** importance of the two propulsion systems in total
gross tonnage, we can observe a regular substitution pattern along a
logistic trajectory, reflecting the long-term comparative advantage of
steamships. This is reported in Figure 3.1.4 for the total world com-
mercial seaship tonnage. The excellent fit of the substitution model to
the empirical data suggests, that the "sailing ship" effect is not discer-
nible in the global substitution pattern.
As Figure 3.1.4 illustrates, the replacement of sail ships in the
gross tonnage of the world's merchant fleet was rather a long process
(6t of 55 years). Although steamships offered considerable
• This so-called "sailing ship effect" (Ward, 1967, and Rosenberg, 1976) was already discussed in Section
2.2.2 above. As will be shown in the subsequent examples, this effect, while of undeniable importance in
terms of the technology development of sail ships (design and performance improvements), did however
not significantly affect the substitution pattern of sail by steamships.
•• For substitution patterns, measuring relative market shares, K (being 100 percent) will not be reported
in the subsequent figures.
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advantages in terms of reliability (no dependence on wind conditions)
and speed, sail ships continued to stay on the market for some 100
years after the introduction of steamships. This was made possible
both by technological improvements as well as their successive move-
ment into lower value market niches. Sailships progressively gave up
transporting passengers and high-value goods and concentrated on
goods where speed was not such a decisive economic criterion. Ironi-
cally, one of these lower value goods was coal for steamships, which
continued to be an important market segment for sail ships well into
the end of their life cycle as observed by Marchetti, 1987.
Available data does not permit the analysis of the replacement of
steamships by motor ships for a large number of countries, as reported
by Nakicenovic, 1984, for England (Figure 3.1.5 below). From this
figure it becomes apparent that steamships reached their maximum
market share by the 1920s, before starting to decline due to competi-
tion from motor ships. On the other hand, the completion of the
replacement process of sail ships (below one percent of the market
share) is estimated in Figure 3.1.4 to occur somewhat later, by 1940.
For the purpose of an international comparison of the dynamics
of technological substitution in ship propulsion, it will suffice to
analyze the most fundamental transformation process in civil ship-
ping: the replacement of renewable (wind) by fossil energy (coal and
later also oil) as a source of the required propulsion energy. One has
to bear in mind, however, that the saturation dates reported in Table
3.1.1 refer to the completion of sail ship replacement rather than a
correct measurement of the saturation date of steamships, due to the
reasons outlined above. However, for our argument of the synchroni-
zation of development, especially of the saturation phases of techno-
logical substitution processes in different countries, this simplification
is of minor importance. In Table 3.1.1 we have regrouped the parame-
ters of a logistic substitution model, calculated from the empirical
replacement data of sail ships in gross commercial tonnage for various
countries (as reported in Figure 3.1.4 for the world total). Parameters
for the United Kingdom (UK) are derived from Figure 3.1.5 (Naki-
cenovic, 1984) and for the USA from Montroll, 1978.
The USA and UK were the leading countries in the introduction
of steamships. Steam propulsion accounted for one percent of total
gross tonnage in the merchant fleet of these countries by 1817* (USA)
and 1825 (UK). With the exception of France, where further detailed
analysis of the causes for the significantly longer diffusion time would
• Particularly in the early (turbulent) phase of the introduction of a new technology, some deviations of
empirical data from model estimates can be observed. Based on Table 3.1.1 the e6timated introduction
dates (1 percent market share) are 1827 (+2 years) for the UK and 1810 (-7 years) for the USA.
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Table 3.1.1. Share of steam/motor ships in gross tonnage of commercial ship
fleet 1818-1938.
Country to
~t Estimated Market Share
years 90% 99%
Austria + 1890 47.6 1913 1937
France 1898 62.6 1929 1960
Germany * 1894 41.9 1915 1936
Russia 0 1899 55.8 1927 1955
UK 1884 57.0 1913 1941
USA 1885 75.0 1923 1960
World 1894 55.2 1921 1949
+ Austria-Hungary 1829-1913
* German Reich 1850-1913
o Tzarist Russia 1859-1913
[Source: UK (Nakicenovic, 1984); USA (Montroll, 1978); all estimates for other coun-
tries are based on data from Mitchell, 1980, and Woytinsky, 1927.]
be required, the USA and England as early starters have also the long-
est diffusion time constant ~t. However, their lead becomes progres-
sively absorbed, and in the end most countries enter their saturation
periods (after penetration beyond the 90 percent market share) at
surprisingly close time intervals.
Thus, the time interval between the appearance date of steam-
ships at a significant level (i.e., above 1 percent market share), span-
ning in our sample 35 years (1817 in the case of the USA and 1852 for
Germany), becomes reduced to 16 years between the first
(Austria-Hungary: 1913) and the last country (France: 1929) reach-
ing their saturation phase (i.e., market shares exceeding 90 percent).
This time lag gets somewhat widened to 24 years when considering the
completion dates of the substitution process (i.e., sail ships accounting
for less than 1 percent of gross commercial fleet tonnage). This, how-
ever, does not appear important for two reasons. First, substitution
proceeds very slowly above the 90 percent market share level, (as we
speak about the flat asymptotic last part of the S-shaped substitution
trajectory) and offers only marginal market share gains. Second, as
discussed above, steamships in turn started to be replaced by motor
ships at the beginning of the 1920s (see Figure 3.1.5). Thus the 90
percent penetration dates can be considered as a fair estimate of the
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Figure 3.1.5. Share of sail-, steam-, and motor ships in gross tonnage re-
gistered in the commercial ship fleet of the United Kingdom. (Source: Naki-
cenovic, 1984.)
saturation of the effective replacement of sail ships by steamships
proper.
It is our contention (and we will try in subsequent sections to
substantiate this hypothesis by further empirical evidence in other
growth and substitution "clusters") that we observe here a "catch-up"
effect in the diffusion patterns between the countries who began early
and countries following later. Thus, although, the dates of introduc-
tion (or start of diffusion/substitution) may be spaced over time, all
countries (or technologies within a "cluster") reach their saturation
phase within a relatively short time period, due to this catch-up effect.
We would like to call this synchronization of the completion of diffu-
sion and substitution processes the season of saturations.
The economic implications of this saturation synchronization,
especially when it occurs for a number of technologies (products) in
different countries, could be formulated in the following way. The
rapid replacement of old technologies by new (e.g., sail ships by
steamships), especially in the time period between 10 to 90 percent
penetration (i.e., the steep part of the S-shaped diffusion/substitution
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trajectory) generates growth impulses due to the large investments
into new equipment and through the induced growth of the industries
manufacturing this equipment. In other words, economic theory
argues (as discussed in Section 2.2.2 above) that diffusion of a new
technique and the related replacement of old techniques, results in
market expansion to a new (equilibrium) level.
Once this process reaches saturation (say beyond the 90 percent
penetration level), expansion becomes almost stationary. Demand
expansion (new steamship orders to replace sail ships) stops, leaving
only replacement demand to be satisfied. In addition, the new level of
market expansion (which became possible through the technical,
economic, etc., possibilities opened up by a new technology) is asymp-
totically reached.
Even if a new technology is introduced at this stage (and in fact,
the next technological "cluster" frequently develops during the satura-
tion phase of the previous one), it will only have a small economic
impact until its penetrates beyond the 10 percent market share level.
Significant growth impulses on the economy can therefore only come
from a new technology "cluster" after it enters its main growth phase.
A "technological cluster" in the present context consists of a host of
interrelated new technologies, products, organizational forms of pro-
duction, and mediating socio-institutional innovations. Furthermore,
the "cluster" is driven by developments in a number of core countries
following (catching up) the leaders (early starters) in diffusion. These
core countries form an international "diffusion bandwagon", as they
are linked by technology, human resources, information, and capital
flows. Consequently the core countries show a similar trajectory of
technology development and a resulting similar dynamic in the long-
term structural change of their economic base.
The synchronization in the diffusion of steamships in replacing
sail ships, especially in the saturation phase, constitutes empirical evi-
dence for such a "bandwagon" in the area of transport technologies.
To this end let us summarize the dynamics and especially the syn-
chronization of the saturation of the "canal age" and the "steamship
age". Figure 3.1.6 presents an account of the growth/substitution
pulses for canals and steamships. Whereas not all countries reach
saturation within the same expansion cycle (note in particular the
data on Russia and later the USSR), the apparent congruence of the
saturation periods of infrastructure growth and technological substitu-
tion in the transport sector is striking and provides an incentive to
proceed in our analysis, to see whether other technologies match the
pattern sketched out in Figure 3.1.6. As we shall see, they do.
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Figure 3.1.6. Growth pulses in the expansion of canal networks (c) and in the
diffusion of steamships (s). A - Austria-Hungary (s), D - Germany (s), E - Eng-
land (c), F - France (c and s), R - Russia (c and s), UK - UK (s), US - USA (c
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3.2. Railways
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The analysis of railway development is a field well covered by
economic historians. The amount of narrative, be it
pictorial/anecdotal, or more in-depth quantitative studies on the
development and economic impact of railways, has grown to such
volumes that a mere bibliography would fill considerably more space
than the whole of this work. As a subjective choice of examples of
excellent quantitative studies, we refer to the international compen-
dium edited by O'Brien, 1983, and at the national level to the studies
of Fogel, 1964, for the USA; Fremdling, 1975, for Germany; and
Hawke, 1970, for the UK.
Consequently, we concentrate on a statistical account of the com-
parative dynamics of railway development in different countries, an
area which, at least to our knowledge, has not received a great deal of
attention (one exception being Mothes, 1950). In addition, we expand
our holistic view of railway development in analyzing the whole life
cycle of railways. Thus, we not only consider growth, but also the
subsequent saturation and decline in various countries. Finally, exam-
ples of technological change in railways for different countries are
presented when analyzing the replacement of steam by diesel/electric
locomotives.
The long-term pattern of railway expansion
The growth of the railway network, following the opening of the 20 km
Stockton & Darlington Railway in 1825* is analyzed like the other
infrastructure systems in this study, viewing railway expansion as a
diffusion process interacting with an (ultimately limiting) environ-
ment. The take-off of the railways demonstrates the importance of
the simultaneous and complementary character of infrastructure and
technology development. When these two streams of development
• We retain thi8 all the 8tarting date of railway expan8ion merely out of convenience. A8 Gei8e, 1959,
rightly points out, the development of 8team railwaY8 8tarted con8iderably before George Stephen8on.
Railway8 are the re8ult of developments in the Engli8h coal mining indu8try (8ee e.g., Nef, 1932): the
wooden and later, iron-rail wagonway for overland coal tran8port all well all the 8team engine for mine wa-
ter drainage. For in8tance, at the opening of the fir8t French railway line (17 km between St. Etienne and
Andr<!zieux) in 1828, over 140 km of horse railway8 were in exi8tence in the coal mining area of the Loire
alone (Stiirmer, 1872), a figure reached by the French national railway network only 6 years later. A good
de8cription of early (pre-1825) railway development in England i8 given by Mar8hall, 1938. In term8 of im-
portance for the tran8port 8Y8tem the beginning of the railway era in England 8hould p088ibly be 1830, Le.,
the opening of the Manche8ter-Liverpool railway line. Note aiBo, that the length of the railway network in
England in 1834 Wall only one percent more than the final (maximum) network 8ize (32,800 km in 1928).
Stiirmer, 1872, and Voigt, 1965, provide a good overview of early railway development in countrie8 other
than the UK.
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Figure 3.2.1. An innovation that failed in absence of a new technological
(prime mover) base. Monorail railway using sails, as proposed by Henry R. Pal-
mer in 1828. (Source: Marshall, 1938.)
merged together (Le., the combination of the iron wagonway with the
steam engine as the prime mover), a technological quantum leap
opened, resulting in the take-off of a new infrastructure system. Thus,
the synergistic whole is more than the sum of the parts. If either one
of the two developments (infrastructure or technology base) takes
place in isolation, significant macro-economic effects of a new technol-
ogy appear unlikely. The history of technology provides many exam-
ples illustrating this point, as shown in Figure 3.2.1. In the same vein,
a quantum leap in the quality of road transport became only possible
after the introduction of the internal combustion engine as the prime
mover. Before that date, even ambitious road construction programs
were not able to significantly improve the slow transport speeds of
horse-drawn carriages and wagons. Could this provide an historical
analogy for judging the possible success and effects of the currently
proposed ambitious railway infrastructure reconstruction programs in
a number of European countries? Only the future will tell, whether
this kind of scepticism is appropriate or not. Let us return instead to
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Figure 3.2.2. Growth of the world railway network [K 1.323 106 km, to 1893,
6.t 57 years]. (Data source: Sturmer, 1872, and Woytinsky, 1927.)
the beginning of the railway era and consider the expansion of the rail-
ways in a number of countries. The diffusion of railways can be
analyzed along two dimensions: time and space.
An analysis of the diffusion process of railways in time is reported
in Figure 3.2.2 for the expansion of the world railway network. The
diffusion process appears - with the exception of some minor deviation
prior to 1855 - to evolve regularly along a logistic trajectory. Total
railway network length increased with a ~t of 57 years to over 1.3 mil-
lion km worldwide, saturating at the end of the 1930s. The somewhat
faster growth at the beginning of the diffusion process can be observed
in many countries. However, in Figure 3.2.2, such a deviation appears
somewhat insignificant* occurring only in the early turbulent phase of
the diffusion process (below 5 percent of final K). We note, however,
cases in which such an asymmetry appears indeed significant, in par-
ticular in the case of the UK, although it is mostly due to the fact that
official railway statistics ignore private mine railways, which was an
• Sensitivity analysis performed with alternative S-shaped diffusion models (Gompertz curve and general-
ized Sharif-Kabir models) did not improve significantly the (already high) R2 value (0.998) of the logistic
fit and shows also higher deviations of the estimated saturation level from the empirical data.
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Figure 3.2.3. Diffusion of starting dates of national railway network construc-
tion. The time lag between the starting date of railway construction in follow-on
countries up to 1825 is considered as a functional measure of their distance to
the innovation center (England). Note that by 1900 virtually all national railway
networks in the world had begun. (Source: Marchetti, 1987, see also Table
3.2.1.)
important (precursor) infrastructure in the early railway era.
Appropriate asymmetric growth models will be tested to describe the
development pattern of railways for such cases (as in Table 3.2.2
below).
The second dimension of the expansion of railways is their diffu-
sion in space. Here, diffusion can be first analyzed as the spread of an
infrastructure system from the innovation center (England) to peri-
pheral regions (other countries), by recording the construction start-
up dates of national railway networks, as shown in Figure 3.2.3. In
comparison to Figure 3.2.2, we see that the dynamics of the temporal
and spatial diffusion process of the railway network are identical (ti.t
of 57 and 56 years respectively). However, the start-up pulse precedes
the growth pulse proper by some 40 years. A corollary of the identical
dynamics in the spatial (as represented by the start-up pulse) and the
temporal diffusion processes is, that the growth of the railway net-
works of individual countries proceeded via an international
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Figure 3.2.4. Spatial diffusion of the European railway network, in isolines of
areas having railway networks by a given date (in lo-year time intervals).
(Source: Godlund, 1952.)
"bandwagon" effect. This resulted in the near simultaneous satura-
tion of railway expansion by the 1930s in all industrialized countries.
This conclusion is confirmed when we look at the spatial diffusion
of railways proper, i.e., by analyzing the spread of the railway network
in terms of spatial coverage and through a hierarchy of innovation
centers as shown in Figure 3.2.4. Here the regularities of the hierar-
chy and neighborhood effect in the spatial diffusion of innovations
(Section 2.3) can be observed. The innovation spread out from the
innovation center (1826) to its hinterland (all of England and parts of
Belgium) as well as to sub-innovation centers (St. Etienne-Lyon in
France, and Austria-Bohemia* in central Europe) by 1836. From this
hierarchy of innovation centers the innovation "wave" had spread out
further by 1846: from England to Scotland, Wales, and part of Ire-
land and from the continental innovation centers (Austria and
France) to most of central Europe, as well as to a third level in the
hierarchy of innovation centers (Russia, in 1838 with the opening of
• The first railway line on the Continent, according to Sturmer, 1872, was the horse railway from Linz to
Budweis constructed between 1825 and 1832.
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the St. Petersburg-Zarskoje Selo line). From 1846 on, the innovation
spread further to the European hinterlands, and by 1876 all of central
Europe, the largest part of European Russia, southern Scandinavia
and part of the Balkans were covered by railway networks. The spa-
tial innovation wave finally reached its last (4th) innovation center
level: Greece. From that date onwards, the wave started to ebb and
progressed to the most remote hinterland areas from the 3rd and 4th
hierarchy sub-innovation centers.
The completion of the expansion of railway networks in Europe
happened in peripheral areas (e.g., in Finland) to some extent later
than in the core countries, but occurred no later than the 1940s. This
implies that the growth process in peripheral areas, where railway con-
struction began at a later date (up to 50 years later than England),
proceeded much faster. Therefore, the analysis of the spatial diffusion
of railways as illustrated in Figure 3.2.4, confirms a significant
catching-up tendency for latecomers. As we show below, these lates-
tarters do not, however, develop their infrastructure system in any
way as extensively as those countries that started early.
Table 3.2.1 summarizes the growth of the railway network in a
number of countries (discussed individually in more detail below),
along with their estimated diffusion model parameters and the result-
ing densities per unit of country area and per capita. With the excep-
tion of Tzarist Russia (catching up with a !::J. t of 37.4 years) the time
constant of diffusion (Le., to go from 10 to 90 percent of ultimate
saturation length) of the railway network ranges from 47 to 57 years
for the countries in our sample. The build up of railway infrastruc-
tures was thus a rather long process, but of comparable duration in
the countries analyzed.
With the exception of the second phase in railway construction in
the USSR, railway network expansion was completed in all countries
in Table 3.2.1 by the 1930s. The fact that the length of the railway
network in Austria-Hungary and Germany peaked in 1913 does not
contradict such a statement because we have to take into account the
territorial changes (losses) of these two countries following World
War I. Bearing this in mind, we can conclude that the railway expan-
sion in these countries also saturated around 1930. The closeness of
the saturation dates in railway expansion is all the more noteworthy
considering their long growth period of nearly 100 years. A quick look
at the available statistics (Mitchell, 1980) suggests that a similar
statement can be made for an even larger sample of European coun-
tries. The railway network reached its maximum length around the
1930s: including the Netherlands (1929), Denmark (1932), Belgium
(1933), Switzerland (1937), Sweden and Greece (1938), and finally
Italy (1940). A railway "diffusion bandwagon" thus existed for a large
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Table 3.2.1. The growth of railway networks (km).
Eetimated Maximum 1% of Maximum Density~)Saturation Length 10 t.t Maximum Length in 1925
Country Length (K) Achieved Length Length
1000km lOOOkm year l ) ~ per 10,000year years year per 100 km Inhabitants
~ustria-Hungary3) 24.5 23.0' 1883 51.8 1841 1913' 8.0 10.2
!France 42.5 42.6 187647.1 1841 1933 9.7 13.7
permany4) 66.8 63.4' 1882 57.0 1841 1913' 12.2 9.6
lRussia 73.9 70.2' 1890 37.4 1851 1913' 0.3-1.5 4.8-8.4
IusSR 147.85 ) 145.6 1949 43.6 1921 1986 O.~) 5.55 )
IuKS) 33.9 32.8 1858 56.6 1834 1928 16.0 8.8
IusA 526.1 482.7 1891 54.5 1840 1929 4.3 38.1
~ore Countries in 19257 ) 715.0 2.0 16.7
!Rest of the World in 19257 ) 540.0 0.6 3.7
WORLD 1322.9 1255.0·) 1893 56.9 1844 1930 1.0 6.7
, Important territorial changes thereafter.
I) Source: Mitchell, 1980.
2) Density as calculated by Woytinsky, 1927, for 1925, except Russia and the USSR (own calculation).
Range of figures for Russia corresponds to total density and the European part of the territory respec-
tively. Density figures for USSR are for the 1986 network size.
3) Austria alone after 1919.
4) Including Elsa5-Lothringen (E-L); excluding E-L the maximum network size was approximately 60
103 km by 1938.
5) Including intercept (73.9 loJ km); 90% probability that K lies within 145-150 loJ km. Density figure.
for 1986 network.
6) Parameters refer to a Gompertz function (to = K/e instead of K/2).
7} Core countries including Russia. Rest of the world is the difference between world total and core coun-
tries.
8} Source: Mothes, 1950.
number of industrialized core countries, as presented in Table 3.2.1
(summarized in Figure 3.2.15).
A number of, at that time, still developing countries (e.g., Japan,
India, Latin America and Africa, i.e., the late adopting countries
represented in Figure 3.2.3 above) continued to expand their railway
network even after the 1930s. However, as noted above, the expansion
of the global railway network saturated at the level of 1.3 million km
after 1930, and has remained constant ever since. Railway construc-
tion in peripheral (developing) countries exactly equaled the contrac-
tion of networks in industrialized countries. By 1930 the industrial-
ized core countries represented in Table 3.2.1 had constructed over
715,000 km of railway lines, or some 57 percent of the world total. In
1986, these countries still used slightly more than 500,000 km. Thus,
their share in the world railway network has decreased to 40 percent.
Railway constructions in the periphery countries of the "railway
bandwagon" represent thus a relatively modest effort compared to the
scale and density realized in the core countries.
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Noteworthy are also the different railway densities even among
the various core countries. This illustrates, that the diffusion of infra-
structure networks and systems, whilst being comparable in terms of
their dynamics (6.ts), will result in different absolute as well as rela-
tive density levels. Different diffusion levels (densities) are the result
of the diverse geographical, economic, and social environments (boun-
dary conditions) prevailing in different countries. In addition, the
time period involved for the construction of the network, i.e., the time
lag in the network construction start-up dates appears to be of impor-
tance. Consider just the density levels presented in Table 3.2.1. The
spatial railway densities range between 0.7 km (USSR in 1986) and
16.0 km (UK in 1923) of railway lines per km2, i.e., by a factor of more
than 20. Per capita railway densities range from 5.5 km (USSR in
1986) to 38.1 km (USA in 1923) per 10,000 inhabitants, i.e., a factor
of approximately seven.
However, Table 3.2.1 shows also, that the differences in the den-
sity levels between the core countries and the peripheral areas are
even more divergent than between the core countries proper. Coun-
tries not participating in a particular infrastructure expansion phase
achieve density levels significantly below those in core countries. Even
in 1986, railway densities in areas outside the core countries of the
"railway bandwagon" are, with a spatial density of 0.9 km railways
per 100 km2 of the country, and a per capita density of 1.9 km per
10,000 inhabitants, significantly lower than in the core countries.
Railway densities in core countries continue to be higher, with values
of 1.4 and 7.1 for the spatial and per capita railway densities respec-
tively, despite the fact that these countries already decommissioned
parts of their networks due to the development of new alternatives.
Present railway densities of peripheral countries are even more diver-
gent when compared to the density levels achieved in the core coun-
tries at the time of their maximum network size some 50 years ago.
With respect to railway densities it is therefore interesting to
extend our analysis to those countries that were not part of the "rail-
way bandwagon" of Table 3.2.1. In analyzing the diffusion level (rail-
way density* per km2) resulting from the growth of these, to varying
degrees, "railway latecomers" , we observe an interesting fact: The dif-
fusion levels appear to decrease the later a country started the con-
struction of a railway network, as suggested by Figure 3.2.5. Railway
densities are calculated for the year of maximum network size, or the
latest year data were available in cases railway construction still con-
tinues.
• Because of the strong population dynamics of these countries, per capita densities show even larger
disparities compared to industrialized countries and are also decreasing for most developing countries.
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Figure 3.2.5. Spatial railway density envelope versus network construction
date. (Data source: Mitchell, 1980; Stiirmer, 1872, and Fischer Weltalmanach,
1987.)
Two empirical measures are developed to assess the starting date
for the construction of a national railway network. First the year the
network extended for the first time over one percent of its maximum
size, calculated either from the historical dates indicated in Figure
3.2.5, or in cases such as China where the network is still growing,
from the current size of the network. The second measure records the
date when the first railway line of importance* was constructed. Fig-
ure 3.2.5 suggests, that the resulting railway densities can be
regrouped by a declining "density envelope" as a function of the date
railway construction began. The later a country started, the propor-
tionately fewer railway lines (per unit of country area) were con-
structed. The only exception is Japan, where construction started
rather late (in the 1870s), but where a network on a similar scale (den-
sity) to the industrial core countries forming the "railway bandwagon"
was built. This is possibly an indication that Japan was developing as
early as the second half of the 19th century, the infrastructural
• For Tzarist Russia we put this date at 1845, ignoring the 27 km from St. Petersburg to Zarskoje Selo
opened in 1838 as being of minor importance to the national transport system.
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endowments required for joining the "club" of industrial countries
later.
Thus, any analysis of the diffusion of infrastructures has not only
to account for the different boundary conditions prevailing in different
countries as represented in their size and geography, but also for the
timing and pace a country follows in the diffusion of a particular tech-
nological system. There appears to be a "season" or opportunity win-
dow for the large-scale development of infrastructures. Developments
started outside such a "window" will result in significantly lower
growth and diffusion levels than those achieved in the core countries
originating and synchronously developing a particular technological
cluster. One could also consider that the USSR (as shown by its dif-
ferent infrastructure development pattern) was to a large extent
"decoupled" from the expansion of the new technological base (the
"car age"), which emerged in the 1930s, and which became a principal
driving force of the post World War II growth in industries like auto-
mobiles, petrochemicals, consumer durables, etc., in western market
economies. China would have to increase its present railway network
by more than a factor of 20 in order to achieve a similar spatial rail-
way density that the industrialized core countries attained in the
1930s. This does not only appear infeasible for practical reasons, it
also would be simply absurd to suggest repeating* a growth trajectory
of a 19th century development phase.
Railway growth in individual countries
The expansion of the railway networks of the UK and the USA is dis-
cussed separately for two reasons. First, because of the importance of
these two countries in railway development, either as the pioneer
(UK) or as the country with the largest railway network in the world
(USA). By 1840 US railways already extended over 4,500 km, while in
Europe only some 3,000 km had been opened altogether (Taylor,
1962). By 1930, the saturation of railway expansion, the USA alone
accounted for over 480,000 km of railways, compared to around
400,000 km in Europe and 1,255,000 km worldwide (Woytinsky, 1927,
and Mothes, 1950). This dominance by the USA (close to 40 percent
of the world's railways) is in fact not a unique historical situation. At
• This does not of course imply that developing countries should not construct any new railway lines. For
the transport of low-value goods, say soy beans or iron ore, railways are an efficient and cost effective
transport mode for these countries. Our conclusion just refers to the fact that we do not consider success-
ful catching up of these countries to rely in any way on the development of an infrastructure which was so
essential for the growth of industrial countries in the 19th century.
100 The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Table 3.2.2. Sensitivity analysis: growth of UK railways.
Algorithm Estimated K
%
Deviation
of K from
max. length*
UK (103 km) 1825-1912 (whole growth period):
1 30.876 -6.00 .9914
2 32.341 -1.54 .9877
3
4 33.944 +1.51 .9932
5
6, = 1 37.393 +13.84 .9820
6, = 0.7 36.490 +11.11 .9759
6, = 0.5
6, = 0.3
6, = 0.1
UK (103 km) 1855-1912 (main growth period):
1 32.924 +2.37 .9938
2 33.924 +3.28 .9923
3 34.544 +5.17 .9919
4 35.794 +8.98 .9951
5
6, = 1 41.667 +26.86 .9960
6, = 0.7 40.652 +23.68 .9957
6, = 0.5 39.735 +20.97 .9952
6, = 0.3 38.497 +17.20 .9944
6, = 0.1
• Maximum length in the UK: 32.85 thousand km (in 1928).
- no numerical convergence of algorithm
Algorithms: 1-3 logistic [1 non-linear least-squares fit (LSQ), 2 non-linear LSQ with data dependent
weights, 3 linear LSQ], 4 Gompertz (linear LSQ), 5 modified exponential (linear LSQ), 6 Sharif-Kabir
model with different Kretarding factor" '"I (linear LSQ).
present the USA accounts for close to 40 percent of the total cars
registered worldwide (MVMA, 1983).
The second reason for considering the UK and the USA in more
detail is methodological. As mentioned above, the expansion of the
railway network proceeded somewhat faster in the early phase (pre-
1850) than it would have if the diffusion process had adhered to a per-
fectly symmetric growth trajectory. In Chapter 2, we discussed the
fact that some researchers claim that diffusion should indeed proceed
along a positively skewed S-shaped pattern. As a result, a number of
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asymmetrical diffusion models (Gompertz, Sharif-Kabir, modified
negative exponential) have been proposed in the literature. The case
of the UK and the USA therefore provide an empirical test of various
asymmetrical diffusion models and this is summarized in Tables 3.2.2
and 3.2.3. Railway diffusion is analyzed retrospectively for two
periods, for the whole diffusion period, and for the main growth
period. The different algorithms discussed in Section 2.1 are tested
and two measures of goodness of fit are presented: The deviation of
the estimated saturation level K from the maximum network size in
the two countries (USA: 300 103 miles by 1929; UK 32.85 103 km by
1928), and second, R2 values as a statistical measure* of goodness of
fit.
United Kingdom (UK)
The growth of the UK railway network (excluding Ireland), when the
whole data period is considered, is apparently best described by a
Gompertz function, both in terms of the model deviation from the
empirical final saturation level and in terms of the R2 of the estimate.
This confirms a certain asymmetry of the growth pattern of the UK
railway network in its early phase. The logistic non-linear least square
algorithm with data dependent weights also performs well in terms of
the two goodness of fit criteria, however, it overestimates the very
early growth (pre-1845) phase of the UK railway expansion (see Fig-
ure 3.2.6). The performance of other asymmetric diffusion models, in
particular the "flexible" generalized Sharif-Kabir model turned out to
be rather disappointing, resulting in a considerable overestimation of
the saturation level. For the modified exponential model, no numeri-
cal convergence of the algorithm was achieved (i.e., no model fit to the
empirical data was possible). When considering data for the main
growth period alone (i.e., after the turbulent early growth phase), the
fit of the logistic function appears to describe the development pattern
more precisely (especially in terms of the estimated saturation level)
than the Gompertz model. Again the performance of the Sharif-Kabir
model turned out to be inferior to the logistic and Gompertz models,
despite marginally higher R2 values and the modified exponential
model failed again to reproduce the empirical data base.
• Note here however, that R2 values differ only marginally and are comparable only to a limited extent,
due to the fact that for algorithms 1) and 2) residuals between the actual and estimated data are calculat-
ed, whereas for algorithms 3) to 6) residuals of (linear) tramlorrru of data from the estimate are measured.
Note that R2 values refer only to data segments used for parameter estimation, as indicated in Tables
3.2.2. and 3.2.3.
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Figure 3.2.6. Growth of the railway network of the UK (in 1000 km) and diffu-
sion models based on logistic and Gompertz curves (for parameters see Tables
3.2.1 and 3.2.2). Data points marked separately refer to total railway network
length including private mine horse railways. (Data source: Mitchell, 1980, and
Pollard, 1988.)
One can thus conclude for the UK that the Gompertz model is
preferable for the ex post description of the historical process, but does
not perform as well* as the logistic model as a forecasting tool (i.e.,
estimating the final saturation level K with incomplete data). Partic-
ularly noteworthy is the relatively poor performance of the generalized
Sharif-Kabir model, and the inappropriateness of the modified
exponential model, even in a case depicting relatively strong asym-
metry of the diffusion process. This led us to enquire into the possible
reasons for such a strong initial expansion of the network. As it
turned out, a good part of the asymmetrical diffusion pattern is due to
a definitional problem of the quantitative measure of the diffusion pro-
cess, as the official statistics only recorded public railway lines. Espe-
cially in the early phase of railway development, and in particular
before the advent of Stephenson's steam locomotive, a large number of
private mine wagon and rail-ways existed, using wagons drawn by
• See in particular the larger variation in the estimated K with shorter data segments in Table 3.2.2.
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horses for coal transport. If one includes these early systems into the
figures (as in Figure 3.2.6 using estimates by Pollard, 1988) we see
that in the early phase of railway development the rail-based trans-
port infrastructure was considerably larger, in which case a less
skewed diffusion model appears more appropriate as a descriptive tool.
This points to a more general measurement problem with which diffu-
sion research is confronted. Usually, early precursor or "hybrid" sys-
tems are not included in the analysis, but it appears that precisely
these transitional systems may hold the clue to explaining the rapid
initial adoption phase and thus a skewed diffusion pattern. This is
also the reason why the development of the new French rapid train
system (TGV) will be considered separately in our analysis of the
French railway infrastructure below.
United States of America (USA)
The conclusions with respect to the appropriate diffusion model used
to describe the growth of the railway network of the USA (Table
3.2.3) are as follows: The process is apparently a symmetric diffusion
process, most adequately described by a logistic model, whereas all
other models (including the Gompertz) result in significant overesti-
mation of the saturation level of the diffusion process. Thus, despite a
slight deviation in the early phase, before settling into a regular diffu-
sion pattern (an observation made already by Fisher and Pry, 1971, in
their analysis of technological substitution processes), the logistic
appears to be the most appropriate model to describe the growth of
the railways, and has consequently been retained for the subsequent
analysis of other countries.*
The growth of the railway network of the USA proceeded after
the opening of the first line, the Baltimore-Ohio Railroad in 1829,
with a "diffusion half-time" 6t of 55 years, and reached the maximum
network size by 1929. The smooth evolution of the railway expansion
along the logistic trajectory (see top of Figure 3.2.7) somehow masks
the considerable engineering (see e.g., Taylor, 1962) and financing dif-
ficulties (see for example, Poor, 1860, Goodrich, 1960, and Myers,
1970) which had to be overcome, including strong social resistance, as
illustrated in the bottom of Figure 3.2.7.
In view of these technical, economic, and social complexities, the
regularity of the growth process in the USA as depicted in Figures
3.2.7 and 3.2.9 is indeed striking. Figure 3.2.8 gives a pictorial
• Sensitivity analysis for all these countries yielded similar results as in the case of the USA.
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Table 3.2.3. Sensitivity analysis: growth of USA railways.
Algorithm Estimated K
%
Deviation
of K from
max. length*
.97570
.97323
.97106
.96824
.96437
.99558
.99668
.96236
.99588
+35.39
+28.19
+22.86
+16.78
+9.07
406.168
384.580
368.581
350.350
327.222
USA (l03 miles) 1830-1920 (whole growth period):
1 332.983 +10.99
2 327.040 +9.01
3 308.543 +2.09
4 495.629 +65.21
5
61' = 1
61' = 0.7
61' = 0.5
61' = 0.3
61' = 0.1
.99558
.99544
.99485
.99240
.99510
.99516
.99514
.99500
.99493
+64.18
+52.68
+44.39
+34.63
+22.27
492.545
458.029
433.185
403.887
367.960
USA (l03 miles) 1855-1920 (main growth period):
1 332.983 + 10.99
2 337.980 + 11.27
3 341.557 +14.23
4 549.080 +83.03
5
61' = 1
61' = 0.7
61' = 0.5
61' = 0.3
61' = 0.1
• Maximum length USA: 300 thousand miles (in 1929).
- no numerical convergence of algorithm
Algorithms: see Table 3.2.2.
illustration of the somewhat abstract numerical representation of the
expansion of the US railways presented in Figures 3.2.7 and 3.2.9.
The expansion of the railway network in the USA started to move
from East to West and resulted finally in very different infrastructural
densities between different parts of the country. The contrast
between the high density of railway lines in the rich agricultural
Midwest and the industrial Northeast (in particular the Great Lakes
area and Chicago), and the low railway density in the West is particu-
larly striking. Incidentally, a similar pattern can also be observed in
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Figure 3.2.7. Growth of the railway network in the USA 1830-1930 (top);
(Source: Table 3.2.1 and 3.2.3). Resistance to the growth of railways in the USA
(bottom). (Source: January 1838, Courtesy of Metro-North Commuter Rail-
road, New York.)
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Figure 3.2.8. Railway network of the USA in 1840, 1860, 1882, and 1965.
(Source: adapted from Lord and Lord, 1953, and Morrill, 1970.)
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the USSR, with higher railway densities in the European USSR, com-
pared to the Asian part of the country.
We have noted above that the railway network of the USA
reached its maximum size in 1929. Since that date, the length of the
network has decreased, representing the last phase of the technological
life cycle of the railways: their decline.
The life cycle of railways
Up to now we have discussed railways only during their expansion
phase. Below we extend the analysis up to the present in order to pro-
vide quantitative evidence of both the rise and the fall of railway net-
works (measured by their size) in industrialized countries. We do not
comment here on the causes of saturation and the subsequent decline
of the railway networks. These will be discussed in Chapter 4, where
the development of railways is considered together with the evolution
of other transport infrastructures and technologies.
USA, UK, and Germany (FRG)
Figure 3.2.9 presents the life cycle of railways in the UK, the USA,
and in Germany. A strikingly similar pattern emerges: The railway
network appears to grow along a regular logistic pattern (the asym-
metric growth pattern of the UK is approximated by two logistic
epochs) and to contract thereafter according to a logistic trajectory
with possibly zero asymptote. As we are still in the early phases of
the contraction process, and in any case prior to the inflection point
(half of the maximum network size), the statistical uncertainty· of the
estimates is so great, that the forecasts presented in Figure 3.2.9 are
speculative in nature.
USA
The estimate of the railway life cycle for the USA (data: US DOC,
1975 and 1989) reveals a symmetry in the growth and decline of the
US railway system. The contraction process proceeds, however, with
• The 8tati8tical uncertainty of the uymptote of the contr..ction proce88 i8 (u the upper bound i8 known,
Le., the network cannot contr..ct below zero level) primarily a function of what percentage thi8 proce88 hu
progre88ed up to the pre8ent. A8 all network8 have 8till not yet re..ched or pU8ed the inflection point of
the contr..ction proce88 (half of the ma.ximum network 8ize) the 8tati8tical uncertainty of the final uymp-
tote i8 8ub8tantial. Bued on the re8ult8 of Monte-Carlo 8imulation of parameter uncertainty, pre8ented in
Chapter 2, we e8timate that there i8 a 90 percent probability that the final railway network will be
between 0 to 54,300 mile8 in the USA (179,000 mile8 main tr..ck opera.ted in 1986); between 0 and 3,000
km in cue of the UK (16,670 km in 1986); and between 0 to 18,200 km for the FRG (30,568 km in 1985).
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a t:J.t of 116 years, two times slower than the growth process (t:J.t of 55
years). Still, the regularity of both processes is noteworthy, pointing
to a similarity in the driving forces in the rise and fall of railways.
Positive and negative diffusion therefore characterize the life cycle of
railways in the USA as well as in other countries. The structural
discontinuity marking the transition from positive to negative diffu-
sion occurred prior to 1930. In terms of absolute railway mileage, the
USA has decommissioned the greatest amount of railway length (some
124,000 miles between 1929 and 1986). As a symbol for this process,
the closure of regular transcontinental passenger train connections
stands out, since the market for long-distance passenger transport was
entirely lost to public air and private car transport. In terms of rela-
tive closure however, the USA (having closed down roughly one third
of its railway network) ranks second after the UK, where the railway
network shrunk to about half of its maximum size.
UK
The situation in the UK (data: Mitchell, 1980, and DOT, 1987; Ire-
land is excluded in Table 3.2.1 and Figure 3.2.9) appears to be similar
to the USA, with two noteworthy exceptions. First, the growth pro-
cess exhibits a certain asymmetry (at least for the public railway
infrastructure). Second, the contraction process is, with a t:J.t of 51
years much faster than in the USA or the FRG. In addition, the pro-
cess does not always evolve along a smooth regular pattern. The devi-
ations around World War I and in the 1920s appear to be important
according to Figure 3.2.9. This however, is due to the particular linear
(logit ) transformation employed here, expanding deviations near to
the saturation level. More noteworthy is, however, the "overshooting"
of railway closures between 1960 and 1970, and the marginal decreases
from 1970 to the mid-1980s. Therefore in order to estimate the
parameters of the contraction process we have only used data from the
period 1928 to 1960. As it turned out, the 1960 model forecast proved
quite accurate for the length of the railway network in 1986.
Germany (FRG)
A life cycle analysis of the railway network length of Germany and
later the FRG (data: Mitchell, 1980, and Stat. B.A., 1987) turns out
to be rather complex. Whereas the growth process depicted in Figure
3.2.9 proceeds along a regular logistic path as in other countries, one
has, however, to take into account the territorial losses of the German
Reich after World War I and the state and geographical discontinuity
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Figure 3.2.9. Life cycle of railway network length in the USA, UK, and Ger-
many (FRG). For growth parameters see Table 3.2.1, estimated decline parame-
ters [USA: to 1996, t:.t 116 years; UK: to 1986, t:.t 51 years; FRG: to 2011, t:.t
106 years].
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after World War II. If we make a rough estimate of the share* of the
railway network within the new boundaries as compared to the old
ones, we see a similar picture emerging as for the USA and the UK.
Again functional symmetry between positive and negative diffusion
(with the latter having a considerably longer time constant, !::i.t of 106
years) prevails. The discontinuity date for the transition from positive
to negative diffusion occurred by 1930, as suggested in Figure 3.2.9.
Thus, the process of decline was initiated at a much earlier date, and
is not the result of post WorId War II transport policy, as frequently
argued.
Austria, France, and Russia/USSR
Our analysis of the life cycle of railways would not be complete if we
did not present counterexamples to the picture emerging from Figure
3.2.9. This is shown in Figure 3.2.10, where the railway life cycles for
Austria, France, and Russia/USSR are presented. All these countries
are of special interest, because of the different policies pursued with
respect to railway development after the saturation of railway expan-
sion in the 1930s. In Austria, the length of the railway network has
remained practically constant since 1919 (around 6,000 km). France
experienced a major societal and technological discontinuity (dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter 4) as a result of being occupied dur-
ing World War II, and is currently pursuing an ambitious railway con-
struction program for the high speed TGV train. Finally, the USSR
has experienced two major discontinuities (the October Revolution of
1917, as well as the devastating impacts of World War II) and is the
only industrial country to pursue an extensive railway construction
program, doubling the length of the railway network compared to
Tzarist times.
Austria
The const~.ncy of the railway network of Austria (data: Mitchell,
1980, and" OStZA, 1987) provides a good counterexample to the USA,
the UK, and Germany (FRG). Since the 1930s, only marginal closures
(after taking into account the territorial changes and loss of railway
lines of the Monarchy) have been effected. The contraction tendency
as suggested in Figure 3.2.10 is thus entirely speculative as this pro-
cess has progressed only to the level of the first few percent, and might
• K, all a ballis for Figure 3.2.9 is renormalized (i.e., is changing over time) to account for the change in
country (and railway network) size.
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Figure 3.2.10. Life cycle of railway network length in Austria, France, and
Russia/USSR. For growth parameters see Table 3.2.1, decline trends are specu-
lative.
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not be statistically significant* at all. Probably the most striking
result of our speculation depicted in Figure 3.2.10 is the estimated t:1t
of 195 years for the process of decline. At least in the case of Austria,
railway lines appear to be here to stay. The cause of this has fre-
quently been attributed to the strong representation and influence of
the railway trade union in the political system of Austria. Of course,
the economic performance for a large part of the network is a different
story. In a recent public debate on the possibility of closing some
regional railway lines it was noted that the transport costs (to the
Austrian nationalized railways) per passenger-km on certain lines
exceed the high fares of Viennese taxis.
France
The case of the French railway life cycle is particularly interesting,
because of the large perturbations of usually smooth diffusion trajec-
tories caused by external events, i.e., the two World Wars. The
growth in the French railway network (Mitchell, 1980, and Ann. Stat.,
1987) proceeded along a regular (if we disregard the effects of World
War I) diffusion path, which after 1850, is matched quite accurately
by the logistic pattern indicated in Figure 3.2.10. This process is, with
a t:1t of 47 years, somewhat faster than in other countries, where 55
years is typical. Maximum network size was attained in 1933 with
42,600 km (100 km above the estimated saturation level K of the
logistic diffusion process) and remained at that level up to 1939
(therefore data are outside the ordinates of Figure 3.2.10). During
World War II the railway network shrank by about seven percent and
the resulting reconstruction phase lasted until around 1950 when the
network extended again to 41,300 km. Since that time the railway
network has decreased to the 1986 level of 34,640 km, or by 18.7 per-
cent. Using the time period of 1955 to 1986, this decline process is
estimated** to proceed with a t:1t of around 98 years. Without going
into detail about the plausibility of extrapolating this process into the
future, we point to an interesting discontinuity. The decline process,
extending- over 30 years, appears to have nearly stopped or, at least to
have been reduced to a very small rate since 1980. Total network size
remained nearly constant at a level of around 34,600 km. This
• We estimate that there is a 90 percent probability that the final railway network will be between 0 and
1,800 km. The higher range figure exceeds even the length of the present day system. Hence, we cannot
conclude a statistically significant contraction tendency in the data on the length of the railway in Austria.
•• The TGV lines put into service after 1981 were excluded in the parameter estimation data, they are
plotted separately in Figure 3.2.10. Based on the results of parameter uncertainty of the model, there is a
90 percent probability that the final network size will be between 0 and 21,000 km (1986: 34,640 km).
Thus, the statistical uncertainty involved in such an estimate is substantial.
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discontinuity coincides with the appearance of the TGV high speed
train network.
The emergence of the TGV may be interpreted from yet another
angle: France is the European country with the highest share of
nuclear electricity in it's energy balance. As such the TGV may
represent a first attempt to substitute oil with nuclear electricity in
the transport sector. Although the network served by the TGV is still
relatively small in comparison to the total railway network size (Fig-
ure 3.2.10), it is expected to grow further (TGV Atlantique and
further connections to central Europe). An interesting development
to be monitored within the next decade will be whether the new rail-
way policy, as manifest in the TGV, will be successful in halting the
decay process of the traditional network, or whether the TGV network
will expand at the expense of traditional railway links, concentrating
railway traffic on just a few high-capacity connections.
The expansion and the success of the TGV connections in France,
which partly uses its own lines, and partly uses the existing, tradi-
tional railway network, has been frequently seen as an indicator of a
"railway renaissance" in Europe. However - like many early pioneer-
ing systems - the TGV combines elements of both traditional and of
new (forthcoming) infrastructures. As such, it is functionally prob-
ably similar to early railway lines (like the horse railway between Linz
and Budweis in 1832), and does not represent the ultimate model of a
high speed, long-distance transit system for the next millennium.
Finally, one has to keep in mind, that despite its high visibility and
undeniable success* on certain routes (e.g., Paris-Lyon), its market
impact is still relatively minor. At present, the TGV transports
slightly more than one percent of the total passenger-km in France
and is therefore still in the early "embryonic" phase of its life cycle
development. Therefore future options with respect to the technologi-
cal design of rail based, high speed, and throughput systems and espe-
cially with respect to the appropriate institutional/organizational
frameworks for financing, construction, and operation of such systems,
may still be open, as alternatives developed in the FRG or in Japan
suggest.
• The success of the Paris-Lyon TGV connection can be best rationalized by the fact that the TGV altered
the space-time activity framework of the people who commuted between the two cities, I.e., that the TGV
became the fruttat transport mode between Paris and Lyon. Its future growth will thus depend on whether
this can be repeated on other connections. As the recent (December 1989) speed record on the Atlantique
line indicates, this can indeed be achieved for new connections within France. However, in view of the in-
stitutional rigidities of European railways, it is at present unclear if similar time budget economies, espe-
cially in comparison to air connections, can be realized on a European scale. Interface problems (offsetting
the large part of the speed gains of the TGV network proper) with the UK and with the FRG still remain
unresolved. Again this is not a technological question but rather one of institutions.
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As our final counterexample to the decline of railway networks in
industrialized countries, we consider railway development in the USSR
(data: Mitchell, 1980, and Narod. Khoz., 1982, and 1986). Following
the expansion of the railway system of Tzarist Russia, saturation
appears to be in tune with the life cycle of the railways of other Euro-
pean countries. The newly created USSR initiated, however, an ambi-
tious second railway development program in the 1930s, although
many of the projects planned at that date were only started much
later. The most prominent example is the second Trans-Siberian rail-
way line Baikal-Amur Magistral (BAM).
Figure 3.2.10 shows that in the second phase the railway network
of the USSR doubled in size from around 71,000 km in 1918 to 145,600
km in 1986. This increase followed a logistic trajectory with a t!,.t of
45 years, and was thus similar to the first growth pulse. The second
growth pulse proceeds, however, not along a regular path, but instead
is characterized by a period of high volatility due to the effects of
World War II. After the invasion of the USSR, there was a "burst" of
railway lines. The total network increased from 86,400 km in 1939 to
106,100 km in 1940, i.e., by nearly 20,000 km. This was the result of
an industrial relocation program to, and behind the Urals, and was
made possible by dismantling a large part of the yet uncompleted rail-
way tracks in Siberia and reusing them for railway construction in the
western part of the country (Glaziev, 1988). This burst became, how-
ever, elastically absorbed in due course, and from the mid-1950s
growth again seems to follow the logistic trajectory depicted in Figure
3.2.10. Railway expansion in the USSR appears to be currently
approaching saturation.*
Let us conclude the discussion of the life cycle of railway develop-
ment in different countries by describing the overall picture that has
emerged from the quantitative analysis. We have noted that at the
global level the length of the railway network has not increased since
the 1930s. Hidden behind this global aggregation is in fact a great
diversity in the railway network development pattern in different
countries. In most of the core countries of the 1830 to 1930 expansion
period, the length of the railway network declined; this tendency is
most advanced in the UK and the USA. In other countries this ten-
dency has been only marginal (Austria) or was brought to a halt, at
• ~ with all diffusion processes not yet completed, statistical measures of parameter uncertainty are
given: assuming a 5 percent data error, the estimated saturation level K (146,600 km) of the diffusion pro-
cess lies with 90 percent probability within 144,200 to 149,000 km (1986: 145,600 km). Parameters of the
estimated diffusion model (see Table 3.2.1) are calculated based on data of the railway length in the period
1925-1939, and 1956-1986.
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least temporarily, by a new railway policy (France). Only the USSR
expanded the railway network after 1930. Since this expansion pro-
cess in the USSR appears close to saturation, one would not expect
the railway network of industrialized countries to remain at its present
level, assuming that the contraction tendencies in most countries con-
tinue their historical trends. Also large-scale growth of railway infra-
structures in developing countries to any levels close to those realized
in industrialized countries appears unlikely. After about 50 years of
constant network size at the global level, the traditional railway infra-
structure of the globe is eventually facing a process of decline, even
though the time constants involved, are very long, leaving room to
consider new alternative technological, organizational, and institu-
tional designs.
Effects of railways
Let us conclude this chapter on railways with its somewhat pessimistic
future outlook and return to the "railway era" of the 19th century, in
order to highlight the effects of the growth of the railways. This field
is comprehensively covered by the so-called "new economic history"
school and we will draw a few illustrative examples from this line of
research. The economic effects of the railways have, indeed, been sub-
stantial despite the fact that railways do not qualify as the principal
and single driving force of 19th century economic expansion. Rail-
ways were so successful that by the end of the 19th century they
accounted for close to 90 percent of all passenger-km travelled and
about 70 percent of all ton-km transported (as was the case in France;
Toutain, 1967). Thus, the dominance of the railways in the transport
system of the 19th century was significantly higher than the present
dominance of road transport. Finally the competitive behavior and
resulting pattern in the evolution of market shares of individual trans-
port systems during this period (see Chapter 4) yields interesting
insights into the dynamics of this process. These lead to a better
understanding of what happened when, in turn, railways were chal-
lenged by new competitors, including the automobile.
The development of railways enabled (by their denser geographi-
cal coverage, higher transport speeds, and the lowering of transport
costs) further specialization in production between industries as well
as between geographical areas, which can be considered a major
impetus for economic growth in the 19th century. Railways provided
a novel, speedy, and after overcoming initial technological shortcom-
ings, comfortable and safe means of passenger transport. O'Brien,
1983, notes for the 19th century that demand for travel seems to have
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been both price and income inelastic. Consequently, right from the
beginning, railways captured (despite high initial tariffs) the highest
value market niches in the transport sector: passengers and informa-
tion (mail). For instance, passenger and mail boat service were soon
discontinued after the appearance of railways in France. Even the
Dutch, who had enjoyed with their treckvaarten, the most efficient
mode of passenger transport by water, switched to rail, as soon as this
facility became available.
The multitude of economic effects can be grouped into three
broad areas. First, "forward linkages" in terms of influences on indus-
try and regional specialization and the resulting impacts on urbaniza-
tion and migration flows. In addition, decreasing transport costs
changed prices and price differentials for basic commodities and fin-
ished products. Secondly, railways made direct demands on the indus-
tries supplying the products for their expansion in particular the con-
struction, coal,* steel, and equipment manufacturing industries.
These multiple effects can be summarized as economic "backward
linkages". Finally, another impact of the railways was their effect on
road and water transport and the accompanying drastic loss of market
shares and sharp decline in profitability of the latter.
The "backward" and "forward" linkages of railways to the other
sectors of the economy have been especially studied under the "leading
sector" hypothesis (Rostow, 1952). The general conclusion of a
number of empirical investigations (see e.g. O'Brien, 1983, Fishlow,
1965, Fogel, 1964, Fremdling, 1975, and Hawke, 1970) is that the rail-
ways were never the principal and only "growth locomotive" (or
"panacea", O'Brien, 1983) for economic development in the 19th cen-
tury. For the industry as a whole, railways absorbed - even at peak
levels of construction (and induced** demand) - too Iowa percentage
of total output to qualify as a leading sector strictu sensu. Railways
are thus a representative element of the steam age rather than being
the dominant (in terms of contribution to economic growth) technol-
ogy cluster of the 19th century.
A number of historians have attempted to calculate the impor-
tance of the railways to national economies within the framework of
neo-classical economic theory. This has resulted in estimates on the
"social savings" of an economy due to the existence of railways.
Despite all the theoretical and empirical imperfections (application of
static equilibrium analysis to an essentially dynamic process of
• Although the 8team locomotive i8 u8ually as80ciated with the u8age of coal, one has to note that well into
the 18708 the main fuel for 8team locomotive8 in the USA was wood. Also the 8team locomotive8 of Tzar-
i8t RU88ia were fueled to a con8iderable degree not by coal but with "mazout" (i.e., fuel oil) .
•• There were, however, important feedbacks to individual8ectors e.g., the 8teel indu8try.
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change) of this approach, it provides an interesting attempt to quan-
tify the economic importance of the railways. The "social savings"
associated with the existence of the railways is calculated by estimat-
ing the economic impacts (increase in transport costs) on a national
economy, should the national railway network close down for one
year. This Gedankenexperiment relies however on a stringent (and
thus unrealistic) ceteris paribus assumption: that producers continue
to dispatch exactly the same volume of goods and that passengers per-
form the same trips to the same destinations, even after the closure of
the railway network. The "social savings" is thus the cost savings of
an economy, compared to coping without the railways, expressed as a
percentage of Gross National Product (GNP).
The conclusion of a number of studies calculating the "social sav-
ings" of the railways is that they varied between time (as a conse-
quence of the increasing share of railways in transport volume) and
space (as a consequence of different alternative infrastructure endow-
ments). O'Brien, 1983, presents an overview of such estimates of
"social savings" and concludes that they ranged typically between 5 to
10 percent of GNP for industrialized countries. However, the impor-
tance of railways in the industrialization process and changes in geo-
graphical structure transgresses this type of economic calculus. As an
example of an important "forward linkage" of railways, their impact
on settlement structure is presented in Figure 3.2.11. The unique
growth rate of 3.5 percent/year of German towns between 1850 and
1900 was made possible by the development of the German railway
network (main growth phase: 1853 to 1910, see Figure 3.2.9). The
higher population growth rates of "coal towns" before 1850 and after
1910 point to the importance of coal, fueling the economic expansion
pulse associated with the steam age in 19th century Germany.
Other important "forward linkages" of railways are that they
widened markets (e.g. new export markets, Metzer, 1974), promoted
economies of scale, helped (through regularity of service) to reduce
inventories, encouraged the relocation of economic activities, stimu-
lated competition, and increased trade and specialization. These
effects were of special importance in countries not endowed with
natural waterways. By lowering transport costs, railways changed the
relative price structure and comparative locational advantage, espe-
cially of the primary sectors of agriculture and mining (including
coal). Further significant market expansion of railways was enabled
by progressively lowering transport tariffs as shown (in real terms) in
Figure 3.2.12 for Canada. For France (Toutain, 1967, and Caron,
1983), Germany (Fremdling, 1975) the UK (e.g., Hawke, 1970, and
Pollins, 1971) and the USA (Fogel, 1964, and Chapter 4) similar dras-
tic reductions are typical: 25 percent (Germany), 30 percent
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Development of Railroad Systems in Germany
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Figure 3.2.11. Growth rates of cities in Germany during the phase of rapid
railway development. (Source: Sassin, 1981.)
(Belgium) and 50 percent (France) lower tariffs are reported between
1845 and 1913. It is interesting to note, that this reduction proceeded
slower in high-value market niches, where railways enjoyed a (techno-
logical and infrastructural) quasi monopoly situation, i.e., passenger
transport.
For freight transport, the appearance of railways and the later
reduction of freight rates intensified competition, forcing canal and
water transport companies to reduce their tariffs accordingly, with a
resulting decrease in their respective profitability as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.2.13 for the case of the UK. Railways had two decisive advan-
tages over inland navigation and canals in particular. First, the use of
steam power enabled significantly higher transport speeds. Although
steam power was soon introduced in inland navigation, canals never
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Figure 3.2.12. Real-term passenger and freight transport rates of Canadian
railways in 1913 (Canadian cents per ton and passenger-mile). (Source: Green,
1986.)
could compete with the decisive speed advantage of railways.
Secondly, the railway network developed very rapidly and provided for
a significantly denser spatial coverage than was possible with the
existing waterway and canal network.
Consequently, canal traffic immediately started to lose the
highest value market niches: passenger and information (mail) trans-
port* to the railways. Gradually, railways also conquered the mass
commodity market (especially for coal**), despite fierce competition
and tariff reductions by canal companies. As a result, the profitability
of canal companies declined sharply and many canals were either
closed down (as to a significant extent in the USA) or taken over by
railway companies (as in the case of England).
• Quantitative evidence is presented in Part 4 in the analysis of the long-term evolution of the modal split
of passenger traffic in France.
.. Before the advent of the railways, the supply of coal to London was ensured by water (sea) transport.
By 1845, railways transported 0.2 percent of the coal to London. Their market share increased within 30
yeare to over 65 percent (Mitchell and Deane, 1971).
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Figure 3.2.13. Yearly average index of canal and railway shares in the UK;
June 1840 = 100. (Source: Enzelberger, 1989, based on Gayer et al., 1953.)
The case of England is particularly interesting from an institu-
tional perspective in terms of what happens to the competitor losing
out on the market. Generally, the result of fierce competition between
canals and railways (see Jackman, 1962) was a significant reduction in
transport tariffs, which for England is estimated to range from a third
to a half of the former canal transport rates. Dyos and Aldcroft, 1969,
and Sax, 1920, provide more detail on the takeover of canal companies
by railway companies in England. By 1870 already one third of canal
mileage had been amalgamated with, or were controlled by, railway
companies. A symbol for this was the takeover of the Bridgewater
canal by a railway company in 1872. By 1883 already more than half
of the canal mileage was controlled by railway companies. The result
of railway and canal amalgamation was either the complete closure of
canals and replacement by railways (frequently laid in the former
canal bed) or in a market split between canals and railways leading to
complaints about undue profits of "leviathan monopolists" (Dyos and
Aldcroft, 1969). A number of government regulations in the form of
parliamentary acts (1858, 1863, 1873, and 1888) were attempts to con-
trol the displacement of canals by railways, but in retrospect these
efforts proved utterly unsuccessful. Could this provide a lesson for
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today's regulatory efforts to halt the further decline of the railways in
many industrialized countries?
The decline of canals as a result of the success of railways is illus-
trated even more dramatically in the case of the USA. Only a few,
high capacity, strategically located (e.g., where ocean ships could
reach inland destinations) canals, like the Erie canal, survived the
phase of extensive canal closures, reducing the length of the US canal
network from some 7,000 km prior to 1870 to less than 2,900 km by
the end of the 19th century.
Thus, water transport was progressively competed out of high-
value market niches (passenger and information, i.e., mail, transport)
and then gradually also from other market niches (first manufactured
goods, then iron and coal), finally ending up with the lowest value
market niche only (bulk commodities), where quality of transport
(speed and regularity of service) does not play such a decisive role and
fierce tariff competition prevails.
The competitive effects of railways on road transport were even
more dramatic. The low speed and high costs (e.g., in France costs of
road transport between 1850 and 1913 were on average three to four
times higher than that of railways) of road transport meant that tran-
sportation by horses, mules, and oxen ended up by only providing
complementary (distributive) services to and from the railroads and
practically disappeared as an overland transport mode for passengers
and goods. The already high cost differentials between road and rail
transport at the beginning of the railway era widened even more over
time, due to productivity increases (cost reductions) in rail transport,
which were not matched by road transportation (Laffut, 1983).
Currently, railroads now in turn appear to be trapped in this widening
productivity gap, as their productivity increases have constantly been
falling short of the productivity increases in the economy in general
and of road transport in particular.
Although road transport improved during the 19th century,
technical progress was rather incremental before the internal combus-
tion engine provided a substitute for animal power used for cartage.
Thus, the failure of road transport to compete with railways in the
19th century is a further corroboration of our hypothesis of the neces-
sary synergistic evolution of infrastructure and prime mover technol-
ogy. In the absence of a new (prime mover) technological base even
significant infrastructural investments and improvements could not
change the competitive position of a transport carrier in the long run.
To summarize, the impacts of railways on road transport in the
19th century can only be described as devastating. This can best be
illustrated by the effects of railways on turnpike roads in England. By
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1830 some 3,800 turnpike* trusts were operating around 32,000 km of
(toll) roads in England and Wales. Their number was reduced to
1,048 by 1864; to 20 by 1886, and to 1 (!) in 1896 (Voigt, 1965). Con-
sequently, road maintenance and new construction deteriorated,
resulting in a further comparative disadvantage for road transport.
The competitive pattern outlined above stresses the importance
of comparative speed and service advantages as well as of price insen-
sitive, high-value market niches (passengers and information, later
high-value goods) for the growth of a new transport system. These
high-value markets were also lost first by railways to new competitors.
By 1856 some 34 percent of freight receipts in England and Wales
were obtained from low-value goods like minerals and lifestock
(Hawke, 1970). Their share increased to around 50 percent by 1910
(Munby, 1978) and low-value goods accounted for between 65 to 71
percent of freight income in the period 1970 to 1986 (DOT, 1977, and
1987).
Thus the life cycle of railroads is characterized by penetrating
first into the highest value market niches, and then conquering (via
tariff reductions) progressively lower-value market niches. At the end
of this process railways take the character of an indispensable (price
and government controlled or owned) basic "commodity", becoming
in turn vulnerable to competition from new transport systems, with
improved quality characteristics. In perfect symmetry to their own
success story, railways started to lose high-value market niches first
(passengers to cars and mail to aircraft), and in due course were
forced to concentrate more and more on lower value goods to be trans-
ported (as documented in Chapter 4).
We conclude with a comment on the dating and causality of rail-
way saturation in the 1930s. We consider the saturation phenomenon
of railways not to be a direct consequence of competition (from cars).
As we will show below (Chapter 3.3), the automobile primarily grew
by replacing horses as a means of road transport until the end of the
1930s. Cars were more complementary to railways, rather than being
a competitor for long-distance travel. The saturation of the railways
by 1930 should under such assumptions be rather interpreted as the
approaching of a "feasibility limit", an exhaustion of the expansion
potential of a "technological paradigm" named the railway or steam
age, which in turn provided an opportunity window for the emergence
of the automobile as a long-distance transport mode thereafter.
• Named after the turnpikes used for collecting the road tolls. This, however, faced considerable public
opposition, resulting in frequent riots as for instance in Scotland and Wales (e.g., in 1843), as illustrated in
Gordon, 1988.
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The close association of railways with the technology of the steam
engine is illustrated by an important technological change in railways:
the replacement of steam by diesel and electric locomotives. This pro-
cess is interesting for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that the
decline in importance (both in terms of its infrastructure network and
in terms of market shares) of the railways after 1930 cannot be attri-
buted to a lack of technological innovation.
Second, the replacement process for steam locomotives is interest-
ing from a methodological viewpoint as it provides evidence of a diffu-
sion process with "negative" asymmetry. The initial penetration of
diesel/electric locomotives was very slow up to the 10 percent market
share, but then the process starts to converge to a regular logistic tra-
jectory. As we have noted above in the development of the railway
network, just the opposite effect (a "catch-up" effect to a logistic tra-
jectory) can be observed. In any case, this phenomenon is worth not-
ing as it provides a counterexample of an accelerating* diffusion rate,
since it is often argued that diffusion should proceed with a decreasing
rate (i.e., along one of the positively skewed diffusion models discussed
in Chapter 2).
An interesting finding from Table 3.2.4 is the similarity in the
dynamics of the replacement of steam locomotives among different
countries. ~ts range between 12.2 and 16.8 years (considering t-km as
the most relevant indicator of substitution) and the inflection point of
the substitution process lies (with the exception of the USA) within a
close time interval somewhere between 1960 and 1964. The replace-
ment of steam by diesel locomotives (electric locomotives have no
practical importance in the USA) occurred some 10 years earlier in the
USA than in other countries. This is illustrated when we compare the
steam locomotive replacement process in the USA and the USSR (see
Figure 3.2.14). The conformity of the replacement rates of steam
locomotives in different countries, including a centrally planned econ-
omy, points to a similar comparative advantage for higher quality
energy carriers (electricity either directly or indirectly via diesel) driv-
ing this substitution process.
• Note here that the Iallt few percent of the substitution of steam locomotives proceeds fallter than expect-
ed on the ballis of a logistic model.
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Table 3.2.4. Replacement of steam by diesel/electric locomotives.
Country Mea,sure to f},t Estimated Empirical date
for substitution saturation of completion of
99% share replacement
Austria l ) number 1967.2 15.1 1982 2)n.c.
Austrial ) t-km 1961.5 16.2 1979 1975
France number 1961.9 16.6 1978 1972
FRG number 1964.8 18.7 1983 1976
FRG3) t-km 1961.1 16.8 1978 1977
USA t-km 1950.4 12.2 1963 1961
UK number 1964.1 11.9 1976 1968
USSR t-km 1960.4 12.6 1973 1973
I) only 08terreichi8che Bunde8bahn (OBB)
~) n.c. = not yet completed, market 8hare of 8team locomotive8 > 1%
3) only Deutsche Bunde8bahn (DB)
Data 8ource: AU8tria: OStZA, 1975, 1980 &; 1986; France: Ann. Stat. 1962 &; 1975; FRG: Verkehr in
Zahlen 1975 &; 1985; USA: US DOC, 1975; UK: Munby, 1978; USSR: Kruglikov, 1985.
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Figure 3.2.14. Replacement of steam locomotives in the USA and the USSR.
(Source: Kruglikov, 1985 for the USSR; for the USA authors' estimates; for
diffusion parameters see Table 3.2.4; data source: US DOC, 1975.)
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Figure 3.2.15 presents an overview of the dynamics of the expansion of
the railways and the replacement of steam locomotives. As with
canals and steamships, a "bandwagon" phenomenon in the interna-
tional diffusion of infrastructure systems and technological change in
transport becomes visible. The expansion of railway networks in the
industrial core countries is confined within a "diffusion frontier"
defined by the diffusion processes of the first and the last country that
developed a railway network. All diffusion curves of other countries lie
within this diffusion frontier. The diffusion of railways in industrial-
ized countries brought about a "quantum leap" in the productivity of
the transport system, both in terms of speed and quality of transpor-
tation. Almost for the first time in history, growth in economic output
and passenger travel was not constrained by an inadequate and expen-
sive transport system.
The expansion potential of railway networks was realized up to
the point where railways enjoyed a quasi technological and infrastruc-
tural monopoly position, transporting between 80 to 90 percent of all
passenger- and ton-km in industrialized countries until it finally
became exhausted. This in turn provided an opportunity window for
the transition to new transport systems and infratsructures, in partic-
ular to road transport and the automobile. Our earlier hypothesis on
the synchronization of the saturation periods appears to be further
corroborated by Figure 3.2.15 on the basis of the diffusion of railways
and later new forms of traction railways. A season of saturations can
be seen in the period 1920 to 1930 and at the end of the 1960s and the
beginning of the 1970s.
These dates constitute important turning points for the evolution
of the transport system in all countries, marking the end of a period of
expansion and market dominance, and the beginning of a period of
decline both in terms of length of infrastructure grids and in terms of
relative market shares. Such transition periods are frequently charac-
terized by very volatile markets, as manifest in the performance of
railway shares on the New York Stock exchange prior and after the
1929 crash, especially since railway shares were favored by speculators
(Myers, 1970).
We will try to show in the following Section, that the technologi-
cal cluster associated with oil usage and the diffusion of cars which
emerged during the season of saturations of railways is, after about 50
years, approaching a similar phase of transition.
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Figure 3.2.15. Growth pulses in the expansion of the railway network and in
the replacement of steam locomotives. A - Austria-Hungary (later Austria), D -
Germany (later FRG), F - France, R - Russia (first railway pulse), UK - UK,
excluding Ireland, US - USA, USSR - USSR (second railway pulse, locomotive
substitution), W - World.
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In this Section we discuss road transport under two major working
hypotheses. The first concerns the relationship between road infra-
structure and the appearance of the automobile. We argue, that the
automobile did not create its own dedicated infrastructure as was the
case with railways, but first made use of an already existing road net-
work, which had been developed and improved in quality for horse
driven carriages. Our second working hypothesis is based on the
definition of two distinct phases in the diffusion of the automobile.
These two phases are marked by different growth rates in the expan-
sion of the automobile with a structural discontinuity occurring in the
1930s. We argue, that the first phase of the growth of the automobile
was characterized by its competition within a relatively narrow
market segment, i.e., the automobile was first diffusing into the
market niches previously held by horse drawn carriages for passenger
and goods transport. Its comparative advantage was particularly high
in this market niche, which explains the replacement of horses, a pro-
cess which was complete before World War II.
A corollary to this hypothesis is that the automobile did not enter
into an effective competitive relationship with railways for long-
distance travel before the substitution process for horses was nearing
completion. In the early phase of automobile diffusion, cars had an
essentially complementary role to railways, improving the transport
services to and from railways and providing local (rural and urban)
distribution functions. Two developments mark the transition into
the second growth phase of the automobile. Technological improve-
ments in the car itself, in particular the wide diffusion of closed car
bodies by the end of the 1930s (enabling comfortable long-distance
travelling) as well as the saturation of the railways in the mid-1920s to
the 1930s. The saturation of the railways (both in terms of infrastruc-
ture length and market importance) may have provided an "opportu-
nity window" for the emergence of a competitor for long-distance
travel in form of the car.
Roads
Extensive road networks existed long before the advent of the automo-
bile. The French road network of the 1890s consisted of over 500,000
km of roads (Toutain, 1967), compared to 1985 with 800,000 km
(Ann. Stat., 1987). The road infrastructure of the UK already
extended over 177,000 miles in 1920 (Feinstein, 1988), compared to
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about 218,000 miles in 1986 (DOT, 1987). Even in the case of the
USA the total road network did not really increase substantially. The
earliest figures report some 3.16 million miles of roads in 1921, a figure
which increased to 3.86 million miles in 1985 (US DOC, 1975 and US
DOC, 1987). The road infrastructure was thus already developed to a
considerable degree in the pre-automobile age. With an extensive
road network already in existence, an obvious question which arises
deals with the quality of the road network and of road transport in
general, which, as discussed in Section 3.2 above, turned out to be
inadequate to effectively compete with the railways.
With the possible exception of France, the quality of roads during
the 18th century was extremely (even by contemporary standards)
poor. However, road engineering improved substantially during the
early 19th century, with important contributions by Thomas Telford
(1757-1834) and John McAdam (1756-1836). The main engineering
improvement was a new system of road foundations and water
drainage, over which was laid compact, crushed stone which prevented
water from reaching the road foundations. This meant that roads
became resilient against surface water run-off, which had previously
caused the rapid deterioration of road surfaces. As a result, road re-
construction, for instance in the form of chaussees, was carried out
throughout Europe, resulting in a relatively high quality (in terms of
road foundations, the surface of water-bound, macadamized roads,
however, was not particularly smooth and certainly not dust free)
infrastructure for horse carriages. Road construction was carried out
by state authorities or by private turnpike trusts* (especially in Eng-
land and the United States) and by 1870 the UK had about 160,000
miles of macadamized roads, France some 100,000 miles and Prussia
some 56,000 miles (Forbes, 1975). Unfortunately, our quantitative
information of the functional and quality characteristics of roads dur-
ing the 19th century ends here. In fact the relatively few road statis-
tics available all concentrate on an institutional (administrative)
account of roads (i.e., disaggregation into national, provincial, or local
roads, etc.); practically no information on the functional characteris-
tics (width, type of surfacing, etc.,) is available**. We can only hope
that in future, economic historians will shed some light on the ques-
tion of 19th century road quality.
• A good account of turnpike trusts is given for the UK by Dyos and Aldcroft, 1969; Ginarlis and Pollard,
1988; and Voigt, 1965. For the USA see Taylor, 1962.
•• Despite intensive literature research, no quantitative statistics for 19th century roads by surface type
could be identified. The only noteworthy exception is the thorough study of Lepetit, 1983, for France; un-
fortunately only the period up to 1840 is covered. Lepetit reports that by 1836 some 3,800 km (11 percent)
of the 33,400 km route. rOllale. (Le., what would be termed today "national roadsB ) in France were paved.
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Nevertheless, although we lack quantitative data on the quality
(carrying capacity and transport speed allowed) of the road network
during the 19th century, we can conclude that road infrastructure, at
least in terms of the size of the road network, was already developed
to a considerable degree, and was continually improved in terms of
quality throughout the period of railways expansion. In the absence of
a new technological (prime mover) base to replace the animal drawn
carriages all efforts at improving road infrastructure proved unsuc-
cessful in competing with railways. Voigt, 1965, estimates that the
transport speed on the best road connections in France did not exceed
12 km/hour by the mid-19th century. As a result, railways trans-
ported practically all additional passengers and goods in all European
countries throughout the 19th century and had an absolute market
dominance in the transport sector by the end of the century. Road
transport was finally confined to providing complimentary distributive
services for the railroads, including in particular urban transport
(horse tramways and omnibuses, fiacres and goods transport), with all
the resulting problems of traffic jams, noise, and environmental pollu-
tion due to horse manure (Barker and Robbins, 1974).
The development of smooth, dust free road surfaces (an infras-
tructural precondition for the spread of the automobile) occurred con-
siderably before the first automobiles appeared on the market. Paved
roads (with stone or wood, as for instance in St. Petersburg) had
existed in urban areas and in the vicinity thereof since the Middle
Ages and had found widespread application in European cities in the
18th century. The first concrete roads (especially after the invention
of Portland cement in 1824) were built in the USA as early as the
1850s. A second innovation was the asphalt road (the Place de la
Concorde in Paris was paved with asphalt mastic as early as 1835, see
Hamilton, 1975).
The existence of smooth road surfaces before the advent of the
automobile can be best illustrated in the USA (US DOC, 1987). In
1904, 154,000 miles of roads were already surfaced for a meager car
population of 55,000 (Le., around 4,550 meters of road per car) com-
pared to the current figures of 3.48 million miles of surfaced roads for
a passenger car population of 135.7 million (Le., 41.3 meters of road
per car, US DOC, 1977). Thus, the available infrastructure in terms
of surfaced roads for the first cars was over a factor of 100 larger than
for the present car dominated transport system in the USA. This is
an indication that road infrastructure development significantly pre-
ceded the diffusion of the automobile.
A quantitative analysis of the development of surfaced road infra-
structure for the 20th century faces similar data availability problems
as for the 19th century. Continuous time series data are available
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only* for the USA and the USSR and are analyzed in Figure 3.3.1. An
interesting fact emerges. Despite a completely different situation with
respect to private car ownership in the two countries, the diffusion of
the surfaced road network proceeds at the same rate (~t of 64 and 66
years), the USSR lagging about 30 years behind the USA. Again as
with other transport infrastructures (canals, railroads) the ultimate
saturation levels of diffusion are different in the two countries, reflect-
ing different (geographical, economic, etc.) boundary conditions for
the development of the surfaced road network. Ultimate saturation
levels for the surfaced road network are estimated** to be 6.0 and 1.4
million km in the USA and the USSR respectively.
The estimated ultimate length of surfaced roads for the USA is 6
million km (3.75 million miles) compared with the 1985 figure of 5.6
million km. The length of the surfaced road network appears to have
evolved along a logistic trajectory as shown in Figure 3.3.1. As the
total road network stayed almost constant (it increased from 5 to 6.2
million km between 1920 and 1985) we can conclude that the diffusion
of surfaced roads was essentially a substitution process, where sur-
faced road mileage replaced unsurfaced mileage; an observation made
by Nakicenovic, 1986. The diffusion of the surfaced road network in
the USA is currently almost complete (in 1985 surfaced mileage was
93 percent of the estimated K). On the other hand, as we will discuss
below, the diffusion of the automobile is still far from being saturated.
Car diffusion in any case proceeded both at a slower rate (longer ~t)
and with a considerable time lag (lagged to) after the diffusion of the
surfaced road network. This further corroborates our earlier conclu-
sion that the car followed the development of (surfaced) road infra-
structure and not vice versa. This does not contradict the fact that
with increasing car densities significant upgrading (increasing
throughput by multiple lanes or some network additions in the form of
long-distance connections, i.e., interstate highways or A utobahnen) of
the existing road network became necessary.
• Data on the percentage of different type of surface coverage on German federal roads (Reicludrapen) for
1913, 1925, and 1939 are reported in Der Ellner, 1985. Some data on the length of surfaced roads in Ger-
many in the 1930s are also contained in Voss, 1947 and Wienecke, 1956, however, these constitute too few
observations to permit a quantitative analysis. These figures suggest that by the mid-1920s some 14 per-
cent of Reicluatrapen were already surfaced. This figure increased to about 50 percent in the mid-1930s.
By that date, around 25 percent of all major roads (Reic~ and Landatrapen) were surfaced. Eetimates for
the UK (Feinstein, 1988) indicate that by 1920 some 7 percent of all roads were surfaced, a percentage
which increased to 24 percent by the mid-1930s, Le., a figure similar to Germany. By 1920 the number of
cars accounted for only between 0.2 (Germany) and 1 percent (UK) of present day figures .
.. A. the diffusion processes are not yet completed, statistical measures of uncertainty are provided. We
estimate that there is a 90 percent probability that the ultimate length of surfaced roads will be between
5.6 to 6.3 million km in the USA and between 1.2 to 2.3 million km in the USSR (the higher uncertainty
for the USSR is because the diffusion process has progressed to only slightly more than 50% of K). R~
values of the estimates are 0.9923 and 0.9838 for the USA and USSR, respectively.
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Figure 3.3.1. Length of surfaced roads in the USA [K 6.04 106 kID; to 1951; At
64 years] and USSR [K 1.43 106 kID; to 1980; At 66 years]. (Data source: US
DOC, 1975, 1980, and 1987; Narod. Khoz., 1982, and Kommunist, 1987.)
The diffusion of surfaced roads in the USSR to the present level
of 812,000 km (around 56 percent of our estimated K) is reasonably
described by the logistic diffusion process in Figure 3.3.1. The process
appears rather turbulent in the earlier history of the USSR, with the
effects (decrease between 1917 and 1922) of the October Revolution
and the ensuing civil war, as well as the very rapid increase up to 1940
(similar to the "overshooting" of railway construction in the same
time period) being clearly visible. A regular diffusion pattern was
reassumed only in the 1950s. The dynamics of this diffusion process
are identical to that of the USA, which is not really surprising, consid-
ering the importance of road transport in the Soviet Union. Presently
road transport (although not through individual cars but by public
buses) is the most important means of long-distance passenger trans-
port in the USSR, and in 1986 it accounted for 44 percent of intercity
passenger-km (Narod. Khoz, 1986). This compares to around 80 per-
cent in the USA (US DOC, 1987). This somewhat similar functional
structure in the modal split between the two countries will be taken up
again in Chapter 4.
132 The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Diffusion of the automobile at the global level
After having considered the diffusion of the appropriate infrastruc-
ture, let us now consider automobile diffusion in a number of coun-
tries. First, we will define what we consider an automobile (car) to be.
The first cars were very different from the predominant technological
design of present day cars. Early cars may instead be characterized as
being "horseless carriages" , often with open (and thus rather uncom-
fortable) bodies; construction material (wood as the structural
material), axels, interior design, such as seats, steering design, etc.,
were all taken directly from horse carriage designs or were derivates.
This provides a clear picture of the market niche in which early auto-
mobiles were competing: The automobile emerged and grew by
replacing horse drawn vehicles.
Even the technological design of the major difference from horse
carriages, i.e., the new power source of automobile traction energy
(fossil energy), was far from being standardized. In fact, four techno-
logical routes competed as the prime mover of the automobile: steam,
diesel, and gasoline engines and electric motors. It is one of the
characteristics of the early phase in a technology's life cycle, that a
large number of diverse technological designs* coexist and compete.
The final outcome of this competition is highly uncertain and
essentially unpredictable. It depends on a large number of small, ran-
dom like events, until the system finally "locks in" and a predominant
technological design** emerges (as argued by Arthur, 1983, and
1988). Standardized technological design enabled mass production
and significant cost reductions. The most prominent example is of
course Ford's Model T, which reduced its selling price from US $850 in
1908 to as little as US $290 in 1926 (see in particular Abernathy,
1978, on technological change in the automotive industry). The tech-
nological and productivity (cost and performance) stage for the diffu-
sion of the automobile and the replacement of the horse carriage was
thus set.
Finally, one has to mention another precondition for the diffusion
of the automobile: the overcoming of institutional and societal bar-
riers. As an example we mention the abandonment of the 1836 "Red
Flag Act" in the UK. This Act (see Voigt, 1965) required that, for all
• Here one should also mention the invention of the bicycle in road transport technology (1842). Although
the bicycle did not significantly change the structure of road transport, it provided an importan t predeces-
sor technology for the motorcycle, which was the most important (in terms of their number) motorized
road vehicle in most European countries well into the 1950s.
•• The automobile with the gasoline internal combustion engine. First examples include the motor vehicle
with a gasoline engine constructed by Siegfried Marcus in Vienna 1875 (patented 1882) or the 1.5 horse-
power (hp) automobile constructed by Gottlieb Daimler in 1886.
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steam driven road vehicles, a person with a red flag and a bell had to
walk 20 yards before the vehicle to warn others. Steam vehicles were
also not allowed speeds exceeding 4 km/h. Yet another factor prepar-
ing the (social) grounds for the diffusion of the automobile was the
increasing realization of the negative aspects resulting from the dense
horse carriage traffic in urban areas with all the associated problems
of congestion, energy (feed) supply, "garage" problems, high accident
rates, noise, and environmental pollution stemming from horse
manure (see Barker and Robbins, 1975, for an account of the road
traffic situation of 19th century London).
Figures 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 give an account of the expansion of the
automobile in terms of passenger cars registered worldwide (currently
the total is close to 400 million)* and by broad geographical area.
Figure 3.3.2 illustrates the expansion of the automobile in terms of
passenger cars registered at the world level, as well as for the USA and
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries outside the USA.
Three important features are noticeable in Figure 3.3.2:
(1) Two growth phases are clearly revealed by the different slopes on
the logarithmic scale. The first very rapid expansion phase lasted
until the 1930s with an average exponential growth rate of
around 30 percent per year; the second phase had a significantly
slower growth rate of 5 percent per year on average from 1930 to
1985.
(2) Prior to World War II, automobile growth was greatest in the
USA. The shaded areas of Figure 3.3.2 indicate car registrations
in OECD countries outside the USA and outside OECD (i.e., the
difference between OECD and the world total) and clearly reveal
the absolute dominance of the USA in the first phase of the diffu-
sion of the automobile. Up to 1930, the USA alone accounted for
as much as 80 to 90 percent of all passenger cars registered world-
wide. By 1950, the share of the USA had fallen to around 76 per-
cent, the remainder of the OECD countries accounted for 16 per-
cent and the rest of the world for around 8 percent of passenger
• Data from 1930 onwards are from MYMA, 1983, and 1985. In the absence of available statistics on total
car registrations in OECD countries, we use a proxy sample of 12 countries: Australia, Austria, Canada,
France, FRG, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, New Zealand, UK, and USA. Between 1930 and 1950 our sam-
ple (constantly) accounts for over 90 percent of the world total. Consequently we have applied the same
percentage to the period prior to 1930 to make an estimate of world passenger car registrations. Data
sources are: Mitchell, 1980, and 1982; IRF, 1980, and 1986; as well as updates and consistency checks by
national statistics. It should be noted, that official registration figures even in industrialized countries are
affected by measurement errors. Alternative estimates (Polk, 1987) for instance in the case of the USA
suggest that actual passenger cars in use may differ by as much as 10 percent from the officially recorded
registration figures.
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Figure 3.3.2. Passenger cars registered worldwide, linear and semi-logarithmic
scale.
cars registered. Since 1950, the share of the USA has fallen to
around 35 percent, while the remainder of OECD countries has
risen to about 40 percent of the world total.
(3) The share of countries outside the OECD remained basically very
small, below 10 percent of the world total up to 1960. Since 1960
this share has risen to about 25 percent.
In the first phase of diffusion between 1900-1930 the number of
passenger cars registered worldwide increased by more than four ord-
ers of magnitude, to some 30 million passenger cars, of these over 23
million were registered in the USA. In the second period, passenger
car registrations increased from around 30 million cars in 1930 to close
to 400 million by 1985, with significant growth also occurring outside
the USA. Thus, we conjecture, that the diffusion of the automobile is
characterized by two periods. The spectacular growth of the automo-
bile in the first period up to 1930 is the result of the diffusion of the
car into a specific market niche (road transport), which was previously
held by horse driven carriages and where its comparative advantage
was particularly decisive. Consequently, the substitution of horses in
the transport sector proceeded fast and became almost complete in all
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Figure 3.3.3. Growth of passenger cars registered for selected industrialized
countries.
countries by the 1930s, as illustrated below. The second growth
period is characterized by diffusion into new market niches, either pre-
viously held by railways, or in newly emerging applications such as lei-
sure and weekend travel, commuting, etc.
The two distinct phases in the growth of the automobile dis-
cussed above, is further confirmed if we look at the growth of car
registrations in a number of DEeD countries outside the USA (see
Figure 3.3.3). Although the picture is more turbulent due to the
effects of the two World Wars and the consequent rapid catch up of a
number of countries (Austria, FRG, and Japan) one can see that the
1930s constitute an important "watershed" period in the diffusion of
the automobile in these countries too. Up to 1930 the number of cars
registered increased by more than three orders of magnitude, com-
pared to approximately one order of magnitude in the 50 years that
follow. Again we conjecture that this is the result of the diffusion into
different market niches in the two periods (road transport, held by
horse carriages in the first, and the transport sector in general in the
second). Figure 3.3.4 analyzes the diffusion of the total number of
passenger cars registered worldwide consistent with our hypothesis of
two diffusion periods.
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The data appear to support our working hypothesis, that the
expansion of the world automobile fleet indeed proceeded along the
two logistic diffusion pulses depicted in Figure 3.3.4. The first phase
in the diffusion of the automobile is characterized by a regular logistic
diffusion process, which proceeded rather fast (~t of 15.4 years) in
order to reach a saturation level of 34.6 million cars by 1937. The
downward deviation occurring after 1930 is the effect of the Great
Depression, with a decrease in the number of cars registered in the
USA and Canada. This deviation was, however, absorbed again by
1936.
The second phase in the diffusion of the automobile worldwide
occurs after 1950 (by which date the effects of World War II had been
overcome). The expansion of the world automobile fleet appears to
proceed smoothly along the logistic diffusion pattern shown in Figure
3.3.4. An interesting observation about Figure 3.3.4 is that the post-
1973 developments in the oil market did not appear to have had a
noticeable effect on the diffusion process. This second expansion
Roads, Horses, and Cars 137
phase of the automobile is characterized by a time constant twice as
large as the first diffusion pulse (~t of 36.2 years compared to 15.4
years) and saturation, if the diffusion pattern continues to unfold as in
the past, would occur around the year 2010 at a level of around 464
million cars.*
The growth of worldwide car registrations appears thus to be
approaching saturation, with between 27 to 44 percent growth poten-
tial remaining, taking best fit and high uncertainty band estimates
respectively. This would point at the progressive exhaustion of the
economic growth stimulating effects of the expanding automobile
industry, characteristic for the "oil and car" age. Before we look at
the diffusion of the automobile in a number of countries we corro-
borate our hypothesis that there are two phases in the diffusion of the
automobile.
The replacement of horses
The impact of the diffusion of the automobile on road transport at the
beginning of this century will be analyzed using three different meas-
ures. We will analyze first the growth in the number of road vehicles
(horse carriages, cars and motorcycles) in the UK, then study the evo-
lution of the performance of road transport by horses and the automo-
bile (in terms of share in the passenger-km and ton-km) in France,
and conclude with an analysis of the growth in the number of prime
movers in road transport (number of horses versus number of cars) for
the USA. These three different measures are taken to support our
hypothesis that the first phase of the diffusion of the automobile con-
sisted indeed of the replacement of horses by cars.
Figure 3.3.5A reports the share of motor driven road vehicles in
the total private passenger vehicle fleet in the UK. Figure 3.3.5B
extends this analysis to a more systematic account of the diffusion of
motor vehicles in different market segments (the symmetrical displace-
ment data and substitution curves of horse drawn road vehicles are
omitted in Figure 3.3.5B). The analysis of the substitution processes
is based on data recently estimated by Feinstein, 1988 (referring to
Thompson, 1976), on the number of horse drawn road vehicles (non-
farm carts, vans and wagons, horse omnibuses and stage coaches,
hackneys, and 2- and 4-wheel private carriages) compared to motor
road vehicles (private cars and taxis, buses, motorcycles and trucks)
• We estimate that there is a 90 percent probability that the saturation level of the diffusion process will
be between 404 to 524 million cars (1984: 364.8 million). This estimate includes the intercept (saturation
level of previous growth pulse of 34.6 million cars). R~ of the estimate is 0.9998.
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Figure 3.3.5A. Substitution of hackneys and carriages by motor vehicles (cars,
taxis, and motorcycles) in private passenger vehicle fleet in the UK [to 1912; li.t
16 years]. (Data source: Feinstein, 1988, Mitchell and Deane, 1971, and
Thompson, 1976.)
as reported in Mitchell and Deane, 1971. An interesting insight of this
analysis of a historical substitution pattern is the fact that the auto-
mobile did definitively not diffuse into a vacuum. By 1910 over 1.3
million horse drawn vehicles existed in the UK (compared to some
170,000 motor vehicles), i.e., about one horse carriage per 30 inhabi-
tants. The number of horse drawn road vehicles decreased to 530,000
(including 330,000 non-farm carts and wagons) by 1924. Thus, we can
conclude that the first phase of automobile diffusion indeed was a sub-
stitution process of horse drawn vehicles in road transport.
This process was rather fast (~t of 19.6 years; to 1919), but pro-
ceeded at a different pace for various market segments. The fastest
replacement occurred in the area of mass public transport, where
horse omnibuses and stagecoaches were replaced with a ~t of only 8.1
years (to 1912), followed by private road vehicles (hackneys and 4-
and 2-wheel private carriages were replaced by private cars, taxis, and
motorcycles) with a ~t of 16.1 years (to 1912). Replacement in the
area of goods transport (the lowest value market niche for the first
automobiles) proceeded with a ~t of 22.5 years slower and occurred
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also at a later date (to 1926). Still, we can conclude that by the end of
the 1930s the horse had virtually disappeared as a means of providing
road transport services in the UK. Within a relatively short time
period, between 1900 and 1930, we observe a complete market take-
over of the automobile in road transport.
Our analysis for the UK is further confirmed when we consider
the replacement of the horse in road transport in France, as done in
Figure 3.3.6. Again, the symmetrical displacement data and negative
diffusion curves of horse vehicles are not plotted in the figure for rea-
sons of clarity. Thanks to the research of Toutain, 1967, we can assess
the market impact of the automobile in measuring the relative market
share of horse and motor vehicles in road transport output (passenger-
and ton-km). The automobile first penetrated into road transport by
replacing horse drawn vehicles. The dynamics of this process in
France are quite similar to the UK. The displacement of horse car-
riages for passenger transport proceeded with a ti.t of 15.3 years (to
1909) somewhat faster than in the UK and occurring also at a slightly
earlier date. As in the UK, the diffusion of the automobile into lower
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tion: to 1909; l:i.t 15.3 years. Goods transport substitution: to 1924; l:i.t 17.7
years]. (Data source: Toutain, 1967.)
value market niches (goods transport) was slower and occurred at a
later date (~t of 17.7 years and to 1924). Similarly, the automobile
had effectively displaced horses from the road transport market by the
end of the 1930s. Our estimates for France allow us also to assess the
impact on market volume expansion, due to the diffusion of the auto-
mobile.* Road passenger transport, which was stagnant at a level of
around one billion (109) passenger-km before the appearance of cars
and motorcycles, increased by a factor of 40 until the end of the 1930s.
The output level of goods transported by horses, which had remained
at a level of 3.3 billion ton-km before the advent of the automobile,
increased to over 12 billion ton-km (i.e., by a factor of nearly four) up
to the end of the 1930s. Consistent with our earlier arguments the
pace of diffusion as well as the impact on market volume of the
• Recall here the discussion of the technological diffusion model of Metcalfe, 1983, in Chapter 2 above.
This particular model argues that the diffusion of a new technique (replacing existing ones) results in a
market expansion -impulse- to a new (equilibrium) level. For France the market expansion impact oBhe
diffusion of the automobile in replacing horses is substantial.
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diffusion of a new technology appears significantly higher in high-
value (price insensitive) market niches such as passenger transport.
We conjecture that the situation in other countries closely follows
the pattern as outlined above for the UK and France. Although we do
not have comparable data for Germany, we can nevertheless provide
some indication on the employment effect of the diffusion of the auto-
mobile. Voigt, 1965, presents contemporary statistics of the German
Reich on people employed in road transport. In 1908 about 195,000
coachmen compared to about 5,000 car and truck drivers were
employed in Germany. This ratio changed drastically to around
110,000 coachmen and over 200,000 car and truck drivers by 1933.
Thus, whilst nearly 100,000 coachmen lost their job or had to be
retrained as car drivers, this loss was more than compensated for by
new jobs created in automobile transportation. The increase in
market volume brought about by the diffusion of automobile technol-
ogy, resulted thus in a net increase of over 50 percent in the number of
driving personnel in the period from 1908 to 1933.
Finally, let us analyze the first phase of the diffusion of the auto-
mobile in the USA, in the country with the highest car density in the
world. Credit has to be given to the first analysis of the replacement
of horses as a source of transport motive power, carried out by Naki-
cenovic, 1986. In analyzing the number of horses and mules used for
transport purposes (i.e., excluding farm animals), the picture that
emerges is similar to that of the UK and France. Despite the rela-
tively crude measure for the substitution process allowed by the avail-
able historical statistics (one car could in fact have replaced more than
one horse, since carriages were often pulled by more than one horse), a
regular substitution process is shown in Figures 3.3.5 and 3.3.6. With
a t1t of 12.3 years and to in 1916, the substitution process was some-
what faster than in Europe. The results for the USA confirm our ear-
lier conclusion that by 1930 the horse had practically disappeared as a
means of road transport in all industrialized countries.
In Figure 3.3.7 the substitution process of horses by automobiles
is illustrated by plotting their respective absolute numbers and the
estimated numbers based on a logistic substitution model. This sub-
stitution resulted in a decrease in the number of draft animals used for
transport, i.e., from near to 4 million in 1910 to less than 400,000 by
the end of the 1930s with a corresponding increase in the number of
cars from 400,000 to over 20 million. By the time this substitution
process was completed at the beginning of the 1930s, the US automo-
bile density was close to 200 passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants.
This is a value comparable to the car density of present day Japan
(240 cars per 1,000 inhabitants in 1987). This is another illustration
of the specific circumstances explaining the present high automobile
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and number of cars in the USA (empirical data and model estimates from a
logistic substitution model). (Source: Nakicenovic,1986.)
density in the USA, which makes it all the more unrealistic to use the
US situation as a guide for developments in other countries. In addi-
tion the unique initial starting conditions for the automobile age in the
USA have to be considered. For instance, before the appearance of
the automobile, the number of riding horses and mules in the USA in
1900 exceeded 40 per 1,000 inhabitants, which exceeds today's car
ownership rate in Hong Kong, and is comparable to the current aver-
age car density worldwide (outside the USA) of around 50 passenger
cars per 1,000 inhabitants.
Another observation, which can be made on the basis of Figure
3.3.7 is that the total number of road vehicles (Le., horses plus cars)
appears t6 have evolved along an exponential secular trend with an
average growth rate of above 4 percent per year ever since 1850. This
suggests an analysis of the diffusion of all road vehicles, irrespective of
the replacement process between horses and cars occurring inside the
total road vehicle population. This analysis is reported in Figure
3.3.8. If the growth of the total number of road vehicles in the USA is
analyzed under the hypothesis of a single diffusion process, it appears
that the growth of the number of road vehicles proceeds after initial
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significant turbulences* (but still along the long-term diffusion pat-
tern) finally "locking in" in a regular growth path along the logistic
diffusion trajectory. The implications of this process, should it con-
tinue its historical trend, are particularly noteworthy with respect to
the estimated saturation level of around 350 million vehicles, which
would correspond to a doubling of present day figures and a resulting
road vehicle density of over one vehicle per inhabitant. Although such
a conjecture appears unrealistic, based on today's organizational pat-
terns of car ownership and usage, there are some tourist centers where
car densities exceeding one car per inhabitant can already be observed
today. Could it be that in the future such large numbers of additional
road vehicles will be used in the form of rented cars or similar
• In order to report the whole period in history for which data were available, we also plot in Figure 3.3.8
the phase below 1 percent of the ultimate saturation level, which is usually omitted in the parameter esti-
mation and graphic representation of results. Note also that the ordinate in Figure 3.3.8 stops at 90 per-
cent of K. As the diffusion process has presently progressed to only 50 percent of the estimated final sa-
turation level, the statistical uncertainty involved in parameter estimation is substantial. Assuming a 10
percent data error (to cover the different numerical convergence of various estimation algorithms), we esti-
mate a 90 percent probability that K (352.6 million vehicles) will be between 207 to 516 million vehicles
(1986: 176.5 million). R2 of estimate is 0.9966.
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organizational schemes to provide local and regional transport, with
long-distance transport being provided for by other modes of transpor-
tation (e.g., aircraft or Maglevs)?
Only the future will tell, whether such a scenario may be realistic.
Let us return instead to our previous statement, that the development
of road infrastructure (surfaced roads) preceded the diffusion of road
vehicles. In Figure 3.3.8 we have also plotted the diffusion of surfaced
roads in the USA (from Figure 3.1.1) to provide final empirical evi-
dence supporting our conclusion that the diffusion of the automobile
followed (and not enforced) the diffusion of road infrastructure. The
diffusion of surfaced roads in the USA (to 1951) precedes the diffusion
of road vehicles (to 1985) by over 30 years and progressed with a !:1t of
64 years faster than the expansion of road vehicles (!:1 t 86 years).
Presently the expansion of surfaced roads appears to be practically
complete, whereas possibly only half of the ultimate number of road
vehicles has been reached. It is perhaps not incidental that the origin
of the two diffusion pulses coincides in the 1850s, emphasizing the
close relationship between infrastructure and the transport technology
using it. Roads were first surfaced to serve horse driven vehicles and
the same infrastructure could subsequently be used by the automobile,
when in turn it started to replace the horse on the street.
We would like now to return to the beginning of the automobile
age, and put forward some tentative propositions as regards the driv-
ing force behind the substitution process of horses by cars. We have
concluded that the replacement of horses was practically complete in
all industrialized countries by the 1930s, independent of which specific
indicator was used to describe this substitution process. The speed of
displacement of horses in road transport was rather fast, with !:1ts
ranging from 12 (USA) to 20 (UK) years, meaning that within a
period of one to two decades 80 percent of the stock of horses (and
carriages) in the road transport sector were replaced.
What are the driving forces behind such a rapid process of tech-
nological change? Clearly, a complex vector of comparative advan-
tages of the automobile over horses. Among these comparative advan-
tages we rank in first place improved performance in terms of speed,
range, and ease of use. Average transport speeds of automobiles
increased quickly from around 30 to some 50 km/h [average transport
speed on highways was higher; for 1940 an average speed of 40 miles
(i.e., 60 km/h) is reported, (US DOC, 1975)], compared with the typi-
cal 10 km/h for average horse carriages. Higher speed and ease of use
(no changing of horses over long-distance journeys) meant a consider-
able extension in the travel range which could be covered. Another
aspect of ease of use of the automobile was a significant reduction in
inventories [stables, storage of food - a horse consumes over 25 kg of
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food per day in the form of bulky hay, oats, etc., (Montroll and
Badger, 1974)].
Finally, compared to the horse, the automobile can only be
described as environmentally benign, at least in urban areas of dense
traffic (Ausubel, 1989). Cars made less noise and also less emissions
than the previous dense horse population, as long as the numbers of
cars did not significantly exceed the previous horse population in
cities. Although we now know that the quality (toxicity) of emissions
of automobiles and horses is entirely different, the automobile
nevertheless offered relief from one of the most urgent environmental
pollution problems of urban areas around the turn of the century:
horse manure. Montroll and Badger, 1974, estimate that a horse pro-
duces about 1,000 grams of excrement per mile (g/mile) travelled (635
g/mile solid and 300 g/mile liquid). This compares to 1980 piston
engine standards in the USA of around 5 g/mile (CO, NO x and hydro-
carbons). Thousands of so-called "crossing sweepers" were employed
in London who would clean a path before anyone crossed the street (at
a cost of one halfpenny). Today this may sound anecdotal (provided
by Montroll and Badger, 1974) but horse traffic did previously consti-
tute a serious urban environmental problem.
We conclude our discussion on the first phase of the diffusion of
the automobile by saying that it was (a) characterized by a process of
substituting horse drawn vehicles, and (b) that this first phase of the
diffusion process was essentially completed by the 1930s. Technologi-
cal improvements in automobile design and further improved perfor-
mance and comfort of automobiles has prepared the ground for the
second phase of the diffusion of the automobile, i.e., its emergence as a
mass transport mode and the beginning of competition with tradi-
tional long-distance carriers, in particular the railroads.
The second phase of automobile diffusion
The diffusion of private car ownership will be discussed below under
two main assumptions. First, empirical evidence suggests that the dif-
fusion pattern closely follows a logistic trajectory.* Our second
assumption is based on the conclusions of our analysis of the first
phase of the diffusion of the car. Since it was not until the end of the
1930s that horses disappeared as a means of road transport, we can
only consider the number of cars as an appropriate indicator for
passenger road vehicles after that date. Consequently (and by further
• Sensitivity analysis with alternative diffusion models yielded unsatisfactory results: bad statistical fit
and also unrealistic (and between different models, widely diverging) saturation levels.
146 The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
ignoring the disturbances resulting from World War II) we will
analyze the second phase of the diffusion of the automobile by using
data from the period 1950 to 1986 only. The analysis will use both
absolute and relative measures, one being the number of cars
registered, the other one being the number of cars registered per 1,000
inhabitants.
We have shown in the introduction to this Section that private
car motorization has been primarily a phenomenon of OECD coun-
tries, which presently account for about three-quarters of all passenger
cars registered worldwide. Consequently we will begin our analysis of
post World War II automobile diffusion by examining a sample of 12
OECD countries, representative of the automobile "diffusion
bandwagon" . Subsequently, we extend the analysis to centrally
planned economies and developing countries primarily for two reasons:
• to examine the likelihood of a similar scale of motorization in
those countries as observed for OECD countries (concluding that
similar automobile density levels appear unlikely to emerge in the
future).
• we perform a "bottom-up" consistency check to examine if the
projected world total is in agreement with the aggregated indivi-
dual diffusion forecasts of our sample of 20 countries, which
account for over 90 percent of world passenger car registrations
(concluding that top-down and bottom-up diffusion approaches
yield consistent results).
OEeD countries
Table 3.3.1 presents the estimates of the diffusion of passenger cars in
a number of OECD countries, as well as the total for the world
(including centrally planned and developing countries). We show the
timing (inflection point to, i.e., at K/2) and the duration of the diffu-
sion process (~t), the estimated ultimate level of saturation K,
together with the corresponding uncertainty bands for the estimates
(at 90 percent probability level). The actual car density at present
(registered passenger cars) is also given. As can be seen from these
figures, automobile diffusion appears close to saturation in most of the
OECD countries and at the global level. In fact, in a few cases the
lower uncertainty band has already been surpassed by actual registra-
tion figures. This is the reason why only best fit and high uncertainty
band estimates are considered as ranges for the estimated saturation
level K in the subsequent discussion.
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Table 3.3.1. Passenger car diffusion,l) from 1950 to 1987 (in million passenger
cars registered).
Passenger Cars (million)
Present3 ) inCountry
to t:J.t K K-range2 } Present
R2
(1986-87) %of K of estimate
Australia 1972 43.6 8.6 7.4-9.7 6.8 70-80 0.9996
Austria 1972 27.6 2.9 2.6-3.1 2.7 85-94 0.9978
Canada 1972 51.8 15.0 12.9--17.1 11.5 67-77 0.9969
France 1969 33.8 23.8 21.4-26.1 22.0 84-92 0.9958
FRG 1971 28.9 29.7 26.7-32.7 28.3 87-95 0.9949
Italy 1973 25.7 24.6 22.1-27.0 23.3 87-95 0.9924
Japan 1975 16.6 30.1 27.1-33.1 29.5 89--98 0.9993
Spain 1976 21.2 11.1 10.0-12.2 10.3 85-93 0.9989
Sweden 1965 32.4 3.4 3.1-3.7 3.4 92-100 0.9925
New Zealand 1970 47.7 1.9 1.7-2.1 1.6 76-86 0.9965
UK 1966 33.3 18.1 16.4-19.9 17.0 85-94 0.9977
USA') 1970 59.7'} 157.7 141.4-174.0 135.7 78-86 0.9985
World6 } 1974 51.66 ) 463.9 403.6-524.3 364.8 70-79 0.9998
I) Data period used for parameter estimation: 1950-1986/1987.
2) With 90 percent probability.
3) Range corresponds to high estimate and best fit case respectively.
,) Two growth pulses (t:J.t = 14.4 + 45.3 years).
6) Two growth pulses (t:J.t = 15.4 + 36.2 years, see Figure 3.3.4). Latest data available: 1984. World total
includes centrally planned economies.
(Data sources: Mitchell, 1980, and 1982; IRF, 1980, and 1986; and national statistics.)
A number of observations can be made from Table 3.3.1. First,
the growth of passenger cars registered appears to be close to satura-
tion in all the countries of our data sample. The remaining growth
potential is rather small for all DECD countries analyzed, whereas for
the world a figure of up to 30 percent higher than at present could,
based on our model, be expected. A second observation deals with the
very large heterogeneity in both the diffusion speed (~ts ranging from
17 years in Japan to over 50 years for Canada and the USA) and in
the remaining growth potential. Third, the diffusion rates (~ts) seem
to accelerate the later the diffusion process began.
Both the diffusion rate and the level of saturation thus appear to
be influenced by the time the diffusion process was initiated (meas-
ured by the year when one percent of the saturation level was reached,
i.e., to minus ~t). Early starters grow slower and achieve higher ulti-
mate density levels. But late starters have higher diffusion rates and
therefore tend to catch up with the leaders, albeit reaching lower
saturation levels. This is exactly the same phenomena as seen for the
spread of railways. For instance, the automobile diffusion process was
initiated in Canada and the USA around the turn of the century, grew
slowly (~t around 50 years) and results in very high car density levels
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Table 3.3.2. Passenger car diffusion 1) from 1950 to 1987 (in passenger cars re-
gistered per 1,000 inhabitants).
Cars per 1,000 inhabitants
Country 10 Al K K-range~) Present Present
3 ) in R~
(1986-87) %ofK of estimate
Australia 1965 46.7 495.6 441.6-549.5 431.6 79-87 0.9990
Austria 1971 27.2 366.4 330.Q-402.8 336 83-92 0.9975
Canada 1968 69.6 615.4 526.4-704.4 454 65-74 0.9924
France 1967 34.5 422.5 380.6-464.4 394 85-93 0.9953
FRG 1971 30.7 493.1 443.8-542.4 463 85-94 0.9941
Italy 1972 26.1 426.5 384.0-469.0 408 87-96 0.9920
Japan 1974 16.6 245.2 221.2-269.1 241 90-98 0.9991
Spain 1976 21.9 283.9 255.5-312.2 265.7 85-94 0.9988
Sweden 1964 32.8 401.8 362.0-440.8 401.0 91-100 0.9950
New Zealand 1967 60.7 581.0 508.1--654.0 487.5 75-84 0.9946
UK 1966 36.5 333.3 300.2-366.3 318.0 87-95 0.9895
USA4) 1970 57.84) 611.0 568.0--654.0 562.0 86-92 0.9950
World6 ) 1970 34.16 ) 62.7 58.0--67.3 61.0 91-97 0.9950
l)Data period used for parameter estimation: 1950-1986/1987.
~) With 90 percent probability.
3) Range corresponds to high estimate and best fit case respectively.
4) Two growth pulses (AI = 14.5 + 43.3 years).
6) Two growth pulses (AI = 14.2 + 19.9 years). Latest data available: 1984. World total includes cen-
trally planned economies.
(Data sources: see Table 3.3.1.)
as shown in Table 3.3.2. In Japan the diffusion process started some
60 years later, but due to higher diffusion rates grew faster (caught up
with a ti.t of some 17 years), and appears to be saturating at the same
time as the USA and Canada but at a lower level. Table 3.3.2 comple-
ments the analysis reported in Table 3.3.1 by using relative car den-
sity (passenger cars registered per 1,000 inhabitants) as an additional
indicator.
In comparing Tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, one can conclude, that the
results of diffusion analysis using both absolute and relative measures
are consistent. Differences in the estimated ti.ts for Canada, New Zea-
land, and the world total are the result of strong divergences between
population growth and passenger car registration growth rates. How-
ever, the analysis of both indicators agrees with the conclusion about
the limited growth potential remaining for further automobile diffu-
sion. We again point at the strong heterogeneity in the ultimate
saturation density levels that emerges from our analysis. Early star-
ters such as the USA and Canada may reach saturation density levels
at as high as around 600 passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants, whereas
late starters such as Japan or Spain reach saturation density levels
between 250 to 300 passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants.
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The difference in the high saturation density of the "automobile
bandwagon" (i.e., OECD) countries compared to the estimated world
total implies that most of the developing countries (with most of the
world's population) will not reach car diffusion levels anywhere close
to that of developed countries. In order to corroborate this hypothesis
we present below diffusion analyses for selected COMECON (Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance) and developing countries to investi-
gate whether a forthcoming saturation is also likely in these countries.
With the support of empirical data, Tables 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 show that
this is indeed the case, implying that car diffusion in these countries
will not "tunnel through" the forthcoming saturation in industrialized
countries. This also makes our scenario of global car saturation at
very divergent density levels internally consistent.
The diffusion of registered passenger cars in centrally planned
economies and developing countries is also analyzed using both abso-
lute and relative measures. The diffusion trajectories from both meas-
ures conform well with each other. It is also noticeable that the ulti-
mate diffusion densities which may be achieved will be as heterogene-
ous, or even more divergent, as those emerging from our analysis of
industrialized countries. The uncertainty of the estimated saturation
level is generally higher in these countries than for industrialized coun-
tries (see in particular the much wider uncertainty bands for the
estimated saturation level K). In most cases, this is because the diffu-
sion process is not yet close enough to the saturation level to allow for
higher statistical certainty. In some of the additional countries
analyzed (and not reported in Tables 3.3.3 and 3.3.4), in particular,
India, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, we were
not able to determine an estimate for the saturation level, as the
growth process is still in its early (exponential) phase. This implies
that the ultimate saturation level for these countries might be larger
than the present car density by at least a factor of three. However,
considering the present low density levels of passenger cars per 1,000
inhabitants in these developing countries, e.g., 2 for India, 11 for Thai-
land and 16 for South Korea, even growth by a factor of three would
not noticeably affect our average estimated saturation density of less
than 70 cars per 1,000 inhabitants at the global level.
Of the developing countries analyzed, only Venezuela appears to
have a motorization pattern that allows for significant growth well
into the next century. Venezuela seems to be an example of a country
that started early and grows slowly to high density levels. Taiwan, on
the other hand, is similar to Japan: both countries were late-starters
but caught up quickly as reflected by their rapid At of diffusion.
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Table 3.3.3. Passenger car diffusion!) from 1950 to 1987 in COMECON and
developing countries (in million passenger cars registered).
Passenger Can (millions)
Present3 ) inCountry
to 6t K K-range~) Present R~(198E}--87) % ofK of estimate
Czechoslovakia 1977 26.2 3.5 3.1-4.0 2.7 68-76 0.9942
GDR 1976 28.6 4.1 3.E}--4.7 3.3 71-80 0.9995
Hungary 1979 21.3 1.9 1.E}--2.1 1.5 73-82 0.9991
Poland 1985 25.6 7.2 5.1-9.2 3.3 3E}--46 0.9980
Argentina 1979 39.1 6.0 4.8-7.3 3.9 53~5 0.9970
Brasil 1979 27.8 13.6 12.E}--15.8 10.1 64-74 0.9986
Mexico 1984 33.1 9.9 6.2-13.0 5.2 40-53 0.9768
Taiwan 1988 20.4 2.8 0.3-5.9 1.0 17-36 0.9985
Venezuela 1996 44.1 9.1 2.5-35.4 2.4 7-26 0.9994
I) Data period used for parameter estimation: 1950-1986/1987.
~) With 90 percent probability.
3) Range corresponds to high estimate and best fit case respectively.
(Data sources: see Table 3.3.1.)
Table 3.3.4. Passenger car diffusion!) from 1950 to 1987 in COMECON and
developing countries (in passenger cars registered per 1,000 inhabitants).
Can per 1,000 inhabitants
Country
to 6t K K-range~) Present Present
3 ) in R~
(198E}--87) %ofK of estimate
Czechoslovakia 1977 27.0 225.9 196.1-420.0 173.5 41-77 0.9936
GDR 1976 28.6 249.2 216.0-282.3 198.0 70-80 0.9994
Hungary 1979 21.9 178.3 154.7-202.0 144.9 72-81 0.9990
Poland 1985 27.3 194.7 136.2-253.1 112.1 44-58 0.9972
Argentina 1975 42.2 173.3 149.0-197.6 127.0 64-73 0.9894
Brazil 1977 32.4 96.7 83.E}--119.5 74.0 62-77 0.9949
Mexico 1975 34.5 87.7 76.3-99.0 65.0 6E}--74 0.9593
Taiwan 1986 20.3 112.0 63.0-150.0 54.0 3E}--48 0.9981
Venezuela 1987 58.7 286.2 57.2--420.0 136.0 32-48 0.9919
I) Data period used for parameter estimation: 1950-1986/1987.
~) With 90 percent probability.
3) Range corresponds to high estimate and best fit case respectively.
(Data source: see Table 3.3.1.)
Growth of passenger car registrations will thus be very hetero-
geneous within developing and centrally planned economies. Different
initial conditions, degrees of economic development, and the develop-
ment of road infrastructures, explain the present diverse car owner-
ship rates, even for similar per capita income levels. Countries like
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico or South Korea have per capita GNP values
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of a similar order of magnitude (between 2,000 to 2,500 1982 US
$/capita in the Latin American Countries and 1,530 1982 US $/capita
in South Korea) whereas their car density levels differ by as much as
between 64 to 124 cars/1000 inhabitants in the Latin American coun-
tries and 16 cars/WOO in South Korea (1986 values). From our point
of view, diversity in diffusion levels will continue to be a characteristic
feature of developing countries. The high growth rates in the urban
population in developing countries calls more for the construction of
efficient mass transit systems for short range travel. For long-distance
travel, growth of air transport could be more consistent with the likely
future developments in these countries than a linear extrapolation of
past transportation (i.e., private car motorization) trends of industri-
alized countries.
This brings us to the last level of our analysis: the empirical test
for two characteristic observations in the pattern of car diffusion. We
have observed acceleration of diffusion speed and decrease in ultimate
diffusion levels as a function of the "learning time", Le., the time
period between the beginning of the diffusion process and the time
available for growth (Le., ~t). Figure 3.3.9 summarizes the results of
Tables 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 by analyzing the relationship between the
length of the growth process of automobile diffusion (~t) with the
ultimate saturation level and the time a country began motorization.
The acceleration of diffusion for late starters is not unique, since we
observed earlier a similar relationship in the growth of the railway net-
works.
Perhaps the most striking finding that emerges from Figure 3.3.9
is the straightforward mathematical expression for the "acceleration"
phenomenon of diffusion in relating the log of ~ts to the time period
in which private cars achieved a level of one percent of their ultimate
saturation density. This functional relationship was first hypothesized
by the late Ed Schmidt, 1983. Schmidt's Law describes the accelera-
tion of the diffusion rates of latecomers and their lower diffusion lev-
els. Using linear regression, we arrive at the functional expression
shown in Figure 3.3.9. The data confirm the acceleration tendency at
a statistically highly significant level, and explain as much as 89 per-
cent (R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom) of the variance in the
observed data. If one extrapolates the catch-up tendencies, one
arrives at the conclusion that a country starting the diffusion of
private cars now, would have a diffusion rate ~t lower than 10 years.
Such rapid diffusion of car ownership appears quite infeasible from a
practical viewpoint, and could not in any case result in a significant
growth in both absolute and relative car registration figures.
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Figure 3.3.9. Schmidt's Law: Diffusion (growth) rates and densities of
passenger car ownership as a function of the introduction date of the automobile.
We proceed to analyze the relationship between the estimated
ultimate car diffusion level and the start of motorization. Early star-
ters such as the USA* and Canada will have significantly higher car
density saturation levels (above 500 passenger cars per 1,000 inhabi-
tants) than countries like Hungary, Japan, or Taiwan, where density
levels of about half the level appear typical. The estimated regression
equation of the declining density trend explains as much as 82 percent
• Figure 3.3.9 also include8 the diffu8ion of total road vehicle8 in the USA (Le., riding horse8 and mule8
and later automobile8), becau8e of the high den8ity of individual road tran8port mean8 in the US prior to
the advent of the automobile. Recall here also that at the moment when the replacement of horse8 became
complete, Le., by the 19308, pas8enger car den8ity in the USA was already nearly as high as in pre8ent day
Japan. Recall also the 8ignificant difference in the 8aturation levels of pas8enger car and total road vehi-
cle8 den8ity in the USA.
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of the variance in the estimated saturation density levels of the indus-
trial countries forming the "automobile bandwagon".
Developing countries can be regrouped into three categories.
Countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico appear to follow the
same declining density trend as industrialized countries, albeit at a
significantly lower level. Venezuela and Taiwan are midway between
developing and industrialized countries. All the developing countries,
however, seem to follow a declining density trajectory similar to indus-
trial countries. Other developing countries like China or India fall
even further below the density envelope of developing countries shown
in Figure 3.3.9. However, in the same way that the USA does not pro-
vide a model for car diffusion in countries like the CDR or Japan, car
diffusion in Brazil or Mexico does not imply a realistic model for
Nigeria, India or even China. Density levels below 10 passenger cars
per 1,000 inhabitants, which are consistent with our projected world
average density figure, appear more likely for these countries.
The declining density envelope and the trend line of Figure 3.3.9
suggest that any country starting diffusion now with a rapid growth in
car registration would not achieve a great deal with respect to the
resulting diffusion levels. If we extrapolate the density envelope
trends for the future, we arrive at the conclusion that an industrial
country starting motorization now would grow very fast (~t of around
10 years) but at the same time achieve a density level below 100
passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants. Newly Industrialized Countries
(NICs) on the other hand, may achieve with a ~t of 10 years figures
close to our estimated world average of around 70 cars per 1,000 inha-
bitants, whereas "developed" developing countries like Brazil or Mex-
ico might achieve density levels in the vicinity of 20 to 30 passenger
cars per 1,000 inhabitants should motorization start now. For those
developing countries that do not have the necessary initial conditions
for motorization to take-off (primarily in terms of disposable income)
like India or China, even these values are probably one order of mag-
nitude too high: These countries fall outside the diffusion density
envelope shown in Figure 3.3.9. We believe that within the next
twenty years no trend in car densities, similar to those in industrial or
newly industrializing countries, will emerge in developing countries
such as China.
We postulate that the acceleration tendency in private car diffu-
sion has therefore a number of implications. First, it appears unlikely
that a similar diffusion will occur in countries that are not part of the
present diffusion "bandwagon" of industrialized and industrializing
countries. The second implication is that, with very few exceptions,
the expansion in passenger cars registered will approach saturation by
the turn of the millennium. A season of saturations, which is closer for
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late starters like Japan and Western Europe than for North America,
appears forthcoming. This can be either positive or negative depend-
ing if we are looking at it from the point of view of the automobile
industry or the environmental movement respectively.
The relative diffusion levels that ultimately result from motoriza-
tion differ from country to country as a result of their different geo-
graphical, economic, etc., boundary conditions, and the related accu-
mulated "experience" involved in the diffusion process. This appears
all the more plausible if we consider that in countries where diffusion
spans many decades, lifestyles and settlement and spatial organization
patterns are developed that go along with high motorization levels
(e.g., North America). In countries like Japan, where motorization
occurred within 20 years similar cross-enhancing effects are much
more limited and ultimate motorization levels are therefore consider-
ably lower. Our observation on the different car densities in various
countries is consistent with the results of our analysis on the spread of
the railways as a dominant transport mode prior to the automobile.
The "clustering" of the saturation dates that emerges from our
analysis, is all the more noteworthy in view of the diffusion times
involved spanning several decades. This corroborates our working
hypothesis of the "bandwagon" effect in the diffusion of a technologi-
cal paradigm (as represented by the automobile industry) which
reaches saturation within a relatively short time period. Based on
such a conjecture one would expect a significant structural discon-
tinuity in the evolution of the world automotive industry, a transition
phase which could well be accompanied by a period of high market
volatility and intensified international competition for survival in
saturating markets. The acceleration of diffusion towards the end of
this period of clustering saturations (Le., the Kondratieff barrier) can
also be observed in the diffusion of new technologies within the auto-
mobile industry itself, probably pointing at a deeper functional sym-
metry between automobile diffusion per se and technological change in
the car industry itself.
Technological change in the car fleet
As in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we conclude our discussion on the diffusion
of roads and the automobile by presenting illustrative examples of
technological change in the car fleet. A detailed discussion and
analysis of innovations and technological change in the automobile
sector of the USA is given by Abernathy, 1978; Blackman, 1974; Jutila
and Jutila, 1986; and Nakicenovic, 1986, and we will not try to add
examples to the comprehensive coverage provided by these authors.
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Figure 3.3.10. Diffusion of new technologies in the US car industry (in percent
of car output). (Source: Jutila and Jutila, 1986.)
As illustrative cases we will consider the introduction of different tech-
nological innovations in the US car manufacturing industry as well as
the introduction of compulsory emission control measures in the auto-
mobile fleet of the USA.
Figure 3.3.10 presents the diffusion of different technological
innovations (automatic transmission, power steering, air conditioning,
disc brakes, radial tires, and electronic ignition) in the US car indus-
try. Whereas the functional pattern in the form of S-shaped diffusion
curves is hardly surprising, we note an interesting acceleration ten-
dency in the introduction of technological innovations when approach-
ing the Kondratieff barrier in the saturation of automobile expansion
for most countries identified above. It is as if the industry itself anti-
cipates the approaching saturating markets and tries to gain ground
by accelerating the pace of incremental innovations. Note that during
periods of steady, regular high growth rates (the steep part of the
automobile diffusion curve) the rates of technological change appeared
to be much slower. Faced with almost saturated markets, the indus-
try appears to be forced to rapidly introduce technological innovations
as part of the competitive "elbowing" in the struggle for market
shares. Thus there is certain empirical evidence of the innovation
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Figure 3.3.11. Substitution of cars with emission controls in the USA.
(Source: Nakicenovic, 1986.)
triggering effects when approaching a period of market volatility and
increased competition (i.e., the season of saturations).
As regards the automobile industry, a similar innovation "pull"
can be observed in the early phase of development, which resulted in
the drastic decline of nominal and real term prices of cars up to 1920
(see Chapter 4). This earlier period of rapid technological change of
the, at that time still very young, automobile industry occurred during
the season of saturations of the railway/steam/coal technological clus-
ter described in Section 3.2 above. The very rapid replacement of
horses by the automobile was without doubt made possible by the
rapid technological improvements in cars, their increasing perfor-
mance and comfort, and the decrease in prices in the the first 20 years
of the automobile industry.
A final example of technological change in the automobile indus-
try is presented in Figure 3.3.11, which analyzes the introduction of
environmental control technologies in the US automobile fleet. The
diffusion of environmental control techniques in the car fleet of the
USA is interesting for several reasons. First, it provides a test as to
whether the standard models of technological diffusion and substitu-
tion are also applicable for cases where comparative advantage does
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not (expressed in producers or consumers preference differentials)
drive the substitution process, but rather, government regulations. In
such cases, the substitution model does not describe the diffusion of a
new technology in terms of how it becomes incorporated into produc-
tion or consumption (for instance since 1973 all new cars were
required to comply to low nitrogen emission standards, thus the per-
centage of cars produced/sold with the new technology, the catalytic
converter, changed almost instantaneously from almost zero to 100
percent) but rather how it diffuses into the existing stock of a techno-
logical population. Figure 3.3.11 provides convincing evidence that
technological dynamics resulting from (legal) regulatory measures can
also be captured by technological diffusion and substitution models.
In this case the models describe the population dynamics inherent in
the car fleet of a country. As such it provides a simple mathematical
model reflecting the change in a technological population stemming
from the dynamics of obsolescence* and the resulting replacement
rates, and that of market expansion.
The share of cars equipped with different environmental control
techniques and analyzed in Figure 3.3.11 are: (partial) emission con-
trols in the form of crankcase (hydrocarbon emission reduction),
exhaust controls (for the reduction of carbon monoxide and hydrocar-
bon emissions), and fuel evaporation controls; catalytic converters; or
no controls at all. The relative share of cars with anyone of the three
types of emission control technologies in the automobile fleet of the
USA can thus be described by a multiple logistic substitution model.
The At of the diffusion of cars equipped with catalytic converters is
about 10 years, indicating that the average life time (although varying
over time) of cars in the USA can be approximated by the estimated
At. The analysis also indicates that there are good reasons to be
optimistic about the time horizon of the positive effects of introducing
similar environmental control technologies in other countries, e.g.,
catalysators recently became mandatory in Austria. It is certainly not
incidental** that the time constant involved (around 10 years) in solv-
ing a serious environmental problem resulting from existing road
• Marchetti, 1983, provides a (logistic) "death curveB of the survivors of an age cohort (model year 1967)
in the US car fleet. The tH of the logistic mortality curve is 9.2 yean, indicating that it took 9.2 yean be-
fore the number of the 1967 models originally sold decreased from 99 to 50 percent or from 90 to 10 per-
cent. The 61 is thus an expre88ion for the average survival time of can of a given cohort (model year) .
•• The most straightforward explanation for the similarity in the dynamics of the introduction of catalytic
converter can and the replacement of hones in the transport sector (61 of around 12 yean) would suggest
similar usefullifespans for the two technologies. The average life time of hones (and carriages) was in the
order of around 12 yean (the average active life expectancy of a hone being between 12 to 15 yean,
Meillel, 1988) which is in fact not so different from the current average lifetime of a car. This is a further
indication of a deeper underlying functional similarity between the automobile and the hone in road trans-
port.
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transportation is similar to the dynamics of resolving earlier environ-
mental problems resulting from road transport (horse manure), as
presented in the analysis of the substitution of horses by automobiles
in the USA at the beginning of this century (~t of 12 years).
Summary
Figure 3.3.12 summarizes the diffusion envelopes resulting from our
analysis of the two phases of automobile diffusion in industrialized
countries. The horse replacement and car diffusion trajectories are
summarized by plotting the respective logit transformation of their
diffusion and substitution curves. Together these diffusion curves
represent international diffusion bandwagons, i.e., rather narrow
bands, in which all the diffusion processes of the industrialized coun-
tries analyzed are confined. Figure 3.3.12 identifies two such diffusion
bandwagons. First, the "horse-replacement bandwagon", in which the
diffusion rates are swift and very uniform in all countries and which
reaches saturation in the 1930s.
The second one, consisting of the diffusion of passenger cars, is
progressively converging towards the saturation period, showing a dis-
tinct acceleration for those countries that started motorization later.
As such, Figure 3.3.12 provides a summary of the diffusion of the
technological "paradigm" associated with the "automobile or
petroleum" age. Figure 3.3.12 also incorporates the diffusion trajec-
tories of other infrastructures and technologies representative of the
"automobile and oil age". These include the growth of surfaced road
infrastructure in the USA and the USSR and the diffusion of the
transport infrastructure for petroleum and oil transport (oil pipelines)
in the USA (Griibler and Nakicenovic, 1987); another example returns
to older transport technologies (ships) by showing how the internal
combustion engine substituted coal based steam propulsion technol-
ogy in the UK. The associated large infrastructures of the "oil age"
have tunneled through the first saturation phase of the growth of the
automobile. In turn, these infrastructures appear to be approaching
saturation around the year 2000, which is in tune with the cluster of
saturations for the growth of passenger car registrations in all indus-
trialized countries.
Figure 3.3.12 thus presents a condensed summary of the growth
of a technological paradigm associated with the use of oil and the
internal combustion engine as prime mover, either in creating its own
market (automobile diffusion) or replacing existing techniques like
horse carriages, or coal fired steam engines in the ship fleet or in the
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railway sector. Although the picture appears rather complex, one can
distinguish three classes of diffusion "clusters".
• Very long term, represented by the growth of infrastructures (oil
pipelines and surfaced roads in the USA and the USSR), the
replacement of steam by motor ships (UK), and the diffusion of
the automobile in North America.
• An accelerating diffusion cluster represented by the automobile
growth in most industrialized countries (Austria, Australia,
France, Germany, later the FRG, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Spain,
the UK, and the second growth pulse for passenger cars world-
wide).
• Short (rapid) diffusion processes represented by the replacement
of horses by cars in France, the UK, and the USA as well as
worldwide (first growth pulse of cars) and the diffusion of cata-
lytic converter cars in the USA (and returning to railways, the
replacement of steam locomotives by diesel and electric locomo-
tives).
Despite overlap in these diffusion processes and although their
different ~ts result in a complex pattern of rates of technological
change, one can clearly identify two main periods of structural discon-
tinuity characterized by a clustering of the saturation phases of vari-
ous diffusion processes. These seasons of saturations can be identified
in the period 1930 to 1940 (saturation of the replacement process of
horses as a means of road transport) and in the period from the mid-
1980s to shortly after the year 2000, which is characterized by the pro-
gressive saturation of the car/oil technological cluster. In fact, only
few diffusion processes appear to "tunnel through" this saturation
"barrier" which is most notably* reflected in the growth of surfaced
road ipfrastructure in the USSR. These again would start to enter
their proper season of saturations some 50 years after the beginning of
the saturation season in the 1980s.
Our argument with respect to discontinuities in the rate of tech-
nological change and diffusion and their respective impacts on
economic growth, does not rely on a rigid synchronization or "focus-
ing" of either the introduction, growth or saturation periods of all
processes. It is sufficient that a number of important replacements
and diffusion processes take place at the same time in a number of
core countries, leading to a prolonged period of economic growth. The
growth stimulating effects become progressively exhausted as the
• Automobile diffusion in Canada, the USA and New Zealand may continue for some time even after the
saturation of motorization in industrialized countries, although with decreasing growth rates.
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replacement and diffusion processes start to saturate during relatively
shott time periods, resulting in periods of retarded growth, recession,
economic restructuring, and later on in the introduction of new tech-
nological and social innovations. In Chapter 5 we will develop a new
measure for long-term discontinuities in the technical, economic, and
social change of a country in aggregating a large number of growth
and transformation processes. We will show that indeed strong
discontinuities emerge, even with only a relatively weak "clustering"
in the introduction and saturation phases of many processes of
change.
The exhaustion of the growth potential of the oil/automobile
"cluster" will lead to saturating markets and intensified competition.
However, it is more important to realize the increasing disbenefits
associated with the further intensification of an "automobile society" .
This includes in particular the negative environmental externalities
associated with dense car populations in urban agglomerations. At
the same time automobiles continue to be a symbol of individual
mobility and wealth, and as such the further diffusion of the automo-
bile may ultimately be blocked by the emergence of new social values
and attitudes.
The start of saturation (Le., the growth to limits) of the largest
part of the technological cluster associated with the internal combus-
tion engine and oil usage, that emerges from Figure 3.3.12, is probably
best characterized by the fact that the market share of oil in global
primary energy use is saturating at present (see Figure 2.1.3 above).
From such a perspective, a major structural discontinuity in the evo-
lution of a technological paradigm, responsible for much of the
economic upswing after World War II, appears consistent. Therefore,
the resulting (energy) market and price volatility in the 1970s and
1980s should not be too surprising.
Yet, it is exactly during these periods of discontinuity and volatil-
ity that a new technological paradigm is being shaped. In the next
Section we will discuss air transport and the fact that there are some
indications that air transport may be part of a forthcoming socio-
technical paradigm "tunneling through" the forthcoming saturation
phase of the automobile.
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Figure 3.3.12. Expansion of the oil/internal combustion engine technological
cluster: diffusion of roads, automobiles, oil pipelines and motor ships in core
countries. A - Austria, A US - Australia, CAN - Canada, D - FRG, F - France,
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Kingdom, USSR - USSR, US - USA, W - World. [Source: Oil pipelines
(Griibler and Nakicenovic, 1987), motor ships in merchant ship tonnage of UK
(Nakicenovic, 1984), all others (authors' own estimates).]
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3.4. Air Transport
The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Air transport is the most successful (if measured in terms of market
volume growth) existing long-distance transport mode. Commercial
aviation dates back to the 1930s when the first airplanes achieved the
productivity, range, and economic capabilities necessary to compete
with the more traditional long-distance transport modes - railroads
and ocean-liners. Ever since, air transport has eliminated these older
technologies in almost all market segments of passenger transport for
long distances (above 1,000 km). This is not only true for developed
countries but also for many areas of the third world.
Once a new transport mode makes possible the extension of the
spatio-temporal range of human activities, a very strong impact on
travel demand can be expected. The bottom of Figure 3.4.1 illustrates
such a technological revolution in the transport sector: The replace-
ment of transatlantic passenger crossings by sea first by the piston
and later the jet aircraft. As can be seen from the Figure, it took
around 30 years to completely replace ships by aircraft. The top of
Figure 3.4.1 shows the same process of technological substitution in
analyzing the total number of passengers transported by the three
technologies. The peak of transatlantic passenger crossings by ship
occurred in the late 1920s, with over 2 million passengers transported
annually (Woytinsky, 1927). The emergence of the piston propelled
aircraft resulted in a 50 percent decrease in the number of passengers
previously crossing by ship, whereas the total market volume did not
change noticeably. Thus, by the mid-1950s when the jet aircraft was
introduced, around 1 million people were crossing the Atlantic by ship
and an equal amount by piston aircraft. Much more decisive, how-
ever, was the impact of the jet aircraft on the number of passenger
crossings. Market volume increased dramatically in response to the
availability of a new, fast, and convenient form of transatlantic travel
made possible by the jet aircraft. Compared to its pre-introduction
time, the jet aircraft increased the volume of transatlantic crossings
by a factor of 10 over a period of 30 years.
The rapid expansion of air transport was only made possible by a
large number of scientific and engineering achievements in aircraft
technology, including aerodynamics, aircraft design, propulsion tech-
nology, the development of the necessary air transport infrastructure
(air control and air routes), communication (radio and radar) and
"transfer" infrastructures (airports and hubs), linking air transport to
other transport modes. Another decisive factor which enabled the
rapid growth of air transport was the great improvement in the pro-
ductivity (size and speed) of aircrafts.
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The engineering developments in aircraft design* are probably
best symbolized by the DC-3 airliner, the first "modern" passenger
aircraft introduced in 1935. The widespread use of this aircraft
(DC-3s accounted for about 20 percent of the aircraft fleet of major
US air carriers in 1936, by 1945 this share had risen to over 90 per-
cent, as shown by Martino et al., 1978) marks the beginning of the
"take-off" of large-scale commercial aviation. The success of the DC-3
was not only the result of superior engineering and technological per-
formance but was also due to the fact that it corresponded much
better to the requirements of a rapidly expanding market. The DC-3
aircraft could carry about twice as many passengers as other aircraft
models it replaced (e.g., the Ford Trimotor or the Boeing B-246).
Other technological innovation milestones that were important for the
growth in the performance of aircraft, include improvements in the
performance of piston engines (discussed below), an elaborate com-
munication infrastructure (in particular the use of radio), and subse-
quently, the availability of radar.**
The aircraft industry and air transport in general can be con-
sidered as the first truly global transport technology and infrastruc-
ture. In fact, the number of manufacturers competing in the world
aircraft market is rather small, and even more limited in the area of
aircraft propulsion, where, with the exception of the USSR, only three
major jet engine manufacturers exist today. Successful aircrafts like
the DC-3 or the B-747 (Jumbo) were, and are used in even the most
remote areas of the globe. As is appropriate for the global nature of
air transport, we discuss here the evolution of air traffic and of techno-
logical change in aircrafts primarily at the global level.
World air traffic volume
Figure 3.4.2 presents the growth of the world air transport volume
measured in t-km transported annually. The figures include centrally
planned economies and all commercial carrier operations (scheduled
and others), but exclude (as no international statistics are available)
• The first full metal aircraft suitable for longer
distance passenger transport was the German Junkers F 13 (Lufthansa, 1986) .
•• Before the invention of radar, the main obstacle for the early air transport industry was that flights
could take place only during day time. This technological barrier to further market growth was recognized
in a by now classic study under the leadership of the sociologist William Ogburn in 1937 (National
Resources Committee, 1937). In this study a large number of potential technological "fixes- to overcome
this problem were identified, without however anticipating the final solution: radar, which was invented
in the 1940s. Without taking a too optimistic viewpoint about the feasibility of *technological fixes-, this
case illustrates nevertheless a -market pull- impact on innovative activities, which finally helped to over-
come a barrier to further market expansion.
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Figure 3.4.2. Volume of air transport worldwide (including centrally planned
economies) passenger, cargo, and mail (in 109 t-km per year) [K 289.2 109 t-km;
to 1980; /It 34 years]. (Data source: lATA, 1961 to 1988, and own estimates.)
private commuter traffic. The total transport volume expressed in t-
km includes cargo and air mail as well as passenger traffic.
Passenger-km are converted to t-km based on a weight of 90 kg per
passenger including baggage, following International Air Transport
Association (lATA) conventions. Total ton-km transported world-
wide* by air have increased by approximately two orders of magni-
tude to the present level of 217.3 billion (109) t-km. This market
volume growth proceeded along the logistic trajectory estimated from
the empirical data and plotted in Figure 3.4.2.
The growth of the t-km (including passengers) transported by all
air carriers increased at an exponential rate up to 1980, with a dou-
bling of the transport volume every few years. As of 1980 however,
only one doubling appears to be left until the estimated saturation
• Data sources for global air traffic: lATA, 1961 to 1988, but covering also non-lATA member operations.
The USSR has been included in these statistics since 1973. We have supplemented lATA figures with
data on the USSR prior to 1973, using national Soviet statistics (Narod. Khos., 1982, and 1986, and
Lewybkyj, 1979). As for the 1950s and early 19608 non-scheduled air carrier operations are excluded in
the lATA statistics, we have estimated these operations by assuming that 20 percent of all operations
(similar to the situation in the late 1960s and early 1970s) are accounted for by non-scheduled operations.
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level of around 290* billion t-km will be reached after 2010. The
dynamics of the growth process in total volume transported is in
agreement with independent estimates made for passenger traffic
alone (e.g., Nakicenovic, 1988, estimates the growth of passenger
traffic to proceed with a dt of 29 years and to in 1977 to an ultimate
saturation level of around 200 million passenger-km per hour). If this
growth trend in world air traffic continues, it will have important
consequences on the necessary support infrastructures; air traffic con-
trol, airways, airports, and hubs. Further market volume growth,
which appears likely to continue its historical pattern well after the
year 2000, with a possible second expansion phase starting thereafter,
could therefore be confronted with serious bottlenecks stemming from
already congested air corridors and airports in many areas of the
world.
Within the general growth in total market volume, one can note a
gradual shift in the three different types of payload transported by air.
In the beginning, when comfortable (closed body and later pressurized
cabins) airplanes were not yet developed, most airplanes transported
the highest value goods of low weight, where speedy delivery was
important: information, in the form of mail. In the 1920s for
instance, around 90 percent of all airplane kilometers flown and ton-
nage transported worldwide** was for mail transport. Mail flights
were particularly important in the USA where aircraft finally replaced
the legendary "pony express" for urgent mail deliveries in the West.
Passengers and cargo started to become important only in the 1930s,
following the significant improvements in aircraft design and technol-
ogy.
Figure 3.4.3 shows the share of passengers, cargo, and mail in the
scheduled t-km transported worldwide (including the USSR since
1973), organized with the help of a multiple substitution model. The
gradual decrease in importance of mail in the t-km transported and
the long-term structural shift between passenger and cargo transport
becomes visible. Based on the model forecast, one could expect that
already by the year 2000 some 30 percent of worldwide t-km trans-
ported by aircraft will be cargo. The growing importance of air trans-
port in the goods sector, usually ignored as marginal in the tonnage
oriented national transport statistics, is more plausible if we consider
further shifts (dematerialization) in the direction of higher value goods
for advanced economies (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4).
Increased transport speeds and flexibility will become even more
• 90 percent probability that K will be between 243 to 335 billion t-km. R~ of estimate: 0.993.
•• Woytinsky, 1927, estimates the number of kilometers flown by aircraft to be approximately 4 million
km in 1920; this figure increased at a rate of 40 percent per year to over 15 million km by 1924.
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lATA, 1972 to 1987.)
important under industrial production organization schemes following
the "just in time" principle and the ever continuing quest to reduce
(capital intensive) inventories. In addition, air transport may, in
future, not be confined to traditional high-value or perishable goods
like fashion garments, electronics, flowers, vegetables, etc., but may
enter into markets considered hitherto as unimaginable for air trans-
port. An excellent example is provided by Lufthansa (FRG), which
(together with Alitalia, Italy) transports each week two Jumbos filled
with car bodies (the Cadillac Allante manufactured by Pininferina)
from Torino, Italy to Detroit, USA for final assembly. One might con-
sider this "air lift" of semi-finished car bodies as a production line
extending over nearly 6,000 km. In a similar way Japanese car export-
ers to the USA also began to use air transport. The twice as high
transport costs (compared to sea transport) being largely compen-
sated for by lower insurance costs, reduced damage during transport
(requiring previously expensive repair operations at the point of
delivery), no requirements for protective coating, and finally, due to
the higher transport speeds a considerable reduction of inventory
(capital) costs.
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The comparative advantage of air transport as regards speed,
flexibility, and quality of service appears to be so high, that external
events have not significantly affected the market volume expansion
along the logistic trajectory presented in Figure 3.4.2 above. It is also
worth noting that the regular growth pulse in world air traffic was
apparently not influenced significantly by the rapidly rising fuel costs
that resulted from the considerable appreciation of crude oil prices in
the 1970s. This was most likely due to two factors. First, the demand
for long-distance air travel is certainly amongst the least price sensi-
tive transport market segments. Secondly, rising fuel costs appear to
have been, to a large extent, compensated for by additional rationali-
zation measures by the aircraft operators. It should also be remem-
bered here that on average in the lifetime of an aircraft, about one
third is spent on the aircraft itself, one third on replacing the jet
engines (approximately every 10,000 operating hours) and the remain-
ing third on operating costs (primarily kerosene). Although the USA
is a special case (as regards competitive pressure in the air transport
sector and resulting low air transport prices), no effects on the average
transport costs per passenger-km of the "oil shocks" are noticeable.
Real term air transport costs have been on a steady decline ever since
the beginning of commercial aviation (see Chapter 4 below): from
around 28 US cents per passenger-mile to below 5 US cents per
passenger mile (in constant 1967 US dollars) between the mid 1920s
and 1980s.
Air transportation is carried out through a spatial hierarchy.
Short-distance domestic or short-distance international flights, as in
Europe, usually provide the necessary feeder functions for air tran-
sportation over larger distances, Le., on a continental or even tran-
scontinental scale. We may therefore assume that whatever growth
rate is realized at the higher spatial hierarchies of air transportation,
will also result in an equivalent growth at lower hierarchical levels
providing feeder services. To illustrate the complementary character
of long- and medium-distances in air transportation, we show in Fig-
ure 3.4.4 the evolution of the international ton-km transported by air
(passengers are again included on the basis of 90 kg per passenger
including baggage).
Europe, with its many small countries and resulting short dis-
tances in international air transport, has been considered as function-
ally analogous to the domestic traffic in larger geographical spaces
such as North America (i.e., as "domestic" air traffic in Figure 3.4.4).
As can be seen, domestic (short- to medium-distance) flights have,
after initial predominance over long-distance international flights,
reached parity with international air transport volume since the early
1970s. We consider this as evidence of the complementary character
(-- Parity
~
Domestic/7
///
/ //
// //
// /International
/ /'
+------- I I
A ir Transport
10- 1
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
169
2000
Figure 3.4.4. Growth of domestic and international air transport volume
(passengers, cargo, and mail) including centrally planned economies (in 109 ton-
km flown). (Data source: see Figure 3.4.2.)
of short- and medium-distances, and long-distance air traffic. Future
growth of world air transportation may thus well be divided equally
between international and domestic destinations. Functionally,
Europe is considered to be a "domestic" geographical entity in such a
scenario, which in view of 1992, does not appear to be an unreasonable
working hypothesis.
As regards a regional breakdown in the volume of air transport,
we face a serious data problem, in that no consistent data on the
regional disaggregation of all air transport operations is available. For
international, scheduled air traffic, lATA statistics· do allow, how-
ever, the analysis of its evolution by major geographical area, as
shown in Figure 3.4.5 below. An interesting finding from such an
analysis is the stability in the regional breakdown of international air
transport operations of lATA members. Only the share of Europe
declines from around 20 percent of the market share in 1949 to the
present level of 12 percent. But as discussed above, European air
• Regional breakdown baaed on scheduled, international paasenger-km flown. (Data source: lATA,I961
to 1987.)
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traffic may be functionally better considered as a "domestic" air
operation. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that despite the much
discussed emergence of the Pacific rim countries, their share in inter-
national air transport volume has remained constant at a level of 20
percent ever since the first time statistics were collected for that
region.
The growth of air transport described so far neither appears to be
constrained by external events like rapidly rising fuel costs nor by the
responses of the competitors challenged in long-distance travelling
(ocean liners, cars, and railways). This points to the fact, that the
comparative advantage of aircrafts (mainly their higher transport
speeds) is so strong that it effectively compensates for any intervening
external influences. The only remaining constraint to be analyzed is
whether the development of aircraft infrastructure did*, or could in
the future possibly constitute a bottleneck for the growth of air traffic.
Bearing this in mind, we also ask whether technological development
• Contrary to today's situation of congested air corridors and airports, the land and air based infrastruc-
ture did not impose a significant constraint on the historical growth of air traffic volume.
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and the improvement in performance of aircrafts kept abreast with the
rapid growth of market volume.
Evolution of aircraft performance
The global fleet of commercial aircraft can be described in a number
of ways. An obvious feature is the number of commercial aircraft in
operation worldwide, as was described above for the growth in the
number of passenger cars registered. The number of registered com-
mercial aircraft (excluding private commuter planes) increased from
about 3,000 in the 1950s to some 8,000* in the 1980s. At the same
time, however, and contrary to the situation with cars, the combined
performance in terms of size (carrying capacity) and speed of aircraft
increased by about two orders of magnitude. The DC-3 as the first
modern aircraft, could carry 21 passengers at a speed of around 350
km/h, i.e, an hourly throughput of 7,400 passenger-km. On the other
hand, the Boeing 747 (Jumbo) introduced in 1969 can carry as much
as 500 passengers at an average speed of 1,000 km/h, i.e., its perfor-
mance is 500,000 passenger-km per hour. The largest planned B-747
(500 Series) will carry almost 700 passengers. The performance of
passenger aircraft was therefore improved by a factor of 100 over the
last 50 years. The size of the fleet is therefore not the most important
indicator. One reason is because of the changing performance of air-
crafts in service but also because much of the traffic is allocated to the
most productive aircraft operating among the large hub airports,
while other aircraft constitute the feeder and distribution system
bound for destinations with lower traffic volume. The performance
criterion of how fast and how many passengers an aircraft can carry,
i.e., its productivity level in terms of passenger-km transported per
hour, is analyzed in Figure 3.4.6 for long-distance aircrafts.
The performance of all commercial long-distance passenger air~
crafts appears to evolve within a narrow "feasibility band" over time
(measured by the year it was commercially introduced). It is interest-
ing to note that all commercial aircrafts, in their productivity measure
fall within this narrow "feasibility band", and that all commercially
successful aircrafts fall exactly on the upper limit of the performance
feasibility envelope depicted in Figure 3.4.6. This performance feasi-
bility limit can be described by a logistic function (note that in Figure
• Available statistics are affected by uncertainties due to double counting of aircraft conversions and
differences between aircraft in stock and effectively in use. Boeing, 1988, for instance reports worldwide
some 8,640 aircraft effectively in stock, whereas MBB, 1989, estimates some 7,460 aircraft flying world-
wide.
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Figure 3.4.6. Passenger aircraft performance (measured in passenger-km per
hour) [K 1200; to 1970; ~t 31 years]. (Source: Nakicenovic,1988.)
3.4.6 the level below 1 percent of the ultimate saturation level is also
represented, in order to capture the early phase of the development of
commercial, long-distance passenger aircraft). The upper curve in
Figure 3.4.6 represents a feasibility frontier of aircraft performance: all
commercial aircraft introduced were either exactly on this perfor-
mance limit or below. The aircraft designs, which were at their time
of introduction, exactly on the "feasibility frontier" were all commer-
cially successful. Most of the aircrafts falling below this feasibility
limit proved (if not conceived for specific market niches, such as
short-distance transport) commercially unsuccessful. This is best
illustrated by the Concorde, which significantly fell short of the pro-
ductivity of the B-747 introduced around the same time period. The
Concorde turned out to be too small, and would in fact have required
around 250 passenger seats (compared to the actual 100) in order to
achieve the same productivity level as a B-747. From this perspective
the commercial failure of the Concorde - despite being a technological
marvel - may be better understood.
Thus, at any given time there appears to be only one appropriate
(best) productivity level for long-distance commercial passenger air-
crafts. Due to the fact that all commercial aircraft now travel at
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about the same subsonic speed (1,000 km/h) further improvements of
productivity with existing propulsion technology will only be possible
by increasing the size of aircrafts. According to the estimated curve in
Figure 3.4.6, the asymptotic capacity for the largest aircraft would be
about 1,200 103 passenger-km per hour (or about 10 billion
passenger-km per year). Such large aircrafts may never be built,
because of the logistics problems at airports for boarding over 1,000
passengers into an aircraft. This could be an indication of the fact
that the next generation of long-distance aircrafts will develop in the
direction of higher transport speeds (the second variable entering the
productivity measure discussed here).
Another interesting observation from Figure 3.4.6 is that the pro-
ductivity levels of all passenger aircrafts have evolved over time within
a narrow "feasibility band". This is defined by the highest produc-
tivity aircraft (the feasibility frontier), trend line, and a second paral-
lel curve (lagged by 9 years), which represents the logistic growth of
passenger-km transported worldwide, expressed in the same measure
as for aircraft productivity, Le., passenger-km per hour. The conclu-
sion from this observation is that aircraft productivity and market
expansion evolved in unison and market growth did not appear con-
strained by a lack of availability of aircrafts at the appropriate pro-
ductivity level in the various phases of the expansion of air passenger
traffic. Another aspect of this interdependence of market and aircraft
productivity growth is that no aircraft design exceeded the perfor-
mance levels required by the expanding market at any particular point
in time. The evolution of both aircraft technology and of air traffic
volume is therefore characterized by a process of interrelatedness with
no one-sided "market pull" or "technology push" prevailing, pointing
at complex feedback mechanisms and interdependencies between
market growth and the development of aircraft technology.
It took about 30 years for the performance of the most productive
aircraft to increase from about one percent of the estimated asymp-
totic performance level to about half of that performance level. The
DC-3 represents roughly the one percent achievement level and the
B-747 roughly the 50 percent mark. Thus, in the beginning (i.e., in
the exponential growth phase prior to the inflection point) the produc-
tivity of aircrafts was doubled every few years, whereas after the
inflection point only one doubling in the performance level remains to
be achieved. The implications of differentiating between these two
periods in the development of aircraft performance on aircraft designs
are straightforward. Prior to the inflection point (before the 1980s)
aircraft design evolved in an "evolutionary" sequence of many models
with increasing performance levels every few years. After the inflection
point, when only one doubling of the performance level remains to be
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achieved (at least in the present phase of the development of air-
crafts), a new "gradual" phase of aircraft development, consisting of
modifications in existing designs, characterizes the industry. Thus, for
the next two decades one should not expect a large number of new
long-range aircraft models to appear on the market, but rather a gra-
dual development, consisting of successive improvements and modifi-
cations of existing models. Because the B-747 can in principle be
"stretched" by a factor of about 2, it could remain the largest long-
range aircraft in the medium-term future (i.e., the next 20 years).
This "stretching" policy is actually being followed in the development
of the next generation of the B-747; which is planned to have around
700 passenger seats.
Let us make a final corollary from the observation of the parallel
evolution of passenger market volume and the performance level of
aircrafts. If both the market and the aircraft "throughput" in terms
of passenger-km per hour evolve at the same rate, it means that the
market volume can be transported by a constant number of aircrafts.
Thus, instead of increasing the number of aircrafts in order to trans-
port higher "fluxes" of passenger-km per hour, the productivity of a
(near constant) long-range aircraft fleet grows accordingly. A similar
observation can in fact also be made for the world ship fleet.
The above discussion on the evolution of the air transport market
and the development of aircraft productivity suggests a rather con-
tinuous development pattern. As a final example in this Section we
will show that the evolution of aircraft propulsion technology did not
follow a similar pattern, but is instead characterized by an envelope,
consisting of two successive growth pulses, with a period of saturation
and discontinuity in between. Figure 3.4.7 reports an analysis of the
evolution of the performance of aircraft engines [maximum rated hor-
sepower (hp) for piston engines, and maximum take-off thrust in kilo-
pond (kp) for jet engines].
Figure 3.4.7 shows the improvement in the performance of civil
aircraft engines since the beginning of aviation. The first piston
engine plotted on Figure 3.4.7 is the French 50 HP Antoinette engine
introduced in 1909, and the last one is the American Wright Turbo
Compound rated at 3,400 hp (i.e., at 90 percent of the estimated
saturation level in piston engine performance). This last generation of
piston engines, when approaching their ultimate performance limits,
represented - even by today's standards - highly elaborate achieve-
ments in engineering, including double ("stretched") cylinder rows,
four valve engines, and compound turbocharging to increase shaft
power. These engineering developments after some 50 years, are now
entering into the automotive industry. This could be an indication
that the technological development of the internal combustion engine
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of cars is approaching a similar performance feasibility limit as air-
craft piston engines were approaching in 1940. In fact, SAAB Scania
has recently announced the development of a turbo compound diesel
truck engine.
The development of piston engines is followed (with a lag of 30
years) by a parallel growth pulse of jet engines, starting with the Ger-
man Junkers Juno 004 (rated at 900 kp) and ending with the Ameri-
can Pratt and Whitney JT9D of the early 1980s with around 90 per-
cent of the estimated thrust saturation level. Both pulses are charac-
terized by similar time constants (~t) of 30 years, with the two inflec-
tion points being equally spaced at 30 year intervals. These midpoints
in the development of aircraft propulsion technologies coincided with
the introduction of the DC-3 aircraft and (approximately) the B-747
respectively. The parallel development of two successive technological
generations of aircraft engines is a striking finding in itself which
would merit further research. It appears that the development of the
jet engine is best interpreted as follows: The technical feasibility limit
reached in the development of the piston engine was overcome by the
development of a new technology.
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Thus, certain parallels in the dynamics of the evolution of
passenger aircrafts and of aircraft power plants are evident, beyond
the obvious similarity in their time constants (~t of 30 years). The
development of aircraft propulsion technology did not evolve continu-
ously as did the performance of aircrafts and the market expansion of
air traffic in general, but through two development pulses characteriz-
ing two successive generations of aircraft propulsion technology.
Nevertheless these streams of development evolved consistently and
synchronously. The approaching saturation in the growth of the per-
formance levels of jet engines is an additional indication of the gradual
improvement of aircraft technology development over the next 20
years. Future developments in jet engines will thus consist mostly of
further improvements in fuel efficiency (like the Ultra High Bypass
engine designs resulting in a 40 percent fuel efficiency improvement)
and noise reduction and not in further increases in the rated power of
turbines. As with the "stretching" of the size of the B-747, the
development of piston engines, after having reached their inflection
point in 1936, was also achieved by "stretching" (i.e., doubling of
cylinder rows). A good example of this is the Pratt and Whitney
Twin Wasp powering the DC-3 when introduced in 1935.
The time constants in the development of civil aviation and air-
craft technology are thus around 30 years. Thirty years after the
standard industry design emerged symbolized by the DC-3, the B-747,
as the first wide-body jet, entered service. Its productivity represents
about half of the estimated industry saturation level that might be
approached around the year 2000. Thus, the life cycle of aircraft
development spans about 60 years in total, from initial standardiza-
tion and subsequent rapid growth, characterized by a large number of
successive models introduced into the market, through to the inflec-
tion point of development when emphasis begins to shift to gradual
improvements and increasing competition, characterized by cost
reductions and rationalizations. Based on our analysis, the technolog-
ical (performance) development of aircraft should approach saturation
around the year 2000, with the present growth pulse in the world air
traffic volume entering a phase of saturation some time thereafter.
This, of course, raises the question about what may happen after such
a saturation phase. Could one expect a new growth pulse (as we
would be inclined to believe), a period of stagnation and subsequent
decline (similar to the railways after the 1930s), or a period of instabil-
ity with changing periods of market growth and decline?
Air Transport
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The fastest airliner, Concorde, and the most productive jet aircraft,
the Boeing B-747, flew for the first time almost twenty years ago.
Ever since that time the volume of all airline operations has continued
to increase while the productivity of the B-747 increased marginally
only through stretching. Most of the subsequent technological
development focused on gradual improvements such as noise reduction
and the improvement of fuel efficiency. Unavoidably, this implies
diminishing returns in the further advancement of airliners and, conse-
quently, the possibility of an approaching saturation in commercial air
transport.
Why should one then expect a subsequent further growth pulse in
the volume of world air traffic after the year 2000? Marchetti, 1987,
argues that the world economy and our societies are heading towards
true globalization, which would effectively be achieved if any point on
the globe could be reached within the daily time budget constraint of
around one hour. Taking this a step further, one could imply that
future developments in communication technologies could transform
our globe into a "world village". Increasing global integration of
economies and emerging new industrial production organizations with
different structures of integration (horizontal as opposed to vertical as
argued by Pry, 1988) and specialization in the production process
(increasing importance of "software", highly specialized "custom
design", and real-time production of industrial products, as discussed
by Ayres, 1988) could be part of an emerging new paradigm for
economic growth. Both tendencies would, as in the past, have impor-
tant consequences in creating specific demands for passenger and
goods traffic.
If such emerging tendencies would indeed become predominant
features of the future functioning of our societies and economies, new
transport systems with significantly higher performance levels, both in
terms of transport speed and throughput, would become necessary. It
is unlikely that significant increases in the number of aircraft in use or
the development of hyperjumbos seating a few thousand passengers
will occur, considering current airport overcongestion and the many
inconveniences associated with an increased size of aircraft. Another
possibility would be to enhance the productivity of the fleet by
increasing aircraft speed.
Higher transport speeds, say in the range of Mach 5---6 and ulti-
mately around Mach 25, would be required in order to integrate the
whole globe into a functional entity like a present day urban
agglomeration. Along similar lines, large functional urban agglomera-
tions (i.e., in the form of a "megalopolis" or ultimately in the form of
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an "ecumenopolis", i.e., an urban cluster ultimately spanning a whole
continent, Doxiadis and Papaioannou, 1974), transgressing our
present day definition of cities in terms of their administrative boun-
daries, could only become possible by high speed and capacity trans-
port infrastructures. The first indications of the development of such
"functional" city corridors can be observed for instance in the USA
(Boston-New York-Washington) or Japan (Tokyo-Osaka, with a
total population of nearly 100 million people). It is not incidental that
these large city corridors are connected by aircraft links operating like
shuttle buses (in Japan by specially modified B-747s for the short dis-
tances travelled) or by the predecessors (Japan's Shinkansen or the
French TGV) of new high speed and throughput ground transport sys-
tems. In future, regional links served by Maglevs, for instance in the
form of long-distance metros, as for example proposed for Switzerland
(Die Presse, September 9, 1988), could complement longer distance air
connections. Under such an assumption, one could imagine two types
of high performance transport infrastructures. High speed regional
links integrating whole urban corridors into single functional cities,
either by high speed train or metro type connections (like the planned
new Shinkansen Maglev), or by specially designed medium-range air-
crafts [as for instance developed at present by Messerschmitt-Bolkow-
Blohm GmbH (MBB) for China]. The highest (spatial) hierarchy of
exchange relationships could in turn be provided by a synergistic
interlinkage of new communication and information exchange infra-
structures, complemented by a new generation of high speed (super-
sonic or even hypersonic) aircrafts serving a limited number of tran-
scontinental hubs (like the off-shore Kansai airport in Japan).
As the major productivity indicators (speed and capacity) of
current aircraft technologies are apparently approaching upper limits,
further growth in air transport demand would require new technolo-
gies that would extend the feasible and economic performance
envelope of passenger aircrafts to span subsonic, supersonic, and even-
tually even hypersonic flight regimes. The most daring of the pro-
posed designs could fulfill even more ambitious objectives and lead to
the development of an air-breathing spaceplane. Currently such tech-
nologies are under active development in a number of countries,
including the USA, France, Germany, Japan and the USSR. The
basic objective is to develop new types of aircrafts that could extend
the ultimate productivity limit of conventional aircraft (1.2 million
passenger-km per hour). This will certainly be possible with aircraft
speeds that significantly exceed the sound barrier.
Assuming that such a development is technologically possible and
economically viable, it poses a number of fundamental questions asso-
ciated with the expected side-effects of a large fleet of hypersonic
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passenger aircraft. Certainly, the noise problem must be overcome
both by reducing the inherent noise profiles and removing the hubs
and routes for such aircraft from populated areas. A more important
concern, however, is the possible adverse effect of such a fleet on the
chemistry of the upper atmosphere. In view of the observed ozone
depletion of the stratosphere, such concerns are timely, while the
design and configuration of proposed hypersonic transports are still in
an early development phase.
The most likely designs for such new types of aircraft would favor
alternative fuels, since conventional jet fuel becomes impractical at
speeds exceeding around Mach 3.5. Here methane (natural gas), and
at speeds above Mach 5-6 hydrogen, would be the fuels of choice,
since, apart from other reasons, these fuels would create the most
environmentally benign emissions (Victor, 1989). New advanced types
of aircraft could in fact be indicators of the forthcoming increased
importance of these energy carriers. Increased use of natural gas
(methane) could prepare the ground for a hydrogen economy in the
more distant future in terms of the related infrastructure for trans-
port, storage, and use of gaseous energy vectors.
At present it is of course difficult to assess a scenario that would
enable a truly world economy. If the possible adverse effects of a con-
tinued increase in transport operations could, however, be overcome,
the further maximization of range through productivity increases and
speed by a new generation of transsonic aircraft, would be consistent
with the observed evolution of transport systems since the onset of the
industrial revolution. For the first time in our history, it might
become possible to mesh the world's principal gravity centers into a
single functional entity. The availability of a new air transport tech-
nology could therefore lead to a new growth pulse in air traffic,
increasing traffic flux levels at least by one order of magnitude* above
our estimated saturation level of world air transport based on present
technology.
Finally, one should also recall, that at the time of the large tran-
satlantic liners their travel speed (the fastest connection by the Queen
Elizabeth II took around 5 days and 4 nights between New York and
Southampton) was considered largely adequate by contemporary
sources. Based on this opinion, the market potential for transcon-
tinental air passages should have been assessed as being rather lim-
ited. However, as shown above (Figure 3.4.1), the market response
was rather different. Since the first non-stop flight from Europe to the
USA and back (with a Lufthansa Focke- Wulf Fw 200 "Condor"
• This hypothesis is based on an analogy of the market impact of the introduction of the jet aircraft.
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plane), air traffic has been developing rapidly over the Atlantic, and in
1987, the last regular transatlantic passenger liner, the Polish Stefan
Batory, discontinued service.
Summary
Figure 3.4.8 summarizes the various developments in aircraft perfor-
mance, air traffic volume, and aircraft propulsion technology dis-
cussed so far. It becomes clear, that the growth associated with the
aircraft technology cluster will continue for some time after the
saturation period of the automobile/oil technology cluster discussed in
Section 3.3 above. Thus, air transport and aircraft technology provide
an example of a technological cluster "tunneling through" the satura-
tion period of the dominant technological (automobile/oil) regime.
Such was the case with railways during the saturation phase of canal
development, with cars during the saturation of the railway expansion
pulse, and today it could be the case with air transport in the
approaching saturation phase of car motorization.
We have discussed above the relationship of new aircraft techno-
logies to new energy vectors required for fueling high speed aircrafts:
methane up to speeds of Mach 5-6, and hydrogen for even higher
speeds. We complement our summary by providing an indication of
the energy technology which could also "tunnel through" in its growth
phase, the present saturation of the market dominance of oil. Natural
gas appears to be the energy carrier, which could well provide the
potential for gaining further market shares in the future, eventually to
become the single most important source of primary energy after the
year 2000 (see Hefner, 1984, Rogner 1988, and Griibler and Nakiceno-
vic, 1987). This is illustrated by examples from energy transport
infrastructures. The transport infrastructure of coal and its satura-
tion in the 1930s was already discussed in the Section on railways.
Along with the present saturation of the share of oil in the primary
energy balance, we observe an apparent saturation of oil related trans-
port infrastructure (pipelines) in the USA. Contrary to this, there still
appears to be a growing tendency in the importance (measured by the
size, i.e., the length of the pipeline network) of natural gas transport
infrastructure in the USA and indeed at the global level too. Both air-
craft and methane technologies could thus "tunnel through" the sea-
son of saturations of the oil/internal combustion technological cluster,
responsible for much of the economic growth of the post World War II
period.
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Figure 3.4.8. Evolution of air traffic, aircraft technologies and of energy trans-
port infrastructures (oil and natural gas). (Source: Passenger aircraft perfor-
mance and passenger-km transported worldwide: Nakicenovic, 1988, oil and na-
tural gas pipelines in the USA: Griibler and Nakicenovic, 1987, natural gas pipe-
lines at the global level: Marchetti, 1987, all others: author's own estimates.

CHAPTER 4
An Integrative View of
Long-Term Infrastructure
Development
Evolution is the result of a sequence of replacements.
Elliot W. Montroll, Social Dynamics and
the QuantIfying of Social Forces, 1978
In the previous Chapter we have sketched out a quantitative history of
individual transport infrastructures and of technological change in the
devices using them. In order to explain some of the historical devel-
opment patterns, reference to other transport infrastructures and
technologies was made in discussing the whole life cycle of an infra-
structure system, i.e., not only its growth, but also its subsequent
saturation and eventual decline. The purpose of this Chapter is thus
twofold. First we attempt to integrate the various evolutionary ten-
dencies in the development of individual infrastructures into a holistic
view of the whole transport sector. For this purpose different mea-
sures are used to assess the relative importance of individual transport
systems at various times in history. First, the changing structure of
the whole transport infrastructure is analyzed using both physical
length and the value of the capital stock as an indicator (Section 4.1).
Secondly the relative output of different infrastructures in terms of the
passenger-kilometers (km) and ton-km performed (Le., the modal
split) is analyzed (Section 4.2). We attempt to show, that from a
long-term perspective, the evolution of the transport system both in
terms of its structure as well as its performance (modal split) is
characterized by a regular sequence of replacements of older forms by
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newer forms in order to satisfy human transport needs. These long-
term trends appear to be robust even against major societal and
economic disruptions and discontinuities.
The second objective of this chapter is to develop some general-
ized propositions as regards the driving forces behind the evolutionary
transformations in the transport sector (Section 4.3). These driving
forces are seen in the performance (in particular speed and range) and
in the service (flexibility and quality) characteristics of different trans-
port systems, and how they respond to the continually evolving socie-
tal requirements. In a subsequent step, we discuss some economic
aspects of the long-term evolution of the transport sector. We argue,
that the (price insensitive) high-value market niches in the transport
sector, i.e., moving people, information, and high-value goods, are of
vital importance in the long-term development of an infrastructure. It
is these market niches that are conquered first by a new competitor
and consequently the ones the older systems tend to lose first. Only at
a later stage, when technological and engineering improvements, and
market growth result in a significant reduction in transport costs do
new infrastructure systems also enter into lower value market seg-
ments, finally to become themselves an indispensable (price regulated)
"commodity" .
We then consider the long-term relationship between economic
activity and transport requirements (Section 4.4). This analysis sug-
gests, that we may be in a period of structural transition in the
material intensity of highly developed economies. For the first time
since the onset of the industrial revolution, the transport requirements
per unit of value generated, are not growing but seem to be on the
decline. This is the result of a structural shift in the output of
developed economies in the direction of less material intensive
(lighter) and considerably higher value goods. If this tendency should
continue in the future, important repercussions on the quality of the
transport system (especially as regards speed, flexibility, and quality
of service) will result. This is consistent with our analysis of the rela-
tionship (elasticity) of the modal split in goods transport to the value
of goods transported. On the other hand, no such observation can be
made with respect to passenger traffic, which is expected to continue
to grow at significant rates. Certainly in the area of air transport, this
is possibly not yet fully realized (in terms of potential bottlenecks in
the related infrastructures) by transport policy makers and planners.
This leads to the final hypothesis with respect to the driving
forces behind the long-term evolution of the transport system: the
relationship between transport and communication (Section 4.5).
Seen from a long-term (200 years) perspective, transport and com-
munication appear to evolve in unison, and to be of a synergistic,
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cross-enhancing nature. Transport and communication are seen con-
sequently as complementary rather than substitutable economic goods.
From such a perspective, it appears again unlikely that we are in a
phase of structural discontinuity in the growing trend of passenger
transport. New infrastructures and organizational and institutional
settings will be required to provide fast, safe, reliable, and functionally
(as well as aesthetically and environmentally) adequate transport ser-
vices for future increases in travel demand.
4.1. The Structural Evolution of Transport
Infrastructures
In the previous analyses, the USA has always been used as a prom-
inent example when discussing the quantitative evolution of its trans-
port infrastructure. The reason for this was due to the unique data
availability with respect to long time series on infrastructure develop-
ment (including for instance data on surfaced roads which are almost
entirely lacking in other countries). Consequently we start our
integrative discussion on the structural evolution of the whole trans-
port infrastructure system with the case of the USA. Later, we dis-
cuss the case of Canada and the USSR, which are the only other coun-
tries where data availability permits a study of the long-term evolu-
tion of all transport infrastructures (canals, railroads, surfaced roads,
and airways).
USA
Figure 4.1.1 summarizes the history of individual transport infrastruc-
tures, measured by their respective length, in the USA. An analogy,
with data* on air transport infrastructures (the functional analogy
being already contained in the semantics of the term airways), comple-
ments the quantification of physical infrastructures.
The length of all four transport infrastructures has increased five
orders of magnitude since 1800. Each successive transport infrastruc-
ture expanded into a network ten times larger than the previous one.
In addition, it is interesting to note that, measured by length, new
• Source: us DOC, 1975, a.nd 1976 to 1985. AB a. meallure of the extension of the a.ir tra.nsport infralltruc-
ture, we use the tota.l route milea.ge opera.ted by a.irwa.ys. AB this figure wa.a no longer a.va.ila.ble for yea.n
a.fter 1976, these were estima.ted balled on the growth of Federa.l a.irwa.ys during the period 1977 to 1980.
For yea.ra prior to 1930 the estima.tes from Woytinsky, 1927, ha.ve been used. Our estima.te is of course a.
crude mea.aure, a.a it does not describe a.ny qua.lita.tive cha.ra.cteristic (regula.rity of service, frequency, a.nd
throughput of a.ir tra.nsport) of the a.ir tra.nsport being ca.rried out on these routes. For our purposes here,
it serves a.a a. rough indica.tor of the growing importa.nce of a.ir tra.nsport infralltrueture, a.1though it ma.y
not be directly compa.ra.ble with the physica.1, dedica.ted infralltruetures for wa.ter, nil, a.nd roa.d tra.nsport.
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Figure 4.1.1. Evolution of the length of transport infrastructures (canals, rail-
ways, surfaced roads, and federal airways) in the USA (in 1,000 miles).
infrastructures overtook existing ones only at the time the latter
started saturating. This was the case with canals and railways in the
1840s, and also with railways and surfaced roads prior to the 1920s.
Based on this historical pattern, one would expect airways to become
a dominant transport infrastructure only after the expansion of the
road network is completed.
Figure 4.1.2 summarizes the expansion of the three physical infra-
structures in the USA discussed in detail in Chapter 3, normalized
with respect to their respective saturation levels (by plotting the rela-
tive length as a percentage of the saturation level). The succession of
individual infrastructures can be described in terms of three S-shaped
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Figure 4.1.2. Growth to limits of canals, railroads, and surfaced roads in the
USA. Note that absolute saturation levels are different between the three infra-
structure systems.
growth pulses that are given together with the estimated logistic
curves.
The development of canals, relative to the saturation level
achieved, was much quicker than the expansion of railways and sur-
faced roads. The time it takes to grow from 10 to 90 percent of max-
imum network size, (~t) is about 30 years for canals, 55 years for rail-
roads, and 65 years for surfaced roads. The midpoints between the
individual infrastructure growth pulses (i.e., the time of their max-
imum growth rate) are spaced 55 years, as are their periods of satura-
tion. It is remarkable that the saturation and onset of decline of all
three infrastructures coincides with prolonged economic recessions
(i.e., in the 1870s, 1930s, and 1980s). At the same time these periods
of structural discontinuity see the emergence of new transport sys-
tems: surfaced roads around 1870 and air transport in the 1930s.
The "growth to limits" to different absolute levels and the subse-
quent onset of decline of individual transport systems gradually
changed the structure of the transport infrastructure system and in
particular, the relative importance of individual networks. This
sequence of replacements in the relative importance of individual
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infrastructures already points to a possible analogy to market substi-
tution. Seen from such a perspective, we may interpret the successive
sequence of "life cycles" of individual infrastructures as a change in
the morphology or structure of the transport infrastructure network of
the USA. Previously dominant infrastructures lose out in importance
to newer systems, which in turn tend to saturate themselves and
become replaced by newer infrastructures.
Figure 4.1.3 illustrates the share of individual transport infra-
structures in the total length of the transport system of the USA. In
addition, we depict the evolution of the length of the total transport
infrastructure of the USA, i.e., the expanding "niche" in which indivi-
dual transport infrastructures "compete" for relative positions with
respect to the length of their networks. An interesting finding of our
analysis is that when the different transport infrastructures, including
airways, are regrouped together, they appear to grow according to a
logistic growth pulse depicted in the upper part of Figure 4.1.3, with a
~ t of around 80 years and an estimated ultimate saturation level of
some 4.7 million* miles (around 7.6 million km). Thus, despite the
fact that individual transport infrastructures have evolved through a
series of discontinuities, marked by a sequence of introduction, logistic
growth, subsequent saturation, and finally decline, the aggregate in
measuring the total length of all transport infrastructures (Le., the
envelope resulting from the growth and decline processes of the indivi-
dual infrastructures) appears as a smooth regular growth process. By
1980, it appears that 80 percent of the ultimate saturation level in the
growth process was reached. Also, it was only by the 1860s (the
saturation date for the canal network expansion) that the one percent
mark of the estimated final saturation level was exceeded.
The apparent "homeostasis" in the growth of the transport infra-
structures of the USA is noteworthy in that the saturation and later
on, decline of particular individual networks (as in the case of canals
and railways) was up to now "filled" by the growth of newer infra-
structures, consistent with the logistic "envelope" of Figure 4.1.3.
This is also frequently observed in the evolution of dynamic, self-
organizing systems in chemistry or biology. The growth of this
"envelope" , proceeds with a ~ t of 80 years slower than the growth of
individual infrastructure systems (~t of canal growth around 30
years, railways 55 years and roads around 65 years) and saturation, if
this process should continue its historical pattern, would occur around
the year 2030.
• We estimate a 90 percent probability that the final saturation level K will be between 4.4 to 5.0 million
miles. The R~ of estimate is 0.9978.
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The bottom of Figure 4.1.3 presents the structural changes in the
transport infrastructure of the USA, organized with the help of a
multi-variate logistic substitution model. Despite the fact that the
model fails to describe the rapid early phase in the introduction of the
railways (Le., prior to 1835), and the fact that the growth of air trans-
port infrastructure proceeds rather turbulently, the regularity of the
sequence of replacements in the importance of individual infrastruc-
tures is striking.*
This particular model representation shows the relative impor-
tance of competing infrastructures and the dynamics of the structural
evolution process along a sequence of replacements over the last 160
years. In any given period, there is a clear market dominance (i.e.,
more than a 50 percent share) and at the same time a simultaneous
spread of transport activities over two or three different systems.
Thus, while competing infrastructures are all simultaneously used,
their mix changes over time. Three main periods in the structural
changes of the transport infrastructure of the USA can be dis-
tinguished.
• Growth of the railway network (main tracks operated) and result-
ing decline in importance of canals as a transport infrastructure,
with a !:1t of around 45 years. Note here, that around 1860 (max-
imum size of the canal network) canals accounted for only more
than 10 percent of the total transport infrastructure (canals, rail-
ways, and surfaced roads) of the USA.
• Saturation of the importance of railways (in their share in the
length of transport infrastructures) around 1870 (i.e., around 50
years prior to the time when railways reached their maximum
network size) and subsequent decline in importance due to the
growth of surfaced roads proceeding with a !:1t of around 80
years.
• Long saturation phase (from around 1940 to 1980) during which
roads constituted the most important transport infrastructure in
the USA, however, losing out in the long-run to air transport
infrastructure, growing with a !:1t of around 130 years.
• The turbulent trajectory of air transport infralltructure should not be surprising, all we deal here with a
conceptual and functional analogon, compared to ph~6icaJ infralltructures. Thus, whereall canals, railroads
or surfaced roads evolve through a stable trajectory all a result of the inherent long lead times and costs in
building up and decommissioning physical systems, air routes may eallily be opened and closed down fol-
lowing particular market constraints (see e.g., the turbulent period during World War II in Figure 4.1.3).
Despite the fact that we use a different data set, the estimates with respect to airways in the infralltruc-
ture substitution in the USA are very close to the tentative results reported in Nakicenovic, 1988, and sup-
port the resulting conclusions.
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Several invariant features in the long-term structural evolution of
the US transport system emerge from Figure 4.1.3. The dominant
(longest) transport infrastructure is always longer than at least half of
the total length. Consequently, the second and third longest infra-
structures account for less than half of total length. This symmetry in
the dominating role of individual infrastructures (canals prior to 1840,
railways between 1840 to 1920, and roads since the 1920s and possibly
well into the 21st century), is complemented by another phenomenon:
the time constants At in the growth (decline) of importance in the
total transport infrastructure length increases from around 45 years
(decline of canals and growth of railways) to 80 years (decline of rail-
ways and growth of surfaced roads), and appears to increase further to
some 130 years (decline of roads and growth of air transport infra-
structure). This could be the result that each new infrastructure sys-
tem expands to a larger network size than the previous system
(although the Ats of the individual expansion pulses increase only
from 30 to 55, and 65 years for canals, railways, and roads respec-
tively). A corollary to this is that it apparently takes longer and
longer to phase out transport infrastructures. Could it be that in the
very long-term we are heading towards a situation of maintaining all
infrastructure systems (as a kind of insurance policy), or are we
approaching increasing levels of specialization in the services rendered
by different transport infrastructures? Finally, we note that the dis-
tance between the maxima in the share of total infrastructure length
between railways and surfaced roads is about 100 years, indicating the
considerable time span involved in the transition from the dominance
of one infrastructure system to the next one.
The difference in the dynamics (Ats) of the growth of individual
infrastructures and of their relative shares in total infrastructure
length, might appear at first sight to be a contradiction. However,
this difference stems from the complex coupled dynamics of total
infrastructure growth, and the growth and decline rates of individual
transport infrastructures. As the total length of infrastructures
increases, even the rapid growth of individual infrastructures such as
airways, will translate into slower growth rates in their relative shares.
Once, the growth rate of an individual transport infrastructure falls
behind the growth of the total system, its relative share starts to
decline. Thus, the share of railways in total infrastructure length
decreased as of 1870, whereas railways continued to expand until the
end of the 1920s. Similarly, the length of the surfaced road network
still continues to increase, albeit slowly, as it is close to apparent
saturation. However, its relative share already started to decrease in
the 1960s. Thus, the total length of an individual infrastructure (in
this case canals, railways, and surfaced roads) can still be growing,
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even decades away from ultimate saturation and subsequent senes-
cence in absolute network size, while its share in the length of the
whole transport system is already declining. Therefore, the saturation
and decline in the relative market share precedes the saturation in
absolute growth in an expanding market. This implies that the even-
tual saturation of any competing technology may be anticipated in the
substitution dynamics of a growing market, such as for railways as
early as 1870 and for roads as of 1960. The infrastructure substitution
model measuring market shares, may thus be considered to be a "pre-
cursor" model, in the long-term life cycle of individual infrastructures.
Let us conclude by stressing the regularity in the rise and fall of
the importance of individual transport infrastructures. This regular-
ity neither appears to be affected by the discontinuities in the develop-
ment of individual transport infrastructures as part of their proper life
cycle (growth, saturation, and subsequent decline), nor by external
events like the depression of the 1930s or the effects of major wars.
We surmise that this stable behavior is the result of an invariant pat-
tern in the societal preferences with respect to individual transport
infrastructures, which result from differences in the performance levels
(seen as a complex vector rather than represented by a single meas-
ure) inherent in different transport infrastructures and technologies.
At this point the reader might object to our conclusions by point-
ing out that the stable evolutionary pattern described above may be a
specific isolated case for the USA. A second, justified objection would
be that our analysis of the long-term infrastructure substitution was
based on a rather crude measure of the length of different infrastruc-
tures, ignoring therefore the different costs for construction and the
different capacities (throughputs) and utilization rates realized in dif-
ferent parts of the transport infrastructure network.
Below we show that the pattern observed in the case of the USA
is invariant, in that a similar structural evolution can also be observed
in the case of a planned economy (the USSR). In the case of Canada,
instead of length, we use a monetary indicator (quasi capital stock) to
assess the relative importance of individual infrastructures. We also
analyze below the utilization (throughput) of different infrastructures,
i.e., the modal split (passenger- or ton-km transported) of the whole
transport system and conclude, that the dynamic picture outlined
above, is confirmed by using alternative indicators.
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Figure 4.1.4. Infrastructure substitution in Canada, in fractional shares of ca-
nal, railway, road, and air transport infrastructures in quasi capital stock of the
transport system, measured in constant 1980 Canadian dollars.
Canada
Figure 4.1.4 deals with an analysis of the changing structure of the
transport infrastructure in Canada. The share of different infrastruc-
tures in the capital stock* is used as an alternative measure of their
relative importance. The basic pattern in the sequence of replace-
ments identified for the USA, is also confirmed by this analysis. How-
ever, the relative importance of air infrastructure in the capital stock
is, due to its "immaterial" nature, smaller than its relative length or
its share in the output of the transport sector.
It is even more important to realize the very long time constants
involved in the structural transition in the composition of the trans-
port sector capital stock: the ~ts for the decline of railways and
• The quasi capital stock (excluding depreciation) is measured in constant Canadian 1980 dollars, derived
from cumulative investment data given in Haritos, 1981, and Historical Statistics of Canada, 1965. Rail-
way investment data prior to 1850 were based on marginal railway construction cost estimates using data
from Urquhart, 1986.
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growth of road infrastructure are in the order of 80 years, and the
decline of canals and growth of air infrastructure even slower with .6. ts
of nearly 200 years. Transport structures are built to last, they are
almost immortal. Once their original use declines in importance
because of changing societal preferences and requirements for the
transport system, new uses may evolve. Two good examples are the
leisure activities that have evolved around former canals, e.g., the
Rideau Canal in Canada, and the 19th century museum opened in
Paris in the former Gare d'Orsay, an impressive monument of the rail-
way era.
USSR
Figure 4.1.5 shows the substitution of transport infrastructures in the
USSR and Tzarist Russia before the revolution which is analogous to
the analysis of the USA shown in Figure 4.1.3. As for the USA, the
analysis includes also airway* infrastructures in order to calculate the
relative shares of different systems in the length of the whole transport
infrastructure of the USSR. Despite the fact that there may be some
uncertainty related to our estimate of the extent of air transport infra-
structure in the early days (pre-1965), we observe in both countries a
similar dynamic picture with respect to the structural changes in the
transport infrastructure. Again the pattern of temporal changes is
marked by a high degree of regularity and the quest for higher speed
and productivity.
The similarity in the pattern of structural change in the two
countries is noteworthy for several reasons.
• It demonstrates a continuity in the structural shifts of the trans-
port system which does not appear to be affected by major socie-
tal discontinuities such as the October Revolution.
• ~ a measure of airwaY8 length, the total length of airwaY8 of union importance i8 taken (Lewytzkyj,
1979, and Narod. Khoz, 1982, and 1987). We have u8ed the data available as of 1965. Earlier years are e8-
timated based on interpolation from data given for the 19208 in Woytin8ky, 1927. The only difference
between our e8timate and official8tati8tic8 i8 for the year 1940, where we e8timate 80me 14,000 km of air-
way8 of importance for civilian air traffic. Thi8 i8 in contrast to the official8tati8tic8 of over 51,000 km for
1940 (Narod. Khoz., 1982). Thi8 figure doe8 not, however, appear reali8tic for two reason8: first in view of
the low volume of air tran8port operation8 reported for that particular year (around 800 t-km pas8engers,
mail, and good8 tran8ported per km airway, compared to 30,000 t-km per km airway8 in 1965 and current-
ly over 55,000 t-km/km). Secondly, as our analY8i8 concentrate8 on the civilian tran8port infrastructure,
8uch a high figure for airway8 appears rather unlikely for 1940, Le., a year when World War II 8pread to
the USSR. Finally, one might refer here to the more general problem of data validity for 8tati8tic8 ela-
borated during the Stalini8tic time period. In term8 of our analY8i8 the official figure for the 8hare of air-
way8 in 1940 would amount to 80me 17 percent of total tran8port infrastructure length (as opp08ed to our
e8timate of 5 percent). Recall here, that airwaY8 reached the 20 percent level in the 8hare of total infra-
8tructure length in the official8tati8tic8 only by 1965.
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Figure 4.1.5. Infrastructure substitution in the USSR, in fractional shares of
length of all transport infrastructures.
• The long-term dynamics and structural trends in the transport
infrastructure development show similar results for both a
planned economy and for a market economy.
• The long-term structural changes in the importance of different
infrastructures in the USSR do not appear, in principle, to have
been affected by the entirely different infrastructure development
policy pursued by the USSR.
Recall here, that contrary to the USA, where the length of railways
and canals is declining or stagnating at a low level, the USSR followed
an ambitious canal and railway construction program. Furthermore,
private car ownership in the USSR is at such low per capita levels
(compared to the USA) that the dominance of road infrastructure in
the transport system of the USSR may come as a surprise. We show
below, however, that in terms of transport infrastructures, surfaced
roads are of similar funct£onal importance in the USSR, although road
transport is not assured by private vehicles (cars) but by collective
vehicles (buses).
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Canals appear to have reached the end of their technological life
cycle in the USSR. Despite their revival in the post World War II
period, their share in the length of transport infrastructures has been
hovering around the two percent market share level since 1940. Rail-
ways reached their maximum level of importance at the beginning of
this century and since then have been losing in importance to the sur-
faced road network. The latter is presently saturating in terms of its
relative share in the total length of transport infrastructures, to be
replaced in turn by airways. The time constants of the long-term
structural change processes are all very similar. The Llts for the
replacement of canals and railways and of the growth (and long-term
replacement) of roads and airways are all around 100 years, as is the
spacing between the (estimated) peaks in importance of railways and
roads in the total length of the transport infrastructure of the USSR
(as in the USA). Thus it takes 100 years for the new transport infra-
structure (roads) to take over the dominant role from the old trans-
port infrastructure (railways). The similarity in time constants
observed in the structural evolution of the transport system of the
USSR, is different to that of the USA, where we have observed that
each successive infrastructure system took a longer time constant to
grow in importance in the total infrastructure length.
Over the last few decades, the structure of the transport infra-
structures in the two countries has been converging. Figure 4.1.6
summarizes the infrastructure substitution pattern in the USA and
the USSR. The structural differences between the two countries get
smaller with each new transport system. The greatest difference is
with canals, which phase out some 70 years later in the USSR than in
the USA, and at a considerably slower pace. The decline of impor-
tance of railways proceeds at a similar rate in both countries, with the
USSR lagging by about 30 years. This lag is also reflected in the
phase shift of the peak of the importance of railways between the two
countries (USA in 1870 and in the USSR about 30 years later). Sur-
faced roads approach saturation in both countries practically at the
same time, although at a lower level in the USSR. Airways even
appear to grow faster in importance in the USSR than in the USA.
Currently, airways account for about one fourth of the transport infra-
structure network length in the USSR compared to above 10 percent
in the case of the USA.
However, for the year 2000 and thereafter we may summarize the
infrastructure systems of both countries as follows. Canals will be
almost extinct (in terms of relative importance), railways will be
approaching the end of their technological life cycle accounting for
only a few percent of the infrastructure length, whereas the dominant
transport infrastructures will be roads with decreasing and airways
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Figure 4.1.6. Infrastructure substitution in the USA and the USSR, measuring
shares in length of all transport infrastructures.
with increasing importance. The similarities (although with some
lagged developments as in the case of canals and railways) between
the two countries point to a deeper causality for such similar struc-
tural changes in transport infrastructures. These causal forces appear
disconnected both from the market clearing mechanism (market or
centrally planned economy) and from the different relative transport
cost/price structure prevailing in the two countries.
We assume that differences in inherent performance levels of indi-
vidual infrastructures (in particular transport speed) and basic human
decision criteria and preferences underlying the choice of different
transport modes (such as individual travel time budgets), which
transgress the differences in the economic systems of the two coun-
tries, are responsible for the similarity in development patterns.
Finally, a further similarity in the dynamics between the two countries
appears to exist in the area of the growth in the size of the total infra-
structure network. Total transport infrastructure length in the USSR
grows along a logistic trajectory with a t1t of 80 years (as in the
USA), but lags by some 30 years behind the USA growth pulse (to
around 1980, compared to 1950 in case of the USA).
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Thus, we conclude, that the historical evolution of transport
infrastructures (measured by their share in the length or the value of
the capital stock of the total transport system) is characterized by a
regular sequence of replacements. New systems, that correspond
better in performance levels to societal preferences with respect to
transport infrastructures, replace existing ones. This evolutionary
process appears invariant between different economic systems, and in
addition is of a homeostatic nature. We believe that the main driving
force responsible for this invariant evolutionary pattern relates to the
human time allocation mechanism (the "law of constant travel time"
as formulated by Zahavi, 1979, and 1981) favoring faster transport
infrastructures. From this perspective, the growing importance of air
transport and its infrastructure becomes more plausible, especially as
we show in the next Section that air transport is of growing impor-
tance for moving the highest value "goods" over larger distances:
human beings.
4.2. Evolution of the Performance of Infrastructures
(modal split)
As a subsequent step in the analysis of the importance of various
transport infrastructures, we analyze their relative contribution to the
transportation output in different countries, I.e., the modal split in
terms of passenger- and ton-km performed by various transport
modes. As the analysis of infrastructure development concentrated on
the evolution of long-distance transport systems, we consequently
analyze the modal split for long-distance (intercity) passenger travel
only. The analysis covers some shorter time series (since 1950) for the
USA and the FRG as well as the case of the USSR, where available
data permit us to go back as far as 1920. As another example we con-
sider the case of France, where we have been able to reconstruct time
series of total passenger modal split since the beginning of the 19th
century. The emerging picture is rather turbulent due to the fact that
the available data do not allow the separation of the two different
markets for passenger transport, i.e., local and long-distance travel;
France also experienced two major disruptions because of the two
World Wars. Despite turbulences and the crude (aggregated) meas-
ure available, the results do confirm the analysis of the long-term ten-
dencies of infrastructure development and passenger modal split, iden-
tified in the other countries analyzed.
Finally, we consider the case of goods transport, by discussing the
modal split in France and Germany in terms of traditional tonnage-
oriented measures. In addition we look at the modal split for goods
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transport in terms of value (imported or exported) for Germany and
Sweden. The latter indicator appears more appropriate for describing
the long-term changes in goods transportation, especially if the
apparent transition to increased dematerialization and high-value
goods production becomes a dominant feature in the future of
advanced economies.
4.2.1. Passenger modal split
As a measure of the output (performance) of individual transport
infrastructures we analyze for the following cases the long-distance
passenger modal split. Being the highest value transport market
niche, where competition between different transport modes is largest,
long-distance passenger transport is a good indicator of likely future
developments in the lower value market segments. The analysis
reported below confirms the dynamic picture which emerged from Sec-
tion 4.1: The long-term evolution of the transport system is charac-
terized by a regular sequence of replacements, which appears invariant
between different countries or even between different economic sys-
tems, pointing at much deeper underlying long-term driving forces
than normally enter short-term transport demand and mobility
models (such as relative transport price structure, private car owner-
ship rates, etc.).
USA
Figure 4.2.1 shows domestic intercity passenger traffic in billion
passenger-miles for the USA. The decline in the transport perfor-
mance of railways, the stagnation of bus transport, the continued
growth in car travel, and finally the rapid growth of passenger air
transport, characterize the situation of this premium market segment
of the transport sector. The model forecasts presented in Figure 4.2.1
are derived from the relative market share estimates of different trans-
port modes (Figure 4.2.2) applied to (exponential trend) estimates of
total market volume. Total intercity passenger traffic increased in the
USA from 506 billion passenger-miles in 1950 to close to 1,820 billion
passenger-miles in 1986, i.e., at an average annual growth rate of 3.6
percent. The different (positive or negative) growth trends in the rela-
tive performance (output) of different intercity transport modes in the
USA since 1950 are quite accurately described by a logistic substitu-
tion model as presented in Figure 4.2.2 below.
200
109 Pass-miles
105
The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Car
---~
--~ Air
~
"
----
/~
~
?-- ~
Bus
~ ~101
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Figure 4.2.1. Volume of intercity passenger traffic in the USA by transport
mode, in billion (109) passenger miles. (Data source: US DOC, 1977, and 1980
to 1987.)
The analysis is based on an updated* analysis from Nakicenovic,
1986, and portrays a regular competitive pattern in the market shares
of four different transport modes for long-distance passenger travel:
private cars, public buses, railways, and aircrafts. The analysis shows
railways at the end of their technological life-cycle for long-distance
passenger transport in the USA. Since around 1970, railways trans-
port less than one percent of the total passenger-miles of intercity
traffic. The situation in the USA therefore precedes similar tendencies
in other countries by several decades. Bus transport appears to follow
closely a long-term decline trend and based on the model forecast
should fall below the one percent market share level by the mid-1990s.
The share of private car transportation had reached its maximum
market share already in the 1960s, where close to 90 percent of all
• This panicular analysis provides a good (ez poll) test of the forecasting capabilities of the competitive
evolutionary model used here for the organization of our empirical data base. The estimates as reported in
Nakicenovic, 1986, based on data up to 1980 turned out to be excellent forecasts. No market share level of
any technology forecasted for the year 1986 deviates more than" percent from the actual data.
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Figure 4.2.2. Modal split in intercity passenger traffic in the USA, measured
by fractional shares in passenger-miles travelled. [Source: updated (US DOC,
1987) from Nakicenovic, 1986.]
intercity passenger-miles were accounted for by private cars. Since
then, their share has been decreasing due to the rapid expansion of air
transport. The share of air transport in total long-distance passenger
travel increases with a tit of around 70 years (symmetrical to the
decrease in the market shares of cars). Air travel presently accounts
for around 18 percent of intercity traffic and if the long-term growth
tendency continues, it will become the preferred mode of long-distance
passenger travel in the USA after the year 2000.
The growth in the volume and market share of air traffic does not
appear to have been constrained by external forces such as the evolu-
tion of fuel costs or by the "striking back" of competitors for long-
distance travelling. One can possibly identify, at least in the case of
the car industry of the USA, attempts to imitate the successful new
competitor, at least formalisticly. When the relative market impor-
tance of automobiles was at its peak, and started to be challenged by
air transport, some cars exhibited secondary design characteristics of
aircrafts such as fins very much resembling air foils. Cars were built
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)
Figure 4.2.3. Response of the automobile industry, when challenged by a new
competitor for long-distance travelling in the 1950s. 1959 Cadillac Cyclone, with
an automotive heart but designed to look like an aircraft. (Source: General Mo-
tors, 1983.)
with an "automotive heart but with an aircraft shell" (Herman and
Ausubel, 1988) as shown in Figure 4.2.3.
From a technological history viewpoint, another response by the
automobile industry to the rapid growth of air transport can perhaps
be put forward, namely there were attempts to incorporate some of
the technological developments of aircrafts into automobiles. Car
manufactures were, for instance, devoting considerable efforts into
introducing the gas turbine into the car industry. The most advanced
efforts to develop a car with a gas turbine were probably carried out
by Rover in the UK. Similar attempts were made in the USA by
Chrysler and General Motors, among others. Prototype models were
developed, but never became commercialized. Gas turbines found lim-
ited application as a source of motive power for ground vehicles, e.g.,
for special military (Chrysler tanks) and some early civilian (General
Electric and BBC locomotives) equipment. Other more successful
examples of aircraft technologies being applied in the car industry
include the use of composite materials, turbo charging, compressors,
disc brakes, 4-valve engines, and others.
The major driving force behind the structural change in the pre-
ferred mode of long-distance travel, and the growth of air travel in
particular, appears to be related to the differences in the performance
levels of individual transport modes (in particular travel speed) and
not so much to the relative transport cost structure. From 1950 to
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the present, the average operating costs (including fuel) for private
cars ranged from 10 to 13 US cents (in constant 1967 US $) per mile
(see in particular Section 4.3). If we assume on average two
passengers per long-distance car journey, this would mean that the
average cost for long-distance car travelling is 5 to 7 US cents (1967)
per passenger-mile. Such low levels were reached by air transport only
in the mid-1970s, i.e., significantly after the time period when the
market share of cars started to decline. For the whole period under
consideration, railway transport costs were always significantly lower
than car or air transport costs, i.e., consistently below 4 US cents
(1967) per passenger-mile. These lower costs did not, however, affect
their further decline, both in relative and in absolute (total rail
passenger-miles) terms, until the practical disappearance of railways
from the market. Our conclusion, that it is not so much economic
variables (as reflected in the relative transport cost structure) that
appear to influence long-distance modal split decisions, is further cor-
roborated by an analysis of the USSR, which has an entirely different
transport and infrastructure policy and transport cost structure.
USSR
An analysis of the long-term changes in the modal split in intercity
passenger traffic for the USSR is reported in Figure 4.2.4. Despite
some structural differences, we observe a similar dynamic develop-
ment pattern in the long-distance passenger traffic in the USSR as for
the USA. Traditional (slow) transport modes, lose out (logistically) to
new competitors such as road and air transport. Road transport is,
however, not assured by private cars, but by public buses instead.
Yet, the long-term picture resembles (with some lags) the situation in
the USA. Inland water transport has virtually disappeared as a long-
distance passenger transport mode, railways appear to be on the
decline (in terms of relative market share) since the 1930s, and road
transport is currently entering saturation, to be replaced in the long-
term by air transport.
Figure 4.2.5 compares the intercity passenger modal split
between the USA and the USSR. A specific characteristic of the
USSR modal split compared to the USA is that it combines a struc-
tural evolution of different technological life cycles. Whereas inland
navigation for long-distance passenger transport has fallen below the
one percent market share level since the middle of the 1970s, railways
still account for some 37 percent of all intercity passenger-km of the
USSR as opposed to under one percent in the USA. Their displace-
ment process, although lagged by some 50 years (to 1972 compared to
1921 in the case of the USA), appears to proceed at a similar rate (~t
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Figure 4.2.4. Modal split in intercity passenger traffic in the USSR, measured
in fractional shares of passenger-km travelled. (Data source: Narod. Khoz.,
1982 and 1985.)
of 55 years compared to 48 years in the USA). The saturation in the
market share of road transport (buses) will seemingly occur some time
in the 1990s, i.e., some 30 years after the saturation of the market
share of cars in the USA. The most striking similarity however occurs
in the area of air transport. Air transport in the USSR presently
accounts for some 18.5 percent of all intercity passenger-km, com-
pared to 17.6 percent in the USA. The dynamics of the gains in the
market share of air transport in the USSR (to estimated to occur in
2006, ilt 77 years) closely approach the market dynamics of air trans-
port in the USA (estimated to in 2008, and ilt of some 70 years).
This points to very similar comparative advantages of transport
modes in the long-distance passenger modal split between the two
countries, as reflected in their similar rates of change, ilt. This is
applicable to negative comparative advantage such as the decline in
importance of railways, or positive comparative advantage, as in the
case of growing air transport. This similarity in the dynamics of
structural change in modal split is important in view of the differences
between a market and a centrally planned economy, and especially
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Figure 4.2.5. Modal split in intercity passenger traffic in the USA and the
USSR, measured in fractional shares of passenger-km travelled.
with respect to the policies pursued for alternative transport modes in
the two countries: Promotion and further railway construction in the
case of the USSR, compared to a decrease in network size and the
effective disappearance of railways as an intercity passenger transport
mode in the case of the USA; road transport by public buses as
opposed to private car ownership; a monopoly by the largest airline
company in the world, AEROFLOT versus vicious competition
between private airlines in the USA, etc.
We therefore assume that the inherent advantages of air trans-
port in altering the human space-time activity framework, i.e., the
increased travel range resulting from higher transport speeds by air, is
responsible for its gains in market shares in intercity passenger trans-
port. This comparative advantage, resulting from fundamental
human time allocation mechanisms, influences individual time budgets
and consequently the long-distance transport mode preferences of peo-
ple, regardless of differences in economic systems.
Therefore, we foresee for the year 2000 and beyond a similar
structure for long-distance passenger traffic in the two countries.
Railways will have practically disappeared (in the USA) or account for
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only a few percent of passenger-km travelled (USSR), whereas private
(USA) or collective (USSR) road transport and air transport will
(with approximately equal shares) become the dominant long-distance
transport modes. In the long run, the importance of air transport is
expected to increase further at the expense of road transport, if in
turn air transportation is not challenged by the appearance of a new
(high-speed) long-distance passenger transport mode. In view of the
long lead times in the introduction and growth in the market share of
new transport technologies identified above, it appears unlikely that
the impact of such a new system could be felt before the first decades
of the next millennium.
FRG
We now consider a European case - the FRG* An analysis of the
long-distance passenger modal split in the FRG as compared to the
USA and the USSR is interesting in that we can verify if similar
dynamic tendencies can also be observed for a relatively small, and
densely populated country, where the distances travelled are not so
large and the comparative performance levels of different transport
modes (i.e., their speed) should not exert such a decisive influence. As
Figure 4.2.6 shows, one can observe a similar dynamic situation in the
case of the FRG. The only noteworthy difference is that air transport,
due to the shorter distances travelled, accounts for a smaller share in
the long-distance passenger traffic and is growing at a much slower
rate than in the USA and the USSR. Still, even with a relatively slow
growth in the market share, air transport would, based on our model
extrapolation, account for more passenger-km travelled than railways
by the mid-1990s. If such tendencies materialize, current concerns
regarding the development and investments into different long-
distance passenger transport infrastructure should possibly be ques-
tioned. Based on such a premise, would it not be better if infrastruc-
ture development policy were directed at improving airports and the
linkages of airports to complementary distribution infrastructures,
rather than upgrading the traditional railway network.
Figure 4.2.6 shows private cars as being the preferred mode for
long-distance passenger traffic in the FRG, a growth path which was
• Data source: Verkthr in ZahJtn, 1975, and 1985, and Stat. BA., 1987. Long-distance passenger traffic
was estimated by assuming that all air passenger-km travelled are long-distance; for railways data for the
Schitntn!trnvtrkehr (Le., travel range above 50 km) were taken from the above statistics. For bus and
private car transport, long-distance passenger-km estimates were derived from DIW, 1982, and 1985.
Only data since 1960 have been taken into account, as earlier data exclude Saarland and Berlin and are
therefore not directly comparable to later years. In addition, no disaggregation into short- and long-
distance private road (cars) transport was available prior to 1960.
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Figure 4.2.6. Modal split in long-distance (intercity) passenger traffic in the
FRG, measured in fractional shares of passenger-km travelled.
apparently not noticeably affected by the rapidly increasing gasoline
prices in the 1970s. In the medium-term, the share of private cars in
long-distance passenger traffic appears to saturate, which could pro-
vide an opportunity window for introducing new fast, high throughput
ground transportation systems. Their possible success will most likely
depend on how effectively they can correspond to individual travel
preference choices (i.e., allow for larger distances travelled within a
given travel time budget), and how they complement existing high-
speed long-distance transport modes, Le., air transportation. The
latter requirement would appear to be of particular importance within
a new hierarchy in the long-distance transport chain: air for long dis-
tances; new rapid, e.g., rail based, transport systems connected to air-
ports for medium distances; and finally, (private or rented) car tran-
sportation for final spatial coverage, complementary to the transport
modes at higher hierarchical levels in the transport chain.
The stable dynamic behavior of the long-distance passenger
modal split in the FRG, makes it appear unlikely that (interventionist
type of) policy measures or drastic changes in the relative transport
cost structures could influence the modal split significantly in the
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short-term. We assume that such changes are possible only by the
introduction of new transport systems, with improved performance
(speed) and service (e.g., along the line of the railway trains operated
by the German Lufthansa) levels, i.e., systems which could alter the
space-time framework of human activities over long distances.
France
The evolution of the long-term passenger modal split in France is a
special case in our analysis. The excellent historical transport statis-
tics enabled us to reconstruct passenger modal split data* as of the
beginning of the 19th century. Here one has to mention the study by
Toutain, 1967, who provided much of the original estimates and his-
torical references used to reconstruct the data series. This unique
situation will not recur for many years to come in other countries,
since long series on (private) road transport are almost entirely lack-
ing.
Unfortunately the long historical series do not allow us to dif-
ferentiate between long-distance and local passenger traffic. Therefore
a comparison of the passenger modal split in France with the figures
presented above for the FRG, the USA, and the USSR is limited.
Also, as shown below in Figure 4.2.7, the picture that emerges is
rather turbulent, even to the extent of approaching the limits of a con-
tinuous application to the simple technological substitution model
used here for data structuring. The model fails to capture in particu-
lar the very rapid introduction of the railways prior to 1850. Recall
here that prior to 1830 public railways were practically nonexistent,
whereas the model would put the introduction of railways (if the diffu-
sion pattern after 1845 is "backcasted") at a significantly earlier date.
Still, Figure 4.2.7 enables us to obtain a concise overview of 160 years
of passenger transport in France.
Before the advent of the railways the dominant modes of
passenger transport in France were horse carriages and coaches, and
barges on inland waterways. The improved travel speed and comfort
offered by railways resulted in the rapid displacement of the share in
• Data source: Inland water navigation: Estimates by Teisserenc, 1845, [pa.asenger transport by road and
(steam) navigation) corrected for road pa.asenger transport (by horse), estimated by Toutain, 1967, (ba.aed
on contemporary traffic throughput mea.aurements). Rail transportation (incl. TGV data) from Ann.,
Stat., 1961, and 1973 to 1987, and Mitchell, 1980. Road transport by cars and buses prior to 1965 wu ob-
tained from Toutain, 1967, and hu been complemented by own estimates for bicycles (especially impor-
tant before the turn of the century) and motorcycles. For 1965 onwards, IRF statistics (IRF, 1970 to
1985) and national statistics (Ann. Stat., 1972 to 1987) were used a.a a source for road transport
pa.ssenger-km. Air transport statistics are from Ann. Stat., 1961, and 1973 to 1987 (referring to all opera.-
tions, domestic and international). All data were obtained from annual time series, except horse road
transport (interpolated from the quintannual data given by Toutain, 1967) and (motorized) road transport
prior to 1925, again interpolated from the figures given by Toutain, 1967.
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Figure 4.2.7. Passenger (intra- and intercity) modal split in France, fractional
shares of passenger-km performed and model estimates. Growth trend for TGV
is speculative.
the market of the two previously dominant modes of passenger travel,
despite efforts to improve the performance of traditional transport
modes, e.g., the introduction of steam power on inland navigation.
Inland waterways disappeared as a passenger transport mode by the
1850s, whereas the market share for horse transport declined at a
slower rate and finally disappeared with the advent of the automobile
around the turn of the century.
The growth in the market share of road transport depicted in Fig-
ure 4.2.7 started around 1880, i.e., significantly before the introduc-
tion of automobiles. This points to another frequent feature in the
introduction of new transport systems: the ground is prepared by pre-
vious technologies. In the case of road transport these pre-automobile
age technologies were the bicycle and later the motorcycle* As soon as
• About 10 percent of all passenger-km in France in 1900 were travelled by bicycles and motorcycles, also
for longer, intercity distances. Automobiles were entirely negligible (around 3,000 cars registered) in this
early phase of the growth of road transport. The data for bicycles and motorcycles are, of course, only
first order magnitude estimates, but are rather on the low than on the high side.
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motorcycles, and later automobiles, appeared to expand the competi-
tive niche opened up by the bicycle, road transport started to replace
railways along a logistic substitution pattern, proceeding with a ti.t of
around 60 years. The turbulence in this substitution trajectory due to
World War I was elastically absorbed and the process proceeded regu-
larly up to 1939.
However, the effect of World War II and the occupation of a
large part of France by German troops was dramatic. This event
represents a major political, social, and as Figure 4.2.7 shows, techno-
logical discontinuity in the long-term development pattern of France.
The disruption appears in fact (contrary to World War I) to be so
strong, resulting in a major structural discontinuity and break in a
long-term trend, as is represented in the diffusion pattern of (motor-
ized) road transport. During the war years the historical diffusion
pattern is reversed, and the previous diffusion level is attained again
only after about 15 years. It is as if France went through a period of
"hibernation", a major discontinuity and break in long-term societal
and technological trends, as manifest* in the long-term substitution
between different transport modes. The effects of this discontinuity is
reflected in the fact that no continuous technological substitution
model application is possible.
Another interesting fact emerges from Figure 4.2.7 - the diffusion
rates (i.e., the slope of the substitution trajectories depicted in Figure
4.2.7) apparently did not change due to this discontinuity. Thus, the
system (i.e., its long-term substitution pattern) "hibernates" for 15
years, in order to reassume the pre-war diffusion pattern with the
same diffusion rates (see the parallel trajectories for railways and road
vehicles in Figure 4.2.7). According to diffusion theory this is an indi-
cation that the relative comparative advantages (defining the speed of
diffusion, i.e., ti.t) between different transport modes were not affected
by this major discontinuity. The comparative advantage of road
transport as represented in its ti.t of around 60 years remained the
same in both time periods, before and after the discontinuity, Le.,
between 1900 to 1938 and after World War II. This implies that the
comparative advantage of road transport (primarily automobiles)
responsible for the decline of the railways, was no different before
World War II than it was in the period of massive motorization
thereafter. From such a perspective, the decline of the railways
• In fact the 8ame "hibernation" effect can 30180 be ob8erved in a number of additional 80cietal and techno-
logical indicaton, including communication behavior (8ee Section 4.3 below), cultural activitie8, primary
energy balance (replacement of coal by oil 8howing a 8imilar picture to railway8 and motorized road tran8-
port in Figure 4.2.7) and other8.
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appears to have been "programmed" from as early as the beginning of
this century and is not the result of post World War II developments.
A corollary to the above observations is that we might discuss the
relative comparative advantage of different passenger transport modes
as reflected in their penetration rates (~t) into the passenger trans-
port market. From such a perspective, of all modes covered in Figure
4.2.7, railways offered the largest comparative advantage in their early
phase of development Le., considerably larger than, for instance, the
introduction of the automobile. Railways appeared around 1830 in
France and by 1855 some 50 percent of all passenger-km were already
transported by railways (i.e., a market share growth rate ~t* of 25
years) as a result of the large performance differential (transport
speed and geographical coverage) railways enjoyed over traditional
transport systems. The share of inland water transport decreased
with a ~ t of around 45 years and that of road transport by horses
with a ~t of around 80 years. Whereas inland water passenger-km
decreased both in relative and in absolute terms, and by 1860 inland
navigation had virtually disappeared as a long-distance passenger
transport mode, passenger-km with horse vehicles continued to rise in
absolute figures well into the 1880s. This is a further indication of the
complementary character of short-distance road transport of horses to
railways, a market niche lost by horses only with the appearance of
new road vehicles, first the bicycle, and later the motorcycle, buses,
and private cars.
Thus, the comparative advantage of railways in their early phase
of growth (i.e., prior to 1855) to other transport modes was very high
indeed, and higher against inland water navigation (~t 45 years) than
for total (Le., long- plus short-distance) road transport (~t 80 years).
Only after railroads had effectively eliminated all other long-distance
passenger transport modes (river steam boats and stage coaches) did
the diffusion pattern slow down (to a ~t of some 80 years). We con-
clude, that the effective disappearance of long-distance passenger
transport by river or by stagecoach must have occurred no later than
1880, based on the dynamics of technological competition identified
with our simple model.
Symmetrical to the growth of road transport, railways have
entered a declining market share trajectory since the beginning of this
• Estimated, ae no continuous model application wae possible. The reaeon for this lies most likely in the
inadequacy of the data baee to allow for separate analysis of long- and short-distance transport modes.
The relatively slow replacement of horses is in fact explained in that horses fulfilled an essential comple-
mentary role in distributing paesengers and goods to and from railway stations. By extrapolating the faet
introduction of the railways, one would arrive at the conclusion that by 1880 the horse had already disap-
peared ae a long-didancc paesenger transport mode, which is consistent with the available data on the
discontinuation of the laet stagecoach services around that time period (see e.g., Voigt, 1965).
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century, interrupted only by a shift in its phase-out due to the "hiber-
nation" during World War II and its aftermaths. Since 1970 the rate
of decline has, however, slowed down, indicating that railways are
apparently phasing out more slowly from their last remaining (below
10 percent) market niche which largely consists of commuting and
subsidized transport (e.g., for school children, military personnel,
etc.). After its period of spectacular growth and market dominance,
road transport now appears to be saturating due to the growth of new
competitors. The slower growth rates in air travel in France, com-
pared to the situation in the USA or the USSR, is a direct conse-
quence of the shorter distances travelled and of the resulting smaller
comparative advantage (in terms of reduced travel time) compared to
other transport modes.
After having discussed the historical developments in the French
passenger modal split, what is the outlook for the future? The outlook
relies on an important (and in the long-term unrealistic) ceteris
paribus assumption, i.e., the possible appearance of a new transport
technology is not considered. Although there are doubts about
whether the TGV is an example of a new system, it could well be that
the TGV is the forerunner of new ground based high-speed transport
systems such as Maglev's. In Section 3.2 we used the analogy of the
horse railway between Linz and Budweis as an example of such a tran-
sitional system, combining a new infrastructure network with tradi-
tional propulsion technology. Under such an hypothesis, we have
separated data relative to the passenger-km transported by the TGV
in order to provide some insights into the dynamics of the passenger
modal split responding to the emergence of a new technological sys-
tem.
The forecasts of Figure 4.2.7 indicate road transport at the peak
of its technological life-cycle (in relative terms; absolute passenger-km
by cars is likely to continue to increase in the future). Air transport
appears to grow at a steady, yet slow diffusion rate, an indication of
the relative short transport distances covered in France, where the
comparative advantage of higher speeds of air transport cannot be
fully translated into high market share gains. Still, based on our sim-
ple model one could expect by the year 2000 that about 10 percent of
passenger-km will be transported by aircraft in France, at least for
long-distance* operations. As mentioned above, the decline tendency
of the railways appears to have slowed down since 1970. In fact, it is a
• Here one has to note, however, data problems of the air passenger-km time series available, as they in-
clude not only domestic but abo international destination passenger-km. Domestic air pa88enger-km pos-
sibly do not account for more than 1 to 2 percent of the total passenger-km (including local and urban
traffic) in France. The passenger air transport trajectory from Figure 4.2.7 is thus best interpreted as
representing the share of air transport in long-distance (intercity) passenger travel.
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frequent observation in the analysis of technological substitution
processes, that the last ten percent of market shares are lost at a con-
siderably slower rate than the prime market segments. This may be
due to institutional reasons as well as the maintaining of certain (pro-
tected) market niches (significant tariff reductions for school children
and students, the elderly or people on military service are granted on
most European railways). Based on such a premise railways could
still account for some 6 percent of passenger-km (compared to 8 per-
cent at present) in France in the year 2000.
Road transport in the longer term appears to be really challenged
only by the emergence of new transport modes, such as rapid rail
based intercity connections. The success of the French TGV on cer-
tain routes (e.g., Paris-Lyon) might be a first sign of the likely market
response, once such new advanced high speed ground transportation
becomes available. In the absence of a sufficient historical data base
to calculate a future scenario, we assume a speculative growth trajec-
tory for the TGV in Figure 4.2.7 to illustrate the impact on the
passenger modal split in France. The penetration rate assumed for
the scenario is close to the maximum observed over 200 years, i.e.,
similar to the one prevailing in the introduction phase of railways.
This does, of course, not imply that we consider such a growth
scenario realistic for the TGV proper. Instead, it is only indicative of
the possible maximum penetration rates which could be achieved by a
new transport system with a clear cut competitive edge over tradi-
tional transport modes, in particular road traffic. If history is a guide,
one might expect a continuation of the rapid diffusion of the TGV or
similar systems (like Maglev's) up to a level of a few percent market
share, and then a transition to a slower substitution trajectory, con-
sistent with observed historic market penetration rates. Even in a
speculative high growth scenario, the dominance of the automobile in
passenger transportation in France would not be affected noticeably
before the turn of the century, pointing to the slow response times in
the structural changes in the passenger modal split.
4.2.2. Modal split for goods transport
Goods transport is a market segment quite different from passenger
transportation. As we have seen above, the market dynamics of the
premium transport market (moving people) are primarily influenced
by the inherent performance levels (transport speed) of individual
transport modes and appear to be highly price insensitive (inelastic).
The situation with goods transport is different in that only for a few,
high-value goods (e.g., mail) are similar price insensitive transport
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mode choices made. In brief, the modal choice for goods transport is a
function of availability (access to infrastructure), technological perfor-
mance (transport speed, geographical coverage, weight limitations,
etc.), and finally costs. This complex vector of variables may change
over time, especially in response to changes in the performance and
price structure of different transport modes. Thus, the long-term
dynamics of the modal split for goods ought to be analyzed as a func-
tion of price and performance rather than as a simple time trend pat-
tern.
France
In view of the above arguments, it should not be surprIsmg that the
long-term modal split for goods in France (Figure 4.2.9 below) finally
provides an example for which no simple, continuous time dependent
technological substitution model application is possible.
The empirical data* indicate a more complex dynamic pattern in
the structural change of the goods transport sector in France. Figure
4.2.8 presents the goods transport output by different modes in France
since 1800, measured in 109 ton-km. The evolution of total goods
transport volume is characterized by an exponential growth trend,
which is interrupted only by discontinuities such as the war of 1870,
World War I, and especially World War II. This long-term exponen-
tial growth path of total ton-km transported appears, however, to
slow down after the 1970s, pointing to a possible decoupling between
economic and goods transportation growth. With regard to the
development pattern of different goods transport modes, one can dis-
cern two phases in the development of transport output (ton-km) per-
formed. A very rapid introduction phase during which a new trans-
port mode (railways, trucks, pipelines or aircrafts) conquers special-
ized market niches and in which its comparative advantage is greatest.
This rapid initial growth path in ton-km transported is, however, not
sustained for long. The growth rates slow down considerably,
although still remaining basically exponential for extended time
periods. This transition in the long-term growth rates of individual
• Data source: Inland water navigation: Data series as reported by Toutain, 1967, and Mitchell, 1980,
and updated with Ann. Stat., 1980 to 1987. Data refer to inland (canal and river navigation) only, exports
by ship are excluded. Coastal shipping data available in Toutain, 1967, could not be updated and had con-
sequently to be excluded in the analysis. This, however, would not affect noticeably the long-term (declin-
ing) trend of the share of water navigation in domestic goods transport. Railway t-km are derived from
Mitchell, 1980, (but are consistent with Toutain, 1967) and updated by Ann. Stat., 1980 to 1987. Goods
transport by hones and trucks up to 1965 are taken from estimates provided by Toutain, 1967. Quintan-
nual data are (exponentiallY) interpolated. Since 1965 road transport data are derived from IRF, 1970 to
1985 statistics, complemented by Ann. Stat., 1980 to 1987. Pipeline t-km (oil) are taken from Vivier,
1978, and after 1975 from Ann. Stat. des Transports, 1982 (referring to pipelines longer than 50 km only).
Air transport (including exports) data come from Ann. Stat., 1961, and 1977 to 1987.
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Figure 4.2.8. Goods transport output by different mode and total in France
since 1800, in 109 ton-km performed.
transport technologies occurred for railways around 1870, for trucks
around 1930, and for oil pipelines around 1970. We assume, that this
transition in the growth phases of different technologies is triggered by
the fact that a new system has, by that date, exhausted its initial
growth potential, resulting in the replacement of traditional transport
modes from premium market segments.
We see from Figure 4.2.8 that only one mode of goods transport
has entirely disappeared from the market: horses, whereas other trad-
itional transport modes, such as inland navigation have continued to
transport increasing quantities until fairly recently. Despite the
growth in output, the relative share of different transport modes in
the total ton-km transported has been changing. This is best illus-
trated by the role of railways in the goods transport sector. Despite
the fact that absolute ton-km transported by railways have increased
since the 1920s, their relative market share has been decreasing, as
their respective growth rates have increasingly fallen short of the
growth rates in total market volume.
Figure 4.2.9 presents an overview of the long-term changes in the
relative market shares of different goods transport technologies. The
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Figure 4.2.9. Modal split in goods transport in France, in fractional shares of
ton-km transported.
structural changes in the modal split for goods in France show a com-
plex dynamic pattern, which appears to follow the dynamics of tech-
nological substitution only in the introduction phase and again in the
last phase-out period. The reason for this was already mentioned
above. Diffusion and technological substitution appear to be pri-
marily driven by differences in the comparative advantage of different
transport technologies. For low-value goods in particular, the com-
parative advantage in terms of quality of performance proper (speed,
regularity of service, geographical coverage, etc.) does however not
constitute the only decision making criterion for modal choice, since
(low) transport costs are also decisive. Thus, instead of time, a com-
posite "quality" variable incorporating both price and technological
performance (changing over time) ought to be used as an independent
variable. Absence of detailed time series do not, however, allow such
a comprehensive analysis.
Although no simple continuous technological substitution model
can be applied, we nevertheless present in Figure 4.2.9 the long-term
modal split for goods in the usual logarithmic F/ (1-F) transforma-
tion of market shares over time. This is done in order to make logistic
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growth phases (appearing as linear trends in Figure 4.2.9) clearly dis-
cernible from other structural transitions and to provide comparabil-
ity with technological substitution cases presented earlier.
Even if the complex pattern, which for long periods lacks a signi-
ficant dynamic aspect (see for instance the share of railways between
1880 to 1930), cannot be formalized by a model, one can nevertheless
extract a typical pattern in the introduction of a new mode in the
goods transport sector. In the past, new transport modes for goods
have typically evolved along a four-phase life-cycle model. Once intro-
duced, their rapid growth quickly displaces existing transport modes,
first by carrying higher value goods, i.e., passengers and information,
and later on high-value density products. This rapid first phase of
market share gains lasted from 1830 to 1870 in the case of the rail-
ways, from 1910 to the end of the 1930s for trucks, and from 1955 to
1965 for oil pipelines. The performance advantage of a new transport
mode appears to play a decisive role in rapid initial market penetra-
tion. Figure 4.2.9 suggests, that this initial "premium" market niche
was highest for railways, with their market share increasing from one
to nearly 50 percent in less than 20 years. Truck transportation also
rapidly filled its first market niche, but, with around 25 percent
market share, it was already smaller. The specialized market segment
for pipelines never exceeded 15 percent of all ton-km transported.
Once the initial niche has been conquered, growth proceeds at a
significantly slower pace with additional shares being gained from the
traditional, slower transport modes, primarily via tariff competition,
since transport costs decrease along the learning curve. This second
phase is completed once a system reaches maturity and complete
market dominance. In France, this second phase lasted from about
1870 to the 1920s for railways, when over 70 percent of all ton-km in
France were transported by rail. For truck transport this second
phase appears to be continuing.
The third phase of the four stage life-cycle model consists of a
relatively long saturation period, during which a transport mode loses
market shares but maintains a dominant position. For the railways in
France, this third phase lasted until the 1950s and 1960s, when their
respective market share fell below the 50 percent barrier for the first
time. The last phase is the period of fall and decline under vicious
competition from newer transport modes. This has been the situation
of railways since the 1950s. Railways are retreating progressively into
the lowest value market niches of the goods transport sector by trans-
porting bulk, low-value raw materials, like gravel, scrap or coal, where
low transportation costs are a more important criteria than quality of
service or speed.
218 The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Figure 4.2.9 allows us to summarize the long-term history in the
(domestic) goods transport modal split in France. At the beginning of
the 19th century approximately one fourth of the ton-km carried were
shipped by inland navigation and three fourths by (horse) road trans-
port. As a result of canal development, the share of inland navigation
in ton-km transported increased to an all-time peak market share
value of 38 percent by 1847. The subsequent rapid increase in the
share of railways in the middle of the 19th century is an indication of
their considerable comparative advantage which affected canals and
road (horse) transport in a similar way. As of 1860 the gain in the
market share for railways proceeded at a significantly slower rate.
These later market share gains occurred primarily at the expense of
road transport, with inland water navigation keeping a relatively
stable market share around the 20 percent level between 1880 and
1940. From a long-term perspective, inland water transport appears
to be the least dynamic (sensitive) transport carrier, losing only gra-
dually and slowly its share of the market to other transport modes.
This would be an indication of the fact that inland navigation retained
its comparative advantage (low transport costs) in the lower value
goods (bulk commodities) market segment, where transport speed is
not so decisive.
The decline and end of horse road transport due to the rapid dif-
fusion of trucks between 1910 to 1940 has been discussed already in
Section 3.3. Mter the completion of the replacement of the horse in
road transport, the market share gains of trucks continued to proceed
at a slower rate than during the early introduction phase. This was
primarily at the expense of railroads, which after having reached their
peak in the market share in the goods transport sector (79 percent in
1926), declined. Also noteworthy is the rapid initial growth (1950 to
1965) of the market share of a specially dedicated transport infrastruc-
ture: oil pipelines. Their share in the total ton-km transported
reached its maximum in the 1970s with around 15 percent, in order to
decline thereafter.
A most likely near- to medium-term outlook for the future goods
transport in France would suggest a continuation of the structural
shifts apparent since World War II. Such a scenario would imply that
road transport could eventually reach a similar dominant position in
the transport sector as railways enjoyed in the 1920s, accounting for
close to 80 percent of all ton-km transported. Railways and inland
water navigation would, by continuing their past trends, decrease
further in importance and the relative share of oil pipelines is also not
likely to increase again. At present no real technical alternatives,
resulting in a similar "breaking" of the market dominance of truck
transportation, as was the case with railways some 50 years ago, are
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apparent. Further gains in the market share of road transport appear
likely in the transition of manufacturing in the direction of higher
value goods and smaller batch sizes under "just in time" and inven-
tory minimization strategies. To meet these requirements, road and
air transport appear to have a clear competitive edge as regards flexi-
bility and speed of delivery as opposed to traditional transport modes.
Further increases in market shares and also absolute volumes of truck
transport* are likely to trigger further policy measures to reduce nega-
tive externalities associated with growing truck traffic. Despite the
high comparative advantage of air transport in the goods transport
sector, it does not appear likely (in view of the relatively short trans-
port distances in France) that in tonnage terms, air freight would
transcend the role of a marginal contributer to the domestic goods
modal split. Recall here, that in the statistics presented in Figures
4.2.8 and 4.2.9, exports are included in air ton-km. Thus, the avail-
able data overemphasize the importance of air transport in domestic
ton-km. The situation with respect to the share of air transport in the
value of goods transported will however be drastically different as
shown below.
To finalize the discussion of the long-term trends in goods trans-
port in France, we illustrate the spatial representation of the growth
in the volume of goods transported as shown in Figure 4.2.10. Here
the intensification in the usage of different transport infrastructures,
railways and roads, based on the annual tonnage throughput at vari-
ous segments of the infrastructure network, is shown. The original
data (Renouard, 1960, SNCF, 1987, and SETRA, 1988) have been
replotted on a common scale, i.e., the thickness of the lines in Figure
4.2.10 is proportional to the tonnage transported. We also present the
total national goods traffic flux in 109 ton-km for the railway and road
network for the years shown in Figure 4.2.10. As regards railways
(Figure 4.2.lOA), we observe two phases of growth. The first one
being characterized primarily by an extension of the network (between
1854 and 1878), whereas the second phase is characterized by an
increasing intensification of the use of the existing railway network.
Note in particular, the intensification in tonnage transported between
1913 and 1952 and the only modest increases since then, as well as the
high concentration of tonnage transported in the industrial North-
East of France, the center of the coal and steel industry.
• We discuss below the apparent -decoupling" of goods transport intensity and economic growth. If this
decoupling tendency continues, total t-km transported, which increased with a rate of 3.9 percent per year
between 1950 to 1985, might considerably slow down, depending on overall GNP growth. However, even
under only a gradual growth in total market volume the ton-km transported by trucks is most likely to in-
crease further also in absolute terms.
220
RAILWAYS
The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
1854
c
3.0 109 t-km 1878
c
8.3 109 t-km
o~o
106 t/yr
1913 25.2 109 t-km 1952 44.0 109 t-km
1986 51.7 109 t-km
Figure 4.2.10A. Goods tonnage (tons/year) transported over various segments
of the French railway network from 1854 to 1986. Thickness of lines is propor-
tional to annual tonnage transported.
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Figure 4.2.10B. Goods tonnage (tons/year) transported over various segments
of the French road network from 1856 to 1986. Thickness of lines is proportional
to annual tonnage transported.
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The dominance of railways in the goods transport sector from the
1850s to the 1950s becomes particularly visible in the comparison to
the throughput (tonnage transported) on roads (Figure 4.2.10B).
Since that time however, the throughput at various segments of the
road infrastructure has increased dramatically: on average by a factor
of 6 (measuring ton-km). Despite the fact that in Figure 4.2.10B the
1986 road transport intensity is only an estimate* and may only to a
limited degree be comparable to earlier years, it nevertheless illus-
trates the phase transition in the spatial pattern of the goods
throughput between different transport infrastructures in France:
from railways to roads. Also visible in the comparison between rail-
ways and roads is the increasing spatial division of labor, leading to a
polycentric structure, compared to the concentration in the industrial
North of France some 70 years ago. Finally, the emergence of a new
economic corridor stretching from Paris over Dijon and Lyon to Mar-
seille, as reflected in the intensity of goods throughput both on roads
and on railways, is clearly illustrated in Figure 4.2.10.
FRG
Figure 4.2.11 complements the picture for France discussed above,
with the modal split for goods for the FRG, in terms of ton-km trans-
ported by inland navigation (Le., excluding sea transport), railways
and trucks. The oil pipeline infrastructure, accounting presently for
less than 4 percent of total ton-km transported in the FRG has been
omitted in Figure 4.2.11, due to a lack of long time series. By means
of a continuation of past trends, a similar structural change as identi-
fied in France becomes apparent in the modal split for goods in the
FRG. Around the year 2000 nearly three-quarters of all domestic
ton-km in the FRG would be transported by trucks, with the remain-
ing share accounted for equally by inland navigation and railways.
Air transport does not appear in Figure 4.2.11 at all, as only
some 0.1 percent of all ton-km are transported by aircraft. However,
present tonnage oriented transport statistics are, to some degree,
misleading, as regards the importance of air transport, especially for
an open economy such as the FRG. Instead, we consider that another
more appropriate indicator would be the value-km (DM-km) trans-
ported by different transport modes. Contrary to the passenger modal
split, an analysis of goods transport should consider the different value
of goods transported (i.e., the heterogeneity of the products
• Contrary to earlier years, only vehicle throughput statistics for national roads and highways are avail-
able (SETRA, 1988). We have assumed that the 1986 tonnage transported by trucks is distributed pro-
portionally to the average vehicle frequency on the various segments of the road network.
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Figure 4.2.11. Modal split in domestic goods transport (measured by ton-km
transported) for the FRG (excluding oil pipelines), percentage of market share
and estimates based on logistic substitution model.
transported) by different modes. This has been incorporated* into
official transport statistics only recently. Some short-term data (since
1969) on the modal split of imported goods in value terms are avail-
able, which are further analyzed in Section 4.3. These short-term data
(Stat. BA. Fachserie 7, 1979, and 1986, Stat. BA. (WiSta 7/1987),
1987, and Stat. BA., 1987) nevertheless allow interesting insights (Fig-
ure 4.2.12) into the relative importance of different transport modes in
the value of goods exchanged.
Even if the available data only span 18 years and only refer to
imports and not to exports (data on the value of domestic transport
volume are even entirely lacking), can one see that air transport
becomes important, when considering the value of the goods trans-
ported. Whereas in 1969 some 6 percent of the value of imports was
arriving by aircraft, this percentage had increased to over 10 percent
by 1986. Sea transport is also an important transport mode for
• Export statistics taking into consideration the transport mode and the value of goods transported are
compiled from 1987 onwards. Import statistics are available since 1969.
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Figure 4.2.12. Share of different transport modes in import value (Generalhan-
de~ of the FRG and estimates based on logistic substitution model.
imports to the FRG, but its share in the import value has decreased
from 38 percent in 1969 to 27 percent in 1986. The share of road
transport (trucks) increased on the other hand from 35 to over 55 per-
cent over the same time period. Most interesting is, however, the
situation with respect to railways. Their share in the import value
decreased from 21 percent to about 7.5 percent between 1969 and
1986. Thus, at present a higher DM-value of goods is imported to the
FRG by air than by rail. Based on our model representation of this
structural shift process, the rate of decline of the railways is estimated
to proceed with a ~t of 58 years. This compares with a logistic
decline rate of railways in domestic ton-km transported (Figure 4.2.11
above) with a ~t of 116 years. This means that the market share loss
of railways measured by the value of the goods transported (imported)
to the FRG proceeded twice as fast as their market share losses in the
ton-km transported. This demonstrates clearly the structural
dilemma of railways in the goods transport sector: while losing ton-
nage market shares, they lose out even more on the share of the goods
value transported. At present, it is by no means clear which (drastic)
Evolution of the Performance of Infrastructures (modal split) 225
institutional, organizational as well as technological measures (high-
value goods normally represent small batch sizes and require high tur-
naround times, i.e., transport speeds) could be introduced, in order to
halt the decline of the railways in the goods transport sector. Other-
wise, railways may end up with a similar market niche as inland navi-
gation. While still transporting say around 10 percent of the total
ton-km, their market niche would be confined to extremely low-value
goods, primarily basic commodities transported in large batch sizes,
such as coal, scrap, gravel or wood trains.
Sweden
As a conclusion to our discussion on the modal split of goods transport
let us consider the case of Sweden as an example of a small open econ-
omy. Figure 4.2.13 presents the share in the export value of manufac-
tured goods transported by different transport modes from Sweden to
their final destination. As in Figure 4.2.12 above, the share of dif-
ferent transport modes in the value of exported manufactured goods
from Sweden is presented in linear form. Actual data and estimates
resulting from a logistic substitution model are given, based on data
for the period 1965 to 1984. The trend revealed is consistent with the
picture emerging from Figure 4.2.12 in the case of the FRG. Rail-
ways, and in the medium-term, also sea transport will account for
decreasing shares in the value of exported goods in Sweden. Truck
and air transport are on the increase, and based on the model fore-
casts one may assume that by the year 2000 truck and air could
account for nearly equal shares in the goods exported from Sweden,
measured by the value of the exports. For Sweden, there appears to
be a clear tendency for exports to have a higher value content than
imports (Snikars, 1987). Thus, exports are increasingly likely to leave
Sweden by air or by truck, and only the lowest value goods will be
shipped by railway and ship. Thus, our conclusion with respect to the
importance of high-value market niches (passengers or high-value
goods) in the long-term dynamics of the transport modal split is
further corroborated.
The main driving forces for the changing structure of the modal
split for goods may, therefore, be summarized as follows: increasing
value density of tangible goods and decreasing material intensity tend
to generate a higher total value in the transport sector. Higher qual-
ity service, smaller batch sizes, and faster and reliable deliveries are
required for the transportation of high-value density goods. Despite
higher ton-km tariffs, the total transport costs incurred are lower due
to quicker turn-around times that allow for a significant reduction in
inventories and working capital that would otherwise be tied up in
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Figure 4.2.13. Share of different transport modes in the export value of
manufactured goods in Sweden and estimates based on logistic substitution
model. (Source: Snikars, 1987.)
goods waiting to be shipped. These tendencies favor truck transporta-
tion for domestic deliveries and increasingly air transport over larger
distances, especially for exports and imports.
At this point we conclude the empirical description of the long-
term trends in the structural shifts and substitution of different trans-
port modes. During much of our phenomenological discussion, we
have already made conjectures about the principal driving forces
responsible for the long-term structural change in the transport sector.
These are discussed in more detail in the Section 4.3. We consider
technological performance as represented in quality (primarily trans-
port speed for the whole transport chain) and flexibility of service, to
be the principal driving force. The comparative performance advan-
tage of a new transport system first becomes translated into market
share gains in the premium (high-value) market niches of the trans-
port sector, passenger transport, and transportation of high-value
goods (including information).
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Older technologies, failing to comply with the evolving require-
ments of the transport system as regards performance (speed), qual-
ity, and flexibility of service tend to lose these high-value market
niches first, in order to become confined in the long-term to transport-
ing only relatively low-value primary materials and commodities.
This "last resort" market niche appears, however, not to be a viable
survival strategy in the long-term. With the increasing tendency
towards dematerialization in the advanced economies and a shift to
more information and software content and thus high-value goods,
this last, low-value market niche may eventually not be sufficient to
allow the long-term survival of traditional transport carriers and infra-
structures.
4.3. Driving Forces and the Economics of
Modal Split Changes
Having established empirical evidence with respect to the life cycle of
individual transport infrastructures and the long-term structural
changes in the transport sector, we formulate below some tentative
propositions concerning the driving forces behind these evolutionary
processes.
We emphasize that we consider as a long-term driving force the
relative comparative advantage of different transport systems, seen as
a complex vector of technological, social, institutional, economic and
psychological factors, rather than as a single variable. With this
caveat in mind, we propose some tentative clusters of driving force
variables that have to be considered as intrinsically interwinded and
interdependent, and which cannot be reduced to a one-dimensional
view of being the one and only (principal) driving force in the long-
term development of the transport system.
The comparative advantage of individual transport technologies
and infrastructures discussed originates from three areas: First, tech-
nological performance (in particular speed and range). Second, the
importance of high-value market niches in the initial development and
subsequent growth of infrastructures, as well as the learning curve
phenomenon (decrease in real term transport costs) that allows new
transport systems to enter competition successively in other than
high-value market niches, are emphasized. Third, with regard to
future development, we argue that the transition of developed
economies toward dematerialization and higher information and
software content in products, will have important repercussions on the
transport system. Such developments would increase the require-
ments for fast, reliable transport modes with rapid turnaround times,
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as a result of inventory minimization and "just in time" production
strategies. It appears likely that the long-term goods transport inten-
sity per unit of economic activity of advanced economies may not
grow any further, in fact it may even decline. Such developments
result from increases in the value generated per unit of physical out-
put. Continued economic growth and increasing personal income will
most likely have demand stimulating effects for passenger travel, in
particular long-distance leisure travel. Consequently in the near- to
medium-term we do not foresee any "decoupling" or even decrease in
the passenger transport demand from economic growth.
Technical performance
Figure 4.3.1 presents speed trends in transportation, adapted from an
article by Samaras, 1962. Transport speeds, from the horse
(represented by the pony express for urgent mail delivery in the Amer-
ican West) to trains, to automobiles and finally to aircraft have
increased by over two orders of magnitude over the last 200 years.
We have discussed in Section 3.2 above, that the higher transport
speeds of railway transport (in addition to denser spatial coverage and
higher transport capacity) was without doubt the decisive performance
criterion, explaining the success of the railways at the expense of horse
carriages and inland water navigation (canals). This speed advantage
of the railways was, however, not accepted without challenge. A
number of medical studies of the early 19th century claimed that any
transport speed exceeding about 20 km/hr would be detrimental, even
lethal, to human health (see e.g., Voigt, 1965).
As usual, cartoons provide an excellent account of contemporary
concerns of possible negative effects from a new technology, as illus-
trated in Figure 4.3.2. Despite such early scepticism and social resis-
tance, the impact of railways in altering the space-time framework of
human activities and industrial production, settlement patterns, etc.
was decisive. As a result, by 1900 railways had achieved a dominance
in the transport sector in all industrialized countries which was con-
siderably larger than the present dominance of the automobile.
The speed advantage of the first automobiles over horse carriages
does not require further discussion. Although the average transport
speed of the automobile did not increase along a similar dramatic*
trajectory as suggested by Samaras, 1962 (referring apparently to
record speeds), its independence in usage and nearly complete
• Currently, the average car transport speed in the USA does not exceed 50 to 60 km/hr (including urban
traffic).
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Figure 4.3.1. Transport speed trends, in km/hr. (Source: adapted from
Samaras, 1962.)
geographical coverage facilitated a considerable reduction in travel
time if we consider the whole (Le., door-to-door) transport chain.
Once the automobile had replaced horses as the complementary trans-
port mode to and from railway stations, it also progressively became
the preferred mode for long-distance travel and started to compete
with railways. In the goods transport sector trucks offered an addi-
tional noticeable advantage over railways: smaller batch sizes. Voigt,
1965, argues that this was an important stimulus for the early
development of truck transport in the USA, as many companies tried
to minimize their inventory (i.e., capital) costs during the Great
Depression. Instead of ordering large batch sizes (railway wagons) of
primary materials and intermediate goods, smaller, but more frequent
deliveries by trucks proved advantageous under extreme competitive
pressures. The further growth of the automobile as a form of long-
distance transport was also closely linked to the widespread diffusion
of private car ownership, the spread of suburban settlement patterns,
and the upgrading of road infrastructure, e.g., in the form of Reichs-
autobahnen or interstate highways, allowing for higher transport
speeds in intercity traffic. It was concluded in Section 3.3 above, that
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Figure 4.3.2. Impact of a 60 kmjhr fast train on the environment and train
operators as seen in cartoons from 1862. (Source: Roszak and Schmidt, 1986.)
the relationship between automobile diffusion and the development of
road infrastructure evolved inversely (i.e., the growth of the surfaced
road infrastructure significantly preceded the diffusion of the automo-
bile). The upgrading of long-distance road connections was however
an important factor in the comparative door-to-door travel time
advantage of the automobile over railways for medium-range distances
(up to a few hundred kilometers), and can be considered as a decisive
factor in the long-term substitution pattern in intercity transporta-
tion.
In Section 4.2 above, we showed that the automobile started to
lose market shares in intercity passenger traffic in the USA because of
the growth of a new transport mode, aircrafts, which brought about a
quantum leap in the reduction of travel time over large distances.
Despite considerably higher transport costs initially, aircraft immedi-
ately started to replace automobiles for long-distance transport in the
USA. It is therefore natural to assume that the faster transport speed
of aircraft was the decisive performance criterion responsible for this
substitution. This statement is further corroborated by similar long-
term tendencies in the USSR and even in Europe. In Figure 4.3.1
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above, the increase in the average transport speeds of commercial air-
crafts (using data from Martino, 1983) have been plotted, instead of
the original aircraft record speed performance curve from Samaras,
1962. The average travel speed of aircraft has approached the sound
barrier, a difficult hurdle to overcome for passenger transport, at least
for the present technological generation of passenger aircrafts. The
transsonic speeds realized e.g., by the Concorde or military aircrafts
such as the Lokheed SR 7lA, or the X30 (Mach 6), announced for the
mid-1990s appear, however, to be consistent with the envelope of
transport speeds as shown in Figure 4.3.1. Under such an assumption,
two successive new generations of aircrafts - methane fueled up to
around Mach 6, and hydrogen fueled up to Mach 25 - could push the
feasibility frontier of transport speeds to a level at which all destina-
tions on the globe could be reached within one hour. Whether such a
scenario is realistic cannot be resolved within the present context.
Faster transport speed was, and continues to be the most important
comparative advantage air travel has over traditional transport
modes, especially for premium market segments such as passenger
travel and transportation of high-value and perishable goods.
Without taking a monocausality viewpoint, we conclude
nevertheless that faster transport speed is to be considered as an
important driving force for the long-term competitive pattern outlined
in the empirical part of this study. Faster transport speeds imply -
under a constant travel time budget constraint - that spatial distances
are "compressed" and that a larger (territorial) range can be covered
by an individual. This reduction of travel time results in a "space-
time convergence" (Janelle, 1969) between locations. For instance the
travel time by stage coach between Edinburgh and London improved
from some 20,000 minutes* (two weeks) in 1660 to some 2,000 minutes
by 1800 (mostly due to improved turnpike roads). The introduction
of railways reduced this travel time to less than 800 minutes by 1850
and with further speed improvements to less than 400 minutes at the
present time. The travel time between the two cities by aircraft is less
than 200 minutes. Thus, the reduction in travel time and temporal
distance is a factor of 100 over a time period of some 300 years, i.e.,
the effective space separating the two cities for human activities
(measured by travel time) has been "converging" dramatically.
A corollary of the space-time convergence is that the spatial
range (distance) that can be covered by an individual per unit of time
is increasing. Figure 4.3.3 illustrates this for France, by plotting the
average daily distance travelled per capita by transport mode, and the
• All data from Janelle, 1969, who also provides a graphic representation of this space-time convergence.
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Figure 4.3.3. Range covered (average km travelled daily) per capita in France
by mode and total since 1800.
total for all modes taken together since 1800. Each new transport
mode increased the average range of an individual by about one order
of magnitude. What is perhaps even more noteworthy is the absolute
scale of the increase in travel range: from about 30 meters per capita
per day (1O.2 km per year) in 1800 to some 34 km per capita per day
(12,400 km per year) in 1987, Le., by a factor of over 1,000. Figure
4.3.3 shows a persistent exponential growth path in the individual
daily travel range since 1800.
This trend toward higher mobility does not show any apparent
indication to slowdown* or to "decouple" from its long-term growth
trajectory. The situation in other countries is similar (Eberlein, 1988),
although the distances covered vary in absolute terms due to differ-
ences in geography, spatial structures and the utilization of different
transportation modes, as shown in Table 4.3.1. As a result of the
increasing passenger-km transported by automobiles and aircraft
(including travel abroad), at present the average distance covered per
• Note that the slowdown since 1970 haa brought the mobility indicator just back to the long-term trend
line.
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Table 4.3.1. Average distance traveled daily (all modes l )), in km per day per
capita in 1984-1986 for selected countries.
Total Including Including
long-distance by car and air
France 34.0 n.a. 28.1
FRG 28.4 12.8 23.6
Norway 30.1 n.a. 25.7
Sweden 31.8 n.a. 26.3
Switzerland 41.4 n.a. 34.7
USA 59.2 32.9 32.42)
USSR n.a. 10.4 2.02)
1) Excluding walking and bicycling.
2)Only long-distance travel.
Source: Norway, Sweden: Schipper et al., 1989; Switzerland: BA Stat., 1987, and IRF,
1986; all other: this study.
capita ranges between 30 to 60 km per day in OECD countries, half of
which are for intercity {long-distance) travel.
Faster transport speeds therefore led to an expansion of the
activity range of the population, geographical specialization of the
economy, changes in urbanization patterns, etc. However, transport
speeds and the resulting increases in the human activity range are cer-
tainly not the only contributing factors. Other factors, such as social
acceptance and societal values, differences in the degrees of comfort of
different transport modes, and last, but certainly not least, institu-
tional and organizational settings (see e.g., the organizational history
of railways) contributed to the historical development pattern of
transport infrastructures. Still, we consider the (interrelated) vari-
ables speed and range to be key elements in the long-term evolution of
the transport system, especially for long-distance travel, and premium
market segments such as moving people and high-value goods.
High-value market niches
Into which segments of the transport market does a new technology
and infrastructure diffuse first? An empirical analysis suggests that
the (price insensitive) highest value market niches are conquered first,
despite the fact that transport costs of a new system are initially much
higher. This was the case with railways (conquering first passenger
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and mail transport), the automobiles, and aircrafts. We would like to
call this mechanism the "first in-first out" rule, in describing the
importance of premium markets for the early development phase of
new transport modes. These premium markets are represented first of
all by long-distance passenger transport and secondly by high-value
light goods, such as information (mail), luxury products, etc. Figure
4.3.4 illustrates this rule for market dynamics using as an example the
life-cycle of a transport mode: the share of railways in passenger and
goods transport in France.
The data for Figure 4.3.4 are derived from the long-term modal
split for passenger and goods in transport in France, discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2 above. Especially noticeable is the time lag in the market
dynamics of the increasing share of railways between the premium and
lower-value market segments. Railways first displaced other transport
modes for moving people and, with a lag of around 10 years, followed
a similar market penetration pattern in the goods transport sector.
The maximum market share of railways was reached around 1900,
with close to 90 percent of all passenger-km travelled, i.e., a de facto
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technological monoculture. A similar peak in market dominance in
the goods transport sector was attained only some 30 years later with
close to 80 percent of all ton-km transported by railways. In sym-
metry to the dynamics of gaining market shares, premium shares are
lost first to new competitors. In France the decline trend in the
market share of railways in passenger-km precedes a similar decline
trend in ton-km by some 30 years. The situation in other countries
and with other transport modes follows a similar dynamic pattern as
formulated by the "first in-first out" rule. Recall here the much faster
diffusion of automobiles in public and private passenger transport
compared to goods transport in the UK and France at the beginning
of this century (discussed in Section 3.3). Similarly, air transport first
started to move information in the form of mail and later on
passengers, whereas the share of air transport as a means of transport-
ing goods, at least if measured in ton-km transported, is still practi-
cally negligible. We are reminded here of the dynamics of the inter-
city modal split in the USA (Section 4.2); cars reached their maximum
market share in intercity passenger travel (around 90 percent) in the
early 1960s, whereas the share of road transport in intercity freight
traffic continues to rise, accounting presently for some 25 percent of
the market (US DOC., 1987, and 1989).
Thus, the relatively price insensitive premium market niches pro-
vide the initial growth potential for a new transport mode. Other
market segments, in particular goods of progressively lower value, fol-
low at a later stage when significant cost reduction along the learning
curve allows for competition (via tariff reductions) in lower value
market niches. Only the lowest value goods (basic commodities, and
bulk raw materials and agricultural products) remain as the last com-
petitive domain for traditional (low speed) transport modes. This
was, and continues to be, the principal market niche for inland river
navigation in all countries, and is progressively also becoming the case
for railways.
Under such an assumption, the development of new rapid rail
based passenger transport systems, aimed at gaining shares in a prem-
ium market niche, appears to be strategically correct. Improved com-
petitive advantage is, however, not always primarily a technological
issue. A number of European experts (e.g., Sammer, 1988) claim that
considerable institutional and organizational potential exists for
improving the performance (door-to-door travel time) of railways in
long-distance passenger traffic and that these organizational measures
(e.g., new schemes for nationally coordinated train schedules along the
lines of the Swiss Takt/ahrplan) should be taken prior to massive
investments into upgrading traditional rail infrastructure. Such stra-
tegies for improving the performance of railways are potentially
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Figure 4.3.5. Learning curve in the average passenger transport mode costs in
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new cars in constant 1967 US dollars. (Data source: Garrison, 1989, and US
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successful only, if railways could become superior to private car or
public air transport in door-to-door travel time. This becomes espe-
cially important, as in this premium market segment the lower trans-
port costs of the railways did not noticeably affect their decline in
long-distance passenger traffic.
Figure 4.3.5 illustrates for the USA the basic mechanism for
proceeding from high-value market to lower value market segments:
the learning curve. Initially high real term costs decline over time as a
function of cumulative output. Despite initially significantly higher
costs, each new mode of transport rapidly gains market shares, first in
price insensitive market niches and later on (with declining transport
costs) also in the total transport market. The tariff reductions
proceed in high-value, price insensitive market segments (passenger
transport) slower than in other market niches (e.g., goods transport)
as was illustrated in Section 3.2 for the Canadian railway transport
tariffs.
As no average total operating costs per vehicle-mile for private
cars prior to 1950 were available for Figure 4.3.5, the time series were
complemented by an important element of these costs, i.e., the fixed
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costs resulting from purchasing an automobile. The rapid decrease in
the costs of an automobile, due to Henry Ford's Model T is particu-
larly clear in Figure 4.3.5. It is also interesting to note that the in real
terms the factory sale value of cars started to rise again after 1930,
Le., at the time when the first competitor, the horse, was eliminated
from the market.
Initial costs per passenger-mile travelled were significantly higher
for automobile (and air) transport than for other modes. Neverthe-
less, the car (and later the aircraft) started to diffuse rapidly and
gained market shares. Even now rail prices (measured by the average
revenues of railways per passenger-mile) are significantly lower than
the cost of travelling by car. Assuming two passengers per car for
long-distance travel, car operating costs are in the vicinity of five US
cents (1967) per passenger-mile, i.e., still some 20 percent higher than
railway transport costs. Thus, despite the fact that railways continu-
ously enjoyed a transport cost advantage, their competitive position in
long-distance passenger transport became progressively eroded, until
railways virtually disappeared from this market segment.
Similar tendencies with respect to air transportation can also be
outlined. Although initial air transport tariffs were higher than rail-
way or car transport costs by as much as a factor of four, aircraft
immediately started to gain market shares in long-distance passenger
travel. As a result, the share of cars in intercity passenger travel
started to saturate and decline as of the early 1960s. Air transport
costs, however, approached similar real term passenger-mile costs as
for cars, i.e., around five (1967) US cents per passenger-mile, only in
the late 1970s. Despite higher costs the share of air travel has been
increasing. With similar or lower costs than travelling by car, future
market gains are even more likely. All this demonstrates that modal
split decisions in premium market niches are highly price insensitive
and point to travel time (speed) as being the most decisive preference
criterion.
As transport tariffs become progressively lowered, further market
niches are opened. We mentioned in Section 3.4 that the relative cost
of exporting cars from Japan to the USA by aircraft compared to sea
transport have been reduced already to a factor of two. We have also
mentioned the large-scale export of semi-finished car bodies from Italy
to the USA by aircraft. This implies that in the future air transport
could become significant for the long-distance transport of lower value
(per unit of weight) products, in addition to computers, flowers, fresh
vegetables, etc., considered traditionally as small (measured by ton-
nage) special market segments of air transport. Further air transport
cost reductions in real terms are by no means impossible. The trend
of average air fares in the USA, presented in Figure 4.3.5 above, is a
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Figure 4.3.6. Ratio of value added over inventories in the manufacturing sector
of selected countries versus railway share in goods transportation 1960-1985.
(Data source: UN, 1977, and 1978, and IRF, 1970 to 1986.)
good indicator of the rationalization (cost cutting) potential of air car-
riers, especially when under strong competitive pressure. The rapid
increase in fuel costs (constituting about one-third of the total operat-
ing costs of an aircraft) as a result of the two crude oil price hikes in
the 1970s is barely discernible in the declining trend of average air
passenger-mile fares. With further real term tariff reductions, which
could become a reality under a progressively deregulated air transport
market in Europe also, entirely new market niches could open up, pos-
sibly including regular long-distance commuting and large-scale goods
transport.
The tendency for the latter to occur does not appear unrealistic,
especially if the widespread application of the "just-in-time" principles
in manufacturing and further efforts to reduce capital intensive inven-
tories are carried out. The quest for inventory minimization and
higher turnover in the manufacturing sector is illustrated in Figure
4.3.6 for a number of European countries and Japan. As an indicator
of the performance of the manufacturing sector we take the ratio of
the value added over inventories. A value of one, as is the case for
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Hungary, implies that a whole years' worth of value added is tied up
in inventories, either at the place of production, with the wholesale
and retail dealers or in transit. On the other hand, a high-value of
three, as for Japan, indicates that the total value added in manufac-
turing is turned over three times per year. In order to allow for
warehousing and inventory minimization, and an increase in the turn-
over of working capital, speedy and reliable delivery is expedient.
Thus the performance of the transport sector may explain some of the
variances in the turnover rate in the manufacturing sector of different
countries. We use the share of railways as an indicator of the trans-
port system speed because railways are generally slower than road
transport, and because high tonnage railway cars represent larger
shipment sizes.
Although the relationship between both variables changes discon-
tinuously over time, the turnover performance of the manufacturing
sector and the performance of the transport systems appear to con-
verge. In particular, this is reflected by the percentage of goods not
transported by railways along the performance frontier shown in Fig-
ure 4.3.6. Countries like Hungary, where around 70 percent of all
goods are still transported by rail, have the slowest (and most capital
intensive) turnover rate. Japan, with the smallest share of railways in
its goods transport sector performs best as regards logistics optimiza-
tion (inventory and resulting capital minimization) in its manufactur-
ing sector. Figure 4.3.6 records another indicator of the structural
dilemma of railways. When production is geared toward higher-value
goods, the industry will consequently aim at maximizing turnover and
reducing the amount of time these goods sit around in railway cars
waiting to be transported to their final destination. This poor perfor-
mance of railways is not only the result of extremely low average
transport speeds (very often in the vicinity of those of the preindus-
trial era, Le., below 20 km/hr) but also of institutional and organiza-
tional settings which result in long standing times at various railway
stations (sometimes in the order of several weeks, as for instance in
Italy).
We conclude therefore that in addition to being the driving forces
for future turnover improvements in the manufacturing sector, inven-
tory minimization and just-in-time production regimes require a
higher quality of service in terms of high transport speed, fast pick-up
and delivery, and smaller batch sizes. AIl this should favor truck tran-
sportation or even air freight - or a combination of both - rather than
rail. For instance already 50 percent of the air freight leaves Vienna
airport but by truck (so-called "trucking").
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Dematerialization and consequences for transport
We appear to be at the brink of a paradigm shift with respect to the
long-term developments in goods transportation. Advanced
economies are heading progressively toward increasing dematerializa-
tion (Herman et al., 1989) with a higher software and information
(and thus value) content in the products they manufacture. Figure
4.3.7 illustrates this for the USA. The material intensity of the US
economy both in per capita as well as per constant unit of GNP gen-
erated, has passed its maximum and is on the decline. Similar tenden-
cies can be shown for all advanced economies. This constitutes a
major structural change and discontinuity in long-term economic
development patterns. For the first time since the onset of the indus-
trial revolution, per capita consumption levels and economic activity
no longer appear to be tied to increasing resource inputs. This is cer-
tainly not the result of resource scarcity, but instead the consequence
of a longer term structural change in the output mix of advanced
economies. Increasingly higher value (and lighter) goods, embodying
a higher information and software content, and service activities
become the principal value generating activities of "post-industrial"
societies.
This increasing "dematerialization" tendency can also be
observed in the capital stock of advanced economies. Ever larger
shares of capital investment are embodied in non-material information
or software as illustrated in Figure 4.3.8. It is perhaps ironic, but
nevertheless factual, as the history of the development of (especially
air transport) technologies shows, that the development trends in the
military sector tend to lead similar developments in civilian applica-
tions. As much as 80 percent of capital investment in the military sec-
tor in the USA in 1980 was in the form of (non-material) software
(Ayres, 1989a). Software is projected to account for as much as 50
percent of capital investments into new manufacturing technologies,
such as elM (computer integrated manufacturing) and possibly more
than 10 percent even in traditional manufacturing domains.
The emergence of the so-called "service economy" also points in
the direction of increasing dematerialization of advanced economies.
The service sector is already the largest consumer of "high-
technology" in the form of computer hardware and software in the
USA. New technologies in the service sector, whether automation in
the New York Stock Exchange (Keith and Grody, 1988) or engineering
such as bridge construction (Murillo, 1988) are considered to contri-
bute to significant productivity improvements and further economic
growth of the service sector (Guile and Quinn, 1988). Whether we
consider employment or value (GNP) generated, the service sector
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1987.)
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will, without doubt, increase in importance in developed economies.
This will have important repercussions on the transport sector in gen-
eral. The service sector will impose new qualitative requirements on
the transport sector, for moving people, information, and high-value
goods instead of iron ore, scrap, and metallurgical products. Even if
the precise nature of the output mix of advanced economies under
such a major "paradigm shift" (to the "information and communica-
tion Kondratieff" in the sense of Freeman and Perez, 1988) is at
present still uncertain, various functional characteristics of such a
forthcoming new technological and socio-organizational "paradigm"
have been conjectured. Recall here a few of the principles of our
present industrial production organization: Fordist mass production,
wide diffusion of consumer durables, high per capita consumption lev-
els with resulting high energy and materials intensity, increasing inter-
national division of labor and importance of multinational enterprises.
Freeman and Perez, 1988 (p. 53), describe the new functional charac-
teristics of the forthcoming new production "paradigm" as follows:
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Diseconomies of scale and inflexibility of dedicated assembly-line and
process plant partly overcome by flexible manufacturing systems, "net-
working" and "economies of scope". Limitations of energy and materi-
als intensity [are] partly overcome by electronic control systems and
components. Hierarchical departmentalization overcome by "systemat-
ization", "networking" and intergration of design, production and
marketing. "Networks" of large and small firms based increasingly on
computer networks and close co-operation in technology, quality con-
trol, training, investment planning and production planning ("just-in-
time") etc. "Keretsu" and similar structures offering internal capital
markets.
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Here we only emphasize the principles of "economies of scope" ,
decreasing energy and material intensity, as well as the integration of
design, production, and marketing. All this implies "just-in-time"
organization of design, production, and final delivery, with essentially
zero inventories. The elasticity of demand for transport services in
the future will therefore most likely be driven by increasing quality
requirements as a result of the restructuring of advanced economies in
the direction of higher value goods and services. In the following illus-
trative examples we show that different demand (modal split) elastici-
ties of high-value goods and services in the transport sector can
already be documented.
Figure 4.3.9 illustrates the different elasticities of various trans-
port modes with respect to their respective (cumulative) share in the
volume of (export) goods of different value transported in Sweden.
Over 90 percent of the tonnage transported by railways and ships is
worth less than 4,000 Swedish Kronas per tonne. Truck and air on
the other hand, transport more than 60 percent of their tonnage in the
value category above 4,000 Kronas per tonne. Thus, we can conclude
that in the Swedish economy the largest share of high-value goods is
transported by truck or by air. If the trend in the production of
higher value goods continues, it can be expected that all this addi-
tional production will be shipped by truck or even by air, and that rail
and inland or oversea navigation will be left with decreasing volumes
of low-value goods. Thus, high-value goods appear to be particularly
sensitive with respect to the transportation mode in which they are
carried. The higher the value of goods, the (exponentially) lower is
the share of railways and sea transport.
These findings for Sweden are further corroborated by an analysis
of the elasticity of transport demand (share in the value transported)
versus the average value density of the good transported, as illustrated
in Figure 4.3.10 for goods imported into the FRG in 1986. In 1986
imports of manufactured goods into the FRG accounted for 424 billion
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Figure 4.3.9. Value content of commodity shipments by three different modes
of transport for Sweden in 1980. (Source: Snickars, 1987.)
DM for a total tonnage of 349 million tons (Le., an average value of
1.2 DM/kg). Out of the import value, 50 percent arrived by truck, 24
percent by sea or waterway vessel, 10 percent by air, 7 percent by rail,
and 6 percent by pipeline, (the remaining 3 percent being unaccounted
for). It is interesting to note that while trucks transported 50 percent
of the import value, they account for only 18 percent of the imported
tonnage. For air transport this relation is even more extreme: 10 per-
cent of the import value represent only 0.1 percent of import tonnage,
resulting in an average value density of air freight of 166 DM/kg.
Therefore, the importance of the various transportation modes
changes significantly as a function of the value of the products
shipped.
Figure 4.3.10 illustrates that basic materials such as coal, gravel,
scrap, and raw materials in the value range below a few DM per kilo-
gram are mostly transported by sea, canals, and rail (the dedicated oil
pipelines are excluded in the analysis due to the limited possibilities
for intermodal substitution). Inland navigation (canal) and sea trans-
port account for around 25 percent each of the import value when
dealing with the lowest value goods of one DM/kg. Railways account
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Figure 4.3.10. Share of different transport modes in the import value of the
FRG in 1986 versus average value density of goods imported. (Data source:
Stat. BA. Fachserie 7, 1986, and Stat. BA. (WiSta 7/1987),1987.)
for more than 10 percent with road transport accounting for the
remainder. Goods worth around 10 DM/kg are practically no longer
transported by inland navigation. Thus canals appear the most (nega-
tively) elastic with respect to the value of goods transported, a proof
that inland water navigation is basically confined to transporting low-
value basic commodities. Sea, and to a smaller extent also rail trans-
port, are negatively elastic with respect to the value of the goods
transported. In the category of 10 DM/kg, railways, sea, and air
transport each account for about 10 percent of the import value, with
the largest part (around 70 percent of import value) of these products
being transported by trucks. Most manufactured goods, such as auto-
mobiles or machine tools fall into a value density range of up to 100
DM/kg. For this category, rail and sea transport nearly disappear as
transport modes. The share of goods worth around 100 DM/kg that
arrive by air and by truck is approximately equal, whereas railways
and ships combined account for less than 10 percent of the import
value in this relatively high-value goods category. Higher value densi-
ties, Le., goods with values exceeding 100 DM/kg, such as electronics,
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computers or preClSlon instruments, are usually shipped by air.
Incidentally, the highest value manufactured goods (excluding pre-
cious metals, drugs or caviar) are aerospace products and aircraft
themselves, all exclusively transported by air. The FRG, as illustrated
in Figure 4.3.10, is not a special situation. Similar analyses for export
or import relationships in Sweden, France, and Austria yield identical
results. In fact, at the level of a cross-sectional analysis Figure 4.3.10
shows a similar dynamic for transport mode substitution as the long-
term (longitudinal) infrastructure and modal split substitution pat-
terns identified in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 above. This points to the self-
similarity of the process of change, i.e., a fractal type pattern in the
dynamics of change in the transport sector.
Under the growing significance of high-value goods production
and just-in-time production regimes, the importance of air transport
will grow substantially. Fast turnaround times as a result of high
transport speeds, flexibility, and quality of service (around the clock
pick-up and delivery) will be important performance criteria imposed
on future transport systems. Specialized (private) fast delivery com-
panies such as Federal Express in the USA consider themselves as the
"largest warehouse in the country", pointing to the importance of
immediate "just-in-time" delivery of goods between geographically
widely spaced sites for design, production, and marketing of material
and "non-material" goods (e.g., software, information). Plans by
Federal Express for renting several Concorde airplanes for the trans-
port and delivery of goods were based on rentability calculations in
which the price charged per kg transported exceeded the price of a
first class trans-atlantic passenger Concorde air ticket (per kg trans-
ported) by a factor of three. Thus, a significant market already exists
in which the price for expedient goods transport significantly exceeds
the costs we are apparently ready to incur for moving human beings
faster over the Atlantic.
These may be of course considered as extreme examples, but they
are early indicators of the possible developments emerging from
further dematerialization and the generation of higher-value products
by advanced economies. Such dematerialization tendencies would also
appear desirable from the viewpoint of resource inputs and adverse
environmental impacts of present material and energy intensive
economies.
Long-Term Transport Intensities 0/ an Economy
4.4. Long-Term Transport Intensities of an Economy
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The long time series available on the transport output for France since
1800, discussed in Section 4.2 above, allow us to consider the long-
term relationship between transport output and economic activity,
i.e., ton- and passenger-km transported per unit of (constant) GDP.
Figure 4.4.1 presents these three indicators: the constant GDP meas-
ured in 1913 French Francs (Toutain, 1987), as well as the total ton-
and passenger-km transported. We observe that both ton-km as well
as passenger-km have been growing at a faster rate than constant
GDP. The growth rate of ton-km in relation to constant GDP has
however been considerably smaller than the total passenger-km GDP
growth. Since the 1970s, the rate of growth in ton-km no longer
proceeds faster or even parallel to GDP growth, but is considerably
slower pointing at a decoupling of goods transport from GDP growth.
Figure 4.4.2 analyzes the resulting transport intensity per con-
stant unit of GDP. Note that the turbulent years during World War I
and II, with their resulting unreliable GDP and transport output esti-
mates, have been omitted in Figure 4.4.2. Ever since the 1930s and
especially after World War II, the passenger transport intensity
increases more sharply than that for goods. Both variables show that
from a long-term perspective, the transport intensity of the French
economy (and we would conjecture similar tendencies in other coun-
tries also) has been steadily rising. The goods transport intensity
increased by a factor of 4 between 1800 and 1985, i.e., from 0.197 to
0.79 ton-km per 1913 Franc GDP, corresponding to an average growth
rate of 0.75 percentfyear. Passenger transport intensity has, on the
other hand, increased by a factor of over 53 (!) during the same time
period (i.e., from 0.04 to 2.2 passenger-km per 1913 Franc GDP).
This corresponds to an average growth rate of 2.2 percent/year. Con-
sidering that moving people represents the highest value, premium
market segment of the transport sector, the much higher historical
growth rates of passenger transport intensity should not come as a
surprise. The increase in transport intensity is in contrast to energy
intensity, which, as a historical analysis for the USA since 1800 has
shown, has been decreasing* at an average annual rate of about 1 per-
cent per year.
One should not be biased by the high figures for transport output
per unit of constant GDP, as the GDP data are expressed in constant
• Source: Nakicenovic, 1984. Energy intensity in the USA ha.s been declining ever since 1800. The energy
input of the US economy (including also non-commercia.! energy forms such a.s fuel wood and feed for an-
ima.! power) ha.s declined from 13 KWyr per 1958 US dollar GNP in 1800 to around 2.2 KWyr per 1958 US
dollar GNP at present, i.e., by nearly a factor of 6.
248
Billion
10]
The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
>,
//~
1/
,
- '/..-J
r--U'V>--'''\ 'f
~~ :tJ
GDPI913~ .~ "
-- --
-
,-- /-
---/ ,
Ton-k~ rI
V- I I Pass-km
,
-
-
-
--t-+-+-- I I I I I I---+-10- 1
1800 1825 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000
Figure 4.4.1. Transport output and constant GDP in France since 1800, in bil-
lion (109) ton- and passenger-km transported and billion 1913 French Francs.
1913 money terms. In terms of current French Francs (FF) the trans-
port intensity in 1985 corresponded to around 135 passenger-meters
travelled and to around 47 kg-km transported per 1985 FF GDP in
1985. Assuming 90 kg per passenger, passenger transport corresponds
to around 12 kg-km per FF (1985) GDP, and total traffic thus to
around 60 kg-km per 1985 FF GDP. Transport and communication
accounted for around 6 percent of GDP in 1985. The increasing trans-
port intensity of the French economy observed in Figure 4.4.2 does
not imply that an even higher share of the GDP is spent* in the trans-
port sector, at least not in a similar fashion as the increase of trans-
port intensity per constant unit of GDP would suggest. Recall here,
the drastic real term transport cost decreases in the case of the USA
(Figure 4.3.5). Although no detailed statistics for France are avail-
able, one can assume a similar decreasing tendency (the real term rail-
way tariff reductions in France were mentioned in Section 3.2 above).
• Toutain, 1987, estimates that transport accounted for some 1.7 percent of the produit phll.ique in 1830
and for around 3 percent in the 1930s, compared to 6 percent presently (including, however, also communi-
cation).
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Figure 4.4.2. Transport intensity of the French economy since 1800, in ton-km
and passenger-km per 1913 French Franc GDP.
The drastic decrease in real term transport costs certainly stimulated
further increases in the transport intensity of the French economy, as
outlined in the discussion of the UMOT transport model (Chapter 1),
which puts forward empirical evidence that on average a constant
fraction of 15 percent of disposable family income is spent on tran-
sportation.
From Figure 4.4.2 it becomes clear that the transport intensity of
goods passed its maximum in the 1960s and appears to have been dec-
lining ever since. We have noted that this might constitute an impor-
tant discontinuity in the long-term development of goods transport,
resulting from the structural shift to increasing dematerialization and
higher shares of (low weight) high-value goods and services in the out-
put mix of developed countries in their transition to "post-industrial"
economies. Thus, it appears likely that the ton-km transported per
unit of GDP will continue to gradually decline in the medium-term
future.
However, similar tendencies are not apparent in passenger trans-
port intensity. The latter has been increasing since the onset of the
19th century, first due to the introduction and growth of the railways,
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Figure 4.4.3. Total passenger- and ton-km to constant GDP growth elasticity
in France, yearly elasticities smoothed by a 3-year moving average.
later the automobile and recently aircrafts. As in the discussion of the
long-term passenger modal split in Section 4.2 above, we note a major
discontinuity as a result of World War II. The passenger- and ton-km
growth in relation to GDP growth discussed above, may also be
analyzed in terms of the commonly used indicator of elasticity, i.e.,
the relationship of transport output growth to economic growth as
shown in Figure 4.4.3. The war-time period elasticities are omitted
due to the inherent uncertainties of GDP and transport output esti-
mates during World War I and II.
A first observation from Figure 4.4.3 is that over most of the time
period under consideration the elasticity is significantly above 1.
Second, it shows typical fluctuations as a result of medium-term busi-
ness cycles (the very strong annual fluctuations in elasticity are
smoothed in Figure 4.4.3 by a 3-year moving average). It is
noteworthy that up to the 1970s, both passenger and goods transport
elasticity with respect to GDP growth, never bifurcated, i.e., that
while being different in various historical phases, both showed a syn-
chronous behavior and moved in the same positive or negative direc-
tion. The prevalence of passenger over goods transport elasticities is
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indicated by the shading in Figure 4.4.3. Unshaded areas indicate
time periods where the good transport was growing faster than
passenger transport per unit GDP growth. Historically we may con-
clude, that as a rule goods transport growth reacted more sensitively
to business cycle variations. Since 1950 a divergence in the passenger
and goods transport elasticities to real term GDP growth can be iden-
tified. Passenger transport growth was consistently above the goods
transport growth per unit of growth of GDP. The higher passenger
elasticity since 1950 in Figure 4.4.3 implies that passenger-km have
grown significantly more per unit of real term GDP added than ton-
km.
Since the early 1970s, however, we observe a complete bifurca-
tion. Goods transport growth appears to progressively decouple from
economic growth as shown in the high negative elasticities over an
extended period of time as a response to the two oil price shocks. In
contrast, passenger transport elasticities have been highly positive.
Whereas this may be a specific case for France (a similar analysis for
the FRG showed no such strong bifurcation), it is nevertheless an indi-
cator that in future the transport demand for passengers and high-
value goods may portray a different behavior to that of low-value pro-
ducts.
At present, it is not clear whether the historic trend observed in
France is also representative of other countries, especially in the long-
term. Still, it appears likely that with increasingly affluent societies,
passenger transport demand will continue to grow in the future. In
the goods transport sector, increasing affluence means an increase in
the value and information (software) content, and a decrease in the
material and energy input per unit value added of the goods produced
and consumed. This implies that a further decoupling of ton-km
transport volume from economic growth might be expected in the
longer term. This decoupling does not mean of course that the total
ton-km transported will decrease, but rather that its growth rate will
fall behind that of GDP growth, since much of the economic growth
will be based on the service sector with its "immaterial" (information
and value intensive) type of products.
The growth trend of passenger-km transported per capita or per
unit of constant GDP observed above, encourages us to speculate
about the outlook for the future. The long-term growth trend of
passenger transport intensity of the French economy was disrupted
only once, as a result of WorId War II. We have observed that the
French society and economy behaved as if it was a "hibernation"
period. Long-term social and economic growth trends became tem-
porarily reversed during the war, but reassumed the pre-war growth
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Figure 4.4.4. Gedankenexperiment in the analysis of the long-term growth
trend in the passenger transport intensity of the French economy (in passenger-
km transported per 1913 Franc GDP). The experiment assumes, that the time
period between 1940 and 1950 (World War II and its aftermaths) never hap-
pened. Note in particular the split in the time axis between the bottom and top
scale of the figure.
trend (rate) about 10 years later, once the pre-war diffusion or inten-
sity level was reached again.
For such a speculative outlook for the future we propose the fol-
lowing Gedankenexperiment. What would be the long-term trend in
the growth of passenger transport (intensity) assuming that World
War II never occurred? The Gedankenexperiment suggests the remo-
val of the period of "hibernation" between 1940 and 1950, by assum-
ing that these years in fact never existed, Le., we assume for our
analysis a kind of "time reform" (thus the year 1951 becomes the new
"synthetic" year 1941 and so on). Figure 4.4.4 reports the results of
this Gedankenexperiment. Note in particular the discontinuity in the
time axis. After 1940 (bottom of Figure 4.4.4) comes 1951 (Le., 1940
and 1950 are identical on the split time scale) and from there on the
data refer to the top part of the x-axis. The long-term time trend was
estimated using a logistic function, primarily in order to avoid
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suggesting that the growth of passenger transport could proceed
without any ultimate limit. The growth trend up to the present has
been basically exponential (as reflected in the estimate of the growth
function prior to its inflection point).
Despite the fact that we deal here with a hypothetical case, the
continuation of the pre-war growth trend emerging from Figure 4.4.4
is striking. It is as if the passenger transport intensity, after a period
of "hibernation" continues smoothly the dynamic trajectory it started
100 years before the major discontinuity of World War II. Based on
this Gedankenexperiment it appears that we might be only half-way
through the long-term growth trend of passenger transport intensity.
Because the analysis is hypothetical, we refrain from presenting this
result as a possible forecast. * Instead Figure 4.4.4 is intended as a sim-
ple observation of a stable long-term trend in the premium market
segment of the transport sector: moving people. From this, we may
conclude that at least the dynamics of the process (the growth rate)
was apparently unaffected by a major societal and economic discon-
tinuity. Under the continuation of such a long-term growth trend,
passenger transport could well grow significantly** more in the future.
Such a long-term growth scenario would, of course, still have to be
corroborated by similar analyses for other countries. Unfortunately
the available data allow only the consideration of a (possibly
uncharacteristic) recent short time segment of the long-term growth
trend in passenger transport. Our conjecture about possible future
growth is, however, corroborated by an analysis of the long-term rela-
tionship between transport and communication, discussed in the fol-
lowing Section. From this analysis we derive that passenger transport
and communication evolve as complementary, rather than substitut-
able economic goods. The possible emergence of new information and
communication technologies may, under such a conjecture, provide for
further growth in passenger transport. Is man a "territorial animal"
as claimed by Marchetti, 1987, aiming to "control" ever larger "terri-
tories", travelling ever larger distances, as was apparently the case
during the last 200 years?
• Therefore no model parameters and statistical measures of fit are presented. From a stati.tical point of
view, the uncertainty in the parameter estimation is in fact so high (as the growth process has not reached
the inflection point yet), that one cannot conclude whether the process is approaching any long-term sa-
turation level at all or is simply following an exponential growth path.
•• Assuming a growth rate of the real term GDP of two percent per year, paBsenger-km could increase by
up to a factor of 6 over the next 70 years, based on the above Gedankenezperiment.
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4.5. Substitutability Versus Complementarity of
Transport and Communication
In Section 4.4, we have conjectured that the historical trend in the
increase of passenger transportation over the last 200 years is likely to
continue in the medium-term future. We have referred to the fact
that a number of authors consider that the future direction of
economic growth will be progressively shaped by a new "paradigm" in
the organization of production, summarized under the heading of the
"information and communication Kondratieff" (Freeman and Perez,
1988). Such a hypothesis is corroborated by the increasing tendencies
toward dematerialization and higher information and software content
in products as well as the further growth of the service sector in
advanced economies.
If one of the predominant features of a next step in the evolution-
ary development of our economies is the widespread application of
new information and communication technologies, a most natural
question arises as to how this would affect the postulated continuation
in the growth of passenger traffic. It has been advanced that the
widespread diffusion of new information and communication technolo-
gies could result in a significant reduction of personal travel, i.e., that
new communication technologies will eventually substitute for travel-
ling.
In the discussion of the long-term evolution of passenger trans-
port it was pointed out that the introduction of new systems are of
particular importance in the long-term growth of total passenger
transport volume and the structural changes in the relative shares of
different transport modes. The same can be said for communication
technologies. Both the speed of communication as well as the type,
form, and information content of messages exchanged were drastically
altered by new communication technologies introduced in the past;
first the telegraph then the telephone, and possibly in the future by
new communication systems, intergrating video-phones, telefaxes, and
information and data exchange via interconnected computer networks.
Thus; as a first step in our analysis, we examine the relationship
between different modes of communication in a historical context.
The conclusion from such an analysis suggests that in the area of com-
munication, a sequence of replacements progressively changes the
morphology of the communication system and contributes to overall
system output (number of messages exchanged) growth. The intro-
duction of the telephone was possibly the most fundamental and
important innovation in the recent history of communication. Figure
4.5.1 suggests that in the case of France, the market impact of the
telephone (measuring its share by the number of messages exchanged)
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Figure 4.5.1. Substitution of letters by telephone calls in the total number of
messages communicated, France 1900 to 1985.
while being significant, was certainly not of a rapid short-term nature.
In analyzing the share of letters and telephone calls (both domestic
and external communications) in the total number of messages com-
municated in France, we see a long-term structural shift (substitu-
tion), which appears to proceed with a !:i.t of 53 years and to in 1971.
All other forms of messages, telegrams, faxes, telexes, etc. account
together for only between one and two percent of all letters and tele-
phone calls, and have been consequently excluded from Figure 4.5.l.
The impact of the telephone on communication behavior as
represented by our crude* measure is thus very long-term, since even
in the early 1970s half of the messages communicated in France were
in the form of letters. Analyses for other countries show an identical
pattern (Batten, 1989).
• Our quantitative measure of considering the share of letters and telephone calla in the total number of
messages transmitted ignores of COUflle important qualitative differences, which may exist in the form and
content of messages transmitted (e.g., a love letter compared to a business call). A similar problem occurs
in the area of passenger transport performance (e.g., a daily commuting trip in a crowded train as opposed
to a weekend excursion by bicycle to the countryside). However, such qualitative characteristics cannot be
captured within the quantitative analysis framework followed here.
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Figure 4.5.2. Growth of passenger transport and communication in France,
measured in passenger-km and total number of messages transmitted in form of
an index 1985=100.
In order to examine the long-term relationship between passenger
transport and communication, we compare the total output of the two
systems in France over a long period in history. This allows an
analysis of whether the introduction of different new transport and
communication systems has changed the relationship between them.
Figure 4.5.2 reports the growth of total passenger-km transported and
total output of the communication sector, i.e., total number of mes-
sages sent, by letter, telegram, telex, telefax, and telephone (data
source: Mitchell, 1980, and Ann. Stat., 1961 and 1987) since the
beginning of the 19th century. The two measures, not directly com-
parable, are normalized by using an index of 100 for their respective
output in 1985. Both transport and communication have increased by
over four orders of magnitude since the beginning of the 19th century.
The impacts of both world wars, in particular World War II are
clearly visible in Figure 4.5.2 and have been discussed already in some
detail in the preceding Chapters. It is visible from the piecewise linear
(exponential) growth trends in Figure 4.5.2, that from a historical per-
spective, transport and communication have evolved in unison.
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1986.)
Any long-term substitution tendency between transport and com-
munication would only appear if the exponential growth paths would
diverge significantly over longer time periods (as reflected in different
slopes). Figure 4.5.2 indicates however, that both transport and com-
munication grew at similar long-term rates, i.e., they evolved as com-
plementary goods rather than substitutable ones.
However, transport and communication have not always grown
at exactly the same rate. Passenger transport has grown faster than
communication over a period of several decades particularly due to
the introduction of railways and later automobiles. In the long-term,
however, the two seem to reestablish parity. This long-term parity
rate appears to be in the vicinity of around six passenger-km travelled
per message transmitted. As shown in Figure 4.5.3, this is not only
true for France but also for Germany and the UK. Thus, one might
conclude that whatever growth potential due to new communication
technologies realized, it may just be sufficient to bring the ratio of
face-to-face to information channel communication back to long-term
parity. Thus, while the growth of transport and communication did
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not evolve completely in unison, they do enhance each other and show
many parallel developments. New communication technologies may
consequently be seen as "catch-up" instruments in the long-term com-
plementary and synergistic relationship between transport and com-
munication, a hypothesis at least consistent with 200 years of history.
Although a number of (e.g., business) trips may be substituted by
new communication technologies, it is equally important to consider
that new communication technologies may in turn also induce addi-
tional travel, as argued for instance by Cerwenka, 1986.* Particularly
under a given travel time budget constraint, it appears possible that
any trip savings due to new communication technologies, whilst reduc-
ing the passenger-km travelled for a specific purpose, such as business,
may induce trips in other domains such as leisure or holiday travel.
The various, differentiated effects of new communication techno-
logies on different travel purposes (work, education, business, shop-
ping, leisure, and holidays) are comprehensively discussed by
Cerwenka, 1986. For our purposes here it suffices to report his conclu-
sions: due to the diffusion of new telecommunication technologies
there will be no reduction in passenger travel, instead considerable
growth is likely to occur. Thus, travel and communications are better
seen as interrelated elements in a social context which they help to
create (Albertson, 1977).
• Cerwenka, 1986, reports estimates that new communication technologies may reduce business travel by
an amount corresponding to around 0.5 percent of the total passenger-km travelled in the FRG. Cerwenka
and Rommerskirchen, 1983, report that presently already as much as 48 percent of all passenger-km
travelled in the FRG are for leisure and holiday purposes. This percentage is expected to increase to over
50 percent in the near future.
CHAPTERS
Infrastructures and Long Waves·
The history of the productive apparatus is a history of revolutions. So is the
history of transportation from the mailcoach to the airplane. The opening
up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development
from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the
same process of industrial mutation - if I may use this biological term - that
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of
Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.
Joseph A. Schumpeter,
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1942
Economic growth is not a continuous process. Periods of high growth
rates in output and of stable evolution in the form and direction of
economic growth can be identified in economic history, like the Belle
Epoque of the 19th century or the post World War II boom ending at
the beginning of the 1970s. Economic theory argues that the economy
is expanding along an equilibrium growth path. Such periods do not,
however, last indefinitely; periods of growth and expansion in
economic activities are punctuated with phases of fundamental
changes in the structure of the economy, the technological base, and
many social institutions and relations. Some of the most important
changes in socio-institutional frameworks and in the economic struc-
ture since the onset of the industrial revolution are related to the per-
vasive adoption of new systems, including for instance the develop-
ment of infrastructures. Today, the emergence of new systems such as
• Parts of this Chapter are drawn from research carried out at IIASA together with Nebojsa Nakicenovic
within the framework of diffusion and long-wave research. Some of these results have been published else-
where, see for example: Griibler, 1987; Nakicenovic, 1987; and Griibler and Nakicenovic, 1990.
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Table 5.1. Clusters of pervasive technologies.
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1770-1830 1820-1880 1870-1940 1930-1990 1980-2040
Water Power, Coal, Iron, Railways, Electric Power, Gas, Nuclear,
Sails, Canals, Steam Steam Ships, Oil, Cars, Aircraft,
Turnpikes, Power, Heavy Industry, Radio, TV, Telecomm.,
Iron Castings, Mechanical Steel, Dyestuff, Durables, Information,
Textiles Equipment Telegraph Petrochemicals Photo-Electron.
Mechanical Steel, Electricity, Nuclear, Biotechnology,
Equipment, City Gas, Cars, Trucks, Computers, Artificial
Coal, Indigo, Radio, Phone, Gas, Tele- Intelligence,
Stationary Telegraph, Oil, Roads, communication, Space Industry
Steam Power Railways Petrochemicals Aircraft & Transport
Manufacture Ind. Prod. Standardization Ford-Taylorism Quality Control
Source: Adapted from Pry, 1988.
information and communication technologies is often mentioned in
this context because there are reasons to believe that they may
become pervasive throughout the economy, Le., that they will not dif-
fuse in just a few selected sectors.
The growth of pervasive systems entails a large set of technologi-
cal, infrastructural, but also institutional and organizational innova-
tions. For example, the diffusion of motor vehicles was contingent on
the development of numerous other technologies and infrastructures
such as paved roads, the internal combustion engine, oil refining,
motor fuels and oil pipelines, new sheet metals and high quality steels,
electrical equipment, and a whole host of other new technologies and
products. Table 5.1 illustrates this clustering and cross-enhancing
effect of a number of interrelated technological systems, which have
been driving forces for particular economic expansion and growth
periods since the onset of the industrial revolution.
The list of technology clusters as presented in Table 5.1 is illus-
trative rather than exhaustive and also the timing of the various
development periods is only approximate. Still it represents a general
overview of the main technology clusters, which were responsible (fre-
quently studied under the leading sector hypothesis by economic his-
torians, e.g., as for railways) for much of the extent and the general
direction of economic growth during particular historical periods. The
top of Table 5.1 presents the principal technology clusters dominating
a particular epoch of development. The lower part indicates
Infrastructures and Long Waves 261
technologies which are introduced and emerge during the same phase,
in order to become pervasive in the next phase of development. For
example, the dominant cluster of the 1930s to the present time
includes: growth in electric power, oil and petroleum, roads and cars,
petrochemicals, radio and TV, instruments and controls, etc. During
the same period we had innovations and the emergence of new indus-
tries which may become important in the future: nuclear energy, com-
puters, natural gas, telecommunication and information systems.
On the bottom of Table 5.1 we have attempted to summarize the
general "trajectory" (Nelson and Winter, 1982) or principle driving
force and direction of economic growth during the various epochs:
from manufacturing to industrial production to the emergence of stan-
dardization, then to economies of scale based on Fordist production
and scientific management principles (Taylorism), in the period from
the 1930's to the present, and finally economies of scope, and quality
control and management most likely in the next phase of develop-
ment.
The transition from one phase of development to another is trig-
gered primarily by the fact that the technological cluster, responsible
for much of the economic growth, approaches a number of limits:
saturating markets, diminishing returns from further incremental
improvements and productivity gains, increasing awareness of social
and environmental disbenefits associated with a continuation, and
further intensification of the traditional mode of development. The
"crises" in predominant "techno-economic paradigms" (Freeman and
Perez, 1988) are generally manifested in increased turbulence and
volatility in markets, prices, and even in social relations. At the same
time, it is exactly during these transitional adjustment phases that
clusters of new technologies emerge and the characteristics and direc-
tion of the next phase of development are being shaped by a social
process. These changes in the techno-economic paradigms, illustrated
by the emergence and diffusion of interrelated clusters of pervasive
technologies, enables us (as shown below) to integrate the history of
transportation into the more broader long-term changes in economic
structure and social fabric.
Whereas there is wide agreement about the discontinuous nature
of long-term economic growth and the importance of technological
change, there is still controversy (see e.g., Rosenberg and Frischtak,
1983) surrounding the issue of whether the historically discontinuous
development pattern involves long-term regularities, what are its
causes, and whether there are associated recurrent fluctuations of
relevant quantitative indicators such as prices, profit rate, employ-
ment, innovative activity, trade, investment, etc. Research has often
concentrated on the extent to which the fluctuations in price levels are
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cyclical, whether there is synchronization, whether the variations are
only limited to monetary indicators or can also be extended to physi-
cal measures of output, materials or employment. Below we attempt
to describe the phenomenon of Wechsellagen in economic development
as a process of structural change that goes beyond the question as to
what extent prices and other monetary indicators might portray infla-
tionary tendencies over a period of a few decades followed by periods
of disinvestment. We document that periods of growth and expansion
in economic activities, and in particular in infrastructure development,
are interlaced with phases of fundamental changes in the technological
and infrastructural base, the structure of the economy, and also many
social institutions and relations.
To this end, we summarize below the empirical findings and the
resulting long-term patterns in the development of transport infra-
structures identified in Chapters 3 and 4. We have observed, that
both technology clusters like the transport technologies based on the
steam engine (railways, steamships, etc.), and country clusters (inter-
national diffusion bandwagons), i.e., countries participating in a major
expansion impulse, as characterized by their similar diffusion pattern,
tend to saturate during relatively short time periods. This short time
interval, during which most diffusion processes become completed and
eventually enter a phase of decline, is the more noticeable in view of
the long time constants involved in the growth of large-scale systems.
We have argued, that this "synchronous" saturation is the result of a
"catch-up" effect in the diffusion pattern between countries, but also
within a given technology cluster (e.g., the acceleration in the intro-
duction of new technologies in the US car industry, shown in Section
3.3). Such "clusters" in the completion of a large number of interre-
lated technological diffusion and substitution processes in various
countries have been referred to as the season of saturations.
Thus, long-term infrastructure development is seen to proceed
through a dichotomy of expansion periods, characterized by the
widespread diffusion of new technological systems as represented for
example by the canal age, the steam (coal) and railway age, the auto-
mobile (oil) and road age, etc. Boom periods are followed by a
clustered saturation of the predominant techno-economic features
responsible for the previous upswing, including (at present the case
with automobiles) the widespread realization of negative externalities
resulting from the growth of the dominant technological regime. The
season of saturations would, from such a perspective, indicate that
some kind of economic, socio-technical, and environmental feasibility
(or social acceptance) limits are being reached. "Gales of creative des-
truction" (Schumpeter, 1935, and 1939) prevail in this period of tur-
bulence and volatility, but provide in turn possibilities for adjustments
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to new requirements and for the emergence of new socio-technical
solutions. The latter, whilst (latently) already in existence, have been
effectively barred from widespread diffusion during the previous
growth phase (Brooks, 1988), due to the commitments to traditional
infrastructures and capital vintages. Thus, a particular (interrelated)
cluster of solutions determining the form and direction of economic
growth is "locked-in" (Arthur, 1983) which hinders the emergence of
new systems. Technical, organizational and institutional innovations
and reforms (many of them accumulated over the past decades) may
be turned into practical applications only once the traditional socio-
technical regime enters crisis. The latter paves the way for overcom-
ing existing feasibility limits (the "technological stalemate" of
Mensch, 1975) and for transgressing the turbulent period of discon-
tinuity in order to reassume a stable evolutionary path thereafter.
In essence, the above is already a verbal model* of long-term
discontinuities in economic development as reflected in the evolution
of the transport sector observed in the empirical part of our analysis.
However, such discontinuities cannot be discussed in isolation for the
transport sector alone. An analysis of the transport sector has to be
embedded into the overall evolutionary pattern of the economy and of
technological change in general. This is necessary in order to show
that the empirical observations and the mechanisms responsible for
them, are consistent with an important line of research on long-term
patterns of economic growth: Long Wave (Kondratieff wave) theory.
Following Van Gelderen, 1913, Nikolai Kondratieff, 1926, and
1928, and especially Joseph Schumpeter, 1939, long-wave theory has
received an increasing amount of attention in recent years. Empirical
and theoretical work, building on the basis laid by these pioneers, has
confirmed their conclusions about the discontinuous nature of long-
term economic development. Studies of long-term fluctuations in
economic development have grown to such considerable volumes, that
an overview of the origins, lines of research followed, and empirical
evidence assembled arguing pro or contra would require more space
than is available here. Therefore, we refer only to some works that
provide a good overview, in particular Bruckmann, 1983, Delbeke,
1983, van Duijn, 1983, Freeman, 1983, Goldstein, 1988, Kleinknecht,
1987a, and Nakicenovic, 1984.
Whereas empirical evidence indicates beyond doubt that long-
term economic development has indeed proceeded through a succes-
sion of major discontinuities, the debate continues (see e.g., the papers
contained in Vasko, 1987), as regards the cyclicity and recurrence of
• For a formal mathematical model along these lines see for instance Mosekilde and Rasmussen, 1986.
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economic fluctuations, their nature (whether long waves are a
phenomenon confined to capitalistic economies or extend even to
periods prior to the industrial revolution), and especially with regard
to their driving forces. To be concise, the debate centers on the pre-
valence of various causal factors of long-term economic fluctuations, in
particular innovation and entrepreneurship (e.g., Mensch, 1975; Mar-
chetti, 1980; Kleinknecht, 1986, and 1987a), capital and investment
(e.g., along the Marxist tradition represented for instance by Mandel,
1980, or the systems dynamics studies of Forrester, 1983); employ-
ment (in connection with discontinuities in innovative behavior and
different sectorial growth, as argued by Freeman et al., 1982) or the
availability of raw materials and foodstuffs (e.g., Rostow, 1975, and
1980). Other factors (for an overview see in particular, Goldstein,
1988) considered include migration flows (Berry, 1988) and macrop-
sychological factors related to socio-technical change (De Greene,
1988).
Although many of the above mentioned factors are interrelated
and much of the debate centers on the question as to which factor out-
weights the others in influence and importance, three main areas of
agreement about long-term economic fluctuations emerge:
(1) Economic growth is not a smooth continuous process, but is
characterized by major discontinuities and a (regular or irregu-
lar) succession of periods of extended growth with periods of
retarded growth, recession or even depression.
(2) Empirical evidence suggests, that particularly in price series, sig-
nificant discontinuities are revealed for most industrialized coun-
tries, in some countries even for periods prior to the onset of the
industrial revolution i.e., before 1750.
(3) The importance of (technological, social, and institutional) inno-
vations and discontinuities in innovative and entrepreneurial
activities is acknowledged by most researchers.
The line of research into discontinuities in the appearance of inno-
vations was influenced very strongly by the work of Mensch, 1975.
Although there exists convincing evidence that the "bunching" in the
appearance of innovations during periods of recession and depression
is much weaker than originally maintained by Mensch, a certain clus-
tering of innovations can still be (at a statistically significant level)
identified. However, the "bunching of innovations", is not going to
explain the whole sequence of discontinuities in economic development
from the slowdown in growth to recession, recovery, and growth.
Innovations, Le., new technologies at their moment of introduction
proper (a typical innovation in Mensch's sample is the Stephenson
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locomotive), will have only a marginal impact on the economy as a
whole. An innovation "bunch" would only provide for economic
growth at a later stage, when being translated (via diffusion) into the
creation of whole new industries and product lines. Long-wave
research has almost entirely concentrated on the appearance aspect of
innovations (formulation by Mensch, 1975, vivid critique by Freeman,
Clark and Soete, 1982, and first conclusion by Kleinknecht, 1987a and
1987b), whereas the diffusion aspect, i.e., how do innovations contri-
bute to economic growth and - when saturating - to economic reces-
sion, has received limited attention. Despite the fact that most
researchers agree about the theoretical rationale that economic slow-
down and recession is a saturation phenomenon, extensive empirical
evidence has yet to be assembled. Consequently, we try to fill this gap
by analyzing empirically the diffusion history of a large sample of
innovations in the case of the USA, covering the whole "life cycle" of
innovations, i.e., their introduction, diffusion, and saturation. We
show that discontinuities in the long-term evolution occur, even
without a rigid clustering in either the appearance, growth or satura-
tion dates of innovations.
In this context, innovations should not be defined only within a
narrow technological context. Innovations consist of a host of interre-
lated technological, institutional, and organizational new ways to per-
form traditional or entirely new tasks, to produce traditional or
entirely new products and services, etc. The importance of such a set
of interrelated, interdependent technological, institutional, and organi-
zational innovations, driving major economic expansion periods was
convincingly argued by Dosi, 1983; Perez, 1983; and Freeman and
Perez, 1988. Such an interrelated set of innovations has been referred
to as technological "trajectory", "paradigm" or "socio-technical para-
digm" , by various authors. For our purposes here, it suffices to stress
the importance of interdependencies between technological innova-
tions proper, and the associated new forms of production organization,
new institutions, management methods, etc., required to fully realize
the inherent growth potential of a new technological stream.
Consequently, we integrate the evolutionary pattern of infrastruc-
ture development into discontinuities in the long-term development of
the economy as a whole, in order to suggest that transport technolo-
gies and infrastructures constitute important "indicator" innovations
for various historical socio-technological paradigms, the growth of
which (due to their demand and investment stimulating effects) was
responsible for economic upswing periods. The saturation of the
predominant paradigm in turn results in a slowdown of economic
growth and a phase of (economic) restructuring, characterized by
periods of economic and social turbulence and volatility (as reflected
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in price data). It is during these periods of turbulence and structural
transition, that the technological, economic, as well as the institu-
tional and/or organizational characteristics of a new paradigm are
shaped, which through its progressive diffusion, provides the basis for
a new upswing.
We emphasize again, that we do not argue for a strict and rigid
clustering in the growth and saturation periods of a large number of
interrelated innovations. It is sufficient that a larger number of
important innovations overlap to some extent in their main growth
and saturation phases, whereas some technologies and market seg-
ments "tunnel through" the period of saturation and turbulence (the
"Kondratieff barrier") in order become part of the main growth sec-
tors in the next upswing period. This was the case with the continu-
ing expansion of railways after 1870, automobiles after 1930 and is, in
our opinion, currently the case with air transport.
Consistent with one area of agreement by most long-wave
researches, the discontinuities in the long-term development of an
economy (in our case the USA) is illustrated by two indicators:
prices, represented by energy and crude oil prices* and a new measure
of discontinuities of innovation diffusion.
One of the widely used indicators for identifying turning points in
long-term Wechsellagen of economic growth is the fluctuation in price
levels. Figure 5.1 shows real term average energy prices as well as the
real term price of crude oil in the USA since 1800. The energy price
trends shown in Figure 5.1 are quite representative of the general price
levels in the US economy, as reflected for instance in wholesale prices
(Nakicenovic, 1984). Despite many turbulent events and acute crises,
and the complete transformation of the USA from an agrarian to an
industrial society over the last two centuries, the long-term energy
price trends have been surprisingly stable with the exception of four
pronounced flares: prior to 1820, around 1860-1870, the 1920s, and in
the 1970s and early 1980s.
Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the price flares since the OPEC oil
embargo have been deflated back down to historical levels. Thus, in
spite of the recurring brief episodes of extreme price volatility, crude
oil (and energy in general) has shown rather remarkable price stability
in real terms over its more than a century-long history as one of the
major world commodities. With the exception of three prominent
price flares around the 1870s, prior to the Great Depression and after
1973, the price of crude oil fluctuated within the relatively narrow
• Data eource: US DOC, 1975, and 1980 to 1987. The average real term energy price data are baeed on
price eeriee by energy carrier, weighted by their reepective market eharee in the primary energy balance of
the USA.
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Figure 5.1. Real-term oil and composite price of all energy sources in the USA
since 1800, in 1958 US dollars per KWyr.
range of about US $13/bbl (in 1987 US dollars, or about US
$18/KWyr* in constant 1958 US dollars as shown in the figure). It
has been shown elsewhere (Nakicenovic, 1988, and Griibler, 1987),
that periods of price volatility mark important turning points in the
structural evolution of the US economy in terms of the saturation of
predominant technological systems as well as in the introduction of
new ones.
Energy prices accurately indicate** rather than trigger, an
important structural discontinuity in the long-term evolution of a sys~
tern. These discontinuities in the energy sector are mirrored by the
changes in energy technologies and their infrastructural base,
represented by the emergence of new primary energy forms and
saturation in the market share of the dominant energy carrier (Naki-
cenovic, 1984, and Griibler and Nakicenovic, 1987): emergence of coal
around 1815; saturation of feed as the primary energy carrier and
• Kilowatt-year per year (31.5 109 Joule). One KWyr equala about 5 barrela (bbla) of crude oil.
•• At this point a possible analogue to our body temperature can be made. Rather than being the cause, a
rise in body temperature is an indicator of important physiological changes (e.g., an infection).
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emergence of oil around 1870; saturation of coal and emergence of
natural gas (not produced as a byproduct from oil fields) around 1920;
and the present saturation of oil and the emergence of nuclear energy.
The energy price series reconstructed here, also allow a comparison of
expenditure on energy in an economy compared to GNP. Apart from
the periods of price volatility, primary energy inputs to the US econ-
omy account typically for two to three percent of GNP. The fact that
this ratio has not increased over the last 200 years (except for limited
periods of market volatility) suggests that, at least in the energy field,
resource scarcity phenomena can not be observed in the long-term.
Against the background of the rather static indicator of real term
energy prices (despite the four pronounced flares around the station-
ary trend), we document below the dynamic changes in the replace-
ment of old by new pervasive systems. As a measure of long-term
discontinuities we will consider the diffusion of innovations. Here we
are interested in analyzing the long-term tendencies in the rate of
technical, economic, and social change. For this purpose, we have
taken a sample of 117 innovation diffusion cases for the USA, comple-
mented by a second sample comprising 265 diffusion histories. Details
on the methodology as well as on data sources used to estimate the
parameters of the diffusion models are contained in Griibler, 1988, and
will not be repeated in detail here. The basic idea is to analyze the
average rate* of technical, economic, and social change by averaging
the first derivatives of the diffusion and/or substitution functions of a
large number of processes of change, which are derived from long
empirical time series. To clarify, this is the diffusion equivalent to the
annual GNP growth rate.
Innovations, consistent with the concept of socio-technological
paradigms presented above, are not only taken from the technological
field alone. The empirical cases considered include the areas of
energy, transport (i.e., some of the results presented in this work),
manufacturing, agriculture, consumer durables, communication, mili-
tary, and finally economic and social diffusion and structural change
processes (e.g., diffusion of literacy, reduction of infant mortality,
structural changes in employment, etc.). The characteristics of our
sample may be summarized as follows: Diffusion rates differ widely
between different innovations. Measured by their ti.t, i.e., the time
required to go from 10 to 90 percent of ultimate (growth or market
share) potential, the diffusion rates range from 2 to 300 years, with
the mean in our data sample being 57 years. ** Diffusion processes,
• This is the sum of the growth rates for all diffusion processes in a given year, divided by the number of
observations.
•• 41 yean in the second sample of 265 innovation Calel. The second sample includes in addition to the
IIASA sample many short-term technological change prOCeises, the parameters of which were not estimat-
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Figure 5.2. Average rate of technical, economic, and social change in the USA,
based on the diffusion of a sample of 117 innovations, in percent/year.
measured by their time constant l:i.t exhibit a rank size distribution.
No general acceleration tendency of diffusion rates over time has been
observed in our data samples. The only acceleration tendency notice-
able is the one towards the end to the main growth period, i.e., similar
to the acceleration tendency towards the "Kondratieff barrier"
observed in this study. The mean diffusion rate of 57 years is a possi-
ble indication that the famous 55-year Kondratieff cycle may indeed
be closely linked (we conjecture caused) by the average rate a society
and an economy absorbs (discontinuously) new innovations. Figure
5.2 summarizes the results of this analysis by showing the aggregated
rate of change, Le., the average of the first derivatives of all diffusion
processes occurring at a particular time period.
The analysis reveals clear peaks and troffs in the average diffu-
sion rate, Le., the average pace of change in the US economy and
society. Long-term development is therefore far from being a continu-
ous process. The longer-term trend indicates an increase in the
ed ouraelves but obtained from a large number of diffusion studies (referred to in Chapter 2).
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aggregate level of diffusion. This could, however, be the artifact of the
sample. There are simply more diffusion processes documented for the
last hundred than the previous hundred years. Although we are tak-
ing averages, the higher number of overlapping processes in one inter-
val could result in a higher aggregate diffusion rate. In weighting the
large number of different diffusion processes (see discussion below)
this increasing tendency in the average rate of change is indeed shown
to stem from the data sample, confirming however, the conclusion
with respect to the discontinuous nature of socio-technical change.
Each peak characterizes the beginning of the saturation of the
corresponding cluster or family of diffusion processes. The reason why
the curve tapers off to the right of the graph (after the present time) is
that it could be assumed that some diffusion processes with very long
Llts will continue in the future. Presumably many innovations have
emerged during the last decades that may turn out to be successful,
and if they were included perhaps we could expect a trend reversal in
the rate of change curve sometime after the mid-1990s. Such an
inherent lag is due to the slow diffusion rates at the beginning of the
introduction phase of innovations, i.e., the flat initial part of the S-
shaped diffusion curve. The turning points in the evolution of this
new empirical measure of the long-term rate of change are consistent
with the turning points of economic development identified by a
number of long-wave researchers (e.g., van Duijn, 1983; Goldstein,
1988; Marchetti, 1983; Nakicenovic, 1984; and Vasko, 1987).
Our working hypothesis is that the diffusion processes within suc-
cessive clusters or families of interrelated systems enhance each other
and promote the pervasiveness of each of the successive development
trajectories. A classification or a taxonomy of each individual innova-
tion, required to make a whole technology cluster viable, would prob-
ably reveal a hierarchical system with one successful diffusion having a
positive feedback and catalytic effect on the development of many oth-
ers within the whole cluster. We assume that it is the interdepen-
dence of individual diffusion processes that in time focuses each of the
clusters in order to approach saturation within a relatively short
period of time. Thus, the increasing rates of change in Figure 5.2 indi-
cate the diffusion of a whole technology cluster, which we can associ-
ate with the development of individual transport infrastructures:
canals up to 1860, railways up to the 1920s, and roads and automo-
biles up to the 1970s. The declining average rate of change that fol-
lows the peaks, indicates a gradual transition of many diffusion
processes to a phase of saturation and onsetting decline, i.e., a season
of saturations. During this period, the growth potential (rates) of the
dominant paradigm becomes progressively exhausted, whereas the
newly emerging paradigm, (although already partly in existence) is
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still in its very early phase of diffusion, with corresponding small
growth rates.
Of course our analysis has up to now just considered a large
number of innovation diffusion cases, irrespective of their macro-
economic effects. If one does not want to resort to a subjective, and
thus necessarily arbitrary, ranking of a large number of diffusion
processes, a theoretical framework for weighting various diffusion
processes ought to be developed. We suggest that a classification or a
taxonomy of diffusion processes along a hierarchical system might be
a way to assess the different macro-economic effects of different diffu-
sion processes.
To this end, Table 5.2 shows a hierarchy of diffusion processes
taking into account their temporal dimension, Le., a hierarchy along
the required diffusion time between the introduction and the satura-
tion of diffusion processes in the transport sector, taking into con-
sideration the different diffusion rates, b..t between the USA and the
USSR (Tzarist Russia prior to 1917). The reason for considering two
countries with entirely different market structures relates to the vali-
dity of such a hierarchical classification of diffusion processes. We
consider, that if the processes can be classified in a hierarchical struc-
ture, despite the economic differences between a market and a cen-
trally planned economy, that any derived weighting measure will be
robust across different systems (countries) and by analogy also
between different diffusion processes (i.e., over time). In addition to
the diffusion time constant b..t, Table 5.2 also shows the inflection
point to of the diffusion process, i.e., the time of the maximum growth
(replacement) rate at the 50 percent diffusion (market share) level.
A hierarchy of diffusion processes all along from the macro down
to the micro level emerges when considering the time constants
involved in the growth (diffusion) of transport systems and of techno-
logical change (substitution) in transportation. Another interesting
finding, which emerges from Table 5.2 is that while the diffusion
processes are shifted in time (time lag between to in Table 5.2), the
diffusion time constants appear to be of a similar order of magnitude
between the two countries. Of course decisive differences also remain
as for instance the second phase in railway construction in the USSR
compared to a decrease in the size of the network in the USA (dis-
cussed in Chapter 3 above).
The similar duration in the diffusion of technologies and infra-
structures between the two countries, enables us to develop a rough
hierarchical classification of diffusion processes, as reflected by their
diffusion constants b..t. Between each of the hierarchical levels of tem-
poral diffusion processes, the diffusion constant b..t varies approxi-
mately by a factor of two. At the very macro level, when considering
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Table 5.2. Hierarchy of diffusion processes in the transport sector of the USA
and the USSR, measured by their temporal diffusion parameters.
USA USSR
to !:J.t to !:J.t
Total Length of
Transport Infrastructures 1950 80 1980 80
Growth of Railways
Network 1830-1930 1858 54 1890 37
Railways 1930-1987 decline decline 1949 44
Treated Ties (USA) 1923 26
Track Electrification (USSR) 1965 27
Replacement of
Steam Locomotives 1950 12 1960 13
the growth of the total length of transport infrastructures, the time
constants involved are very long indeed; it takes around eight decades
to go from one percent to 50 percent of the ultimate final network
length. This process, spanning over successive generations of diffusion
life cycles of individual transport infrastructures and across major
social and economic transformations, can therefore be considered as a
good example of a truly large pervasive system.
At the next hierarchical level, when considering the growth of
individual transport infrastructures, we observe that the building up
of major infrastructures proceeds with a !:J.t of typically between four
and five decades. As the next hierarchical level in the temporal diffu-
sion process, we consider the case of technological change or upgrad-
ing within an already existing infrastructure grid, i.e., the substitution
process of treated wooden railway cross-ties in the USA (a substitu-
tion process occurring in a contracting market, as the railway network
of the USA has been decreasing since the 1930s) and the electrification
of railway tracks in the case of the USSR. Here diffusion time con-
stants (!:J.t) below three decades are typical, i.e., about twice as fast as
in the case of new constructions of infrastructure grids.
Finally, at the last hierarchical level of the time constants of dif-
fusion presented in Table 5.2, we consider a replacement process
within the capital vintage structure in the form of the rolling stock of
railways. The replacement of the coal fired steam locomotive by diesel
traction (as in the USA) and by electric and diesel traction locomo-
tives (in the USSR) proceeds in both countries with a !:J.t of 12 to 13
years, i.e. a similar diffusion constant. If we look at the hierarchical
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structure of temporal diffusion processes one level further to the micro
level one observes even faster diffusion ~ts, in the order of a few years
for consumer durables. Even one hierarchical level further down, ~ts
of a few months can be observed, when considering the diffusion of
fashion items or novelty gadgets.
Thus, we propose that diffusion processes can be characterized
(classified) as operating within a temporal hierarchical structure,
when considering the time constants (~t) involved in diffusion. This
hierarchy extends from the macro down to the micro level, and
throughout we observe a self-similarity in the process of change, i.e., a
fractal type of structure of diffusion processes all along their temporal
(or spatial) hierarchical levels. Along the temporal hierarchy, diffu-
sion processes appear to be faster the closer we get to the micro level.
Of course more empirical studies will have to be carried out before
such a working hypothesis can be firmly substantiated. However, we
consider that a classification of diffusion processes along the hierarchy
structure sketched out above may indeed be a first step in developing
a quantitative taxonomy of diffusion processes.
Following the above taxonomy of diffusion processes and their
temporal characteristics, we propose the following hypothesis as a
weighting measure of different processes of change: A diffusion pro-
cess is more important from a macro (economic) perspective, the
higher it is located in the temporal hierarchy, i.e., the longer its diffu-
sion time ~t. The proposed weighting measure thus links the impor-
tance of a particular diffusion process proportionally to its diffusion
time constant ~t. Thus, we suggest that a one percent growth in the
railway network of the USA (~t of 54 years), is proportionally (54/12)
more important than a one percent growth in the diffusion of
diesel/electric locomotives (replacing steam locomotives) proceeding
with a ~t of 12 years. As Figure 5.3 shows, the conclusion about the
discontinuous nature of economic, technological, and social change in
a dichotomy of accelerating and de-accelerating diffusion rates is also
corroborated using this alternative measure. Figure 5.3 also presents
results obtained by analyzing a larger sample of 265 innovation diffu-
sion cases, revealing an identical pattern.*
Periods of accelerating rates of change indicate the emergence
and growth of a new socio-technical paradigm in which a large number
of technical, organizational, and social innovations diffuse into the
economy and are absorbed by the society at large, contributing to pro-
longed periods of growth during which (energy) prices remain stable.
These periods are followed by seasons of saturations, characterized by
• The generally higher absolute level of the average rate of change in the second (265 cases) data sample is
not significant as it results from different weighting (by the respective mean fl.t) in the two samples.
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Figure 5.3. Weighted (by mean diffusion time) average rate of technical,
economic, and social change in the USA, based on a sample of 117 and 265 inno-
vation diffusion cases, in percent/year.
a significant decline in the average rate of technical and social change,
accompanied by price flares indicating increased market volatility and
turbulence. Schumpeterian "gales of creative destruction" (Le., organi-
zational readjustment processes like bankruptcies or intensive
mergers), a lack of productive investments as a result of the saturation
of traditional markets and uncertainty about the characteristics and
investment opportunities of the new emerging paradigm prevail. Con-
sequently we observe the widespread application of speculative instru-
ments and increased market volatility in the form of "Black Fridays"
or "Black Mondays" (recall here the October 1987 stock market
crash). The shift in the search for profit opportunities away from pro-
ductive investments is also reflected in massive investments into
(speculative) mergers and acquisitions (over 300 billion US dollars in
1988 in the USA alone). From such a perspective, a redirection
toward productive investments at a significant rate, may only finally
occur once the opportunities opened up by an emerging socio-technical
paradigm become more broadly perceived, and/or after large-scale
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destruction of speculative capital reduces the disparities in yields
between financial and productive investments.
Seen from a broader international perspective, we may interpret
the massive devaluation of currencies and capital stock (closures of
unproductive nationalized industries) resulting from economic restruc-
turing in most Eastern European countries and their "creative des-
truction" of social* and economic institutions during the second half
of 1989, as being the most apparent manifestation of the downswing
phase of the present Kondratieff cycle. In Western market economies
the Kondratieff downswing has up to now been most visible in chronic
unemployment, a general productivity slowdown, and saturation of
some traditional markets, such as the steel industry, and the redirec-
tion to financial investments discussed above. However, it is exactly
during such periods of turbulence and structural transition that the
characteristics (technologies, new institutions) of the form and direc-
tion of a next expansion phase are being shaped. Diffusion of this new
paradigm provides in the longer-term new investment and produc-
tivity gain possibilities in emerging new growth sectors and infrastruc-
tures.
Although the results presented above, as well as their tentative
integration into a (holistic) model of discontinuities in the long-term
economic development, are tentative and require further empirical and
theoretical corroboration, they are encouraging. There are three rea-
sons for this conclusion:
• Empirical evidence of the Schumpeterian bandwagon argument
has been assembled.
• The narrow definition of innovations, being for a long time con-
fined to the technological area, has been partly overcome and
now includes variables of economic and social change also.
• The results confirm that even without a rigid clustering and syn-
chronization in the appearance, growth or saturation phase of
innovation diffusion, discontinuities in the long-term rate of
change can be identified.
At this point, let us return to the discontinuities of transport
infrastructure development proper. Figure 5.4 integrates the evolu-
tion of physical infrastructures with discontinuities in the evolution of
energy prices and of the rate of technical, economic, and social change
in the USA. Synchronization between the discontinuities in the
development of physical transport infrastructures and discontinuities
• On the diffusion of democracy see for instance ModeJ.eki and Perry, 1989.
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Figure 5.4. Discontinuities in the long-term evolution of average energy and
crude oil prices (in 1958 US $/KWyr); the long-term rate of technical, economic,
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in long-term economic development* emerges from Figure 5.4. The
growth pulses of individual transport infrastructures are spaced at 55
year intervals (measured between the inflection points, i.e., the periods
of maximum growth rates of canals, railways, and surfaced roads).
The relationship between the periods of structural discontinuity in the
evolution of transport infrastructures (saturation of growth of existing
and emergence of new systems), the periods of price volatility and the
turning points in the long-term rate of change are clearly discernible.
If economic history continues to unfold as it has in the past, the
present (near-term) saturation of the expansion of the surfaced road
network, as well as the possible emergence of a new transport infra-
structure around the turn of the century would repeat past experi-
ences. Based on such an assumption, we appear to be amid a period
of structural discontinuity, characterized by the saturation in the
expansion of an old development paradigm and the transition to a
new, yet uncertain development path. In the past this structural
discontinuity has been accompanied by high economic (price) volatil-
ity. The period of price volatility seems to have been almost over-
come, and based on historical experience one could expect a return to
stable real term energy and general price levels for an extended period
of time (say 20 to 30 years).
The relationship of the dynamics of the development pattern of
different infrastructures to long-term fluctuations in the economic
development of the USA is not an isolated case. A similar chronologi-
cal development pattern can also be shown in the evolution of dif-
ferent infrastructural bandwagons in a number of countries. Long
waves are thus an international phenomenon. Figure 5.5 provides a
concluding "summary of summaries" of the evolution of various trans-
port technology clusters in the countries covered in the analysis in
Chapter 3. The condensed results of the evolution of different trans-
port systems discussed in Sections 3.1 to 3.4 above, are summarized to
reveal the temporal overlap of their respective saturation phases.
The diffusion (growth) of different transport technologies and
infrastructures in a number of countries is evolving within a relatively
narrow band, defined by a diffusion frontier, i.e., the area spanned by
the diffusion curves of the first and last country respectively, develop-
ing a particular transport system (canals, railways, roads and automo-
biles, air transport) or following a similar trajectory in the replace-
ment of a particular transport technology (sail ships by steamships or
horses by automobiles). We consider Figure 5.5 to be an empirical
indication of the existence of international diffusion bandwagons and
• A similar argument was put forward by Hartman and Wheeler, 1979.
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of the (converging) diffusion within technology clusters. As men-
tioned earlier, the focusing is not very pronounced and there is a high
degree of overlap among the various diffusion bandwagons and tech-
nology clusters due to differences in the time constants (~t) among
individual diffusion processes. Nevertheless, three rather clear clusters
can be distinguished. The first saturates around 1865, the second
around 1930, and the third in 1995. Each cluster is converging toward
the saturation period. The focusing increases as the diffusion cluster
matures. In other words, the introduction of innovations is associated
with great lags between the early and late adopters. However, the
latecomers appear to achieve faster diffusion rates than the original
innovators. We can say that there is a pronounced catch-up effect
that converges toward the saturation point, indicating a season of
saturations at the international level of technology diffusion as early
as the 19th century.
The only noteworthy exception to this picture emerging from Fig-
ure 5.5 is the infrastructural development pattern of Tzarist Russia
and the USSR. Whereas the development of the railway network and
the replacement of sail ships in Tzarist Russia appear to be in tune
with international developments, canal construction in Tzarist Russia
enters its phase of saturation one cycle (around 50 years) later than in
other countries. The transport infrastructure development policy of
the USSR also falls outside the picture outlined in Figure 5.5. We
have argued above, that this particular pattern may be an indication
that the USSR has, to a large extent, been "decoupled" from the
major economic expansion pulse that characterized the post World
War II growth of Western market economies. It is thus not incidental
that these past decoupling tendencies have become increasingly recog-
nized within the USSR. In light of this, perestroika appears to be a
possibly long overdue restructuring effort toward a new development
path.
For all other countries individual transport development
"bandwagons" are "rolling along in tune". Particularly noteworthy is
the synchronization of the saturation periods inside the railway,
steamship, and horse replacement "bandwagons" and of the three
"bandwagons" together in the 1930s. We thus contend, that the
severity of the Great Depression in the 1930s may indeed have been
caused by the saturation of most of the technologies responsible for
the economic upswing throughout the 19th century (i.e., the
steam/coal technological cluster) and that this did not happen in indi-
vidual countries alone, but at the international level.
Only a few technologies "tunneled through" (Le., continued their
growth pattern) during the 1930s depression, as illustrated by the
example of oil pipeline growth in the USA in Figure 5.5. It was
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precisely this technological (i.e., oil) cluster, which in its growth tra-
jectory was not noticeably affected by the saturation of the predom-
inant technological (i.e., steam and coal) system, that became a key
element in the subsequent growth period. Similarly, the growth tra-
jectory of air transport and the development of natural gas infrastruc-
tures again appear to "tunnel through" the present or near-term
saturation of the automobile age. This could be an indication that
these technologies may become of pervasive importance in the future.
In this sense each Kondratieff long wave portrays a barrier to dif-
fusion. Most processes saturate at the end of the inflationary period
and the onset of the disinvestment phase in the Kondratieff wave.
Very few diffusion processes can "tunnel" through this barrier. If it is
true that this marks the beginning of paradigm shifts, it is not surpris-
ing that further diffusion of systems associated with the old techno-
economic development trajectory is blocked to make way for new ones.
It is the disruptive crisis of the old that provides the fertile ground for
new systems to develop.
CHAPTER 6
Summary and Conclusion
The objective of this study is to give a quantitative long-term view of
the history of individual transport infrastructures and to integrate
these developments into a holistic picture of the evolution of the trans-
port system as a whole. Innovations in transport and communication
infrastructures and the technologies and devices using them, alter the
range of human activities in space and time. Although generally
technical in nature, they are closely related to important organiza-
tional and social adaptation processes. Some innovations become per-
vasive in the sense that they lead to a host of interrelated activities
across many sectors of the economy or change many aspects of every-
day life. Transport systems and infrastructures are examples of such
pervasive innovations: they emerge, grow, and eventually decline as a
result of changing societal requirements.
The main theme of this study is the dynamics of when and where
innovations appear and become accepted by society, as manifest in
their evolution (growth) and rate of interaction (replacement or sub-
stitution) with existing techniques. The regularity shown in the
growth and structural changes of transport systems in different coun-
tries, even with different political systems and market clearance
mechanisms, is consistent with the approach adopted in a new line of
evolutionary economic models. In such models, ordered, structured
evolutionary paths at the macro level are driven rather than dissi-
pated by diversity in technological design, individual behavior, and
the economic and social consequences of technological change at the
micro level. Thus, the long-term development and structural changes
in the transport sector portray features of self-organizing systems.
Our analysis has shown that the innovation diffusion and substi-
tution models used within the present context for the systematization
and organization of empirical data map the historical development
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patterns quite accurately. As such, these models constitute a neces-
sary - and in their analytical resolution surprisingly accurate - tool
for the quantitative description of long-term evolutionary processes.
The use of quantitative diffusion and substitution models is also a
prerequisite for international comparability, in order to take into
account the varying boundary conditions of different systems, i.e.,
countries. Thus, developments in different countries can be compared
in terms of their rates of change and in terms of the resulting struc-
tural changes of the transport system. Static cross-sectional comparis-
ons of absolute diffusion levels appear from the perspective of this
study to be highly problematic.
From a more formal viewpoint we conclude that, out of the
numerous diffusion models proposed, the logistic growth and substitu-
tion model appeared as the most versatile and universally applicable
in the cases analyzed here. This suggests that the underlying
rationale for a symmetrical* diffusion model (i.e., a social learning
process) is the basis for the diffusion patterns examined here. The
speed at which diffusion/substitution proceeds, is a function of the
"stimulus" (seen as a complex vector of comparative advantage
changing over time, rather than a single static variable) for social
acceptance of new infrastructures and for changing preferences under-
lying modal split decisions.
Growth and technological change in the transport sector follow
regular, structured evolutionary paths, resulting in a characteristic
pattern of change. This pattern consists of a sequence of replacements
of older forms of transportation by new ones. We also showed that
the basic elements of the technology life-cycle, birth, growth, satura-
tion, and eventual decline, characterize the long-term development of
individual transport technologies and infrastructures not only in dif-
ferent market economies, but also in planned economies. The pattern
of temporal changes over time and between countries is marked by a
high degree of regularity and a quest for higher speed and produc-
tivity.
This points to the fact that the underlying causal forces responsi-
ble for the historical development pattern transgress differences in pol-
itical systems, market mechanisms, and relative cost/price structures.
We maintain that the way in which different transport modes affect
the spatial and temporal range of activities of a population determines
the evolutionary development path observed. From such a
• This statement holds true only for the proper use of such diffusion models. Above all, an innovation
must not be analyzed in isolation. As a result, diffusion can be modeled in most cases successfully only by
accounting explicitly for technological hetorogeneitll, Le., by use of a multiple technological substitution
model.
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perspective, it is primarily the quality and performance of different
transport modes that influence modal split decisions. Under a con-
stant travel time budget constraint, systems that are faster and allow
for a wider human activity range gain a decisive comparative advan-
tage over competitive systems.
Our analysis of the long-term trends in passenger travel suggest
that as societies become more affluent, personal travel will grow signi-
ficantly. People will also travel increasingly more for pleasure rather
than for work. In addition we have concluded that, from a long-term
perspective, transport and communication are of a complementary
rather than substitutable nature. Under such premises, it appears
again likely that we are in a phase of continuing long-term growth in
passenger transport, especially as new information and communica-
tion technologies are on the verge of widespread diffusion. As regards
goods transport, our analysis suggests that future changes in the
transport system will most likely be driven by the evolving structure
in output mix, further dematerialization, and a shift to higher value
goods and services, as societies become wealthier. If, in fact, such ten-
dencies become preeminent, economic growth will no longer be depen-
dent on growing volumes of goods transport, but will impose higher
quality standards for transport services.
The study suggests that out of the existing long-distance trans-
port systems, air transport corresponds best to future requirements
with respect to speed, flexibility and quality of service. Consequently,
air traffic should be expected to grow in the future, including long-
distance air freight. In the same way as urban centers grew in con-
junction with the expansion of railways throughout the 19th century,
airports could become new nodes of urban agglomerations, as they
progressively evolve into centers of economic activity, e.g., as in the
case of Frankfurt airport.
From the historical perspective, it appears that the success of any
new transport system depends on a number of functional criteria.
These include first, a synergistic development of a new technology
(prime mover) base in combination with a new infrastructure system.
Second, during the initial growth phase of a new infrastructure the
complementarity to, and independence of existing infrastructures is
important. Independence is possibly the most decisive factor in the
emergence of new transport infrastructures because new institutional
and organizational settings are required for the construction and suc-
cessful operation of such systems.
Even when promising new transport systems appear to be the
brink of commercial introduction, particularly in Japan and in a
number of European countries, an over enthusiastic assessment of
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their short-term impact on the existing transport system is inappropri-
ate. Older infrastructures are here to last, albeit with declining
importance, as considerable time is required for building-up and
decommissioning such large-scale systems. The life cycles spanning
birth, growth and saturation and the start of decline of infrastructures
are very long, lasting up to a century. The duration of senescence can
be even longer. However, the most vital infrastructures are here to
stay. Their immortality is marked by the provision of different ser-
vices than were originally envisaged. More than a century after the
canal age, the remaining inland waterways are used for leisure activi-
ties, irrigation, and maintaining a last market niche in the transport of
low-value goods. There are also more boats today than in the heyday
of ocean clippers, but they have entered a different market niche and
are used as pleasure boats instead.
In their historical evolution, transport systems portray a strong
homeostatic character in their growth and ordered structural transi-
tion paths, apparently being unaffected in the longer term by disrup-
tions or major societal and economic discontinuities. Even in cases
where major disruptive events resulted in a discontinuation of particu-
lar development trajectories, at least for a limited time period (e.g., in
occupied France during World War II), the rate of evolution and
structural transition, was not affected by such major discontinuities.
The analysis of the long-term development of different transport
technologies, canals, railways, road and air transport, has shown that
the historical evolutionary pattern may be described by:
• Invariance (similar development patterns can be observed across
different countries and economic systems).
• Regularity (evolution via structured ordered growth and transi-
tion paths).
• Discontinuity (as a result of the emergence of new, and the
saturation of old systems).
• Synchronization (empirical evidence of diffusion "bandwagons" at
the international level as well as within given technological clus-
ters was established).
We have observed that both technology clusters, like the trans-
port technologies based on the steam engine, and country clusters, i.e.,
countries characterized by their similar diffusion pattern e.g., develop-
ing railway networks, tend to saturate during relatively short time
periods. This "cluster" effect in the completion of a large number of
interrelated technological diffusion and substitution processes and in a
number of countries is referred to as a season of saturations. The
technical and economic potentials for further growth of a particular
technology cluster becomes exhausted, and awareness of increasing
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social disbenefits and environmental externalities from a further inten-
sification of the dominant development mode become widespread,
leading to structural change and transition to a next generation of
transport systems.
This short time interval, during which most diffusion processes
are completed and eventually enter a phase of decline is more notice-
able in view of the long time constants involved in the growth of
large-scale systems. The "simultaneous" saturation of infrastructure
expansion pulses at the international level stems from the coupled
dynamics of the introduction dates of systems and of the "catch-up"
effect in the diffusion pattern between countries. Our understanding
of the possible driving forces for the "season of saturations" is still
insufficient to propose an underlying theoretical model. Here it is
interpreted as being the result of the saturation and exhaustion of the
growth potentials of the predominant paradigm of development, both
nationally and internationally.
Our empirical results indicate that there is stronger evidence for
a congruence in the saturation of diffusion processes rather than in
their emergence, so that the focusing increases as systems mature.
Such clustering is, however, not very rigid, but apparently still suffi-
cient to result in major discontinuities in the long-term pattern of
infrastructure development at the national and the international level.
During the period of saturation of an old development trajectory, the
previous generation of pervasive technologies, infrastructures, and
institutional forms is not only challenged, but an opportunity window
opens to replace the old paradigm in the longer term with new solu-
tions. The overall development trajectory is thus punctuated by crises
that emerge in the transition from an old, saturating to anew, yet
uncertain development path.
Diffusion and replacement processes proceed according to a
schedule that apparently defines the opportunity windows for the
development of particular systems. In the "leader" countries diffusion
leads to a long, sustained period of development with all the charac-
teristics of pervasive systems, corresponding high adoption levels, and
resulting in a specific spatial and social organization of societies. In
"follower" countries where adoption occurs later, growth proceeds fas-
ter, but results in lower adoption levels and concomitant spatial and
social structures. Consequently, railway networks are smaller in coun-
tries where they were introduced later; similarly, automobile owner-
ship is also lower in countries catching-up on the leading countries.
Since the evolutionary development path that follows saturation is
based on fundamentally new techno-economic solutions, further
development of the transport systems is based on new technologies
and infrastructures rather than on a repetition of the growth
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characteristics of the previous development phase.* Thus, produc-
tivity gains from a further intensification of the traditional mode of
development and its associated infrastructures are limited, leading to
a transition to new systems. This even appears necessary for long-
term development as Schumpeter (1935) observed: "Add as many
mail-coaches as you please, you will never get a railroad by so doing. "
A crucial question for future global resource and environmental
impacts is whether Third World countries, many of them still embed-
ded in the "First Wave" (Toffler, 1980), can proceed directly to a new,
environmentally more benign "Third Wave" (Stigliani, 1990). To
what extent will it be possible for developing countries to "leap-frog"
entirely one technology life cycle such as massive private motoriza-
tion? Historical experience suggests that while a particular technology
system may not be skipped altogether, the intensity of its development
may be orders of magnitude lower than the ones attained in a previous
phase of economic development. Indeed, the study has illustrated
cases (such as in the USSR) where the further intensification of tradi-
tional infrastructures appeared to impede rather than to promote suc-
cessful catching up.
The integration of infrastructure growth and technological
change in the transport sector into long-term economic development
has shown that each major infrastructural development cycle is closely
related to a cluster of important technological and organizational
innovations. These form a "socio-technological paradigm" which
dominates and drives major economic expansion periods, reaches
saturation, and initiates a structural discontinuity in the long-term
economic development paths.
The importance of the transport infrastructure developments
appears crucial with respect to the observed pulses in economic activi-
ties. For example, the construction of canal networks throughout
Europe and the USA during the 18th and the beginning of the 19th
century was initiated by an increasing need to transport wood, char-
coal, and other goods in large quantities over longer distances. Later,
railroads, the steam engine, and coal-use were associated with a simi-
lar boom period basically due to the same reason: the concentration
of production and population in urban areas required a more efficient
transport system (and an energy carrier with higher energy density
and versatility of use than traditional renewable energy sources). In a
similar way, the growth of the automobile was contingent on the
development of numerous other systems, such as paved roads, the
internal combustion engine, oil refining and motor fuels, new sheet
• See Griibler and Nowotny, 1989, on this argument.
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metals and high quality steels, electrical equipment and a whole host
of other new technologies and products. Thus, we argue that specific
expansion periods in economic development are driven by a cluster of
interrelated technologies and infrastructures, which are interdepen-
dent and mutually cross-enhancing.
Transport systems in particular are prominent examples of per-
vasive technology clusters in various periods in history. Transport
systems are however, closely linked and depend on the development of
many other systems, particularly in the energy sector. Both the dom-
inant transport and energy system approach maturity and saturation
at the same time (either in the total length of the system or in terms
of primary energy market shares): Canals and feed energy (for animal
traction) around 1870, railways and coal around 1930, roads and auto-
mobiles together with oil, starting from the 1970s. This points to a
common future growth potential for air transport and natural gas
technologies and infrastructures, apart from their obvious interdepen-
dence for supersonic aircrafts (up to Mach 5 or 6), which could be
fueled by methane. The "tunneling through" of air transport (and
natural gas) through the present or near-term saturation of the diffu-
sion of the automobile-oil "cluster", could be an indication of their
growing importance in a forthcoming new expansion period in a simi-
lar way that railways and automobiles "tunneled-through" the satura-
tion phase of their respective predecessor systems. Such a contention
seems more plausible when considering the quality characteristics of
these technologies.*
Future economic growth may proceed in a qualitative rather than
quantitative manner, at least for developed economies. Increasing
tendencies toward dematerialization, and higher information and
software content (i.e., value) in industrial products, and in services,
extensive new information and communication technologies, further
growth in face-to-face communication (Le., passenger transport), and
increasing environmental compatibility through a closed industrial
metabolism (Ayres, 1989b) etc., will all impose more stringent quality
requirements on the transport and energy system.
If environment emerges as a major force determining the future
direction of technological evolution, the successful development and
introduction of new systems will only be possible if environmental
boundary conditions and impacts, such as the effects of hypersonic
aircrafts on the chemistry of the stratosphere, are endogenized right
from the beginning into the design and systems configuration of new
transport and energy systems. This is historically a new situation, but
• Le., the comparative quality characteristics of air transport illustrated here, and the large resource base
and environmental advantages of natural gas (see Lee et aJ., 1988).
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it enables new systems to become both environmentally and socially
qualified, enhancing rather than inhibiting their growth prospects.
Transport infrastructures are therefore closely associated with
developments in the energy system and with the long-term evolution
of the economy and of technological change in general.
Because of their vital importance to society, infrastructures and
transport and energy technologies are, in fact "metaphor" (indicator)
systems representative of historical economic expansion periods. The
saturation in the expansion of a particular development paradigm
leads to a phase of structural discontinuity and serves here as a model
to explain slowdown phases in long-term economic growth. During
this period of structural discontinuities and economic volatility, the
decline of traditional, and the emergence of new systems is initiated.
This "process of creative destruction" may serve as a theoretical
model for the transitions and changes within the transport sector in
the future, acting as an essential and inherent part of the long-term
evolution of our economies and societies. It is the crisis of the old that
provides the fertile ground for the emergence of the new.
Our transport infrastructure both records the past and shapes
our present and future. It results from a long evolutionary sequence of
growth and structural transition processes. The inherent dynamics of
change in the long-term history of the transport systems imply that
some technical and organizational/institutional solutions have entirely
sunk into oblivion or are at the brink of disappearing. Feelings of
regret about the loss of familiar infrastructure systems and the tech-
nologies using them are not warranted. Especially as these technolo-
gies do not really disappear, but rather "conquer" new market niches
and frequently gain even anew, aesthetic value. The horse has disap-
peared as a means of transportation but is presently used for recrea-
tional purposes. Former canals, riverport and dock sites become pre-
ferred leisure and residential areas, railway lines are being turned into
bicycle tracks. The Gare d'Orsay in Paris has been converted into a
museum of the 19th century.
Will our future urban centers lie around airports, how will they
be linked, and how will highway bridges be utilized, once they are no
longer needed for automobiles? There remain far more questions than
possible answers, but as Francis Bacon said: He that will not apply
new remedies must expect new evils; for time is the greatest innovator.
References
Abernathy, W.J., 1978. The Productivity Dilemma, Roadblock to Innovation in
the Automobile Industry. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and
London.
Albertson, L.A., 1977. Telecommunications as a Travel Substitute: Some
Psychological, Organizational, and Social Aspects. Journal of Communica-
tion, Vo1.27, Nr.2:32-43.
d'Ancona, U., 1939. Der Kampf urns Dasein, eine biologisch-mathematische Dar-
stellung der Lebensgemeinschaften und biologischen Gleichgewichte.
Gebriider Borntraeger, Berlin.
Angelucci, E. and Matricardi, P., 1977. Practical Guide to World Airplanes,
Volumes 1 to 4., Mondatori, Milano (in Italian).
Annuaire Statistique (Ann. Stat.) de la France, 1961. Retrospectif. Imprimerie
Nationale, Paris.
Annuaire Statistique (Ann. Stat.) de la France, 1972 to 1987. INSEE, Paris.
Annuaire Statistique des Transports, 1982. Ministere des Transports,
Departement des Statistiques des Transports, Paris.
Abler, R., Adams, J.S. and Gould. P., 1971. Spatial Organization, the
Geographer's View of the World. Prentice Hall, London.
Arcangeli, F., David, P.A. and Dosi, G. (Eds.), 1990. Frontiers on Innovation
Diffusion. Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
Arrow, K.J., 1962. The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing. Review of
Economic Studies, 29:155-173.
Arthur, W.B., 1983. Competing Technologies and Lock-in by Historical Small
Events: The Dynamics of Choice under Increasing Returns. Center for
Economic Policy Research Paper 43. Stanford University.
Arthur, W.B., 1988. Competing Technologies: An Overview, in: G. Dosi, et al.
(Eds.), Technical Change and Economic Theory. Pinter Publishers, London
and New York.
Ausubel, J.H., 1989. Regularities in Technological Development: An Environ-
mental View, in: J.H. Ausubel and H.E. Sladovich (Eds.)' Technology and
Environment, US National Academy of Engineering, Washington D.C.
290 The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Ayres, R.U., 1969. Technological Forecasting and Long-range Planning.
McGraw-Hill, New York.
Ayres, R.U., 1987. Future Trends in Factory Automation. WP-87-22, IIASA,
Laxenburg, Austria.
Ayres, R.U., 1989a. Technology Forecast for CIM. Manufacturing Review, Vo1.2,
No.l:43-52.
Ayres, R.U., 1989b. Industrial Metabolism, in: J.H. Ausubel and H.E. Sladovich
(Eds.), Technology and Environment, US National Academy of Engineer-
ing, Washington D.C.
BA Stat. (Bundesamt fur Statistik), 1987. Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz
1986, BA Stat. (Ed.). Birkhauser Verlag, Basel.
Bandura, A., 1977. Social Learning Theory. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey.
Barker, T.C. and Robbins, M., 1975. A History of London Transport, Volume 1
and 2. Allen & Unwin, London.
Barry, B.J.L., 1988. Migration Reversals in Perspective: The Long-wave Evi-
dence. International Regional Science Review VoUl, No.3:245-251.
Bass, F .M., 1969. A New Product Growth Model for Consumer Durables.
Management Science, 5:215-227.
Bass, F .M., 1980. The Relationship Between Diffusion Rates, Experience Curves
and Demand Elasticities for Consumer Durable Technological Innovations,
Journal of Business, 53:51-67.
Bass, F .M., 1986. The Adoption of a Marketing Model: Comments and Observa-
tions, in: V. Mahajan and Y. Wind (Eds.), Innovation Diffusion Models of
New Product Acceptance. Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass.
Batten, D.F., 1989. The Future of Transport and Interface Communication:
Debating the Scope for Substitution Growth, in: D.F. Batten and R. Thord
(Eds.), Transportation for the Future. Springer Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg,
New York.
Bieshaar, H. and Kleinknecht, A., 1984. Kondratieff Long Waves in Aggregate
Output? An Econometric Test. Konjunkturpolitik, Vo!.30, No.5:279-303.
Blackman, A. W., 1971. The Rate of Innovation in the Commercial Aircraft Jet
Engine Market. Techno!. Forecasting and Soc. Change, 2:269-276.
Blackman, A. W., 1972. A Mathematical Model for Trend Forecasts. Techno!.
Forecasting and Soc. Change, 3:441-452.
Blackman, A.W., 1974. The Market Dynamics of Technological Substitutions.
Techno!. Forecasting and Soc. Change, 6:41-63.
Blackman, A.W., Seligman, E.J. and Sogliero, G.C., 1973. An Innovation Index
Based on Factor Analysis. Techno!. Forecasting and Soc. Change, 4:301-
316.
Boeing, 1988. World Jet Airplane Inventory at Year End. Boeing Co., Seattle.
Borchard, K., 1968. Staatsverbrauch und Offentliche Investitionen in Deutsch-
land 1780-1850. Dissertation an der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftli-
chen Fakultat der Universitat Gottingen.
Braudel, F., 1979. Civilisation materielle, economie et capitalisme, xve-XVIIle
siecle. Le structure du quotidien: Le possible et l'impossible. Librairie
Armand Colin, Paris.
References 291
O'Brien, P. (Ed.), 1983. Railways and the Economic Development of Western
Europe 1830-1914. Macmillan Press, London.
Brooks, H., 1988. The Typology of Surprises in Technology, Institutions and
Development, in: Jo Clark and T. Munn (Eds.), Sustainable Development of
the Biosphere. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Brown, L.A., 1981. Innovation Diffusion: A New Perspective. Methuen, New
York.
Bruckmann, G., 1983. The Long-wave Debate. Options (1983)2:6-9, IIASA, Lax-
enburg, Austria.
Cameron, H.M. and Metcalfe, J.S., 1987. On the Economics of Technological
Substitution. Technol. Forecasting and Soc. Change, 32:147-162.
Carlstein, T., 1982. Time Resources, Society and Ecology, Volume I: Preindus-
trial Societies. George Allen & Unwin, London.
Caron, F., 1983. France, in: P. O'Brien (Ed.), Railways and the Economic
Development of Western Europe 1830-1914. Macmillan Press, London.
Carroll, G.R., 1982. National City-size Distributions: What Do We Know After
67 Years of Research? Progress in Human Geography, Vo1.6, No.1 (March
1982):1-43.
Casetti, E., 1969. Why Do Diffusion Processes Conform to Logistic Trends?
Geogr. Anal. 1.
Cerwenka, P., 1986. Wechselwirkungen zwischen Telekommunikation und Per-
sonenverkehr. Offentlicher Sektor - Forschungsmemoranden, Vo1.12, No.2
(June 1986):38-56.
Cerwenka, P. and Rommerskirchen, So, 1983. Aufbereitung globaler
Verkehrsprognosen fur die Fortschreibung der Bun-
desverkehrswegeplanung. Prognos AG., Basel.
Coleman, J., Menzel, H. and Katz, E., 1966. Medical Innovation: A Diffusion
Study. Bobbs-Merrill, New York.
Daumas, M. (Ed.), 19800 A History of Technology and Invention, Progress
Through the Ages, Volume III: The Expansion of Mechanization 1725-1860.
J. Murray, London.
Daumas, M. and Gille, P., 1980. Part Three, Chapters 1 to 4, in: M. Daumas
(Ed.), 1980. A History of Technology and Invention, Progress Through the
Ages, Volume III: The Expansion of Mechanization 1725-1860, pp. 235-368.
J. Murray, London.
Davies, S., 1979. The Diffusion of Process Innovations. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Davies, S., 1980. Diffusion, Innovation and Market Structure, in: D. Sahal (Ed.),
Research, Development and Technological Innovation, Recent Perspectives
on Management. Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass.
De Green, K.B., 1988. Long Wave Cycles of Sociotechnical Change and Innova-
tion: A Macropsychological Perspective. Journal of Occupational Psychol-
ogy 61:7-23.
Debecker, A. and Modis, T., (Digital Equipment Corporation Geneva), 1986.
Determination of the Uncertainties in S-curve Logistic Fits. Paper submit-
ted to the Sixth International Symposium on Forecasting, Paris, June 15-
18, 1986.
292 The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Delbeke, J., 1983. Recent Long Wave Theories, a Critical Survey, in: G. Bianchi,
G. Bruckmann and T. Vasko (Eds.), Background Material for a Meeting on
Long Waves, Depression and Innovation, Siena/Florence, October 26-29,
1983. CP-83-44, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
DIW (Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung), 1982. Analyse und Projek-
tion der Personenverkehrsnachfrage in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Beitrage zur Strukturforschung Heft 70. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin.
DIW (Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung), 1985. Regionale Struktur
des Personenverkehrs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahre 1980.
Beitrage zur Strukturforschung Heft 88. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin.
Dixon, R., 1980. Hybrid Corn Revisited. Econometrica, 48:1451-1461.
Dosi, G., 1983. Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories. The
Determinants and Directions of Technical Change and the Transformation
of the Economy, in: C. Freeman (Ed.), Long Waves in the World Economy.
Butterworths, London.
Dosi, G., Orsenigo, 1. and Silverberg, G., 1986. Innovation, Diversity and Diffu-
sion: A Self-organisation Mode!. Draft, SPRU, University of Sussex, June
1986.
Dosi, G., Freeman, C., Nelson, R., Silverberg, G. and Soete, L., 1988. Technical
Change and Economic Theory. Pinter Publishers, London and New York.
DOT (Department of Transport), 1977. Transport Statistics Great Britain
1965-1975. Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London.
DOT (Department of Transport), 1987. Transport Statistics Great Britain
1976-1986. Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London.
Doxiadis C.A. and Papaioannou, J .C., 1983. Ecumenopolis. The Inevitable City
of the Future. Athens Center for Ekistics, Athens.
Duckham, B.F., 1983. Canals and River Navigations, in: D.H. Aldcroft and M.J.
Freeman (Eds.), Transport in the Industrial Revolution. Manchester
University Press, Manchester.
van Duijn, J.J., 1983. The Long Wave in Economic Life. Allen & Unwin, Lon-
don.
Dyos, H.J. and Aldcroft, D.H., 1969. British Transport, an Economic Survey
from the Seventeenth Century to the Twentieth. Leicester University Press.
Eberlein, D., 1988. Projektionen des offentlichen Personenvernverkehrs unter
besonderer Berucksichtigung des grenzuberschreitenden europaischen
Verkehrs. Thyssen Technische Berichte, Heft 1 (1988):39-50.
Der Elsner, 1985. Handbuch fur StraBen und Verkehrswesen. Otto Elsner Ver-
lagsanstalt, Darmstadt.
Easingwood, C.J., Mahajan, V. and Muller, E., 1981. A Nonsymmetric Respond-
ing Logistic Model for Technological Substitution. Techno!. Forecasting
and Soc. Change, 20:199-213.
Enzelberger, S., 1989. Okonomische Hintergrunde und Auswirkungen des lang-
fristigen Technologiewandels im Verkehrssektor, dargestellt an den
Beispielen USA, GroBbritannien und Deutschland-BRD. Diplomarbeit,
Institut fUr Finanzwissenschaft und Infrastrukturpolitik, Technische
Universitat Wien.
References 293
Feinstein, C.H., 1988. National Statistics 1760-1920, in: C.H. Feinstein and S.
Pollard (Eds.), Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom 1750-
1920. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Fischer Weltamanach, 1987. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt a.M.
Fisher, J.C. and Pry, R.H., 1971. A Simple Substitution Model of Technological
Change. Techno!. Forecasting and Soc. Change, 3:75-88.
Fishlow, A., 1965. American Railroads and the Transformation of the Ante-
bellum Economy. Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Floyd, A., 1968. A Methodology for Trend-forecasting of Figures of Merit. In: J.
Bright (Ed.), Technological Forecasting for Industry and Government:
Methods and Applications. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
Fogel, R. W., 1964. Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in
Economic History. 1970 Edition, John Hopkins, Baltimore.
Forbes, R.J., 1975. Roads to c 1900, in: C. Singer, E.J. Holmyard, A.R. Hall and
T.!. Williams (Eds.), 1975. A History of Technology, Vol. IV: The Indus-
trial Revolution c 1750 to c 1850. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Forrester, J.W., 1983. Innovation and Economic Change, in: C. Freeman (Ed.),
Long Waves in the World Economy. Butterworths, London.
Fremdling, R., 1975. Eisenbahnen und deutsches Wirtschaftswachstum 1840-
1879, ein Beitrag zur Entwicklungstheorie und zur Theorie der Infrastruk-
tur. Gesellschaft fUr Westf1l.lische Wirtschaftsgeschichte E.V., Dortmund.
Freeman, M.J., 1980. Road Transport in the English Industrial Revolution: An
Interim Reassessment. Journal of Hist. Geography, Vo!.6, No.1:17-28.
Freeman, C. (Ed.), 1983. Long Waves in the World Economy. Butterworths,
London.
Freeman, C., Clark, J. and Soete, L., 1982. Unemployment and Technical Inno-
vation: A Study of Long Waves and Economic Development. Frances
Pinter, London.
Freeman, C. and Perez, C., 1988. Structural Crises of Adjustment, Business
Cycles and Investment Behaviour; in: G. Dosi, et al. (Eds.), Technical
Change and Economic Theory. Pinter Publishers, London and New York.
French, R.A., 1983. Canals in Pre-revolutionary Russia. Russian Historical
Geography Vo!.2:451-481.
Garrison, W.L., 1989. Using Technology to Improve Transportation Services, in:
D.F. Batten and R. Thord (Eds.), Transportation for the Future. Springer
Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York.
Gatignon, H.A. and Robertson, T.S., 1986. Intergration of Consumer Diffusion
Theory and Diffusion Models: New Research Directions, in: V. Mahajan
and Y. Wind (Eds.), Innovation Diffusion Models of New Product Accep-
tance. Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass.
Gayer, A.D., Rostow, W.W. and Schwartz, A.J., 1953. The Growth and Fluctua-
tion of the British Economy 1790-1850, an Historical, Statistical and
Theoretical Study of Britain's Economic Development. Clarendon Press,
Oxford.
Gatto, M., 1985. Introduzione all'ecologia delle populazioni. CLUP, Milano.
294 The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Geise, J., 1959. What is a Railway? Technology and Culture, 1:68-77.
General Motors, 1983. The First 75 Years of Transportation Products. Automo-
bile Quaterly Inc., Princeton, New Jersey.
Ginarlis, J. and Pollard, S., 1988. Roads and Waterways 1750-1850, in: C.H.
Feinstein and S. Pollard (Eds.), Studies in Capital Formation in the United
Kingdom 1750-1920. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Glaziev, S., 1988. Private communication, Central Economic-Mathematical Insti-
tute, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow..
Godlund, S., 1952. Ein Innovationsverlauf in Europa, dargestellt in einer
vorlaufigen Untersuchung iiber die Ausbreitung der Eisenbahninnovation.
Lund Studies in Geography, Ser. B. Human Geography No.6., C.W.K.
Gleerup Publishers, Lund, Sweden.
Goell, N.S., Maitra, S.C. and Montroll, E.W., 1971. On the Volterra and Other
Nonlinear Models of Interacting Populations. Rev. Mod. Phys., 43:231-276.
Gold, B., Pierce, W. and Rosegger, G., 1970. Diffusion of Major Technological
Innovations in the U.S. Iron and Steel Industry. Journal of Industrial
Economics 18 (July 1970).
Goldstein, J.S., 1988. Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age.
Yale University Press, New Haven and London.
Gompertz, B., 1825. Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. London, 115:513-585.
Goodrich, C., 1960. Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads
1800-1890. Columbia University Press, New York and London.
Goodrich, C., Rubin, J., Cranmer, H.J. and Segal, H.H., 1975. Canals and
American Economic Development. Kennikat Press, Port Washington N.Y.
and London.
Gordon, A., 1988. To Move With the Times, the Story of Transport and Travel
in Scotland. The University Press, Aberdeen.
Gottinger, H-W., 1985. Modeling the Diffusion of Innovations. Internal paper,
Batelle-Institut, Frankfurt, February 1985.
Green, A.G., 1986. Growth and Productivity Change in the Canadian Railway
Sector 1871-1926, in: S.L. Engerman and R.E. Gallman (Eds.), Long-term
Factors in American Economic Growth. University of Chicago Press, Chi-
cago and London.
Grey, C.G. (Ed.), 1969. Janes's All the World's Aircraft, Reprint of 1919 Edi-
tion. David & Charles Publishers, London.
Griliches, Z., 1957. Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technical
Change. Econometrica, 25:501-522.
Griibler, A., 1988. Saturation Periods in Scientific-technical Progress. Paper
delivered at the Conference on Regularities of Scientific-technical Progress
and Long-term Tendencies of Economic Development, March 14-18, 1988,
Novosibirsk, Akademgorodok.
Griibler, A. and Nakicenovic, N., 1987. The Dynamic Evolution of Methane
Technologies. WP-87-2, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Griibler, A. and Nakicenovic, N., 1990. Long-waves, Technology Diffusion and
Substitution. Review (forthcoming).
References 295
Griibler, A. and Nowotny, H., 1989. Towards the Fifth Kondratieff Upswing,
Elements of an Emerging New Growth Phase and Possible Development
Trajectories, in: Science, Technology and Development, International
Council for Science Policy Studies, Paris.
Griibler, A., Posch, M. and Nakicenovic, N., 1988. Methods of Estimating S-
shaped Growth Functions: Algorithms and Computer Programs. Internal
paper, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Guile, B.R. and Quinn, J.B. (Eds.), 1988. Managing Innovation, Cases from the
Services Industries. National Academy Press, 1988.
Hadfield, C., 1968. The Canal Age. David & Charles, Newton Abbot and Lon-
don.
Hadfield, C., 1986. World Canals, Inland Navigation Past and Present. David &
Charles, Newton Abbot and London.
Hafele, W. (Program Leader), 1981. Energy in a Finite World, a Global Systems
Analysis. Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass.
Hagerstrand, T., 1952. The Propagation of Innovation Waves. Lund Studies in
Geography, Ser. B, No.4. Lund, Sweden.
Hagerstrand, T., 1953. Innovationsforloppet ur korologisk synpunkt (Engl. trans-
lation: Hagerstrand, 1967). University of Lund, Department of Geography
Bulletin 15, Lund, Sweden.
Hagerstrand, T., 1967. Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process. University of
Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
Hagerstrand, T., 1970. What to Do About People in Regional Science? Papers
of the Regional Science Association XXIV, pp. 7-21.
Hamblin, R.L., Jacobsen, R.B. and J.L.L. Miller, 1973. A Mathematical Theory
of Social Change. John Wiley & Sons, New York, London, Sydney,
Toronto.
Hamilton, S.B., 1975. Building and Civil Engineering Construction, in: Singer,
C., et aI. (Eds.), 1975. A History of Technology, Vol. IV: The Industrial
Revolution c 1750 to c 1850. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Haritos, Z.J., 1987. The Economic Long Wave and Transportation. University of
Toronto/York University, Toronto, Ontario.
Hartman, R.S. and Wheeler, D.R., 1979. Schumpeterian Waves of Innovation
and Infrastructure Development in Great Britain and the Unites States:
The Kondratieff Cycle Revisited. Research in Economic History, 4:37-85.
Hawke, G.R., 1970. Railways and Economic Growth in England and Wales
1840-1870. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hefner, R.H. III, 1984. Natural Gas - the Politically and Environmentally Benign
Least-cost Energy for Successful 21st Century Economies, the Energy Path
to a Better World. GHK Company, Oklahoma City, Okla.
Heine, H., 1843. Lutetia, in: Allgemeine Zeitung, Augsburg 1840-1843.
Reprinted in: Kindler Taschenbuch 1021-1024.
Herman, R. and Ausubel, J .H., 1988. Cities and Infrastructure: Synthesis and
Perspectives, in: J.H. Ausubel and R. Herman (Eds.)' Cities and Their
Vital Systems, Infrastructure Past, Present and Future. National Academy
Press, Washington, D.C.
296 The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Herman, R., Ardekani, S.A. and Ausubel, J.H., 1989. Dematerialization, in: J.H.
Ausubel and H.E. Sladovich (Eds.), Technology and Environment, US
National Academy of Engineering, Washington D.C.
Herodot, Historiae, Carolus Hude (Ed.) Oxford Classical Text, 3rd Edition 1927,
Oxford University Press.
Historical Statistics of Canada, 1965, M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley (Eds.).
Cambridge University Press.
Hsia, R., 1973. Technological Change in the Industrial Growth of Hong Kong, in:
B.R. Williams (Ed.), Science and Technology in Economic Growth. Mac-
millan, New York.
Hurter, A.P. and Rubinstein, A.H., 1978. Market Penetration by New Innova-
tions: The Technical Literature. Techno!. Forecasting and Soc. Change,
11:197-221.
IATA (International Air Transport Association), 1961 to 1988. World Air Trans-
port Statistics. lATA, Cointrin-Geneva.
IRF (International Road Federation), 1970 to 1986. World Road Statistics.
Geneva and Washington D.C.
Isard, W., 1942. A Neglected Cycle: The Transport Building Cycle. Rev. of Econ.
Stat., XXIV, 4:149-158.
Jackman, W.T., 1962. The Development of Transportation in Modern England.
Frank Cass & Co, London.
Janelle, D.G., 1969. Spatial Reorganization: A Model and Concept. Ann. Ass.
Am. Geogr., LIX, 2:348-364.
Jane's, 1984. Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1984-1985, J.W.R. Taylor (Ed.),
Jane's Publishing Co., London.
Jutila, S.T. and Jutila, J.M., 1986. Diffusion of Innovation in American Automo-
bile Industry. Paper prepared for The Advanced Summer Institute in
Regional Science, University of UmeA June 9-28, 1986. UmeA, Sweden.
Keith, C. and Grody, A., 1988. Electronic Automation at the New York Stock
Exchange, in: B.R. Guile and J.B. Quinn (Eds.), Managing Innovation,
Cases from the Services Industries. National Academy Press, Washington
D.C.
Kleinknecht, A., 1987a. Innovation Patterns in Crisis and Prosperity,
Schumpeter's Long Cycle Reconsidered. Macmillan Press, London.
Kleinknecht, A., 1987b. Are there Schumpeterian Waves of Innovations? WP-
87-076. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Kommunist, 2, January 1987. Moscow. pp. 125-126.
Kondratieff, N.D., 1926. Die langen Wellen in der Konjunktur. Archiv fur Sozi-
alwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 56 (1926) :573-609.
Kondratieff, N.D., 1928. Die Preisdynamik der industriellen und landwirtschaftli-
chen Waren. Archiv fUr Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 60 (1928):1-
85.
Kruglikov, A.G., 1985. Dynamics Modeling of Technological Innovations Diffu-
sion Processes. Paper presented at the Task Force Meeting on Dynamizing
Technology October 28-29, 1985. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
References 297
Laffut, M., 1983. Belgium, in: P. O'Brien (Ed.), Railways and the Economic
Development of Wp.stern Europe 1830-1914. Macmillan Press, London.
Lee, T.H., Linden, H.R., Dreyfus, D.A. and Vasko, T. (Eds.), 1988. The
Methane Age. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London.
Lees, L.H. and Hohenberg, P.M., 1988. How Cities Grew in the Western World:
A Systems Approach, in: J.H. Ausubel and R. Herman (Eds.), Cities and
their Vital Systems, Infrastructure Past, Present and Future. National
Academy Press, Washington, D.C.
Lepetit, B., 1983. Chemin te terre & voies d'eau, ftlSeaUX de transports et organi-
sation de l'espace en France 1740-1840. Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes
Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.
Lewytzkyj, B. (Ed.), 1979. The Soviet Union, Figures - Facts - Data. K.G. Sauer,
Miinchen, New York, London, Paris.
Linstone, H.A. and Sahal, D., 1976. Technological Substitution, Forecasting
Techniques and Applications. Elsevier, New York, Oxford, Amsterdam.
Lord, C.L. and Lord, E.H., 1953. Historical Atlas of the United States, 1953 Edi-
tion. Henry Holt & Co., New York.
Lotka, A., 1924. Elements of Physical Biology. Republished 1956 as: Elements of
Mathematical Biology, Dover Publications, New York.
Lufthansa, 1986. Start und Ziel: Berlin. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Public Rela-
tions Direktion, Koln.
Mahajan, V. and Peterson, R.A., 1979. Integrating Time and Space in Techno-
logical Substitution Models. TechnoI. Forecasting and Soc. Change,
14:231-241.
Mahajan, V. and Peterson, R.A., 1985. Models for Innovation Diffusion. Sage
Publications, Beverly Hills, London, New Dehli.
Mahajan, V. and Wind, Y., 1986. Innovation Diffusion Models of New Product
Acceptance. Ballinger, Cambridge, Mass.
Mahajan, V., Muller, E. and Bass, F.M., 1990. New Product Diffusion Models in
Marketing: A Review and Directions for Research. Journal of Marketing 54
(January 1990) (forthcoming).
Mandel, E., 1980. Long Waves of Capitalist Development, the Marxist Interpre-
tation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Mansfield, E., 1961. Technical Change and the Rate of Imitation. Econometrica,
VoI.29, No.4:741-766.
Mansfield, E., 1968a. Industrial Research and Technological Innovation, an
Econometric Analysis. W.W. Norton & Co., New York.
Mansfield, E., 1968b. The Economics of Technological Change. W.W. Norton &
Co., New York.
Mansfield, E., 1977. The Diffusion of Eight Major Industrial Innovations in the
United States, in: N.E. Terleckyj (Ed.), The State of Science and Research:
Some New Indicators. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.
Mansfield, E., 1984. Economic Effects of Research and Development, the Diffu-
sion Process, and Public Policy, in: R.A. Goodman and Julian Pavon
(Eds.), Planning for National Technology Policy. Praeger, New York.
298 The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Mansfield, E., Rapoport, J., Schnee, J., Wagner, S. and Hamburger, M., 1971.
Research and Innovation in the Modern Corporation. Macmillan, New
York.
Mansfield, E., Rapoport, J., Romeo, A., Villani, E., Wagner, S. and Husic, F.,
1977. The Production and Application of New Industrial Technology.
W.W. Norton & Co., New York.
Marchetti, C., 1975. On Strategies and Fate, in: W. Hafele, et al., Second Status
Report of the nASA Project on Energy Systems 1975. RR-76-1, nASA,
Laxenburg, Austria.
Marchetti, C., 1980. Society as a Learning System: Discovery, Invention, and
Innovation Cycles Revisited. Techno!. Forecasting and Soc. Change,
18:267-282.
Marchetti, C., 1983. The Automobile in a Systems Context, the Past 80 Years
and the Next 20 Years. Techno!. Forecasting and Soc. Change, 23:3-23.
Marchetti, C., 1987. Infrastructures for Movement. Techno!. Forecasting and
Soc. Change, 32:373-393.
Marchetti, C., Nakicenovic, N., Peterka, V. and Fleck, F., 1978. The Dynamics
of Energy Systems and the Logistic Substitution Model, Executive Sum-
mary. AR-78-1A, nASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Marchetti, C. and Nakicenovic, N., 1979. The Dynamics of Energy Systems and
the Logistic Substitution Mode!. RR-79-13, nASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Marshall, C.F.D. 1938. A History of British Railways Down to the Year 1830.
Oxford University Press, London.
Martino, J.P., 1983. Technological Forecasting for Decision Making. Elsevier,
New York.
Martino, J.P., Chen, K-L. and Lenz, R.C., 1978. Predicting the Diffusion Rate of
Industrial Innovations. UDRI-TR-78-42, University of Dayton Research
Institute, Dayton, Ohio.
MBB (Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm GmbH)' 1989. Forecast to Year 2008.
MBB Transport Aircraft Group, MBB, Hamburg.
Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J. and Behrens W.W., 1972. The
Limits to Growth. Universe Books, New York.
MeiBel, H., 1988. Private communication, Veterinary surgeon, Salzburg.
Mensch, G., 1975. Das technologische Patt, Innovationen iiberwinden die
Depression. Umschau Verlag, Frankfurt.
Metcalfe, J .S., 1970. Diffusion of Innovations in the Lancashire Textile Industry.
Manchester School, June 1970.
Metcalfe, J .S., 1983. Impulse and Diffusion in the Study of Technical Change, in:
C. Freeman (Ed.), Long Waves in the World Economy. Butterworths,
London.
Metzer, J., 1974. Railroads in Tsarist Russia: Direct Gains and Implications.
Explorations in Economic History, Vo!.43, No.3:529-550.
Mitchell, B.R., 1980. European Historical Statistics 1750 - 1975, Second Revised
Edition. Macmillan Press, London.
Mitchell, B.R., 1982. International Historical Statistics: Africa and Asia. Mac-
millan Press, London.
References 299
Mitchell, B.R. and Deane, P., 1971. Abstract of British Historical Statistics.
Cambridge University Press.
Modelski, G. and Perry, G., 1989. Democratization in Long Perspective, paper
presented at the conference: Diffusion of Technologies and Social
Behaviour, June 14-16 1989, nASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Montroll, E.W., 1978. Social Dynamics and the Quantifying of Social Forces.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, Vo1.75, No.1O:4633-4637.
Montroll, E.W. and Badger, W.W., 1974. Introduction to Quantitative Aspects
of Social Phenomena. Gordon and Breach, New York.
Morrill, R.L., 1968. Waves of Spatial Diffusion. J. Regional Sci., 8:1-18.
Morrill, R.L., 1970. The Spatial Organization of Society. Duxbury Press, Bel-
mont, California.
Morrill, R.L., Gaile, G.L. and Thrall, G.!., 1988. Spatial Diffusion. Sage Publica-
tions, Beverly Hills, London, New Dehli.
Mosekilde, E. and Rasmussen, S., 1986. Technical Economic Succession and the
Economic Long Wave. European Journal of Operational Research 25:27-38.
Mothes, F., 1950. Das Wachstum der Eisenbahnen. Zeitschrift fiir Okonometrie,
1:85-104.
Munby, D.L., 1978. Inland Transport Statistics Great Britain 1900-1970, Volume
I: Railways, Public Road Passenger Transport, London's Transport (edited
and completed by A.H. Watson). Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Murillo, J.A., 1988. Modern Bridge Construction and Engineering Services, in:
B.R. Guile and J.B. Quinn (Eds.), Managing Innovation, Cases from the
Services Industries. National Academy Press, 1988.
MVMA (Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States), 1983,
and 1985. World Motor Vehicle Data. MVMA, Detroit and Washington
D.C.
Myers, M.G., 1970. A Financial History of the United States. Columbia Univer-
sity Press, New York and London.
Nakicenovic, N., 1979. Software Package for the Logistic Substitution Model.
RR-79-12, nASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Nakicenovic, N., 1984. Growth to Limits, Long Waves and the Dynamics of
Technology. Dissertation an der Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen
Fakultat, Universitat Wien.
Nakicenovic, N., 1986. The Automobile Road to Technological Change, Diffusion
of the Automobile as a Process of Technological Substitution. Techno!.
Forecasting and Soc. Change, 29:309-340.
Nakicenovic, N., 1987. Dynamics of Change and Long Waves. Paper presented at
the international workshop: Cycles de vie et cycles long: technologie,
economie, societe, July, 8-10, Montpellier, France. Reprinted as WP-88-
074, June 1988, nASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Nakicenovic, N., 1988. Dynamics and Replacement of U.S. Transport Infrastruc-
tures, in: J.H. Ausubel and R. Herman (Eds.), Cities and their Vital Sys-
tems, Infrastructure Past, Present and Future. National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C.
300 The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR (Narod. Khoz.) 1922-1982, 1982. Finansi i Statis-
tika, Moscow.
Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR (Narod. Khoz.) 1986 and 1987. Finansi i Statis-
tika, Moscow.
Nasbeth, 1. and Ray, G.F. (Ed.), 1974. The Diffusion of New Industrial
Processes: An International Study. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
National Resources Committee of the US Congress, 1937. Technological Trends
and National Policy, Including the Social Implications of New Innovations,
report of the Subcommittee on Technology (W.F. Ogburn, Chairman) to
the National Resources Committee, 75th Congress, 1st Session, House
Document No. 360, US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C.
Nef, J., 1932. The Rise of the British Coal Industry. Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.,
London.
Nelson, R.R. and Winter, S., 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic
Change. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Oster, S., 1982. The Diffusion of Innovation Among Steel Firms: The Basic Oxy-
gen Furnace. Bell Journal of Economics, 13(1):45-56.
Osterreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt (OStZA), 1975, 1980, and 1987. Statis-
tisches Handbuch fur die Republik Osterreich. OStZA, Wien.
Pearl, R., 1925. The Biology of Population Growth. Knopf, New York.
Perez, C., 1983. Structural Change and the Assimilation of New Technologies in
the Economic and Social System. Futures, Vo1.15, No.4:357-375.
Peschel, M. and Mende, W., 1983, Leben wir in einer Volterra Welt? Akademie
Verlag, Berlin.
Peterka, V., 1977. Macrodynamics of Technological Change: Market Penetration
by New Technologies. RR-77-22, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Peterka, V. and Fleck, F., 1978. The Dynamics of Energy Systems and the Logis-
. tic Substitution Model, Volume 2: Theoretical Part. AR-78-1C, IIASA,
Laxenburg, Austria.
Pollard, S., 1988. Coal Mining 1750-1850, in: C.H. Feinstein and S. Pollard
(Eds.), Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom 1750-1920.
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Pollins, H., 1971. Britain's Railways: An Industrial History. David & Charles,
Newton Abbot.
Polk, R.L., 1987. Quoted in: M.C. Holcomb, S.D. Floyd and S.L. Cagle, 1987,
Transportation Energy Data Book: Edition 9. Oak Ridge National Labora-
tory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Poor, H.V., 1860. History of the Railroads and Canals of the Unites States of
America. John H. Schultz & Co, New York (reprinted by August M. Kelly
Publishers, New York, 1970).
Pred, A., 1967. Postscript to English translation of T. Hagerstrand, Innovation
Diffusion as a Spatial Process, pp. 299-324. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago and London.
die Presse, September 9, 1988. U-Bahn-Raketen fur den Reiseverkehr. ECO-
Journal p. 5.
References 301
Prigogine, I., 1976. Order Through Fluctuation: Self-organization and Social Sys-
tem, in: E. Jantsch and C.H. Waddington (Eds.), Evolution and Conscious-
ness. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass.
Pry, R.H., 1988. The Changing Nature of Industrial Management. Draft, IIASA,
Laxenburg, Austria, March 1988.
Putzger, F.W. (revised by: Lendl, E., Wagner, W. and Klein R.), 1965. Histor-
ischer Weltatlas zur allgemeinen und osterreichischen Geschichte, 44th edi-
tion. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, Osterreichischer Bundesverlag, Wien.
Reinganum, J.F., 1983. Technology Adoption Under Imperfect Information. Bell
Journal of Economics, 14(1):57-69.
Renouard, D., 1960. Les transports de marchandises par fer, route et eau depuis
1850. Librairie Armand Colin, Paris.
Robinson, J.P., Andreyenkov, V.G. and Patrushev, V.D., 1989. The Rhythm of
Everyday Life, How Soviet and American Citizens Use Time. Westview
Press, Boulder, Co., San Francisco, London.
Rogers, E., 1962. Diffusion of Innovations. The Free Press, New York.
Rogers, E. and Shoemaker, F., 1971. Communication of Innovations. The Free
Press, New York.
Rogers, E., 1983. Diffusion of Innovations, 3rd Edition. The Free Press, New
York.
Rogner, H-H., 1988. Technology and the Prospects for Natural Gas, Results of
Current Studies. Energy Policy (February 1988):9-26.
Romeo, A., 1977. The Rate of Imitation of a Capital-embodied Process Innova-
tion. Economica, Vo1.44, No.173:63-69.
Rosenberg, N., 1976. On Technological Expectations. Economic Journal, 86:523-
535.
Rosenberg, N. and Frischtak, C.R., 1983. Long Waves and Economic Growth: A
Critical Appraisal. American Economic Review 73(1983):146-151.
Rostow, W.W., 1952. The Process of Economic Growth. W.W. Norton, New
York, 2nd edition, 1960.
Rostow, W.W., 1975. Kondratieff, Schumpeter and Kuznets: Trend Periods
Revisited. Journ. of Econ. Hist., 35:719-753.
Rostow, W.W., 1980. Why the Poor Get Richer and the Rich Slow Down, Essays
in the Marshallian Long Period. Macmillan Press, London.
Roszak, J. and Schmidt, B., 1986. Als das Dampfrofi schnaufen lernte, die Eisen-
bahn in der Karikatur. Langen Miiller, Miinchen, Wien.
Russell, T., 1980. Comments on 'The Relationship Between Diffusion Curves,
Experience Curves, and Demand Elasticities for Consumer Durable Tech-
nological Innovations' (Bass, 1980). Journal of Business, 53:S69-S73.
Sahal, D., 1981. Patterns of Technological Innovation. Addison-Wesley, Reading,
Mass.
Samaras, D.G., 1962. Nuclear Space Propulsion - a Historic Necessity. Nuclear
Energy (September 1962):351-356.
Sammer, G., 1988. Private communication, Institut fUr Strafienbau und
Verkehrswesen, Technische Universitat Graz.
302 The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Sassin, W., 1981. The Coal Option, in: W. Hafele (Program Leader), 1981,
Energy in a Finite World, a Global Systems Analysis. Ballinger, Cam-
bridge, Mass.
Sax, E., 1920. Die Verkehrsmittel in Volks- und Staatswirtschaft, Volume 1 and
2. Second, revised Edition, Julius Springer Verlag, Berlin.
Schafer, E.H., 1971, Ancient China. Time-Life Books, Time Inc., New York.
Schipper, L., Barlett, S., Hawk, D. and Vine, E., 1989. Linking Life-styles and
Energy Use: A Matter of Time? Annual Review of Energy, 14:273-320.
Schmidt, E., 1983. Quoted in Marchetti, 1983.
Schumpeter, J.A., 1935, The Analysis of Economic Change. Review of Economic
Statistics, 17:2-10.
Schumpeter, J .A., 1939. Business Cycles, a Theoretical, Historical and Statistical
Analysis of the Capitalist Process, Volume I and II. McGraw-Hill, New
York.
Schumpeter, J.A., 1942. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 6th Edition,
1987, Unwin Paperbacks, London.
SETRA (Service d'Etudes Techniques des Routes et Autoroutes), 1988. Recense-
ment de la circulation sur les routes nationales et autoroutes 1986.
Ministere de l'Equipement, du Logement, de l'Amenagement du Territoire
et des Transport, Paris.
Sharif, M.N. and Kabir, C., 1976a. A Generalized Model for Forecasting Tech-
nological Substitution. Technol. Forecasting and Soc. Change, 8:353-334.
Sharif, M.N. and Kabir, C., 1976b. System Dynamics Modeling for Forecasting
Multilevel Technological Substitution. Technol. Forecasting and Soc.
Change, 9:89-112.
Sharif, M.N. and Haq, A., 1979. Determinants for Forecasting Technological
Substitution. Technol. Forecasting and Soc. Change, 13:59-81.
Sieferle, R.P., 1982. Der unterirdische Wald, Energiekrise und Industrielle Revo-
lution. C.H. Beck, Munchen.
Silvennoinen, P. and Vali.nanen, J., 1987. Forecasting Technological Substitu-
tion: The Logistic Model of Energy Systems Revisited. Technol. Forecast-
ing and Soc. Change, 32:273-280.
Silverberg, G., 1984. Embodied Technical Progress in a Dynamic Economic
Model, the Self-organizational Paradigm, in: R.M. Goodwin, M. Kruger
and A. Vercelli (Eds.), Nonlinear Models of Fluctuating Growth. Springer
Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York.
Silverberg, G., 1987. Technical Progress, Capital Accumulation, and Effective
Demand: A Self-organizational Model, in: D. Batten, J. Casti and B.
Johansson (Eds.), Economic Evolution and Structural Adjustment.
Springer Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York.
Silverberg, G., Dosi, G. and Orsenigo, L., 1988. Innovation, Diversity and Diffu-
sion: A Self-organisation Model. The Economic Journal 98 (December
1988):1032-1054.
Simon, H.A., 1988. Prediction and Prescription in System Modeling. Paper
presented at the conference: IIASA: Perspectives and Future, 14-15 June,
1988, Laxenburg. IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
References 303
Simon, P., 1975. Models of Process Diffusion and Entry in the U.S. Chemical
Industry. Ph.D. Diss. University of Pennsylvania.
Singer, C., Holmyard, E.J., Hall, A.R. and Williams, T.r. (Eds.), 1972. A His-
tory of Technology, Vol. II: The Mediterranean Civilizations and the Mid-
dle Ages c. 700 B.C. to c. A.D. 1500. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Singer, C., Holmyard, E.J., Hall, A.R. and Williams, T.r. (Eds.), 1975. A His-
tory of Technology, Vol. IV: The Industrial Revolution c 1750 to c 1850.
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Singer, C., Holmyard, E.J., Hall, A.R. and Williams, T.!. (Eds.), 1979. A His-
tory of Technology, Vol. III: From the Renaissance to the Industrial Revo-
lution c 1500 - c 1750. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Skiadas, C., 1986. Innovation Diffusion Models Expressing Asymmetry and/or
Positively or Negatively Influencing Factors. Technol. Forecasting and
Soc. Change, 30:313-330.
SNCF (Direction des Etudes de la Planification et de la Recherche Departement
Statistique), 1987. Trafic de marchandises, debit journalier moyen. SNCF,
Paris.
Snickars, F., 1987. The Transportation Sector in the Communications Society -
Some Analytical Observations, in: P. Nijkamp and S. Reichmann (Eds.),
Transportation Planning in a Changing World. Gower, Aldershot,
Hampshire.
Sombart, W., 1916. Der moderne Kapitalismus, historisch-systematische Darstel-
lung des gesamteuropaischen Wirtschaftslebens von seinen Anfangen bis
zur Gegenwart, Volumes I to III, 2nd Edition. Dunker & Humblot,
Miinchen und Leipzig (dtv reprint May 1987, DTV, Miinchen).
Sonis, M., 1984. Dynamic Choice of Alternatives, Innovation Diffusion, and Eco-
logical Dynamics of the Lotka-Volterra Model, in: D.E. Pitfield (Ed.),
Discrete Choice Models in Regional Science. London Papers in Regional
Science Vol. 14. Pion Ltd., London.
Sonis, M., 1986. A Unified Theory of Innovation Diffusion, Dynamic Choice of
Alternatives, Ecological Dynamics and Urban/regional Growth and
Decline. Richerche Economiche, XL, 4:696-723.
Statistisches Bundesamt (Stat. BA.), 1979. Fachserie 7, Abschnitt 3: Gen-
eralhandel. Stat. BA., Wiesbaden.
Statistisches Bundesamt (Stat. BA.), 1987. Statistisches Jahrbuch 1987 fiir die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, Mainz.
Statistisches Bundesamt (Stat. BA.), WiSta 7/1987, 1987. Einfuhr nach Gren-
zabschnitten und Verkehrszweigen 1986. Stat. BA., Wiesbaden.
Steinbach, J., 1980. Theoretische und methodische Grundlagen fiir ein Modell
des sozialbestimmten raumlichen Verhaltens. Wiener Beitrage zur
Regionalwissenschaft Band 3, Institut fiir Stadt- und Regionalforschung,
Technische Universitat Wien.
Stigliani, W.M., 1990. Private communication, International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.
Stiirmer, G., 1872. Das Wachstum der Eisenbahnen, Entwicklung und jetzige
Gestaltung samtlicher Eisenbahnnetze der Erde. Mittler'sche
Buchhandlung, Bromberg.
304 The Rise and Fall of Infrastructures
Szalai, A., 1972. The Use of Time, Daily Activities of Urban and Suburban
Populations in Twelve Countries. Mouton, The Hague and Paris.
Tani, A., 1988. Penetration Mechanism of New Technologies: Integration For-
mulation from the Company Level to the Macroeconomic Level. WP-88-42,
IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria.
Tarde, G., 1895, Les lois de l'imitation, etude sociologique, seconde edition.
Germer Bailliere et Cie., Paris
Teisserenc, 1845. Statistique des voies de communication en France. Paris, 1845
(data reproduced in Toutain, 1967).
Taylor, G.R., 1962. The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860, Vol. IV of The
Economic History of the United States. Hold, Rinehart and Winston. New
York.
Thompson, F.M.L., 1976. Nineteenth-century Horse Sense. Econ. Hist. Rev.
29:67-72.
Tomer, A., 1980. The Third Wave. Morrow, New York.
Toutain, J.C., 1967. Les transports en France de 1830 a. 1965. Cahiers de l'ISEA,
Serie Histoire Quantitative de l'Economie Francaise No.8, Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, Paris.
Toutain, J .C., 1987. Le produit interieur brut de la France de 1789 a 1982.
Cahiers de l'ISMEA, Serie Histoire Quantitative de l'Economie Francaise
No. 15, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, France.
UN, 1977. U.N. Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 1977, Volume 1: General Indus-
trial Statistics. UN, New York.
UN, 1987. U.N. Industrial Statistics Yearbook 1987, Volume 1: General Indus-
trial Statistics. UN, New York.
Urquhart, M.C., 1986. New Estimates of Gross National Product, Canada 1870-
1926: Some Implications for Canadian Development, in: S. Engerman and
R. Gallman (Eds.), Long-term Factors in American Economic Growth.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
US DOC (U.S. Department of Commerce), 1975. Historical Statistics of the
United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Volume 1 and 2. Bureau of the
Census, Washington D.C.
US DOC (U.S. Department of Commerce), 1976 to 1989. Statistical Abstract of
the United States 1976 to 1989, 97th to 109th Editions. Bureau of the
Census, Washington D.C.
Van Gelderen (J. Fedder pseudonym), 1913. Springvloed: Beschouwingen over
industrieele ontwikkeling en prijsbeweging. De Nieuwe Tijd 18.
Vasko, T. (Ed.), 1987. The Long-wave Debate. Springer Verlag, Berlin, Heidel-
berg.
Verhulst, P.-F., 1838. Notice sur la loi que la population suit dans son accroisse-
ment. Correspondence Mathematique et Physique 10: 113-121.
Verkehr in Zahlen, 1975, 1978, and 1987. Der Bundesminister fiir Verkehr (Ed.),
Bonn.
Victor, D.G., 1989. Liquid Hydrogen Aircraft and the Greenhouse Effect. Work-
ing Paper, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria (forthcoming).
References 305
Virilio, P., 1977. Vitesse et politique, essai de dromologie. Ed. Galilee, Paris.
Virilio, P., 1978. Fahren, fahren, fahren ... Merve Verlag, Berlin.
Vivier, M., 1978. Transport des personnes et des marchandises. Paper presented
at the conference: Role de I'Energie Nucleaire dans Ie Cadre d'un Plan
Energetique National. AIEA, Vienna, Austria and L'Institut National des
Sciences et Techniques Nucleaires, Gif-sur-Yvette, France.
Voigt, F., 1965. Verkehr. Dunker & Humblot, Berlin.
Volterra, V., 1927. Una teoria matematica sulla lotta per l'esistenza. Scientia,
Vol. XLI.
Volterra, V., 1931. Lecons sur la theorie mathematique de la lutte pour la vie
(redigees par M. Brelot). Paris.
Voss, H., 1947. Die Entwicklung der Kraftfahrzeugstrassen in Deutschland.
Dissertation an der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultat der
Universitat Koln.
Ward, W.H., 1967. The Sailing Ship Effect. Bull. Inst. Phys. & Phys. Soc.
18:169.
Wienecke, C., 1956. Entwicklungskritische Betrachtung des deutschen
StraBenwesens in den Jahren 1871-1945. Forschungsarbeiten aus dem
StraBenwesen, Neue Folge - Heft 28, Kirschbaum Verlag, Bielefeld.
Williams, R.H., Larson, E.D. and Ross, M.H., 1987. Materials, Affluence, and
Industrial Energy Use. Annual Review of Energy, 12:99-144.
Woytinsky, 1927. Die Welt in Zahlen, funftes Buch: Handel und Verkehr.
Rudolf Mosse Buchverlag, Berlin.
Zahavi, Y., 1979. The MUMOr Project. Report DOT-RSPA-DPB-2D-79-3,
prepared for U.S. Department of Transportation and Ministry of Trans-
port, FRG. NTIS, Springfield, Va.
Zahavi, Y., 1981. The UMOT-urban Interactions. DOT-RSPA-DPB 10/7, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.
Zipf, G.K., 1949. Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort. Hafner
Publishing Co., New York, 1972 (reprint of 1949 edition).
Zuzanek, J., 1980. Work and Leisure in the Soviet Union, a Time-budget
Analysis, Praeger, New York.



